diff options
author | Curl Upstream <curl-library@cool.haxx.se> | 2014-09-10 06:07:58 (GMT) |
---|---|---|
committer | Brad King <brad.king@kitware.com> | 2014-10-08 19:53:25 (GMT) |
commit | 3fe5d9bff98b4716e219516c30d71462495324f4 (patch) | |
tree | cd369c3f671882cefde2f68a1ac8146f97c6bc84 /lib/hostcheck.c | |
parent | f086cb372e41035260fcd9b4ed3d2cfb272f138f (diff) | |
download | CMake-3fe5d9bff98b4716e219516c30d71462495324f4.zip CMake-3fe5d9bff98b4716e219516c30d71462495324f4.tar.gz CMake-3fe5d9bff98b4716e219516c30d71462495324f4.tar.bz2 |
curl 7.38.0 (reduced)
Extract upstream curl using the following shell code.
url=git://github.com/bagder/curl.git &&
v=7.38.0 &&
r=202aa9f7 &&
paths="
CMake/*
CMakeLists.txt
COPYING
include/curl/*.h
include/curl/curlbuild.h.cmake
lib/*.c
lib/*.h
lib/CMakeLists.txt
lib/Makefile.inc
lib/curl_config.h.cmake
lib/libcurl.rc
lib/vtls/*.c
lib/vtls/*.h
" &&
mkdir curl-$v-g$r-reduced &&
git clone $url curl-git &&
date=$(cd curl-git && git log -n 1 --format='%cd' $r) &&
(cd curl-git && git checkout $r &&
git archive --format=tar $r -- $paths) |
(cd curl-$v-g$r-reduced && tar xv &&
rm lib/config-*.h) &&
echo "g$r date: $date"
Diffstat (limited to 'lib/hostcheck.c')
-rw-r--r-- | lib/hostcheck.c | 148 |
1 files changed, 148 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/lib/hostcheck.c b/lib/hostcheck.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..42eb2ee --- /dev/null +++ b/lib/hostcheck.c @@ -0,0 +1,148 @@ +/*************************************************************************** + * _ _ ____ _ + * Project ___| | | | _ \| | + * / __| | | | |_) | | + * | (__| |_| | _ <| |___ + * \___|\___/|_| \_\_____| + * + * Copyright (C) 1998 - 2014, Daniel Stenberg, <daniel@haxx.se>, et al. + * + * This software is licensed as described in the file COPYING, which + * you should have received as part of this distribution. The terms + * are also available at http://curl.haxx.se/docs/copyright.html. + * + * You may opt to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute and/or sell + * copies of the Software, and permit persons to whom the Software is + * furnished to do so, under the terms of the COPYING file. + * + * This software is distributed on an "AS IS" basis, WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY + * KIND, either express or implied. + * + ***************************************************************************/ + +#include "curl_setup.h" + +#if defined(USE_SSLEAY) || defined(USE_AXTLS) || defined(USE_QSOSSL) || \ + defined(USE_GSKIT) +/* these backends use functions from this file */ + +#ifdef HAVE_NETINET_IN_H +#include <netinet/in.h> +#endif + +#include "hostcheck.h" +#include "rawstr.h" +#include "inet_pton.h" + +#include "curl_memory.h" +/* The last #include file should be: */ +#include "memdebug.h" + +/* + * Match a hostname against a wildcard pattern. + * E.g. + * "foo.host.com" matches "*.host.com". + * + * We use the matching rule described in RFC6125, section 6.4.3. + * http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6125#section-6.4.3 + * + * In addition: ignore trailing dots in the host names and wildcards, so that + * the names are used normalized. This is what the browsers do. + * + * Do not allow wildcard matching on IP numbers. There are apparently + * certificates being used with an IP address in the CN field, thus making no + * apparent distinction between a name and an IP. We need to detect the use of + * an IP address and not wildcard match on such names. + * + * NOTE: hostmatch() gets called with copied buffers so that it can modify the + * contents at will. + */ + +static int hostmatch(char *hostname, char *pattern) +{ + const char *pattern_label_end, *pattern_wildcard, *hostname_label_end; + int wildcard_enabled; + size_t prefixlen, suffixlen; + struct in_addr ignored; +#ifdef ENABLE_IPV6 + struct sockaddr_in6 si6; +#endif + + /* normalize pattern and hostname by stripping off trailing dots */ + size_t len = strlen(hostname); + if(hostname[len-1]=='.') + hostname[len-1]=0; + len = strlen(pattern); + if(pattern[len-1]=='.') + pattern[len-1]=0; + + pattern_wildcard = strchr(pattern, '*'); + if(pattern_wildcard == NULL) + return Curl_raw_equal(pattern, hostname) ? + CURL_HOST_MATCH : CURL_HOST_NOMATCH; + + /* detect IP address as hostname and fail the match if so */ + if(Curl_inet_pton(AF_INET, hostname, &ignored) > 0) + return CURL_HOST_NOMATCH; +#ifdef ENABLE_IPV6 + else if(Curl_inet_pton(AF_INET6, hostname, &si6.sin6_addr) > 0) + return CURL_HOST_NOMATCH; +#endif + + /* We require at least 2 dots in pattern to avoid too wide wildcard + match. */ + wildcard_enabled = 1; + pattern_label_end = strchr(pattern, '.'); + if(pattern_label_end == NULL || strchr(pattern_label_end+1, '.') == NULL || + pattern_wildcard > pattern_label_end || + Curl_raw_nequal(pattern, "xn--", 4)) { + wildcard_enabled = 0; + } + if(!wildcard_enabled) + return Curl_raw_equal(pattern, hostname) ? + CURL_HOST_MATCH : CURL_HOST_NOMATCH; + + hostname_label_end = strchr(hostname, '.'); + if(hostname_label_end == NULL || + !Curl_raw_equal(pattern_label_end, hostname_label_end)) + return CURL_HOST_NOMATCH; + + /* The wildcard must match at least one character, so the left-most + label of the hostname is at least as large as the left-most label + of the pattern. */ + if(hostname_label_end - hostname < pattern_label_end - pattern) + return CURL_HOST_NOMATCH; + + prefixlen = pattern_wildcard - pattern; + suffixlen = pattern_label_end - (pattern_wildcard+1); + return Curl_raw_nequal(pattern, hostname, prefixlen) && + Curl_raw_nequal(pattern_wildcard+1, hostname_label_end - suffixlen, + suffixlen) ? + CURL_HOST_MATCH : CURL_HOST_NOMATCH; +} + +int Curl_cert_hostcheck(const char *match_pattern, const char *hostname) +{ + char *matchp; + char *hostp; + int res = 0; + if(!match_pattern || !*match_pattern || + !hostname || !*hostname) /* sanity check */ + ; + else { + matchp = strdup(match_pattern); + if(matchp) { + hostp = strdup(hostname); + if(hostp) { + if(hostmatch(hostp, matchp) == CURL_HOST_MATCH) + res= 1; + free(hostp); + } + free(matchp); + } + } + + return res; +} + +#endif /* SSLEAY or AXTLS or QSOSSL or GSKIT */ |