diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'Utilities/cmcurl/lib/vtls/openssl.c')
-rw-r--r-- | Utilities/cmcurl/lib/vtls/openssl.c | 3660 |
1 files changed, 3660 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/Utilities/cmcurl/lib/vtls/openssl.c b/Utilities/cmcurl/lib/vtls/openssl.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..93faa6f --- /dev/null +++ b/Utilities/cmcurl/lib/vtls/openssl.c @@ -0,0 +1,3660 @@ +/*************************************************************************** + * _ _ ____ _ + * Project ___| | | | _ \| | + * / __| | | | |_) | | + * | (__| |_| | _ <| |___ + * \___|\___/|_| \_\_____| + * + * Copyright (C) 1998 - 2018, Daniel Stenberg, <daniel@haxx.se>, et al. + * + * This software is licensed as described in the file COPYING, which + * you should have received as part of this distribution. The terms + * are also available at https://curl.haxx.se/docs/copyright.html. + * + * You may opt to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute and/or sell + * copies of the Software, and permit persons to whom the Software is + * furnished to do so, under the terms of the COPYING file. + * + * This software is distributed on an "AS IS" basis, WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY + * KIND, either express or implied. + * + ***************************************************************************/ + +/* + * Source file for all OpenSSL-specific code for the TLS/SSL layer. No code + * but vtls.c should ever call or use these functions. + */ + +/* + * The original SSLeay-using code for curl was written by Linas Vepstas and + * Sampo Kellomaki 1998. + */ + +#include "curl_setup.h" + +#ifdef USE_OPENSSL + +#include <limits.h> + +#include "urldata.h" +#include "sendf.h" +#include "formdata.h" /* for the boundary function */ +#include "url.h" /* for the ssl config check function */ +#include "inet_pton.h" +#include "openssl.h" +#include "connect.h" +#include "slist.h" +#include "select.h" +#include "vtls.h" +#include "strcase.h" +#include "hostcheck.h" +#include "curl_printf.h" +#include <openssl/ssl.h> +#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL_ENGINE_H +#include <openssl/engine.h> +#endif +#include <openssl/rand.h> +#include <openssl/x509v3.h> +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA +#include <openssl/dsa.h> +#endif +#include <openssl/dh.h> +#include <openssl/err.h> +#include <openssl/md5.h> +#include <openssl/conf.h> +#include <openssl/bn.h> +#include <openssl/rsa.h> +#include <openssl/bio.h> +#include <openssl/buffer.h> +#include <openssl/pkcs12.h> + +#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x0090808fL) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_OCSP) +#include <openssl/ocsp.h> +#endif + +#include "warnless.h" +#include "non-ascii.h" /* for Curl_convert_from_utf8 prototype */ + +/* The last #include files should be: */ +#include "curl_memory.h" +#include "memdebug.h" + +#ifndef OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER +#error "OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER not defined" +#endif + +#if defined(HAVE_OPENSSL_ENGINE_H) +#include <openssl/ui.h> +#endif + +#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00909000L +#define SSL_METHOD_QUAL const +#else +#define SSL_METHOD_QUAL +#endif + +#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10000000L) +#define HAVE_ERR_REMOVE_THREAD_STATE 1 +#endif + +#if !defined(HAVE_SSLV2_CLIENT_METHOD) || \ + OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L /* 1.1.0+ has no SSLv2 */ +#undef OPENSSL_NO_SSL2 /* undef first to avoid compiler warnings */ +#define OPENSSL_NO_SSL2 +#endif + +#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L) && /* OpenSSL 1.1.0+ */ \ + !defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER) +#define SSLEAY_VERSION_NUMBER OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER +#define HAVE_X509_GET0_EXTENSIONS 1 /* added in 1.1.0 -pre1 */ +#define HAVE_OPAQUE_EVP_PKEY 1 /* since 1.1.0 -pre3 */ +#define HAVE_OPAQUE_RSA_DSA_DH 1 /* since 1.1.0 -pre5 */ +#define CONST_EXTS const +#define HAVE_ERR_REMOVE_THREAD_STATE_DEPRECATED 1 +#else +/* For OpenSSL before 1.1.0 */ +#define ASN1_STRING_get0_data(x) ASN1_STRING_data(x) +#define X509_get0_notBefore(x) X509_get_notBefore(x) +#define X509_get0_notAfter(x) X509_get_notAfter(x) +#define CONST_EXTS /* nope */ +#ifdef LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER +static unsigned long OpenSSL_version_num(void) +{ + return LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER; +} +#else +#define OpenSSL_version_num() SSLeay() +#endif +#endif + +#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x1000200fL) && /* 1.0.2 or later */ \ + !defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER) +#define HAVE_X509_GET0_SIGNATURE 1 +#endif + +#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10002003L && \ + OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER <= 0x10002FFFL && \ + !defined(OPENSSL_NO_COMP) +#define HAVE_SSL_COMP_FREE_COMPRESSION_METHODS 1 +#endif + +#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x0090808fL) +/* not present in older OpenSSL */ +#define OPENSSL_load_builtin_modules(x) +#endif + +/* + * Whether SSL_CTX_set_keylog_callback is available. + * OpenSSL: supported since 1.1.1 https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2287 + * BoringSSL: supported since d28f59c27bac (committed 2015-11-19) + * LibreSSL: unsupported in at least 2.5.1 (explicitly check for it since it + * lies and pretends to be OpenSSL 2.0.0). + */ +#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10101000L && \ + !defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER)) || \ + defined(OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL) +#define HAVE_KEYLOG_CALLBACK +#endif + +#if defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER) +#define OSSL_PACKAGE "LibreSSL" +#elif defined(OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL) +#define OSSL_PACKAGE "BoringSSL" +#else +#define OSSL_PACKAGE "OpenSSL" +#endif + +#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L) +/* up2date versions of OpenSSL maintain the default reasonably secure without + * breaking compatibility, so it is better not to override the default by curl + */ +#define DEFAULT_CIPHER_SELECTION NULL +#else +/* ... but it is not the case with old versions of OpenSSL */ +#define DEFAULT_CIPHER_SELECTION \ + "ALL:!EXPORT:!EXPORT40:!EXPORT56:!aNULL:!LOW:!RC4:@STRENGTH" +#endif + +#define ENABLE_SSLKEYLOGFILE + +#ifdef ENABLE_SSLKEYLOGFILE +typedef struct ssl_tap_state { + int master_key_length; + unsigned char master_key[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH]; + unsigned char client_random[SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE]; +} ssl_tap_state_t; +#endif /* ENABLE_SSLKEYLOGFILE */ + +struct ssl_backend_data { + /* these ones requires specific SSL-types */ + SSL_CTX* ctx; + SSL* handle; + X509* server_cert; +#ifdef ENABLE_SSLKEYLOGFILE + /* tap_state holds the last seen master key if we're logging them */ + ssl_tap_state_t tap_state; +#endif +}; + +#define BACKEND connssl->backend + +/* + * Number of bytes to read from the random number seed file. This must be + * a finite value (because some entropy "files" like /dev/urandom have + * an infinite length), but must be large enough to provide enough + * entropy to properly seed OpenSSL's PRNG. + */ +#define RAND_LOAD_LENGTH 1024 + +#ifdef ENABLE_SSLKEYLOGFILE +/* The fp for the open SSLKEYLOGFILE, or NULL if not open */ +static FILE *keylog_file_fp; + +#ifdef HAVE_KEYLOG_CALLBACK +static void ossl_keylog_callback(const SSL *ssl, const char *line) +{ + (void)ssl; + + /* Using fputs here instead of fprintf since libcurl's fprintf replacement + may not be thread-safe. */ + if(keylog_file_fp && line && *line) { + char stackbuf[256]; + char *buf; + size_t linelen = strlen(line); + + if(linelen <= sizeof(stackbuf) - 2) + buf = stackbuf; + else { + buf = malloc(linelen + 2); + if(!buf) + return; + } + strncpy(buf, line, linelen); + buf[linelen] = '\n'; + buf[linelen + 1] = '\0'; + + fputs(buf, keylog_file_fp); + if(buf != stackbuf) + free(buf); + } +} +#else +#define KEYLOG_PREFIX "CLIENT_RANDOM " +#define KEYLOG_PREFIX_LEN (sizeof(KEYLOG_PREFIX) - 1) +/* + * tap_ssl_key is called by libcurl to make the CLIENT_RANDOMs if the OpenSSL + * being used doesn't have native support for doing that. + */ +static void tap_ssl_key(const SSL *ssl, ssl_tap_state_t *state) +{ + const char *hex = "0123456789ABCDEF"; + int pos, i; + char line[KEYLOG_PREFIX_LEN + 2 * SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + 1 + + 2 * SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH + 1 + 1]; + const SSL_SESSION *session = SSL_get_session(ssl); + unsigned char client_random[SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE]; + unsigned char master_key[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH]; + int master_key_length = 0; + + if(!session || !keylog_file_fp) + return; + +#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L && !defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER) + /* ssl->s3 is not checked in openssl 1.1.0-pre6, but let's assume that + * we have a valid SSL context if we have a non-NULL session. */ + SSL_get_client_random(ssl, client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); + master_key_length = (int) + SSL_SESSION_get_master_key(session, master_key, SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH); +#else + if(ssl->s3 && session->master_key_length > 0) { + master_key_length = session->master_key_length; + memcpy(master_key, session->master_key, session->master_key_length); + memcpy(client_random, ssl->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); + } +#endif + + if(master_key_length <= 0) + return; + + /* Skip writing keys if there is no key or it did not change. */ + if(state->master_key_length == master_key_length && + !memcmp(state->master_key, master_key, master_key_length) && + !memcmp(state->client_random, client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) { + return; + } + + state->master_key_length = master_key_length; + memcpy(state->master_key, master_key, master_key_length); + memcpy(state->client_random, client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); + + memcpy(line, KEYLOG_PREFIX, KEYLOG_PREFIX_LEN); + pos = KEYLOG_PREFIX_LEN; + + /* Client Random for SSLv3/TLS */ + for(i = 0; i < SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; i++) { + line[pos++] = hex[client_random[i] >> 4]; + line[pos++] = hex[client_random[i] & 0xF]; + } + line[pos++] = ' '; + + /* Master Secret (size is at most SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) */ + for(i = 0; i < master_key_length; i++) { + line[pos++] = hex[master_key[i] >> 4]; + line[pos++] = hex[master_key[i] & 0xF]; + } + line[pos++] = '\n'; + line[pos] = '\0'; + + /* Using fputs here instead of fprintf since libcurl's fprintf replacement + may not be thread-safe. */ + fputs(line, keylog_file_fp); +} +#endif /* !HAVE_KEYLOG_CALLBACK */ +#endif /* ENABLE_SSLKEYLOGFILE */ + +static const char *SSL_ERROR_to_str(int err) +{ + switch(err) { + case SSL_ERROR_NONE: + return "SSL_ERROR_NONE"; + case SSL_ERROR_SSL: + return "SSL_ERROR_SSL"; + case SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ: + return "SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ"; + case SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE: + return "SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE"; + case SSL_ERROR_WANT_X509_LOOKUP: + return "SSL_ERROR_WANT_X509_LOOKUP"; + case SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL: + return "SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL"; + case SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN: + return "SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN"; + case SSL_ERROR_WANT_CONNECT: + return "SSL_ERROR_WANT_CONNECT"; + case SSL_ERROR_WANT_ACCEPT: + return "SSL_ERROR_WANT_ACCEPT"; +#if defined(SSL_ERROR_WANT_ASYNC) + case SSL_ERROR_WANT_ASYNC: + return "SSL_ERROR_WANT_ASYNC"; +#endif +#if defined(SSL_ERROR_WANT_ASYNC_JOB) + case SSL_ERROR_WANT_ASYNC_JOB: + return "SSL_ERROR_WANT_ASYNC_JOB"; +#endif +#if defined(SSL_ERROR_WANT_EARLY) + case SSL_ERROR_WANT_EARLY: + return "SSL_ERROR_WANT_EARLY"; +#endif + default: + return "SSL_ERROR unknown"; + } +} + +/* Return error string for last OpenSSL error + */ +static char *ossl_strerror(unsigned long error, char *buf, size_t size) +{ + ERR_error_string_n(error, buf, size); + return buf; +} + +static int passwd_callback(char *buf, int num, int encrypting, + void *global_passwd) +{ + DEBUGASSERT(0 == encrypting); + + if(!encrypting) { + int klen = curlx_uztosi(strlen((char *)global_passwd)); + if(num > klen) { + memcpy(buf, global_passwd, klen + 1); + return klen; + } + } + return 0; +} + +/* + * rand_enough() returns TRUE if we have seeded the random engine properly. + */ +static bool rand_enough(void) +{ + return (0 != RAND_status()) ? TRUE : FALSE; +} + +static CURLcode Curl_ossl_seed(struct Curl_easy *data) +{ + /* we have the "SSL is seeded" boolean static to prevent multiple + time-consuming seedings in vain */ + static bool ssl_seeded = FALSE; + char fname[256]; + + if(ssl_seeded) + return CURLE_OK; + + if(rand_enough()) { + /* OpenSSL 1.1.0+ will return here */ + ssl_seeded = TRUE; + return CURLE_OK; + } + +#ifndef RANDOM_FILE + /* if RANDOM_FILE isn't defined, we only perform this if an option tells + us to! */ + if(data->set.str[STRING_SSL_RANDOM_FILE]) +#define RANDOM_FILE "" /* doesn't matter won't be used */ +#endif + { + /* let the option override the define */ + RAND_load_file((data->set.str[STRING_SSL_RANDOM_FILE]? + data->set.str[STRING_SSL_RANDOM_FILE]: + RANDOM_FILE), + RAND_LOAD_LENGTH); + if(rand_enough()) + return CURLE_OK; + } + +#if defined(HAVE_RAND_EGD) + /* only available in OpenSSL 0.9.5 and later */ + /* EGD_SOCKET is set at configure time or not at all */ +#ifndef EGD_SOCKET + /* If we don't have the define set, we only do this if the egd-option + is set */ + if(data->set.str[STRING_SSL_EGDSOCKET]) +#define EGD_SOCKET "" /* doesn't matter won't be used */ +#endif + { + /* If there's an option and a define, the option overrides the + define */ + int ret = RAND_egd(data->set.str[STRING_SSL_EGDSOCKET]? + data->set.str[STRING_SSL_EGDSOCKET]:EGD_SOCKET); + if(-1 != ret) { + if(rand_enough()) + return CURLE_OK; + } + } +#endif + + /* fallback to a custom seeding of the PRNG using a hash based on a current + time */ + do { + unsigned char randb[64]; + size_t len = sizeof(randb); + size_t i, i_max; + for(i = 0, i_max = len / sizeof(struct curltime); i < i_max; ++i) { + struct curltime tv = Curl_now(); + Curl_wait_ms(1); + tv.tv_sec *= i + 1; + tv.tv_usec *= (unsigned int)i + 2; + tv.tv_sec ^= ((Curl_now().tv_sec + Curl_now().tv_usec) * + (i + 3)) << 8; + tv.tv_usec ^= (unsigned int) ((Curl_now().tv_sec + + Curl_now().tv_usec) * + (i + 4)) << 16; + memcpy(&randb[i * sizeof(struct curltime)], &tv, + sizeof(struct curltime)); + } + RAND_add(randb, (int)len, (double)len/2); + } while(!rand_enough()); + + /* generates a default path for the random seed file */ + fname[0] = 0; /* blank it first */ + RAND_file_name(fname, sizeof(fname)); + if(fname[0]) { + /* we got a file name to try */ + RAND_load_file(fname, RAND_LOAD_LENGTH); + if(rand_enough()) + return CURLE_OK; + } + + infof(data, "libcurl is now using a weak random seed!\n"); + return (rand_enough() ? CURLE_OK : + CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR /* confusing error code */); +} + +#ifndef SSL_FILETYPE_ENGINE +#define SSL_FILETYPE_ENGINE 42 +#endif +#ifndef SSL_FILETYPE_PKCS12 +#define SSL_FILETYPE_PKCS12 43 +#endif +static int do_file_type(const char *type) +{ + if(!type || !type[0]) + return SSL_FILETYPE_PEM; + if(strcasecompare(type, "PEM")) + return SSL_FILETYPE_PEM; + if(strcasecompare(type, "DER")) + return SSL_FILETYPE_ASN1; + if(strcasecompare(type, "ENG")) + return SSL_FILETYPE_ENGINE; + if(strcasecompare(type, "P12")) + return SSL_FILETYPE_PKCS12; + return -1; +} + +#if defined(HAVE_OPENSSL_ENGINE_H) +/* + * Supply default password to the engine user interface conversation. + * The password is passed by OpenSSL engine from ENGINE_load_private_key() + * last argument to the ui and can be obtained by UI_get0_user_data(ui) here. + */ +static int ssl_ui_reader(UI *ui, UI_STRING *uis) +{ + const char *password; + switch(UI_get_string_type(uis)) { + case UIT_PROMPT: + case UIT_VERIFY: + password = (const char *)UI_get0_user_data(ui); + if(password && (UI_get_input_flags(uis) & UI_INPUT_FLAG_DEFAULT_PWD)) { + UI_set_result(ui, uis, password); + return 1; + } + default: + break; + } + return (UI_method_get_reader(UI_OpenSSL()))(ui, uis); +} + +/* + * Suppress interactive request for a default password if available. + */ +static int ssl_ui_writer(UI *ui, UI_STRING *uis) +{ + switch(UI_get_string_type(uis)) { + case UIT_PROMPT: + case UIT_VERIFY: + if(UI_get0_user_data(ui) && + (UI_get_input_flags(uis) & UI_INPUT_FLAG_DEFAULT_PWD)) { + return 1; + } + default: + break; + } + return (UI_method_get_writer(UI_OpenSSL()))(ui, uis); +} +#endif + +static +int cert_stuff(struct connectdata *conn, + SSL_CTX* ctx, + char *cert_file, + const char *cert_type, + char *key_file, + const char *key_type, + char *key_passwd) +{ + struct Curl_easy *data = conn->data; + char error_buffer[256]; + bool check_privkey = TRUE; + + int file_type = do_file_type(cert_type); + + if(cert_file || (file_type == SSL_FILETYPE_ENGINE)) { + SSL *ssl; + X509 *x509; + int cert_done = 0; + + if(key_passwd) { + /* set the password in the callback userdata */ + SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb_userdata(ctx, key_passwd); + /* Set passwd callback: */ + SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb(ctx, passwd_callback); + } + + + switch(file_type) { + case SSL_FILETYPE_PEM: + /* SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file() only works on PEM files */ + if(SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file(ctx, + cert_file) != 1) { + failf(data, + "could not load PEM client certificate, " OSSL_PACKAGE + " error %s, " + "(no key found, wrong pass phrase, or wrong file format?)", + ossl_strerror(ERR_get_error(), error_buffer, + sizeof(error_buffer)) ); + return 0; + } + break; + + case SSL_FILETYPE_ASN1: + /* SSL_CTX_use_certificate_file() works with either PEM or ASN1, but + we use the case above for PEM so this can only be performed with + ASN1 files. */ + if(SSL_CTX_use_certificate_file(ctx, + cert_file, + file_type) != 1) { + failf(data, + "could not load ASN1 client certificate, " OSSL_PACKAGE + " error %s, " + "(no key found, wrong pass phrase, or wrong file format?)", + ossl_strerror(ERR_get_error(), error_buffer, + sizeof(error_buffer)) ); + return 0; + } + break; + case SSL_FILETYPE_ENGINE: +#if defined(HAVE_OPENSSL_ENGINE_H) && defined(ENGINE_CTRL_GET_CMD_FROM_NAME) + { + if(data->state.engine) { + const char *cmd_name = "LOAD_CERT_CTRL"; + struct { + const char *cert_id; + X509 *cert; + } params; + + params.cert_id = cert_file; + params.cert = NULL; + + /* Does the engine supports LOAD_CERT_CTRL ? */ + if(!ENGINE_ctrl(data->state.engine, ENGINE_CTRL_GET_CMD_FROM_NAME, + 0, (void *)cmd_name, NULL)) { + failf(data, "ssl engine does not support loading certificates"); + return 0; + } + + /* Load the certificate from the engine */ + if(!ENGINE_ctrl_cmd(data->state.engine, cmd_name, + 0, ¶ms, NULL, 1)) { + failf(data, "ssl engine cannot load client cert with id" + " '%s' [%s]", cert_file, + ossl_strerror(ERR_get_error(), error_buffer, + sizeof(error_buffer))); + return 0; + } + + if(!params.cert) { + failf(data, "ssl engine didn't initialized the certificate " + "properly."); + return 0; + } + + if(SSL_CTX_use_certificate(ctx, params.cert) != 1) { + failf(data, "unable to set client certificate"); + X509_free(params.cert); + return 0; + } + X509_free(params.cert); /* we don't need the handle any more... */ + } + else { + failf(data, "crypto engine not set, can't load certificate"); + return 0; + } + } + break; +#else + failf(data, "file type ENG for certificate not implemented"); + return 0; +#endif + + case SSL_FILETYPE_PKCS12: + { + FILE *f; + PKCS12 *p12; + EVP_PKEY *pri; + STACK_OF(X509) *ca = NULL; + + f = fopen(cert_file, "rb"); + if(!f) { + failf(data, "could not open PKCS12 file '%s'", cert_file); + return 0; + } + p12 = d2i_PKCS12_fp(f, NULL); + fclose(f); + + if(!p12) { + failf(data, "error reading PKCS12 file '%s'", cert_file); + return 0; + } + + PKCS12_PBE_add(); + + if(!PKCS12_parse(p12, key_passwd, &pri, &x509, + &ca)) { + failf(data, + "could not parse PKCS12 file, check password, " OSSL_PACKAGE + " error %s", + ossl_strerror(ERR_get_error(), error_buffer, + sizeof(error_buffer)) ); + PKCS12_free(p12); + return 0; + } + + PKCS12_free(p12); + + if(SSL_CTX_use_certificate(ctx, x509) != 1) { + failf(data, + "could not load PKCS12 client certificate, " OSSL_PACKAGE + " error %s", + ossl_strerror(ERR_get_error(), error_buffer, + sizeof(error_buffer)) ); + goto fail; + } + + if(SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey(ctx, pri) != 1) { + failf(data, "unable to use private key from PKCS12 file '%s'", + cert_file); + goto fail; + } + + if(!SSL_CTX_check_private_key (ctx)) { + failf(data, "private key from PKCS12 file '%s' " + "does not match certificate in same file", cert_file); + goto fail; + } + /* Set Certificate Verification chain */ + if(ca) { + while(sk_X509_num(ca)) { + /* + * Note that sk_X509_pop() is used below to make sure the cert is + * removed from the stack properly before getting passed to + * SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert(), which takes ownership. Previously + * we used sk_X509_value() instead, but then we'd clean it in the + * subsequent sk_X509_pop_free() call. + */ + X509 *x = sk_X509_pop(ca); + if(!SSL_CTX_add_client_CA(ctx, x)) { + X509_free(x); + failf(data, "cannot add certificate to client CA list"); + goto fail; + } + if(!SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert(ctx, x)) { + X509_free(x); + failf(data, "cannot add certificate to certificate chain"); + goto fail; + } + } + } + + cert_done = 1; + fail: + EVP_PKEY_free(pri); + X509_free(x509); + sk_X509_pop_free(ca, X509_free); + + if(!cert_done) + return 0; /* failure! */ + break; + } + default: + failf(data, "not supported file type '%s' for certificate", cert_type); + return 0; + } + + file_type = do_file_type(key_type); + + switch(file_type) { + case SSL_FILETYPE_PEM: + if(cert_done) + break; + if(!key_file) + /* cert & key can only be in PEM case in the same file */ + key_file = cert_file; + /* FALLTHROUGH */ + case SSL_FILETYPE_ASN1: + if(SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_file(ctx, key_file, file_type) != 1) { + failf(data, "unable to set private key file: '%s' type %s", + key_file, key_type?key_type:"PEM"); + return 0; + } + break; + case SSL_FILETYPE_ENGINE: +#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL_ENGINE_H + { /* XXXX still needs some work */ + EVP_PKEY *priv_key = NULL; + if(data->state.engine) { + UI_METHOD *ui_method = + UI_create_method((char *)"curl user interface"); + if(!ui_method) { + failf(data, "unable do create " OSSL_PACKAGE + " user-interface method"); + return 0; + } + UI_method_set_opener(ui_method, UI_method_get_opener(UI_OpenSSL())); + UI_method_set_closer(ui_method, UI_method_get_closer(UI_OpenSSL())); + UI_method_set_reader(ui_method, ssl_ui_reader); + UI_method_set_writer(ui_method, ssl_ui_writer); + /* the typecast below was added to please mingw32 */ + priv_key = (EVP_PKEY *) + ENGINE_load_private_key(data->state.engine, key_file, + ui_method, + key_passwd); + UI_destroy_method(ui_method); + if(!priv_key) { + failf(data, "failed to load private key from crypto engine"); + return 0; + } + if(SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey(ctx, priv_key) != 1) { + failf(data, "unable to set private key"); + EVP_PKEY_free(priv_key); + return 0; + } + EVP_PKEY_free(priv_key); /* we don't need the handle any more... */ + } + else { + failf(data, "crypto engine not set, can't load private key"); + return 0; + } + } + break; +#else + failf(data, "file type ENG for private key not supported"); + return 0; +#endif + case SSL_FILETYPE_PKCS12: + if(!cert_done) { + failf(data, "file type P12 for private key not supported"); + return 0; + } + break; + default: + failf(data, "not supported file type for private key"); + return 0; + } + + ssl = SSL_new(ctx); + if(!ssl) { + failf(data, "unable to create an SSL structure"); + return 0; + } + + x509 = SSL_get_certificate(ssl); + + /* This version was provided by Evan Jordan and is supposed to not + leak memory as the previous version: */ + if(x509) { + EVP_PKEY *pktmp = X509_get_pubkey(x509); + EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(pktmp, SSL_get_privatekey(ssl)); + EVP_PKEY_free(pktmp); + } + +#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) && !defined(OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL) + { + /* If RSA is used, don't check the private key if its flags indicate + * it doesn't support it. */ + EVP_PKEY *priv_key = SSL_get_privatekey(ssl); + int pktype; +#ifdef HAVE_OPAQUE_EVP_PKEY + pktype = EVP_PKEY_id(priv_key); +#else + pktype = priv_key->type; +#endif + if(pktype == EVP_PKEY_RSA) { + RSA *rsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(priv_key); + if(RSA_flags(rsa) & RSA_METHOD_FLAG_NO_CHECK) + check_privkey = FALSE; + RSA_free(rsa); /* Decrement reference count */ + } + } +#endif + + SSL_free(ssl); + + /* If we are using DSA, we can copy the parameters from + * the private key */ + + if(check_privkey == TRUE) { + /* Now we know that a key and cert have been set against + * the SSL context */ + if(!SSL_CTX_check_private_key(ctx)) { + failf(data, "Private key does not match the certificate public key"); + return 0; + } + } + } + return 1; +} + +/* returns non-zero on failure */ +static int x509_name_oneline(X509_NAME *a, char *buf, size_t size) +{ +#if 0 + return X509_NAME_oneline(a, buf, size); +#else + BIO *bio_out = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem()); + BUF_MEM *biomem; + int rc; + + if(!bio_out) + return 1; /* alloc failed! */ + + rc = X509_NAME_print_ex(bio_out, a, 0, XN_FLAG_SEP_SPLUS_SPC); + BIO_get_mem_ptr(bio_out, &biomem); + + if((size_t)biomem->length < size) + size = biomem->length; + else + size--; /* don't overwrite the buffer end */ + + memcpy(buf, biomem->data, size); + buf[size] = 0; + + BIO_free(bio_out); + + return !rc; +#endif +} + +/** + * Global SSL init + * + * @retval 0 error initializing SSL + * @retval 1 SSL initialized successfully + */ +static int Curl_ossl_init(void) +{ +#ifdef ENABLE_SSLKEYLOGFILE + char *keylog_file_name; +#endif + + OPENSSL_load_builtin_modules(); + +#ifdef HAVE_ENGINE_LOAD_BUILTIN_ENGINES + ENGINE_load_builtin_engines(); +#endif + + /* OPENSSL_config(NULL); is "strongly recommended" to use but unfortunately + that function makes an exit() call on wrongly formatted config files + which makes it hard to use in some situations. OPENSSL_config() itself + calls CONF_modules_load_file() and we use that instead and we ignore + its return code! */ + + /* CONF_MFLAGS_DEFAULT_SECTION introduced some time between 0.9.8b and + 0.9.8e */ +#ifndef CONF_MFLAGS_DEFAULT_SECTION +#define CONF_MFLAGS_DEFAULT_SECTION 0x0 +#endif + + CONF_modules_load_file(NULL, NULL, + CONF_MFLAGS_DEFAULT_SECTION| + CONF_MFLAGS_IGNORE_MISSING_FILE); + +#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L) && \ + !defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER) + /* OpenSSL 1.1.0+ takes care of initialization itself */ +#else + /* Lets get nice error messages */ + SSL_load_error_strings(); + + /* Init the global ciphers and digests */ + if(!SSLeay_add_ssl_algorithms()) + return 0; + + OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms(); +#endif + +#ifdef ENABLE_SSLKEYLOGFILE + if(!keylog_file_fp) { + keylog_file_name = curl_getenv("SSLKEYLOGFILE"); + if(keylog_file_name) { + keylog_file_fp = fopen(keylog_file_name, FOPEN_APPENDTEXT); + if(keylog_file_fp) { +#ifdef WIN32 + if(setvbuf(keylog_file_fp, NULL, _IONBF, 0)) +#else + if(setvbuf(keylog_file_fp, NULL, _IOLBF, 4096)) +#endif + { + fclose(keylog_file_fp); + keylog_file_fp = NULL; + } + } + Curl_safefree(keylog_file_name); + } + } +#endif + + return 1; +} + +/* Global cleanup */ +static void Curl_ossl_cleanup(void) +{ +#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L) && \ + !defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER) + /* OpenSSL 1.1 deprecates all these cleanup functions and + turns them into no-ops in OpenSSL 1.0 compatibility mode */ +#else + /* Free ciphers and digests lists */ + EVP_cleanup(); + +#ifdef HAVE_ENGINE_CLEANUP + /* Free engine list */ + ENGINE_cleanup(); +#endif + + /* Free OpenSSL error strings */ + ERR_free_strings(); + + /* Free thread local error state, destroying hash upon zero refcount */ +#ifdef HAVE_ERR_REMOVE_THREAD_STATE + ERR_remove_thread_state(NULL); +#else + ERR_remove_state(0); +#endif + + /* Free all memory allocated by all configuration modules */ + CONF_modules_free(); + +#ifdef HAVE_SSL_COMP_FREE_COMPRESSION_METHODS + SSL_COMP_free_compression_methods(); +#endif +#endif + +#ifdef ENABLE_SSLKEYLOGFILE + if(keylog_file_fp) { + fclose(keylog_file_fp); + keylog_file_fp = NULL; + } +#endif +} + +/* + * This function is used to determine connection status. + * + * Return codes: + * 1 means the connection is still in place + * 0 means the connection has been closed + * -1 means the connection status is unknown + */ +static int Curl_ossl_check_cxn(struct connectdata *conn) +{ + /* SSL_peek takes data out of the raw recv buffer without peeking so we use + recv MSG_PEEK instead. Bug #795 */ +#ifdef MSG_PEEK + char buf; + ssize_t nread; + nread = recv((RECV_TYPE_ARG1)conn->sock[FIRSTSOCKET], (RECV_TYPE_ARG2)&buf, + (RECV_TYPE_ARG3)1, (RECV_TYPE_ARG4)MSG_PEEK); + if(nread == 0) + return 0; /* connection has been closed */ + if(nread == 1) + return 1; /* connection still in place */ + else if(nread == -1) { + int err = SOCKERRNO; + if(err == EINPROGRESS || +#if defined(EAGAIN) && (EAGAIN != EWOULDBLOCK) + err == EAGAIN || +#endif + err == EWOULDBLOCK) + return 1; /* connection still in place */ + if(err == ECONNRESET || +#ifdef ECONNABORTED + err == ECONNABORTED || +#endif +#ifdef ENETDOWN + err == ENETDOWN || +#endif +#ifdef ENETRESET + err == ENETRESET || +#endif +#ifdef ESHUTDOWN + err == ESHUTDOWN || +#endif +#ifdef ETIMEDOUT + err == ETIMEDOUT || +#endif + err == ENOTCONN) + return 0; /* connection has been closed */ + } +#endif + return -1; /* connection status unknown */ +} + +/* Selects an OpenSSL crypto engine + */ +static CURLcode Curl_ossl_set_engine(struct Curl_easy *data, + const char *engine) +{ +#if defined(USE_OPENSSL) && defined(HAVE_OPENSSL_ENGINE_H) + ENGINE *e; + +#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00909000L + e = ENGINE_by_id(engine); +#else + /* avoid memory leak */ + for(e = ENGINE_get_first(); e; e = ENGINE_get_next(e)) { + const char *e_id = ENGINE_get_id(e); + if(!strcmp(engine, e_id)) + break; + } +#endif + + if(!e) { + failf(data, "SSL Engine '%s' not found", engine); + return CURLE_SSL_ENGINE_NOTFOUND; + } + + if(data->state.engine) { + ENGINE_finish(data->state.engine); + ENGINE_free(data->state.engine); + data->state.engine = NULL; + } + if(!ENGINE_init(e)) { + char buf[256]; + + ENGINE_free(e); + failf(data, "Failed to initialise SSL Engine '%s':\n%s", + engine, ossl_strerror(ERR_get_error(), buf, sizeof(buf))); + return CURLE_SSL_ENGINE_INITFAILED; + } + data->state.engine = e; + return CURLE_OK; +#else + (void)engine; + failf(data, "SSL Engine not supported"); + return CURLE_SSL_ENGINE_NOTFOUND; +#endif +} + +/* Sets engine as default for all SSL operations + */ +static CURLcode Curl_ossl_set_engine_default(struct Curl_easy *data) +{ +#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL_ENGINE_H + if(data->state.engine) { + if(ENGINE_set_default(data->state.engine, ENGINE_METHOD_ALL) > 0) { + infof(data, "set default crypto engine '%s'\n", + ENGINE_get_id(data->state.engine)); + } + else { + failf(data, "set default crypto engine '%s' failed", + ENGINE_get_id(data->state.engine)); + return CURLE_SSL_ENGINE_SETFAILED; + } + } +#else + (void) data; +#endif + return CURLE_OK; +} + +/* Return list of OpenSSL crypto engine names. + */ +static struct curl_slist *Curl_ossl_engines_list(struct Curl_easy *data) +{ + struct curl_slist *list = NULL; +#if defined(USE_OPENSSL) && defined(HAVE_OPENSSL_ENGINE_H) + struct curl_slist *beg; + ENGINE *e; + + for(e = ENGINE_get_first(); e; e = ENGINE_get_next(e)) { + beg = curl_slist_append(list, ENGINE_get_id(e)); + if(!beg) { + curl_slist_free_all(list); + return NULL; + } + list = beg; + } +#endif + (void) data; + return list; +} + + +static void ossl_close(struct ssl_connect_data *connssl) +{ + if(BACKEND->handle) { + (void)SSL_shutdown(BACKEND->handle); + SSL_set_connect_state(BACKEND->handle); + + SSL_free(BACKEND->handle); + BACKEND->handle = NULL; + } + if(BACKEND->ctx) { + SSL_CTX_free(BACKEND->ctx); + BACKEND->ctx = NULL; + } +} + +/* + * This function is called when an SSL connection is closed. + */ +static void Curl_ossl_close(struct connectdata *conn, int sockindex) +{ + ossl_close(&conn->ssl[sockindex]); + ossl_close(&conn->proxy_ssl[sockindex]); +} + +/* + * This function is called to shut down the SSL layer but keep the + * socket open (CCC - Clear Command Channel) + */ +static int Curl_ossl_shutdown(struct connectdata *conn, int sockindex) +{ + int retval = 0; + struct ssl_connect_data *connssl = &conn->ssl[sockindex]; + struct Curl_easy *data = conn->data; + char buf[256]; /* We will use this for the OpenSSL error buffer, so it has + to be at least 256 bytes long. */ + unsigned long sslerror; + ssize_t nread; + int buffsize; + int err; + int done = 0; + + /* This has only been tested on the proftpd server, and the mod_tls code + sends a close notify alert without waiting for a close notify alert in + response. Thus we wait for a close notify alert from the server, but + we do not send one. Let's hope other servers do the same... */ + + if(data->set.ftp_ccc == CURLFTPSSL_CCC_ACTIVE) + (void)SSL_shutdown(BACKEND->handle); + + if(BACKEND->handle) { + buffsize = (int)sizeof(buf); + while(!done) { + int what = SOCKET_READABLE(conn->sock[sockindex], + SSL_SHUTDOWN_TIMEOUT); + if(what > 0) { + ERR_clear_error(); + + /* Something to read, let's do it and hope that it is the close + notify alert from the server */ + nread = (ssize_t)SSL_read(BACKEND->handle, buf, buffsize); + err = SSL_get_error(BACKEND->handle, (int)nread); + + switch(err) { + case SSL_ERROR_NONE: /* this is not an error */ + case SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN: /* no more data */ + /* This is the expected response. There was no data but only + the close notify alert */ + done = 1; + break; + case SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ: + /* there's data pending, re-invoke SSL_read() */ + infof(data, "SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ\n"); + break; + case SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE: + /* SSL wants a write. Really odd. Let's bail out. */ + infof(data, "SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE\n"); + done = 1; + break; + default: + /* openssl/ssl.h says "look at error stack/return value/errno" */ + sslerror = ERR_get_error(); + failf(conn->data, OSSL_PACKAGE " SSL_read on shutdown: %s, errno %d", + (sslerror ? + ossl_strerror(sslerror, buf, sizeof(buf)) : + SSL_ERROR_to_str(err)), + SOCKERRNO); + done = 1; + break; + } + } + else if(0 == what) { + /* timeout */ + failf(data, "SSL shutdown timeout"); + done = 1; + } + else { + /* anything that gets here is fatally bad */ + failf(data, "select/poll on SSL socket, errno: %d", SOCKERRNO); + retval = -1; + done = 1; + } + } /* while()-loop for the select() */ + + if(data->set.verbose) { +#ifdef HAVE_SSL_GET_SHUTDOWN + switch(SSL_get_shutdown(BACKEND->handle)) { + case SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN: + infof(data, "SSL_get_shutdown() returned SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN\n"); + break; + case SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN: + infof(data, "SSL_get_shutdown() returned SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN\n"); + break; + case SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN|SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN: + infof(data, "SSL_get_shutdown() returned SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN|" + "SSL_RECEIVED__SHUTDOWN\n"); + break; + } +#endif + } + + SSL_free(BACKEND->handle); + BACKEND->handle = NULL; + } + return retval; +} + +static void Curl_ossl_session_free(void *ptr) +{ + /* free the ID */ + SSL_SESSION_free(ptr); +} + +/* + * This function is called when the 'data' struct is going away. Close + * down everything and free all resources! + */ +static void Curl_ossl_close_all(struct Curl_easy *data) +{ +#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL_ENGINE_H + if(data->state.engine) { + ENGINE_finish(data->state.engine); + ENGINE_free(data->state.engine); + data->state.engine = NULL; + } +#else + (void)data; +#endif +#if !defined(HAVE_ERR_REMOVE_THREAD_STATE_DEPRECATED) && \ + defined(HAVE_ERR_REMOVE_THREAD_STATE) + /* OpenSSL 1.0.1 and 1.0.2 build an error queue that is stored per-thread + so we need to clean it here in case the thread will be killed. All OpenSSL + code should extract the error in association with the error so clearing + this queue here should be harmless at worst. */ + ERR_remove_thread_state(NULL); +#endif +} + +/* ====================================================== */ + + +/* Quote from RFC2818 section 3.1 "Server Identity" + + If a subjectAltName extension of type dNSName is present, that MUST + be used as the identity. Otherwise, the (most specific) Common Name + field in the Subject field of the certificate MUST be used. Although + the use of the Common Name is existing practice, it is deprecated and + Certification Authorities are encouraged to use the dNSName instead. + + Matching is performed using the matching rules specified by + [RFC2459]. If more than one identity of a given type is present in + the certificate (e.g., more than one dNSName name, a match in any one + of the set is considered acceptable.) Names may contain the wildcard + character * which is considered to match any single domain name + component or component fragment. E.g., *.a.com matches foo.a.com but + not bar.foo.a.com. f*.com matches foo.com but not bar.com. + + In some cases, the URI is specified as an IP address rather than a + hostname. In this case, the iPAddress subjectAltName must be present + in the certificate and must exactly match the IP in the URI. + +*/ +static CURLcode verifyhost(struct connectdata *conn, X509 *server_cert) +{ + bool matched = FALSE; + int target = GEN_DNS; /* target type, GEN_DNS or GEN_IPADD */ + size_t addrlen = 0; + struct Curl_easy *data = conn->data; + STACK_OF(GENERAL_NAME) *altnames; +#ifdef ENABLE_IPV6 + struct in6_addr addr; +#else + struct in_addr addr; +#endif + CURLcode result = CURLE_OK; + bool dNSName = FALSE; /* if a dNSName field exists in the cert */ + bool iPAddress = FALSE; /* if a iPAddress field exists in the cert */ + const char * const hostname = SSL_IS_PROXY() ? conn->http_proxy.host.name : + conn->host.name; + const char * const dispname = SSL_IS_PROXY() ? + conn->http_proxy.host.dispname : conn->host.dispname; + +#ifdef ENABLE_IPV6 + if(conn->bits.ipv6_ip && + Curl_inet_pton(AF_INET6, hostname, &addr)) { + target = GEN_IPADD; + addrlen = sizeof(struct in6_addr); + } + else +#endif + if(Curl_inet_pton(AF_INET, hostname, &addr)) { + target = GEN_IPADD; + addrlen = sizeof(struct in_addr); + } + + /* get a "list" of alternative names */ + altnames = X509_get_ext_d2i(server_cert, NID_subject_alt_name, NULL, NULL); + + if(altnames) { + int numalts; + int i; + bool dnsmatched = FALSE; + bool ipmatched = FALSE; + + /* get amount of alternatives, RFC2459 claims there MUST be at least + one, but we don't depend on it... */ + numalts = sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(altnames); + + /* loop through all alternatives - until a dnsmatch */ + for(i = 0; (i < numalts) && !dnsmatched; i++) { + /* get a handle to alternative name number i */ + const GENERAL_NAME *check = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(altnames, i); + + if(check->type == GEN_DNS) + dNSName = TRUE; + else if(check->type == GEN_IPADD) + iPAddress = TRUE; + + /* only check alternatives of the same type the target is */ + if(check->type == target) { + /* get data and length */ + const char *altptr = (char *)ASN1_STRING_get0_data(check->d.ia5); + size_t altlen = (size_t) ASN1_STRING_length(check->d.ia5); + + switch(target) { + case GEN_DNS: /* name/pattern comparison */ + /* The OpenSSL man page explicitly says: "In general it cannot be + assumed that the data returned by ASN1_STRING_data() is null + terminated or does not contain embedded nulls." But also that + "The actual format of the data will depend on the actual string + type itself: for example for and IA5String the data will be ASCII" + + Gisle researched the OpenSSL sources: + "I checked the 0.9.6 and 0.9.8 sources before my patch and + it always 0-terminates an IA5String." + */ + if((altlen == strlen(altptr)) && + /* if this isn't true, there was an embedded zero in the name + string and we cannot match it. */ + Curl_cert_hostcheck(altptr, hostname)) { + dnsmatched = TRUE; + infof(data, + " subjectAltName: host \"%s\" matched cert's \"%s\"\n", + dispname, altptr); + } + break; + + case GEN_IPADD: /* IP address comparison */ + /* compare alternative IP address if the data chunk is the same size + our server IP address is */ + if((altlen == addrlen) && !memcmp(altptr, &addr, altlen)) { + ipmatched = TRUE; + infof(data, + " subjectAltName: host \"%s\" matched cert's IP address!\n", + dispname); + } + break; + } + } + } + GENERAL_NAMES_free(altnames); + + if(dnsmatched || ipmatched) + matched = TRUE; + } + + if(matched) + /* an alternative name matched */ + ; + else if(dNSName || iPAddress) { + infof(data, " subjectAltName does not match %s\n", dispname); + failf(data, "SSL: no alternative certificate subject name matches " + "target host name '%s'", dispname); + result = CURLE_PEER_FAILED_VERIFICATION; + } + else { + /* we have to look to the last occurrence of a commonName in the + distinguished one to get the most significant one. */ + int j, i = -1; + + /* The following is done because of a bug in 0.9.6b */ + + unsigned char *nulstr = (unsigned char *)""; + unsigned char *peer_CN = nulstr; + + X509_NAME *name = X509_get_subject_name(server_cert); + if(name) + while((j = X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID(name, NID_commonName, i)) >= 0) + i = j; + + /* we have the name entry and we will now convert this to a string + that we can use for comparison. Doing this we support BMPstring, + UTF8 etc. */ + + if(i >= 0) { + ASN1_STRING *tmp = + X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_data(X509_NAME_get_entry(name, i)); + + /* In OpenSSL 0.9.7d and earlier, ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8 fails if the input + is already UTF-8 encoded. We check for this case and copy the raw + string manually to avoid the problem. This code can be made + conditional in the future when OpenSSL has been fixed. Work-around + brought by Alexis S. L. Carvalho. */ + if(tmp) { + if(ASN1_STRING_type(tmp) == V_ASN1_UTF8STRING) { + j = ASN1_STRING_length(tmp); + if(j >= 0) { + peer_CN = OPENSSL_malloc(j + 1); + if(peer_CN) { + memcpy(peer_CN, ASN1_STRING_get0_data(tmp), j); + peer_CN[j] = '\0'; + } + } + } + else /* not a UTF8 name */ + j = ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8(&peer_CN, tmp); + + if(peer_CN && (curlx_uztosi(strlen((char *)peer_CN)) != j)) { + /* there was a terminating zero before the end of string, this + cannot match and we return failure! */ + failf(data, "SSL: illegal cert name field"); + result = CURLE_PEER_FAILED_VERIFICATION; + } + } + } + + if(peer_CN == nulstr) + peer_CN = NULL; + else { + /* convert peer_CN from UTF8 */ + CURLcode rc = Curl_convert_from_utf8(data, (char *)peer_CN, + strlen((char *)peer_CN)); + /* Curl_convert_from_utf8 calls failf if unsuccessful */ + if(rc) { + OPENSSL_free(peer_CN); + return rc; + } + } + + if(result) + /* error already detected, pass through */ + ; + else if(!peer_CN) { + failf(data, + "SSL: unable to obtain common name from peer certificate"); + result = CURLE_PEER_FAILED_VERIFICATION; + } + else if(!Curl_cert_hostcheck((const char *)peer_CN, hostname)) { + failf(data, "SSL: certificate subject name '%s' does not match " + "target host name '%s'", peer_CN, dispname); + result = CURLE_PEER_FAILED_VERIFICATION; + } + else { + infof(data, " common name: %s (matched)\n", peer_CN); + } + if(peer_CN) + OPENSSL_free(peer_CN); + } + + return result; +} + +#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x0090808fL) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && \ + !defined(OPENSSL_NO_OCSP) +static CURLcode verifystatus(struct connectdata *conn, + struct ssl_connect_data *connssl) +{ + int i, ocsp_status; + const unsigned char *p; + CURLcode result = CURLE_OK; + struct Curl_easy *data = conn->data; + + OCSP_RESPONSE *rsp = NULL; + OCSP_BASICRESP *br = NULL; + X509_STORE *st = NULL; + STACK_OF(X509) *ch = NULL; + + long len = SSL_get_tlsext_status_ocsp_resp(BACKEND->handle, &p); + + if(!p) { + failf(data, "No OCSP response received"); + result = CURLE_SSL_INVALIDCERTSTATUS; + goto end; + } + + rsp = d2i_OCSP_RESPONSE(NULL, &p, len); + if(!rsp) { + failf(data, "Invalid OCSP response"); + result = CURLE_SSL_INVALIDCERTSTATUS; + goto end; + } + + ocsp_status = OCSP_response_status(rsp); + if(ocsp_status != OCSP_RESPONSE_STATUS_SUCCESSFUL) { + failf(data, "Invalid OCSP response status: %s (%d)", + OCSP_response_status_str(ocsp_status), ocsp_status); + result = CURLE_SSL_INVALIDCERTSTATUS; + goto end; + } + + br = OCSP_response_get1_basic(rsp); + if(!br) { + failf(data, "Invalid OCSP response"); + result = CURLE_SSL_INVALIDCERTSTATUS; + goto end; + } + + ch = SSL_get_peer_cert_chain(BACKEND->handle); + st = SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(BACKEND->ctx); + +#if ((OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER <= 0x1000201fL) /* Fixed after 1.0.2a */ || \ + (defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER) && \ + LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER <= 0x2040200fL)) + /* The authorized responder cert in the OCSP response MUST be signed by the + peer cert's issuer (see RFC6960 section 4.2.2.2). If that's a root cert, + no problem, but if it's an intermediate cert OpenSSL has a bug where it + expects this issuer to be present in the chain embedded in the OCSP + response. So we add it if necessary. */ + + /* First make sure the peer cert chain includes both a peer and an issuer, + and the OCSP response contains a responder cert. */ + if(sk_X509_num(ch) >= 2 && sk_X509_num(br->certs) >= 1) { + X509 *responder = sk_X509_value(br->certs, sk_X509_num(br->certs) - 1); + + /* Find issuer of responder cert and add it to the OCSP response chain */ + for(i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ch); i++) { + X509 *issuer = sk_X509_value(ch, i); + if(X509_check_issued(issuer, responder) == X509_V_OK) { + if(!OCSP_basic_add1_cert(br, issuer)) { + failf(data, "Could not add issuer cert to OCSP response"); + result = CURLE_SSL_INVALIDCERTSTATUS; + goto end; + } + } + } + } +#endif + + if(OCSP_basic_verify(br, ch, st, 0) <= 0) { + failf(data, "OCSP response verification failed"); + result = CURLE_SSL_INVALIDCERTSTATUS; + goto end; + } + + for(i = 0; i < OCSP_resp_count(br); i++) { + int cert_status, crl_reason; + OCSP_SINGLERESP *single = NULL; + + ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *rev, *thisupd, *nextupd; + + single = OCSP_resp_get0(br, i); + if(!single) + continue; + + cert_status = OCSP_single_get0_status(single, &crl_reason, &rev, + &thisupd, &nextupd); + + if(!OCSP_check_validity(thisupd, nextupd, 300L, -1L)) { + failf(data, "OCSP response has expired"); + result = CURLE_SSL_INVALIDCERTSTATUS; + goto end; + } + + infof(data, "SSL certificate status: %s (%d)\n", + OCSP_cert_status_str(cert_status), cert_status); + + switch(cert_status) { + case V_OCSP_CERTSTATUS_GOOD: + break; + + case V_OCSP_CERTSTATUS_REVOKED: + result = CURLE_SSL_INVALIDCERTSTATUS; + + failf(data, "SSL certificate revocation reason: %s (%d)", + OCSP_crl_reason_str(crl_reason), crl_reason); + goto end; + + case V_OCSP_CERTSTATUS_UNKNOWN: + result = CURLE_SSL_INVALIDCERTSTATUS; + goto end; + } + } + +end: + if(br) OCSP_BASICRESP_free(br); + OCSP_RESPONSE_free(rsp); + + return result; +} +#endif + +#endif /* USE_OPENSSL */ + +/* The SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK doesn't exist in ancient OpenSSL versions + and thus this cannot be done there. */ +#ifdef SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK + +static const char *ssl_msg_type(int ssl_ver, int msg) +{ +#ifdef SSL2_VERSION_MAJOR + if(ssl_ver == SSL2_VERSION_MAJOR) { + switch(msg) { + case SSL2_MT_ERROR: + return "Error"; + case SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO: + return "Client hello"; + case SSL2_MT_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY: + return "Client key"; + case SSL2_MT_CLIENT_FINISHED: + return "Client finished"; + case SSL2_MT_SERVER_HELLO: + return "Server hello"; + case SSL2_MT_SERVER_VERIFY: + return "Server verify"; + case SSL2_MT_SERVER_FINISHED: + return "Server finished"; + case SSL2_MT_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE: + return "Request CERT"; + case SSL2_MT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE: + return "Client CERT"; + } + } + else +#endif + if(ssl_ver == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR) { + switch(msg) { + case SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST: + return "Hello request"; + case SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO: + return "Client hello"; + case SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO: + return "Server hello"; +#ifdef SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET + case SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET: + return "Newsession Ticket"; +#endif + case SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE: + return "Certificate"; + case SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE: + return "Server key exchange"; + case SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE: + return "Client key exchange"; + case SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST: + return "Request CERT"; + case SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE: + return "Server finished"; + case SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY: + return "CERT verify"; + case SSL3_MT_FINISHED: + return "Finished"; +#ifdef SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS + case SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS: + return "Certificate Status"; +#endif + } + } + return "Unknown"; +} + +static const char *tls_rt_type(int type) +{ + switch(type) { +#ifdef SSL3_RT_HEADER + case SSL3_RT_HEADER: + return "TLS header"; +#endif + case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC: + return "TLS change cipher"; + case SSL3_RT_ALERT: + return "TLS alert"; + case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE: + return "TLS handshake"; + case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA: + return "TLS app data"; + default: + return "TLS Unknown"; + } +} + + +/* + * Our callback from the SSL/TLS layers. + */ +static void ssl_tls_trace(int direction, int ssl_ver, int content_type, + const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl, + void *userp) +{ + struct Curl_easy *data; + const char *msg_name, *tls_rt_name; + char ssl_buf[1024]; + char unknown[32]; + int msg_type, txt_len; + const char *verstr = NULL; + struct connectdata *conn = userp; + + if(!conn || !conn->data || !conn->data->set.fdebug || + (direction != 0 && direction != 1)) + return; + + data = conn->data; + + switch(ssl_ver) { +#ifdef SSL2_VERSION /* removed in recent versions */ + case SSL2_VERSION: + verstr = "SSLv2"; + break; +#endif +#ifdef SSL3_VERSION + case SSL3_VERSION: + verstr = "SSLv3"; + break; +#endif + case TLS1_VERSION: + verstr = "TLSv1.0"; + break; +#ifdef TLS1_1_VERSION + case TLS1_1_VERSION: + verstr = "TLSv1.1"; + break; +#endif +#ifdef TLS1_2_VERSION + case TLS1_2_VERSION: + verstr = "TLSv1.2"; + break; +#endif +#ifdef TLS1_3_VERSION + case TLS1_3_VERSION: + verstr = "TLSv1.3"; + break; +#endif + case 0: + break; + default: + snprintf(unknown, sizeof(unknown), "(%x)", ssl_ver); + verstr = unknown; + break; + } + + if(ssl_ver) { + /* the info given when the version is zero is not that useful for us */ + + ssl_ver >>= 8; /* check the upper 8 bits only below */ + + /* SSLv2 doesn't seem to have TLS record-type headers, so OpenSSL + * always pass-up content-type as 0. But the interesting message-type + * is at 'buf[0]'. + */ + if(ssl_ver == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR && content_type) + tls_rt_name = tls_rt_type(content_type); + else + tls_rt_name = ""; + + msg_type = *(char *)buf; + msg_name = ssl_msg_type(ssl_ver, msg_type); + + txt_len = snprintf(ssl_buf, sizeof(ssl_buf), "%s (%s), %s, %s (%d):\n", + verstr, direction?"OUT":"IN", + tls_rt_name, msg_name, msg_type); + Curl_debug(data, CURLINFO_TEXT, ssl_buf, (size_t)txt_len, NULL); + } + + Curl_debug(data, (direction == 1) ? CURLINFO_SSL_DATA_OUT : + CURLINFO_SSL_DATA_IN, (char *)buf, len, NULL); + (void) ssl; +} +#endif + +#ifdef USE_OPENSSL +/* ====================================================== */ + +#ifdef SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_HOSTNAME +# define use_sni(x) sni = (x) +#else +# define use_sni(x) Curl_nop_stmt +#endif + +/* Check for OpenSSL 1.0.2 which has ALPN support. */ +#undef HAS_ALPN +#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10002000L \ + && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) +# define HAS_ALPN 1 +#endif + +/* Check for OpenSSL 1.0.1 which has NPN support. */ +#undef HAS_NPN +#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10001000L \ + && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) \ + && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) +# define HAS_NPN 1 +#endif + +#ifdef HAS_NPN + +/* + * in is a list of length prefixed strings. this function has to select + * the protocol we want to use from the list and write its string into out. + */ + +static int +select_next_protocol(unsigned char **out, unsigned char *outlen, + const unsigned char *in, unsigned int inlen, + const char *key, unsigned int keylen) +{ + unsigned int i; + for(i = 0; i + keylen <= inlen; i += in[i] + 1) { + if(memcmp(&in[i + 1], key, keylen) == 0) { + *out = (unsigned char *) &in[i + 1]; + *outlen = in[i]; + return 0; + } + } + return -1; +} + +static int +select_next_proto_cb(SSL *ssl, + unsigned char **out, unsigned char *outlen, + const unsigned char *in, unsigned int inlen, + void *arg) +{ + struct connectdata *conn = (struct connectdata*) arg; + + (void)ssl; + +#ifdef USE_NGHTTP2 + if(conn->data->set.httpversion >= CURL_HTTP_VERSION_2 && + !select_next_protocol(out, outlen, in, inlen, NGHTTP2_PROTO_VERSION_ID, + NGHTTP2_PROTO_VERSION_ID_LEN)) { + infof(conn->data, "NPN, negotiated HTTP2 (%s)\n", + NGHTTP2_PROTO_VERSION_ID); + conn->negnpn = CURL_HTTP_VERSION_2; + return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK; + } +#endif + + if(!select_next_protocol(out, outlen, in, inlen, ALPN_HTTP_1_1, + ALPN_HTTP_1_1_LENGTH)) { + infof(conn->data, "NPN, negotiated HTTP1.1\n"); + conn->negnpn = CURL_HTTP_VERSION_1_1; + return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK; + } + + infof(conn->data, "NPN, no overlap, use HTTP1.1\n"); + *out = (unsigned char *)ALPN_HTTP_1_1; + *outlen = ALPN_HTTP_1_1_LENGTH; + conn->negnpn = CURL_HTTP_VERSION_1_1; + + return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK; +} +#endif /* HAS_NPN */ + +static const char * +get_ssl_version_txt(SSL *ssl) +{ + if(!ssl) + return ""; + + switch(SSL_version(ssl)) { +#ifdef TLS1_3_VERSION + case TLS1_3_VERSION: + return "TLSv1.3"; +#endif +#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x1000100FL + case TLS1_2_VERSION: + return "TLSv1.2"; + case TLS1_1_VERSION: + return "TLSv1.1"; +#endif + case TLS1_VERSION: + return "TLSv1.0"; + case SSL3_VERSION: + return "SSLv3"; + case SSL2_VERSION: + return "SSLv2"; + } + return "unknown"; +} + +static CURLcode +set_ssl_version_min_max(long *ctx_options, struct connectdata *conn, + int sockindex) +{ +#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x1000100FL) || !defined(TLS1_3_VERSION) + /* convoluted #if condition just to avoid compiler warnings on unused + variable */ + struct Curl_easy *data = conn->data; +#endif + long ssl_version = SSL_CONN_CONFIG(version); + long ssl_version_max = SSL_CONN_CONFIG(version_max); + + if(ssl_version_max == CURL_SSLVERSION_MAX_NONE) { + ssl_version_max = ssl_version << 16; + } + + switch(ssl_version) { + case CURL_SSLVERSION_TLSv1_3: +#ifdef TLS1_3_VERSION + { + struct ssl_connect_data *connssl = &conn->ssl[sockindex]; + SSL_CTX_set_max_proto_version(BACKEND->ctx, TLS1_3_VERSION); + *ctx_options |= SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2; + } +#else + (void)sockindex; + failf(data, OSSL_PACKAGE " was built without TLS 1.3 support"); + return CURLE_NOT_BUILT_IN; +#endif + /* FALLTHROUGH */ + case CURL_SSLVERSION_TLSv1_2: +#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x1000100FL + *ctx_options |= SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1; +#else + failf(data, OSSL_PACKAGE " was built without TLS 1.2 support"); + return CURLE_NOT_BUILT_IN; +#endif + /* FALLTHROUGH */ + case CURL_SSLVERSION_TLSv1_1: +#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x1000100FL + *ctx_options |= SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1; +#else + failf(data, OSSL_PACKAGE " was built without TLS 1.1 support"); + return CURLE_NOT_BUILT_IN; +#endif + /* FALLTHROUGH */ + case CURL_SSLVERSION_TLSv1_0: + *ctx_options |= SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2; + *ctx_options |= SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3; + break; + } + + switch(ssl_version_max) { + case CURL_SSLVERSION_MAX_TLSv1_0: +#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x1000100FL + *ctx_options |= SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1; +#endif + /* FALLTHROUGH */ + case CURL_SSLVERSION_MAX_TLSv1_1: +#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x1000100FL + *ctx_options |= SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2; +#endif + /* FALLTHROUGH */ + case CURL_SSLVERSION_MAX_TLSv1_2: + case CURL_SSLVERSION_MAX_DEFAULT: +#ifdef TLS1_3_VERSION + *ctx_options |= SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_3; +#endif + break; + case CURL_SSLVERSION_MAX_TLSv1_3: +#ifdef TLS1_3_VERSION + break; +#else + failf(data, OSSL_PACKAGE " was built without TLS 1.3 support"); + return CURLE_NOT_BUILT_IN; +#endif + } + return CURLE_OK; +} + +static CURLcode ossl_connect_step1(struct connectdata *conn, int sockindex) +{ + CURLcode result = CURLE_OK; + char *ciphers; + struct Curl_easy *data = conn->data; + SSL_METHOD_QUAL SSL_METHOD *req_method = NULL; + X509_LOOKUP *lookup = NULL; + curl_socket_t sockfd = conn->sock[sockindex]; + struct ssl_connect_data *connssl = &conn->ssl[sockindex]; + long ctx_options = 0; +#ifdef SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_HOSTNAME + bool sni; + const char * const hostname = SSL_IS_PROXY() ? conn->http_proxy.host.name : + conn->host.name; +#ifdef ENABLE_IPV6 + struct in6_addr addr; +#else + struct in_addr addr; +#endif +#endif + long * const certverifyresult = SSL_IS_PROXY() ? + &data->set.proxy_ssl.certverifyresult : &data->set.ssl.certverifyresult; + const long int ssl_version = SSL_CONN_CONFIG(version); +#ifdef USE_TLS_SRP + const enum CURL_TLSAUTH ssl_authtype = SSL_SET_OPTION(authtype); +#endif + char * const ssl_cert = SSL_SET_OPTION(cert); + const char * const ssl_cert_type = SSL_SET_OPTION(cert_type); + const char * const ssl_cafile = SSL_CONN_CONFIG(CAfile); + const char * const ssl_capath = SSL_CONN_CONFIG(CApath); + const bool verifypeer = SSL_CONN_CONFIG(verifypeer); + const char * const ssl_crlfile = SSL_SET_OPTION(CRLfile); + char error_buffer[256]; + + DEBUGASSERT(ssl_connect_1 == connssl->connecting_state); + + /* Make funny stuff to get random input */ + result = Curl_ossl_seed(data); + if(result) + return result; + + *certverifyresult = !X509_V_OK; + + /* check to see if we've been told to use an explicit SSL/TLS version */ + + switch(ssl_version) { + case CURL_SSLVERSION_DEFAULT: + case CURL_SSLVERSION_TLSv1: + case CURL_SSLVERSION_TLSv1_0: + case CURL_SSLVERSION_TLSv1_1: + case CURL_SSLVERSION_TLSv1_2: + case CURL_SSLVERSION_TLSv1_3: + /* it will be handled later with the context options */ +#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L) && \ + !defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER) + req_method = TLS_client_method(); +#else + req_method = SSLv23_client_method(); +#endif + use_sni(TRUE); + break; + case CURL_SSLVERSION_SSLv2: +#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SSL2 + failf(data, OSSL_PACKAGE " was built without SSLv2 support"); + return CURLE_NOT_BUILT_IN; +#else +#ifdef USE_TLS_SRP + if(ssl_authtype == CURL_TLSAUTH_SRP) + return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR; +#endif + req_method = SSLv2_client_method(); + use_sni(FALSE); + break; +#endif + case CURL_SSLVERSION_SSLv3: +#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3_METHOD + failf(data, OSSL_PACKAGE " was built without SSLv3 support"); + return CURLE_NOT_BUILT_IN; +#else +#ifdef USE_TLS_SRP + if(ssl_authtype == CURL_TLSAUTH_SRP) + return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR; +#endif + req_method = SSLv3_client_method(); + use_sni(FALSE); + break; +#endif + default: + failf(data, "Unrecognized parameter passed via CURLOPT_SSLVERSION"); + return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR; + } + + if(BACKEND->ctx) + SSL_CTX_free(BACKEND->ctx); + BACKEND->ctx = SSL_CTX_new(req_method); + + if(!BACKEND->ctx) { + failf(data, "SSL: couldn't create a context: %s", + ossl_strerror(ERR_peek_error(), error_buffer, sizeof(error_buffer))); + return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; + } + +#ifdef SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS + SSL_CTX_set_mode(BACKEND->ctx, SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS); +#endif + +#ifdef SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK + if(data->set.fdebug && data->set.verbose) { + /* the SSL trace callback is only used for verbose logging */ + SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback(BACKEND->ctx, ssl_tls_trace); + SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback_arg(BACKEND->ctx, conn); + } +#endif + + /* OpenSSL contains code to work-around lots of bugs and flaws in various + SSL-implementations. SSL_CTX_set_options() is used to enabled those + work-arounds. The man page for this option states that SSL_OP_ALL enables + all the work-arounds and that "It is usually safe to use SSL_OP_ALL to + enable the bug workaround options if compatibility with somewhat broken + implementations is desired." + + The "-no_ticket" option was introduced in Openssl0.9.8j. It's a flag to + disable "rfc4507bis session ticket support". rfc4507bis was later turned + into the proper RFC5077 it seems: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5077 + + The enabled extension concerns the session management. I wonder how often + libcurl stops a connection and then resumes a TLS session. also, sending + the session data is some overhead. .I suggest that you just use your + proposed patch (which explicitly disables TICKET). + + If someone writes an application with libcurl and openssl who wants to + enable the feature, one can do this in the SSL callback. + + SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG option enabling allowed proper + interoperability with web server Netscape Enterprise Server 2.0.1 which + was released back in 1996. + + Due to CVE-2010-4180, option SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG has + become ineffective as of OpenSSL 0.9.8q and 1.0.0c. In order to mitigate + CVE-2010-4180 when using previous OpenSSL versions we no longer enable + this option regardless of OpenSSL version and SSL_OP_ALL definition. + + OpenSSL added a work-around for a SSL 3.0/TLS 1.0 CBC vulnerability + (https://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt). In 0.9.6e they added a bit to + SSL_OP_ALL that _disables_ that work-around despite the fact that + SSL_OP_ALL is documented to do "rather harmless" workarounds. In order to + keep the secure work-around, the SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS bit + must not be set. + */ + + ctx_options = SSL_OP_ALL; + +#ifdef SSL_OP_NO_TICKET + ctx_options |= SSL_OP_NO_TICKET; +#endif + +#ifdef SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION + ctx_options |= SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION; +#endif + +#ifdef SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG + /* mitigate CVE-2010-4180 */ + ctx_options &= ~SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG; +#endif + +#ifdef SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS + /* unless the user explicitly ask to allow the protocol vulnerability we + use the work-around */ + if(!SSL_SET_OPTION(enable_beast)) + ctx_options &= ~SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS; +#endif + + switch(ssl_version) { + case CURL_SSLVERSION_SSLv3: +#ifdef USE_TLS_SRP + if(ssl_authtype == CURL_TLSAUTH_SRP) { + infof(data, "Set version TLSv1.x for SRP authorisation\n"); + } +#endif + ctx_options |= SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2; + ctx_options |= SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1; +#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x1000100FL + ctx_options |= SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1; + ctx_options |= SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2; +#ifdef TLS1_3_VERSION + ctx_options |= SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_3; +#endif +#endif + break; + + case CURL_SSLVERSION_DEFAULT: + case CURL_SSLVERSION_TLSv1: + ctx_options |= SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2; + ctx_options |= SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3; + break; + + case CURL_SSLVERSION_TLSv1_0: + case CURL_SSLVERSION_TLSv1_1: + case CURL_SSLVERSION_TLSv1_2: + case CURL_SSLVERSION_TLSv1_3: + result = set_ssl_version_min_max(&ctx_options, conn, sockindex); + if(result != CURLE_OK) + return result; + break; + + case CURL_SSLVERSION_SSLv2: +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL2 + ctx_options |= SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3; + ctx_options |= SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1; +#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x1000100FL + ctx_options |= SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1; + ctx_options |= SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2; +#ifdef TLS1_3_VERSION + ctx_options |= SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_3; +#endif +#endif + break; +#else + failf(data, OSSL_PACKAGE " was built without SSLv2 support"); + return CURLE_NOT_BUILT_IN; +#endif + + default: + failf(data, "Unrecognized parameter passed via CURLOPT_SSLVERSION"); + return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR; + } + + SSL_CTX_set_options(BACKEND->ctx, ctx_options); + +#ifdef HAS_NPN + if(conn->bits.tls_enable_npn) + SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb(BACKEND->ctx, select_next_proto_cb, conn); +#endif + +#ifdef HAS_ALPN + if(conn->bits.tls_enable_alpn) { + int cur = 0; + unsigned char protocols[128]; + +#ifdef USE_NGHTTP2 + if(data->set.httpversion >= CURL_HTTP_VERSION_2 && + (!SSL_IS_PROXY() || !conn->bits.tunnel_proxy)) { + protocols[cur++] = NGHTTP2_PROTO_VERSION_ID_LEN; + + memcpy(&protocols[cur], NGHTTP2_PROTO_VERSION_ID, + NGHTTP2_PROTO_VERSION_ID_LEN); + cur += NGHTTP2_PROTO_VERSION_ID_LEN; + infof(data, "ALPN, offering %s\n", NGHTTP2_PROTO_VERSION_ID); + } +#endif + + protocols[cur++] = ALPN_HTTP_1_1_LENGTH; + memcpy(&protocols[cur], ALPN_HTTP_1_1, ALPN_HTTP_1_1_LENGTH); + cur += ALPN_HTTP_1_1_LENGTH; + infof(data, "ALPN, offering %s\n", ALPN_HTTP_1_1); + + /* expects length prefixed preference ordered list of protocols in wire + * format + */ + SSL_CTX_set_alpn_protos(BACKEND->ctx, protocols, cur); + } +#endif + + if(ssl_cert || ssl_cert_type) { + if(!cert_stuff(conn, BACKEND->ctx, ssl_cert, ssl_cert_type, + SSL_SET_OPTION(key), SSL_SET_OPTION(key_type), + SSL_SET_OPTION(key_passwd))) { + /* failf() is already done in cert_stuff() */ + return CURLE_SSL_CERTPROBLEM; + } + } + + ciphers = SSL_CONN_CONFIG(cipher_list); + if(!ciphers) + ciphers = (char *)DEFAULT_CIPHER_SELECTION; + if(ciphers) { + if(!SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(BACKEND->ctx, ciphers)) { + failf(data, "failed setting cipher list: %s", ciphers); + return CURLE_SSL_CIPHER; + } + infof(data, "Cipher selection: %s\n", ciphers); + } + +#ifdef USE_TLS_SRP + if(ssl_authtype == CURL_TLSAUTH_SRP) { + char * const ssl_username = SSL_SET_OPTION(username); + + infof(data, "Using TLS-SRP username: %s\n", ssl_username); + + if(!SSL_CTX_set_srp_username(BACKEND->ctx, ssl_username)) { + failf(data, "Unable to set SRP user name"); + return CURLE_BAD_FUNCTION_ARGUMENT; + } + if(!SSL_CTX_set_srp_password(BACKEND->ctx, SSL_SET_OPTION(password))) { + failf(data, "failed setting SRP password"); + return CURLE_BAD_FUNCTION_ARGUMENT; + } + if(!SSL_CONN_CONFIG(cipher_list)) { + infof(data, "Setting cipher list SRP\n"); + + if(!SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(BACKEND->ctx, "SRP")) { + failf(data, "failed setting SRP cipher list"); + return CURLE_SSL_CIPHER; + } + } + } +#endif + + if(ssl_cafile || ssl_capath) { + /* tell SSL where to find CA certificates that are used to verify + the servers certificate. */ + if(!SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(BACKEND->ctx, ssl_cafile, ssl_capath)) { + if(verifypeer) { + /* Fail if we insist on successfully verifying the server. */ + failf(data, "error setting certificate verify locations:\n" + " CAfile: %s\n CApath: %s", + ssl_cafile ? ssl_cafile : "none", + ssl_capath ? ssl_capath : "none"); + return CURLE_SSL_CACERT_BADFILE; + } + /* Just continue with a warning if no strict certificate verification + is required. */ + infof(data, "error setting certificate verify locations," + " continuing anyway:\n"); + } + else { + /* Everything is fine. */ + infof(data, "successfully set certificate verify locations:\n"); + } + infof(data, + " CAfile: %s\n" + " CApath: %s\n", + ssl_cafile ? ssl_cafile : "none", + ssl_capath ? ssl_capath : "none"); + } +#ifdef CURL_CA_FALLBACK + else if(verifypeer) { + /* verfying the peer without any CA certificates won't + work so use openssl's built in default as fallback */ + SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_paths(BACKEND->ctx); + } +#endif + + if(ssl_crlfile) { + /* tell SSL where to find CRL file that is used to check certificate + * revocation */ + lookup = X509_STORE_add_lookup(SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(BACKEND->ctx), + X509_LOOKUP_file()); + if(!lookup || + (!X509_load_crl_file(lookup, ssl_crlfile, X509_FILETYPE_PEM)) ) { + failf(data, "error loading CRL file: %s", ssl_crlfile); + return CURLE_SSL_CRL_BADFILE; + } + /* Everything is fine. */ + infof(data, "successfully load CRL file:\n"); + X509_STORE_set_flags(SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(BACKEND->ctx), + X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK|X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL); + + infof(data, " CRLfile: %s\n", ssl_crlfile); + } + + /* Try building a chain using issuers in the trusted store first to avoid + problems with server-sent legacy intermediates. + Newer versions of OpenSSL do alternate chain checking by default which + gives us the same fix without as much of a performance hit (slight), so we + prefer that if available. + https://rt.openssl.org/Ticket/Display.html?id=3621&user=guest&pass=guest + */ +#if defined(X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST) && !defined(X509_V_FLAG_NO_ALT_CHAINS) + if(verifypeer) { + X509_STORE_set_flags(SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(BACKEND->ctx), + X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST); + } +#endif + + /* SSL always tries to verify the peer, this only says whether it should + * fail to connect if the verification fails, or if it should continue + * anyway. In the latter case the result of the verification is checked with + * SSL_get_verify_result() below. */ + SSL_CTX_set_verify(BACKEND->ctx, + verifypeer ? SSL_VERIFY_PEER : SSL_VERIFY_NONE, NULL); + + /* Enable logging of secrets to the file specified in env SSLKEYLOGFILE. */ +#if defined(ENABLE_SSLKEYLOGFILE) && defined(HAVE_KEYLOG_CALLBACK) + if(keylog_file_fp) { + SSL_CTX_set_keylog_callback(BACKEND->ctx, ossl_keylog_callback); + } +#endif + + /* give application a chance to interfere with SSL set up. */ + if(data->set.ssl.fsslctx) { + result = (*data->set.ssl.fsslctx)(data, BACKEND->ctx, + data->set.ssl.fsslctxp); + if(result) { + failf(data, "error signaled by ssl ctx callback"); + return result; + } + } + + /* Lets make an SSL structure */ + if(BACKEND->handle) + SSL_free(BACKEND->handle); + BACKEND->handle = SSL_new(BACKEND->ctx); + if(!BACKEND->handle) { + failf(data, "SSL: couldn't create a context (handle)!"); + return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; + } + +#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x0090808fL) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && \ + !defined(OPENSSL_NO_OCSP) + if(SSL_CONN_CONFIG(verifystatus)) + SSL_set_tlsext_status_type(BACKEND->handle, TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp); +#endif + + SSL_set_connect_state(BACKEND->handle); + + BACKEND->server_cert = 0x0; +#ifdef SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_HOSTNAME + if((0 == Curl_inet_pton(AF_INET, hostname, &addr)) && +#ifdef ENABLE_IPV6 + (0 == Curl_inet_pton(AF_INET6, hostname, &addr)) && +#endif + sni && + !SSL_set_tlsext_host_name(BACKEND->handle, hostname)) + infof(data, "WARNING: failed to configure server name indication (SNI) " + "TLS extension\n"); +#endif + + /* Check if there's a cached ID we can/should use here! */ + if(SSL_SET_OPTION(primary.sessionid)) { + void *ssl_sessionid = NULL; + + Curl_ssl_sessionid_lock(conn); + if(!Curl_ssl_getsessionid(conn, &ssl_sessionid, NULL, sockindex)) { + /* we got a session id, use it! */ + if(!SSL_set_session(BACKEND->handle, ssl_sessionid)) { + Curl_ssl_sessionid_unlock(conn); + failf(data, "SSL: SSL_set_session failed: %s", + ossl_strerror(ERR_get_error(), error_buffer, + sizeof(error_buffer))); + return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR; + } + /* Informational message */ + infof(data, "SSL re-using session ID\n"); + } + Curl_ssl_sessionid_unlock(conn); + } + + if(conn->proxy_ssl[sockindex].use) { + BIO *const bio = BIO_new(BIO_f_ssl()); + SSL *handle = conn->proxy_ssl[sockindex].backend->handle; + DEBUGASSERT(ssl_connection_complete == conn->proxy_ssl[sockindex].state); + DEBUGASSERT(handle != NULL); + DEBUGASSERT(bio != NULL); + BIO_set_ssl(bio, handle, FALSE); + SSL_set_bio(BACKEND->handle, bio, bio); + } + else if(!SSL_set_fd(BACKEND->handle, (int)sockfd)) { + /* pass the raw socket into the SSL layers */ + failf(data, "SSL: SSL_set_fd failed: %s", + ossl_strerror(ERR_get_error(), error_buffer, sizeof(error_buffer))); + return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR; + } + + connssl->connecting_state = ssl_connect_2; + + return CURLE_OK; +} + +static CURLcode ossl_connect_step2(struct connectdata *conn, int sockindex) +{ + struct Curl_easy *data = conn->data; + int err; + struct ssl_connect_data *connssl = &conn->ssl[sockindex]; + long * const certverifyresult = SSL_IS_PROXY() ? + &data->set.proxy_ssl.certverifyresult : &data->set.ssl.certverifyresult; + DEBUGASSERT(ssl_connect_2 == connssl->connecting_state + || ssl_connect_2_reading == connssl->connecting_state + || ssl_connect_2_writing == connssl->connecting_state); + + ERR_clear_error(); + + err = SSL_connect(BACKEND->handle); + /* If keylogging is enabled but the keylog callback is not supported then log + secrets here, immediately after SSL_connect by using tap_ssl_key. */ +#if defined(ENABLE_SSLKEYLOGFILE) && !defined(HAVE_KEYLOG_CALLBACK) + tap_ssl_key(BACKEND->handle, &BACKEND->tap_state); +#endif + + /* 1 is fine + 0 is "not successful but was shut down controlled" + <0 is "handshake was not successful, because a fatal error occurred" */ + if(1 != err) { + int detail = SSL_get_error(BACKEND->handle, err); + + if(SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ == detail) { + connssl->connecting_state = ssl_connect_2_reading; + return CURLE_OK; + } + if(SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE == detail) { + connssl->connecting_state = ssl_connect_2_writing; + return CURLE_OK; + } + else { + /* untreated error */ + unsigned long errdetail; + char error_buffer[256]=""; + CURLcode result; + long lerr; + int lib; + int reason; + + /* the connection failed, we're not waiting for anything else. */ + connssl->connecting_state = ssl_connect_2; + + /* Get the earliest error code from the thread's error queue and removes + the entry. */ + errdetail = ERR_get_error(); + + /* Extract which lib and reason */ + lib = ERR_GET_LIB(errdetail); + reason = ERR_GET_REASON(errdetail); + + if((lib == ERR_LIB_SSL) && + (reason == SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED)) { + result = CURLE_SSL_CACERT; + + lerr = SSL_get_verify_result(BACKEND->handle); + if(lerr != X509_V_OK) { + *certverifyresult = lerr; + snprintf(error_buffer, sizeof(error_buffer), + "SSL certificate problem: %s", + X509_verify_cert_error_string(lerr)); + } + else + /* strcpy() is fine here as long as the string fits within + error_buffer */ + strcpy(error_buffer, "SSL certificate verification failed"); + } + else { + result = CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR; + ossl_strerror(errdetail, error_buffer, sizeof(error_buffer)); + } + + /* detail is already set to the SSL error above */ + + /* If we e.g. use SSLv2 request-method and the server doesn't like us + * (RST connection etc.), OpenSSL gives no explanation whatsoever and + * the SO_ERROR is also lost. + */ + if(CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR == result && errdetail == 0) { + const char * const hostname = SSL_IS_PROXY() ? + conn->http_proxy.host.name : conn->host.name; + const long int port = SSL_IS_PROXY() ? conn->port : conn->remote_port; + failf(data, OSSL_PACKAGE " SSL_connect: %s in connection to %s:%ld ", + SSL_ERROR_to_str(detail), hostname, port); + return result; + } + + /* Could be a CERT problem */ + failf(data, "%s", error_buffer); + + return result; + } + } + else { + /* we have been connected fine, we're not waiting for anything else. */ + connssl->connecting_state = ssl_connect_3; + + /* Informational message */ + infof(data, "SSL connection using %s / %s\n", + get_ssl_version_txt(BACKEND->handle), + SSL_get_cipher(BACKEND->handle)); + +#ifdef HAS_ALPN + /* Sets data and len to negotiated protocol, len is 0 if no protocol was + * negotiated + */ + if(conn->bits.tls_enable_alpn) { + const unsigned char *neg_protocol; + unsigned int len; + SSL_get0_alpn_selected(BACKEND->handle, &neg_protocol, &len); + if(len != 0) { + infof(data, "ALPN, server accepted to use %.*s\n", len, neg_protocol); + +#ifdef USE_NGHTTP2 + if(len == NGHTTP2_PROTO_VERSION_ID_LEN && + !memcmp(NGHTTP2_PROTO_VERSION_ID, neg_protocol, len)) { + conn->negnpn = CURL_HTTP_VERSION_2; + } + else +#endif + if(len == ALPN_HTTP_1_1_LENGTH && + !memcmp(ALPN_HTTP_1_1, neg_protocol, ALPN_HTTP_1_1_LENGTH)) { + conn->negnpn = CURL_HTTP_VERSION_1_1; + } + } + else + infof(data, "ALPN, server did not agree to a protocol\n"); + } +#endif + + return CURLE_OK; + } +} + +static int asn1_object_dump(ASN1_OBJECT *a, char *buf, size_t len) +{ + int i, ilen; + + ilen = (int)len; + if(ilen < 0) + return 1; /* buffer too big */ + + i = i2t_ASN1_OBJECT(buf, ilen, a); + + if(i >= ilen) + return 1; /* buffer too small */ + + return 0; +} + +#define push_certinfo(_label, _num) \ +do { \ + long info_len = BIO_get_mem_data(mem, &ptr); \ + Curl_ssl_push_certinfo_len(data, _num, _label, ptr, info_len); \ + if(1 != BIO_reset(mem)) \ + break; \ +} WHILE_FALSE + +static void pubkey_show(struct Curl_easy *data, + BIO *mem, + int num, + const char *type, + const char *name, +#ifdef HAVE_OPAQUE_RSA_DSA_DH + const +#endif + BIGNUM *bn) +{ + char *ptr; + char namebuf[32]; + + snprintf(namebuf, sizeof(namebuf), "%s(%s)", type, name); + + if(bn) + BN_print(mem, bn); + push_certinfo(namebuf, num); +} + +#ifdef HAVE_OPAQUE_RSA_DSA_DH +#define print_pubkey_BN(_type, _name, _num) \ + pubkey_show(data, mem, _num, #_type, #_name, _name) + +#else +#define print_pubkey_BN(_type, _name, _num) \ +do { \ + if(_type->_name) { \ + pubkey_show(data, mem, _num, #_type, #_name, _type->_name); \ + } \ +} WHILE_FALSE +#endif + +static int X509V3_ext(struct Curl_easy *data, + int certnum, + CONST_EXTS STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *exts) +{ + int i; + size_t j; + + if((int)sk_X509_EXTENSION_num(exts) <= 0) + /* no extensions, bail out */ + return 1; + + for(i = 0; i < (int)sk_X509_EXTENSION_num(exts); i++) { + ASN1_OBJECT *obj; + X509_EXTENSION *ext = sk_X509_EXTENSION_value(exts, i); + BUF_MEM *biomem; + char buf[512]; + char *ptr = buf; + char namebuf[128]; + BIO *bio_out = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem()); + + if(!bio_out) + return 1; + + obj = X509_EXTENSION_get_object(ext); + + asn1_object_dump(obj, namebuf, sizeof(namebuf)); + + if(!X509V3_EXT_print(bio_out, ext, 0, 0)) + ASN1_STRING_print(bio_out, (ASN1_STRING *)X509_EXTENSION_get_data(ext)); + + BIO_get_mem_ptr(bio_out, &biomem); + + for(j = 0; j < (size_t)biomem->length; j++) { + const char *sep = ""; + if(biomem->data[j] == '\n') { + sep = ", "; + j++; /* skip the newline */ + }; + while((j<(size_t)biomem->length) && (biomem->data[j] == ' ')) + j++; + if(j<(size_t)biomem->length) + ptr += snprintf(ptr, sizeof(buf)-(ptr-buf), "%s%c", sep, + biomem->data[j]); + } + + Curl_ssl_push_certinfo(data, certnum, namebuf, buf); + + BIO_free(bio_out); + + } + return 0; /* all is fine */ +} + +static CURLcode get_cert_chain(struct connectdata *conn, + struct ssl_connect_data *connssl) + +{ + CURLcode result; + STACK_OF(X509) *sk; + int i; + struct Curl_easy *data = conn->data; + int numcerts; + BIO *mem; + + sk = SSL_get_peer_cert_chain(BACKEND->handle); + if(!sk) { + return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; + } + + numcerts = sk_X509_num(sk); + + result = Curl_ssl_init_certinfo(data, numcerts); + if(result) { + return result; + } + + mem = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem()); + + for(i = 0; i < numcerts; i++) { + ASN1_INTEGER *num; + X509 *x = sk_X509_value(sk, i); + EVP_PKEY *pubkey = NULL; + int j; + char *ptr; + const ASN1_BIT_STRING *psig = NULL; + + X509_NAME_print_ex(mem, X509_get_subject_name(x), 0, XN_FLAG_ONELINE); + push_certinfo("Subject", i); + + X509_NAME_print_ex(mem, X509_get_issuer_name(x), 0, XN_FLAG_ONELINE); + push_certinfo("Issuer", i); + + BIO_printf(mem, "%lx", X509_get_version(x)); + push_certinfo("Version", i); + + num = X509_get_serialNumber(x); + if(num->type == V_ASN1_NEG_INTEGER) + BIO_puts(mem, "-"); + for(j = 0; j < num->length; j++) + BIO_printf(mem, "%02x", num->data[j]); + push_certinfo("Serial Number", i); + +#if defined(HAVE_X509_GET0_SIGNATURE) && defined(HAVE_X509_GET0_EXTENSIONS) + { + const X509_ALGOR *palg = NULL; + ASN1_STRING *a = ASN1_STRING_new(); + if(a) { + X509_get0_signature(&psig, &palg, x); + X509_signature_print(mem, palg, a); + ASN1_STRING_free(a); + + if(palg) { + i2a_ASN1_OBJECT(mem, palg->algorithm); + push_certinfo("Public Key Algorithm", i); + } + } + X509V3_ext(data, i, X509_get0_extensions(x)); + } +#else + { + /* before OpenSSL 1.0.2 */ + X509_CINF *cinf = x->cert_info; + + i2a_ASN1_OBJECT(mem, cinf->signature->algorithm); + push_certinfo("Signature Algorithm", i); + + i2a_ASN1_OBJECT(mem, cinf->key->algor->algorithm); + push_certinfo("Public Key Algorithm", i); + + X509V3_ext(data, i, cinf->extensions); + + psig = x->signature; + } +#endif + + ASN1_TIME_print(mem, X509_get0_notBefore(x)); + push_certinfo("Start date", i); + + ASN1_TIME_print(mem, X509_get0_notAfter(x)); + push_certinfo("Expire date", i); + + pubkey = X509_get_pubkey(x); + if(!pubkey) + infof(data, " Unable to load public key\n"); + else { + int pktype; +#ifdef HAVE_OPAQUE_EVP_PKEY + pktype = EVP_PKEY_id(pubkey); +#else + pktype = pubkey->type; +#endif + switch(pktype) { + case EVP_PKEY_RSA: + { + RSA *rsa; +#ifdef HAVE_OPAQUE_EVP_PKEY + rsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(pubkey); +#else + rsa = pubkey->pkey.rsa; +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_OPAQUE_RSA_DSA_DH + { + const BIGNUM *n; + const BIGNUM *e; + + RSA_get0_key(rsa, &n, &e, NULL); + BN_print(mem, n); + push_certinfo("RSA Public Key", i); + print_pubkey_BN(rsa, n, i); + print_pubkey_BN(rsa, e, i); + } +#else + BIO_printf(mem, "%d", BN_num_bits(rsa->n)); + push_certinfo("RSA Public Key", i); + print_pubkey_BN(rsa, n, i); + print_pubkey_BN(rsa, e, i); +#endif + + break; + } + case EVP_PKEY_DSA: + { +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA + DSA *dsa; +#ifdef HAVE_OPAQUE_EVP_PKEY + dsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_DSA(pubkey); +#else + dsa = pubkey->pkey.dsa; +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_OPAQUE_RSA_DSA_DH + { + const BIGNUM *p; + const BIGNUM *q; + const BIGNUM *g; + const BIGNUM *pub_key; + + DSA_get0_pqg(dsa, &p, &q, &g); + DSA_get0_key(dsa, &pub_key, NULL); + + print_pubkey_BN(dsa, p, i); + print_pubkey_BN(dsa, q, i); + print_pubkey_BN(dsa, g, i); + print_pubkey_BN(dsa, pub_key, i); + } +#else + print_pubkey_BN(dsa, p, i); + print_pubkey_BN(dsa, q, i); + print_pubkey_BN(dsa, g, i); + print_pubkey_BN(dsa, pub_key, i); +#endif +#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_DSA */ + break; + } + case EVP_PKEY_DH: + { + DH *dh; +#ifdef HAVE_OPAQUE_EVP_PKEY + dh = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(pubkey); +#else + dh = pubkey->pkey.dh; +#endif +#ifdef HAVE_OPAQUE_RSA_DSA_DH + { + const BIGNUM *p; + const BIGNUM *q; + const BIGNUM *g; + const BIGNUM *pub_key; + DH_get0_pqg(dh, &p, &q, &g); + DH_get0_key(dh, &pub_key, NULL); + print_pubkey_BN(dh, p, i); + print_pubkey_BN(dh, q, i); + print_pubkey_BN(dh, g, i); + print_pubkey_BN(dh, pub_key, i); + } +#else + print_pubkey_BN(dh, p, i); + print_pubkey_BN(dh, g, i); + print_pubkey_BN(dh, pub_key, i); +#endif + break; + } +#if 0 + case EVP_PKEY_EC: /* symbol not present in OpenSSL 0.9.6 */ + /* left TODO */ + break; +#endif + } + EVP_PKEY_free(pubkey); + } + + if(psig) { + for(j = 0; j < psig->length; j++) + BIO_printf(mem, "%02x:", psig->data[j]); + push_certinfo("Signature", i); + } + + PEM_write_bio_X509(mem, x); + push_certinfo("Cert", i); + } + + BIO_free(mem); + + return CURLE_OK; +} + +/* + * Heavily modified from: + * https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Certificate_and_Public_Key_Pinning#OpenSSL + */ +static CURLcode pkp_pin_peer_pubkey(struct Curl_easy *data, X509* cert, + const char *pinnedpubkey) +{ + /* Scratch */ + int len1 = 0, len2 = 0; + unsigned char *buff1 = NULL, *temp = NULL; + + /* Result is returned to caller */ + CURLcode result = CURLE_SSL_PINNEDPUBKEYNOTMATCH; + + /* if a path wasn't specified, don't pin */ + if(!pinnedpubkey) + return CURLE_OK; + + if(!cert) + return result; + + do { + /* Begin Gyrations to get the subjectPublicKeyInfo */ + /* Thanks to Viktor Dukhovni on the OpenSSL mailing list */ + + /* https://groups.google.com/group/mailing.openssl.users/browse_thread + /thread/d61858dae102c6c7 */ + len1 = i2d_X509_PUBKEY(X509_get_X509_PUBKEY(cert), NULL); + if(len1 < 1) + break; /* failed */ + + /* https://www.openssl.org/docs/crypto/buffer.html */ + buff1 = temp = malloc(len1); + if(!buff1) + break; /* failed */ + + /* https://www.openssl.org/docs/crypto/d2i_X509.html */ + len2 = i2d_X509_PUBKEY(X509_get_X509_PUBKEY(cert), &temp); + + /* + * These checks are verifying we got back the same values as when we + * sized the buffer. It's pretty weak since they should always be the + * same. But it gives us something to test. + */ + if((len1 != len2) || !temp || ((temp - buff1) != len1)) + break; /* failed */ + + /* End Gyrations */ + + /* The one good exit point */ + result = Curl_pin_peer_pubkey(data, pinnedpubkey, buff1, len1); + } while(0); + + /* https://www.openssl.org/docs/crypto/buffer.html */ + if(buff1) + free(buff1); + + return result; +} + +/* + * Get the server cert, verify it and show it etc, only call failf() if the + * 'strict' argument is TRUE as otherwise all this is for informational + * purposes only! + * + * We check certificates to authenticate the server; otherwise we risk + * man-in-the-middle attack. + */ +static CURLcode servercert(struct connectdata *conn, + struct ssl_connect_data *connssl, + bool strict) +{ + CURLcode result = CURLE_OK; + int rc; + long lerr, len; + struct Curl_easy *data = conn->data; + X509 *issuer; + FILE *fp; + char buffer[2048]; + const char *ptr; + long * const certverifyresult = SSL_IS_PROXY() ? + &data->set.proxy_ssl.certverifyresult : &data->set.ssl.certverifyresult; + BIO *mem = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem()); + + if(data->set.ssl.certinfo) + /* we've been asked to gather certificate info! */ + (void)get_cert_chain(conn, connssl); + + BACKEND->server_cert = SSL_get_peer_certificate(BACKEND->handle); + if(!BACKEND->server_cert) { + BIO_free(mem); + if(!strict) + return CURLE_OK; + + failf(data, "SSL: couldn't get peer certificate!"); + return CURLE_PEER_FAILED_VERIFICATION; + } + + infof(data, "%s certificate:\n", SSL_IS_PROXY() ? "Proxy" : "Server"); + + rc = x509_name_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(BACKEND->server_cert), + buffer, sizeof(buffer)); + infof(data, " subject: %s\n", rc?"[NONE]":buffer); + + ASN1_TIME_print(mem, X509_get0_notBefore(BACKEND->server_cert)); + len = BIO_get_mem_data(mem, (char **) &ptr); + infof(data, " start date: %.*s\n", len, ptr); + (void)BIO_reset(mem); + + ASN1_TIME_print(mem, X509_get0_notAfter(BACKEND->server_cert)); + len = BIO_get_mem_data(mem, (char **) &ptr); + infof(data, " expire date: %.*s\n", len, ptr); + (void)BIO_reset(mem); + + BIO_free(mem); + + if(SSL_CONN_CONFIG(verifyhost)) { + result = verifyhost(conn, BACKEND->server_cert); + if(result) { + X509_free(BACKEND->server_cert); + BACKEND->server_cert = NULL; + return result; + } + } + + rc = x509_name_oneline(X509_get_issuer_name(BACKEND->server_cert), + buffer, sizeof(buffer)); + if(rc) { + if(strict) + failf(data, "SSL: couldn't get X509-issuer name!"); + result = CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR; + } + else { + infof(data, " issuer: %s\n", buffer); + + /* We could do all sorts of certificate verification stuff here before + deallocating the certificate. */ + + /* e.g. match issuer name with provided issuer certificate */ + if(SSL_SET_OPTION(issuercert)) { + fp = fopen(SSL_SET_OPTION(issuercert), FOPEN_READTEXT); + if(!fp) { + if(strict) + failf(data, "SSL: Unable to open issuer cert (%s)", + SSL_SET_OPTION(issuercert)); + X509_free(BACKEND->server_cert); + BACKEND->server_cert = NULL; + return CURLE_SSL_ISSUER_ERROR; + } + + issuer = PEM_read_X509(fp, NULL, ZERO_NULL, NULL); + if(!issuer) { + if(strict) + failf(data, "SSL: Unable to read issuer cert (%s)", + SSL_SET_OPTION(issuercert)); + X509_free(BACKEND->server_cert); + X509_free(issuer); + fclose(fp); + return CURLE_SSL_ISSUER_ERROR; + } + + fclose(fp); + + if(X509_check_issued(issuer, BACKEND->server_cert) != X509_V_OK) { + if(strict) + failf(data, "SSL: Certificate issuer check failed (%s)", + SSL_SET_OPTION(issuercert)); + X509_free(BACKEND->server_cert); + X509_free(issuer); + BACKEND->server_cert = NULL; + return CURLE_SSL_ISSUER_ERROR; + } + + infof(data, " SSL certificate issuer check ok (%s)\n", + SSL_SET_OPTION(issuercert)); + X509_free(issuer); + } + + lerr = *certverifyresult = SSL_get_verify_result(BACKEND->handle); + + if(*certverifyresult != X509_V_OK) { + if(SSL_CONN_CONFIG(verifypeer)) { + /* We probably never reach this, because SSL_connect() will fail + and we return earlier if verifypeer is set? */ + if(strict) + failf(data, "SSL certificate verify result: %s (%ld)", + X509_verify_cert_error_string(lerr), lerr); + result = CURLE_PEER_FAILED_VERIFICATION; + } + else + infof(data, " SSL certificate verify result: %s (%ld)," + " continuing anyway.\n", + X509_verify_cert_error_string(lerr), lerr); + } + else + infof(data, " SSL certificate verify ok.\n"); + } + +#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x0090808fL) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && \ + !defined(OPENSSL_NO_OCSP) + if(SSL_CONN_CONFIG(verifystatus)) { + result = verifystatus(conn, connssl); + if(result) { + X509_free(BACKEND->server_cert); + BACKEND->server_cert = NULL; + return result; + } + } +#endif + + if(!strict) + /* when not strict, we don't bother about the verify cert problems */ + result = CURLE_OK; + + ptr = SSL_IS_PROXY() ? data->set.str[STRING_SSL_PINNEDPUBLICKEY_PROXY] : + data->set.str[STRING_SSL_PINNEDPUBLICKEY_ORIG]; + if(!result && ptr) { + result = pkp_pin_peer_pubkey(data, BACKEND->server_cert, ptr); + if(result) + failf(data, "SSL: public key does not match pinned public key!"); + } + + X509_free(BACKEND->server_cert); + BACKEND->server_cert = NULL; + connssl->connecting_state = ssl_connect_done; + + return result; +} + +static CURLcode ossl_connect_step3(struct connectdata *conn, int sockindex) +{ + CURLcode result = CURLE_OK; + struct Curl_easy *data = conn->data; + struct ssl_connect_data *connssl = &conn->ssl[sockindex]; + + DEBUGASSERT(ssl_connect_3 == connssl->connecting_state); + + if(SSL_SET_OPTION(primary.sessionid)) { + bool incache; + SSL_SESSION *our_ssl_sessionid; + void *old_ssl_sessionid = NULL; + + our_ssl_sessionid = SSL_get1_session(BACKEND->handle); + + /* SSL_get1_session() will increment the reference count and the session + will stay in memory until explicitly freed with SSL_SESSION_free(3), + regardless of its state. */ + + Curl_ssl_sessionid_lock(conn); + incache = !(Curl_ssl_getsessionid(conn, &old_ssl_sessionid, NULL, + sockindex)); + if(incache) { + if(old_ssl_sessionid != our_ssl_sessionid) { + infof(data, "old SSL session ID is stale, removing\n"); + Curl_ssl_delsessionid(conn, old_ssl_sessionid); + incache = FALSE; + } + } + + if(!incache) { + result = Curl_ssl_addsessionid(conn, our_ssl_sessionid, + 0 /* unknown size */, sockindex); + if(result) { + Curl_ssl_sessionid_unlock(conn); + failf(data, "failed to store ssl session"); + return result; + } + } + else { + /* Session was incache, so refcount already incremented earlier. + * Avoid further increments with each SSL_get1_session() call. + * This does not free the session as refcount remains > 0 + */ + SSL_SESSION_free(our_ssl_sessionid); + } + Curl_ssl_sessionid_unlock(conn); + } + + /* + * We check certificates to authenticate the server; otherwise we risk + * man-in-the-middle attack; NEVERTHELESS, if we're told explicitly not to + * verify the peer ignore faults and failures from the server cert + * operations. + */ + + result = servercert(conn, connssl, (SSL_CONN_CONFIG(verifypeer) || + SSL_CONN_CONFIG(verifyhost))); + + if(!result) + connssl->connecting_state = ssl_connect_done; + + return result; +} + +static Curl_recv ossl_recv; +static Curl_send ossl_send; + +static CURLcode ossl_connect_common(struct connectdata *conn, + int sockindex, + bool nonblocking, + bool *done) +{ + CURLcode result; + struct Curl_easy *data = conn->data; + struct ssl_connect_data *connssl = &conn->ssl[sockindex]; + curl_socket_t sockfd = conn->sock[sockindex]; + time_t timeout_ms; + int what; + + /* check if the connection has already been established */ + if(ssl_connection_complete == connssl->state) { + *done = TRUE; + return CURLE_OK; + } + + if(ssl_connect_1 == connssl->connecting_state) { + /* Find out how much more time we're allowed */ + timeout_ms = Curl_timeleft(data, NULL, TRUE); + + if(timeout_ms < 0) { + /* no need to continue if time already is up */ + failf(data, "SSL connection timeout"); + return CURLE_OPERATION_TIMEDOUT; + } + + result = ossl_connect_step1(conn, sockindex); + if(result) + return result; + } + + while(ssl_connect_2 == connssl->connecting_state || + ssl_connect_2_reading == connssl->connecting_state || + ssl_connect_2_writing == connssl->connecting_state) { + + /* check allowed time left */ + timeout_ms = Curl_timeleft(data, NULL, TRUE); + + if(timeout_ms < 0) { + /* no need to continue if time already is up */ + failf(data, "SSL connection timeout"); + return CURLE_OPERATION_TIMEDOUT; + } + + /* if ssl is expecting something, check if it's available. */ + if(connssl->connecting_state == ssl_connect_2_reading || + connssl->connecting_state == ssl_connect_2_writing) { + + curl_socket_t writefd = ssl_connect_2_writing == + connssl->connecting_state?sockfd:CURL_SOCKET_BAD; + curl_socket_t readfd = ssl_connect_2_reading == + connssl->connecting_state?sockfd:CURL_SOCKET_BAD; + + what = Curl_socket_check(readfd, CURL_SOCKET_BAD, writefd, + nonblocking?0:timeout_ms); + if(what < 0) { + /* fatal error */ + failf(data, "select/poll on SSL socket, errno: %d", SOCKERRNO); + return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR; + } + if(0 == what) { + if(nonblocking) { + *done = FALSE; + return CURLE_OK; + } + /* timeout */ + failf(data, "SSL connection timeout"); + return CURLE_OPERATION_TIMEDOUT; + } + /* socket is readable or writable */ + } + + /* Run transaction, and return to the caller if it failed or if this + * connection is done nonblocking and this loop would execute again. This + * permits the owner of a multi handle to abort a connection attempt + * before step2 has completed while ensuring that a client using select() + * or epoll() will always have a valid fdset to wait on. + */ + result = ossl_connect_step2(conn, sockindex); + if(result || (nonblocking && + (ssl_connect_2 == connssl->connecting_state || + ssl_connect_2_reading == connssl->connecting_state || + ssl_connect_2_writing == connssl->connecting_state))) + return result; + + } /* repeat step2 until all transactions are done. */ + + if(ssl_connect_3 == connssl->connecting_state) { + result = ossl_connect_step3(conn, sockindex); + if(result) + return result; + } + + if(ssl_connect_done == connssl->connecting_state) { + connssl->state = ssl_connection_complete; + conn->recv[sockindex] = ossl_recv; + conn->send[sockindex] = ossl_send; + *done = TRUE; + } + else + *done = FALSE; + + /* Reset our connect state machine */ + connssl->connecting_state = ssl_connect_1; + + return CURLE_OK; +} + +static CURLcode Curl_ossl_connect_nonblocking(struct connectdata *conn, + int sockindex, + bool *done) +{ + return ossl_connect_common(conn, sockindex, TRUE, done); +} + +static CURLcode Curl_ossl_connect(struct connectdata *conn, int sockindex) +{ + CURLcode result; + bool done = FALSE; + + result = ossl_connect_common(conn, sockindex, FALSE, &done); + if(result) + return result; + + DEBUGASSERT(done); + + return CURLE_OK; +} + +static bool Curl_ossl_data_pending(const struct connectdata *conn, + int connindex) +{ + const struct ssl_connect_data *connssl = &conn->ssl[connindex]; + const struct ssl_connect_data *proxyssl = &conn->proxy_ssl[connindex]; + + if(connssl->backend->handle && SSL_pending(connssl->backend->handle)) + return TRUE; + + if(proxyssl->backend->handle && SSL_pending(proxyssl->backend->handle)) + return TRUE; + + return FALSE; +} + +static size_t Curl_ossl_version(char *buffer, size_t size); + +static ssize_t ossl_send(struct connectdata *conn, + int sockindex, + const void *mem, + size_t len, + CURLcode *curlcode) +{ + /* SSL_write() is said to return 'int' while write() and send() returns + 'size_t' */ + int err; + char error_buffer[256]; + unsigned long sslerror; + int memlen; + int rc; + struct ssl_connect_data *connssl = &conn->ssl[sockindex]; + + ERR_clear_error(); + + memlen = (len > (size_t)INT_MAX) ? INT_MAX : (int)len; + rc = SSL_write(BACKEND->handle, mem, memlen); + + if(rc <= 0) { + err = SSL_get_error(BACKEND->handle, rc); + + switch(err) { + case SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ: + case SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE: + /* The operation did not complete; the same TLS/SSL I/O function + should be called again later. This is basically an EWOULDBLOCK + equivalent. */ + *curlcode = CURLE_AGAIN; + return -1; + case SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL: + failf(conn->data, "SSL_write() returned SYSCALL, errno = %d", + SOCKERRNO); + *curlcode = CURLE_SEND_ERROR; + return -1; + case SSL_ERROR_SSL: + /* A failure in the SSL library occurred, usually a protocol error. + The OpenSSL error queue contains more information on the error. */ + sslerror = ERR_get_error(); + if(ERR_GET_LIB(sslerror) == ERR_LIB_SSL && + ERR_GET_REASON(sslerror) == SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET && + conn->ssl[sockindex].state == ssl_connection_complete && + conn->proxy_ssl[sockindex].state == ssl_connection_complete) { + char ver[120]; + Curl_ossl_version(ver, 120); + failf(conn->data, "Error: %s does not support double SSL tunneling.", + ver); + } + else + failf(conn->data, "SSL_write() error: %s", + ossl_strerror(sslerror, error_buffer, sizeof(error_buffer))); + *curlcode = CURLE_SEND_ERROR; + return -1; + } + /* a true error */ + failf(conn->data, OSSL_PACKAGE " SSL_write: %s, errno %d", + SSL_ERROR_to_str(err), SOCKERRNO); + *curlcode = CURLE_SEND_ERROR; + return -1; + } + *curlcode = CURLE_OK; + return (ssize_t)rc; /* number of bytes */ +} + +static ssize_t ossl_recv(struct connectdata *conn, /* connection data */ + int num, /* socketindex */ + char *buf, /* store read data here */ + size_t buffersize, /* max amount to read */ + CURLcode *curlcode) +{ + char error_buffer[256]; + unsigned long sslerror; + ssize_t nread; + int buffsize; + struct ssl_connect_data *connssl = &conn->ssl[num]; + + ERR_clear_error(); + + buffsize = (buffersize > (size_t)INT_MAX) ? INT_MAX : (int)buffersize; + nread = (ssize_t)SSL_read(BACKEND->handle, buf, buffsize); + if(nread <= 0) { + /* failed SSL_read */ + int err = SSL_get_error(BACKEND->handle, (int)nread); + + switch(err) { + case SSL_ERROR_NONE: /* this is not an error */ + case SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN: /* no more data */ + break; + case SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ: + case SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE: + /* there's data pending, re-invoke SSL_read() */ + *curlcode = CURLE_AGAIN; + return -1; + default: + /* openssl/ssl.h for SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL says "look at error stack/return + value/errno" */ + /* https://www.openssl.org/docs/crypto/ERR_get_error.html */ + sslerror = ERR_get_error(); + if((nread < 0) || sslerror) { + /* If the return code was negative or there actually is an error in the + queue */ + failf(conn->data, OSSL_PACKAGE " SSL_read: %s, errno %d", + (sslerror ? + ossl_strerror(sslerror, error_buffer, sizeof(error_buffer)) : + SSL_ERROR_to_str(err)), + SOCKERRNO); + *curlcode = CURLE_RECV_ERROR; + return -1; + } + } + } + return nread; +} + +static size_t Curl_ossl_version(char *buffer, size_t size) +{ +#ifdef OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL + return snprintf(buffer, size, OSSL_PACKAGE); +#else /* OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL */ + char sub[3]; + unsigned long ssleay_value; + sub[2]='\0'; + sub[1]='\0'; + ssleay_value = OpenSSL_version_num(); + if(ssleay_value < 0x906000) { + ssleay_value = SSLEAY_VERSION_NUMBER; + sub[0]='\0'; + } + else { + if(ssleay_value&0xff0) { + int minor_ver = (ssleay_value >> 4) & 0xff; + if(minor_ver > 26) { + /* handle extended version introduced for 0.9.8za */ + sub[1] = (char) ((minor_ver - 1) % 26 + 'a' + 1); + sub[0] = 'z'; + } + else { + sub[0] = (char) (minor_ver + 'a' - 1); + } + } + else + sub[0]='\0'; + } + + return snprintf(buffer, size, "%s/%lx.%lx.%lx%s", + OSSL_PACKAGE, + (ssleay_value>>28)&0xf, + (ssleay_value>>20)&0xff, + (ssleay_value>>12)&0xff, + sub); +#endif /* OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL */ +} + +/* can be called with data == NULL */ +static CURLcode Curl_ossl_random(struct Curl_easy *data, + unsigned char *entropy, size_t length) +{ + int rc; + if(data) { + if(Curl_ossl_seed(data)) /* Initiate the seed if not already done */ + return CURLE_FAILED_INIT; /* couldn't seed for some reason */ + } + else { + if(!rand_enough()) + return CURLE_FAILED_INIT; + } + /* RAND_bytes() returns 1 on success, 0 otherwise. */ + rc = RAND_bytes(entropy, curlx_uztosi(length)); + return (rc == 1 ? CURLE_OK : CURLE_FAILED_INIT); +} + +static CURLcode Curl_ossl_md5sum(unsigned char *tmp, /* input */ + size_t tmplen, + unsigned char *md5sum /* output */, + size_t unused) +{ + MD5_CTX MD5pw; + (void)unused; + MD5_Init(&MD5pw); + MD5_Update(&MD5pw, tmp, tmplen); + MD5_Final(md5sum, &MD5pw); + return CURLE_OK; +} + +#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x0090800fL) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SHA256) +static void Curl_ossl_sha256sum(const unsigned char *tmp, /* input */ + size_t tmplen, + unsigned char *sha256sum /* output */, + size_t unused) +{ + SHA256_CTX SHA256pw; + (void)unused; + SHA256_Init(&SHA256pw); + SHA256_Update(&SHA256pw, tmp, tmplen); + SHA256_Final(sha256sum, &SHA256pw); +} +#endif + +static bool Curl_ossl_cert_status_request(void) +{ +#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x0090808fL) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && \ + !defined(OPENSSL_NO_OCSP) + return TRUE; +#else + return FALSE; +#endif +} + +static void *Curl_ossl_get_internals(struct ssl_connect_data *connssl, + CURLINFO info) +{ + /* Legacy: CURLINFO_TLS_SESSION must return an SSL_CTX pointer. */ + return info == CURLINFO_TLS_SESSION ? + (void *)BACKEND->ctx : (void *)BACKEND->handle; +} + +const struct Curl_ssl Curl_ssl_openssl = { + { CURLSSLBACKEND_OPENSSL, "openssl" }, /* info */ + + 1, /* have_ca_path */ + 1, /* have_certinfo */ + 1, /* have_pinnedpubkey */ + 1, /* have_ssl_ctx */ + 1, /* support_https_proxy */ + + sizeof(struct ssl_backend_data), + + Curl_ossl_init, /* init */ + Curl_ossl_cleanup, /* cleanup */ + Curl_ossl_version, /* version */ + Curl_ossl_check_cxn, /* check_cxn */ + Curl_ossl_shutdown, /* shutdown */ + Curl_ossl_data_pending, /* data_pending */ + Curl_ossl_random, /* random */ + Curl_ossl_cert_status_request, /* cert_status_request */ + Curl_ossl_connect, /* connect */ + Curl_ossl_connect_nonblocking, /* connect_nonblocking */ + Curl_ossl_get_internals, /* get_internals */ + Curl_ossl_close, /* close_one */ + Curl_ossl_close_all, /* close_all */ + Curl_ossl_session_free, /* session_free */ + Curl_ossl_set_engine, /* set_engine */ + Curl_ossl_set_engine_default, /* set_engine_default */ + Curl_ossl_engines_list, /* engines_list */ + Curl_none_false_start, /* false_start */ + Curl_ossl_md5sum, /* md5sum */ +#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x0090800fL) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SHA256) + Curl_ossl_sha256sum /* sha256sum */ +#else + NULL /* sha256sum */ +#endif +}; + +#endif /* USE_OPENSSL */ |