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-rw-r--r--lib/vtls/schannel_verify.c551
1 files changed, 551 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/lib/vtls/schannel_verify.c b/lib/vtls/schannel_verify.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..db187dd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/vtls/schannel_verify.c
@@ -0,0 +1,551 @@
+/***************************************************************************
+ * _ _ ____ _
+ * Project ___| | | | _ \| |
+ * / __| | | | |_) | |
+ * | (__| |_| | _ <| |___
+ * \___|\___/|_| \_\_____|
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2012 - 2016, Marc Hoersken, <info@marc-hoersken.de>
+ * Copyright (C) 2012, Mark Salisbury, <mark.salisbury@hp.com>
+ * Copyright (C) 2012 - 2018, Daniel Stenberg, <daniel@haxx.se>, et al.
+ *
+ * This software is licensed as described in the file COPYING, which
+ * you should have received as part of this distribution. The terms
+ * are also available at https://curl.haxx.se/docs/copyright.html.
+ *
+ * You may opt to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute and/or sell
+ * copies of the Software, and permit persons to whom the Software is
+ * furnished to do so, under the terms of the COPYING file.
+ *
+ * This software is distributed on an "AS IS" basis, WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY
+ * KIND, either express or implied.
+ *
+ ***************************************************************************/
+
+/*
+ * Source file for SChannel-specific certificate verification. This code should
+ * only be invoked by code in schannel.c.
+ */
+
+#include "curl_setup.h"
+
+#ifdef USE_SCHANNEL
+
+#define EXPOSE_SCHANNEL_INTERNAL_STRUCTS
+
+#ifndef USE_WINDOWS_SSPI
+# error "Can't compile SCHANNEL support without SSPI."
+#endif
+
+#include "schannel.h"
+#include "vtls.h"
+#include "sendf.h"
+#include "strerror.h"
+#include "curl_multibyte.h"
+#include "curl_printf.h"
+#include "hostcheck.h"
+#include "system_win32.h"
+
+/* The last #include file should be: */
+#include "curl_memory.h"
+#include "memdebug.h"
+
+#define BACKEND connssl->backend
+
+#define MAX_CAFILE_SIZE 1048576 /* 1 MiB */
+#define BEGIN_CERT "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\n"
+#define END_CERT "\n-----END CERTIFICATE-----"
+
+typedef struct {
+ DWORD cbSize;
+ HCERTSTORE hRestrictedRoot;
+ HCERTSTORE hRestrictedTrust;
+ HCERTSTORE hRestrictedOther;
+ DWORD cAdditionalStore;
+ HCERTSTORE *rghAdditionalStore;
+ DWORD dwFlags;
+ DWORD dwUrlRetrievalTimeout;
+ DWORD MaximumCachedCertificates;
+ DWORD CycleDetectionModulus;
+ HCERTSTORE hExclusiveRoot;
+ HCERTSTORE hExclusiveTrustedPeople;
+} CERT_CHAIN_ENGINE_CONFIG_WIN7, *PCERT_CHAIN_ENGINE_CONFIG_WIN7;
+
+
+static CURLcode add_certs_to_store(HCERTSTORE trust_store,
+ const char *ca_file,
+ struct connectdata *conn)
+{
+ CURLcode result;
+ struct Curl_easy *data = conn->data;
+ HANDLE ca_file_handle = INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE;
+ LARGE_INTEGER file_size;
+ char *ca_file_buffer = NULL;
+ char *current_ca_file_ptr = NULL;
+ const TCHAR *ca_file_tstr = NULL;
+ size_t ca_file_bufsize = 0;
+ DWORD total_bytes_read = 0;
+ bool more_certs = 0;
+ int num_certs = 0;
+ size_t END_CERT_LEN;
+
+ ca_file_tstr = Curl_convert_UTF8_to_tchar(ca_file);
+ if(!ca_file_tstr) {
+ failf(data,
+ "schannel: invalid path name for CA file '%s': %s",
+ ca_file, Curl_strerror(conn, GetLastError()));
+ result = CURLE_SSL_CACERT_BADFILE;
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Read the CA file completely into memory before parsing it. This
+ * optimizes for the common case where the CA file will be relatively
+ * small ( < 1 MiB ).
+ */
+ ca_file_handle = CreateFile(ca_file_tstr,
+ GENERIC_READ,
+ 0,
+ NULL,
+ OPEN_EXISTING,
+ FILE_ATTRIBUTE_NORMAL,
+ NULL);
+ if(ca_file_handle == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE) {
+ failf(data,
+ "schannel: failed to open CA file '%s': %s",
+ ca_file, Curl_strerror(conn, GetLastError()));
+ result = CURLE_SSL_CACERT_BADFILE;
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ if(!GetFileSizeEx(ca_file_handle, &file_size)) {
+ failf(data,
+ "schannel: failed to determine size of CA file '%s': %s",
+ ca_file, Curl_strerror(conn, GetLastError()));
+ result = CURLE_SSL_CACERT_BADFILE;
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ if(file_size.QuadPart > MAX_CAFILE_SIZE) {
+ failf(data,
+ "schannel: CA file exceeds max size of %u bytes",
+ MAX_CAFILE_SIZE);
+ result = CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ ca_file_bufsize = (size_t)file_size.QuadPart;
+ ca_file_buffer = (char *)malloc(ca_file_bufsize + 1);
+ if(!ca_file_buffer) {
+ result = CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ result = CURLE_OK;
+ while(total_bytes_read < ca_file_bufsize) {
+ DWORD bytes_to_read = (DWORD)(ca_file_bufsize - total_bytes_read);
+ DWORD bytes_read = 0;
+
+ if(!ReadFile(ca_file_handle, ca_file_buffer + total_bytes_read,
+ bytes_to_read, &bytes_read, NULL)) {
+
+ failf(data,
+ "schannel: failed to read from CA file '%s': %s",
+ ca_file, Curl_strerror(conn, GetLastError()));
+ result = CURLE_SSL_CACERT_BADFILE;
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ if(bytes_read == 0) {
+ /* Premature EOF -- adjust the bufsize to the new value */
+ ca_file_bufsize = total_bytes_read;
+ }
+ else {
+ total_bytes_read += bytes_read;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Null terminate the buffer */
+ ca_file_buffer[ca_file_bufsize] = '\0';
+
+ if(result != CURLE_OK) {
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ END_CERT_LEN = strlen(END_CERT);
+
+ more_certs = 1;
+ current_ca_file_ptr = ca_file_buffer;
+ while(more_certs && *current_ca_file_ptr != '\0') {
+ char *begin_cert_ptr = strstr(current_ca_file_ptr, BEGIN_CERT);
+ if(!begin_cert_ptr) {
+ more_certs = 0;
+ }
+ else {
+ char *end_cert_ptr = strstr(begin_cert_ptr, END_CERT);
+ if(!end_cert_ptr) {
+ failf(data,
+ "schannel: CA file '%s' is not correctly formatted",
+ ca_file);
+ result = CURLE_SSL_CACERT_BADFILE;
+ more_certs = 0;
+ }
+ else {
+ CERT_BLOB cert_blob;
+ CERT_CONTEXT *cert_context = NULL;
+ BOOL add_cert_result = FALSE;
+ DWORD actual_content_type = 0;
+ DWORD cert_size = (DWORD)
+ ((end_cert_ptr + END_CERT_LEN) - begin_cert_ptr);
+
+ cert_blob.pbData = (BYTE *)begin_cert_ptr;
+ cert_blob.cbData = cert_size;
+ if(!CryptQueryObject(CERT_QUERY_OBJECT_BLOB,
+ &cert_blob,
+ CERT_QUERY_CONTENT_FLAG_CERT,
+ CERT_QUERY_FORMAT_FLAG_ALL,
+ 0,
+ NULL,
+ &actual_content_type,
+ NULL,
+ NULL,
+ NULL,
+ &cert_context)) {
+
+ failf(data,
+ "schannel: failed to extract certificate from CA file "
+ "'%s': %s",
+ ca_file, Curl_strerror(conn, GetLastError()));
+ result = CURLE_SSL_CACERT_BADFILE;
+ more_certs = 0;
+ }
+ else {
+ current_ca_file_ptr = begin_cert_ptr + cert_size;
+
+ /* Sanity check that the cert_context object is the right type */
+ if(CERT_QUERY_CONTENT_CERT != actual_content_type) {
+ failf(data,
+ "schannel: unexpected content type '%d' when extracting "
+ "certificate from CA file '%s'",
+ actual_content_type, ca_file);
+ result = CURLE_SSL_CACERT_BADFILE;
+ more_certs = 0;
+ }
+ else {
+ add_cert_result =
+ CertAddCertificateContextToStore(trust_store,
+ cert_context,
+ CERT_STORE_ADD_ALWAYS,
+ NULL);
+ CertFreeCertificateContext(cert_context);
+ if(!add_cert_result) {
+ failf(data,
+ "schannel: failed to add certificate from CA file '%s'"
+ "to certificate store: %s",
+ ca_file, Curl_strerror(conn, GetLastError()));
+ result = CURLE_SSL_CACERT_BADFILE;
+ more_certs = 0;
+ }
+ else {
+ num_certs++;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ if(result == CURLE_OK) {
+ if(!num_certs) {
+ infof(data,
+ "schannel: did not add any certificates from CA file '%s'\n",
+ ca_file);
+ }
+ else {
+ infof(data,
+ "schannel: added %d certificate(s) from CA file '%s'\n",
+ num_certs, ca_file);
+ }
+ }
+
+cleanup:
+ if(ca_file_handle != INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE) {
+ CloseHandle(ca_file_handle);
+ }
+ Curl_safefree(ca_file_buffer);
+ Curl_unicodefree(ca_file_tstr);
+
+ return result;
+}
+
+static CURLcode verify_host(struct Curl_easy *data,
+ CERT_CONTEXT *pCertContextServer,
+ const char * const conn_hostname)
+{
+ CURLcode result = CURLE_PEER_FAILED_VERIFICATION;
+ TCHAR *cert_hostname_buff = NULL;
+ size_t cert_hostname_buff_index = 0;
+ DWORD len = 0;
+ DWORD actual_len = 0;
+
+ /* CertGetNameString will provide the 8-bit character string without
+ * any decoding */
+ DWORD name_flags = CERT_NAME_DISABLE_IE4_UTF8_FLAG;
+
+#ifdef CERT_NAME_SEARCH_ALL_NAMES_FLAG
+ name_flags |= CERT_NAME_SEARCH_ALL_NAMES_FLAG;
+#endif
+
+ /* Determine the size of the string needed for the cert hostname */
+ len = CertGetNameString(pCertContextServer,
+ CERT_NAME_DNS_TYPE,
+ name_flags,
+ NULL,
+ NULL,
+ 0);
+ if(len == 0) {
+ failf(data,
+ "schannel: CertGetNameString() returned no "
+ "certificate name information");
+ result = CURLE_PEER_FAILED_VERIFICATION;
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ /* CertGetNameString guarantees that the returned name will not contain
+ * embedded null bytes. This appears to be undocumented behavior.
+ */
+ cert_hostname_buff = (LPTSTR)malloc(len * sizeof(TCHAR));
+ actual_len = CertGetNameString(pCertContextServer,
+ CERT_NAME_DNS_TYPE,
+ name_flags,
+ NULL,
+ (LPTSTR) cert_hostname_buff,
+ len);
+
+ /* Sanity check */
+ if(actual_len != len) {
+ failf(data,
+ "schannel: CertGetNameString() returned certificate "
+ "name information of unexpected size");
+ result = CURLE_PEER_FAILED_VERIFICATION;
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ /* If HAVE_CERT_NAME_SEARCH_ALL_NAMES is available, the output
+ * will contain all DNS names, where each name is null-terminated
+ * and the last DNS name is double null-terminated. Due to this
+ * encoding, use the length of the buffer to iterate over all names.
+ */
+ result = CURLE_PEER_FAILED_VERIFICATION;
+ while(cert_hostname_buff_index < len &&
+ cert_hostname_buff[cert_hostname_buff_index] != TEXT('\0') &&
+ result == CURLE_PEER_FAILED_VERIFICATION) {
+
+ char *cert_hostname;
+
+ /* Comparing the cert name and the connection hostname encoded as UTF-8
+ * is acceptable since both values are assumed to use ASCII
+ * (or some equivalent) encoding
+ */
+ cert_hostname = Curl_convert_tchar_to_UTF8(
+ &cert_hostname_buff[cert_hostname_buff_index]);
+ if(!cert_hostname) {
+ result = CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
+ }
+ else {
+ int match_result;
+
+ match_result = Curl_cert_hostcheck(cert_hostname, conn_hostname);
+ if(match_result == CURL_HOST_MATCH) {
+ infof(data,
+ "schannel: connection hostname (%s) validated "
+ "against certificate name (%s)\n",
+ conn_hostname, cert_hostname);
+ result = CURLE_OK;
+ }
+ else {
+ size_t cert_hostname_len;
+
+ infof(data,
+ "schannel: connection hostname (%s) did not match "
+ "against certificate name (%s)\n",
+ conn_hostname, cert_hostname);
+
+ cert_hostname_len = _tcslen(
+ &cert_hostname_buff[cert_hostname_buff_index]);
+
+ /* Move on to next cert name */
+ cert_hostname_buff_index += cert_hostname_len + 1;
+
+ result = CURLE_PEER_FAILED_VERIFICATION;
+ }
+ Curl_unicodefree(cert_hostname);
+ }
+ }
+
+ if(result == CURLE_PEER_FAILED_VERIFICATION) {
+ failf(data,
+ "schannel: CertGetNameString() failed to match "
+ "connection hostname (%s) against server certificate names",
+ conn_hostname);
+ }
+ else if(result != CURLE_OK)
+ failf(data, "schannel: server certificate name verification failed");
+
+cleanup:
+ Curl_unicodefree(cert_hostname_buff);
+
+ return result;
+}
+
+CURLcode verify_certificate(struct connectdata *conn, int sockindex)
+{
+ SECURITY_STATUS status;
+ struct Curl_easy *data = conn->data;
+ struct ssl_connect_data *connssl = &conn->ssl[sockindex];
+ CURLcode result = CURLE_OK;
+ CERT_CONTEXT *pCertContextServer = NULL;
+ const CERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT *pChainContext = NULL;
+ HCERTCHAINENGINE cert_chain_engine = NULL;
+ HCERTSTORE trust_store = NULL;
+ const char * const conn_hostname = SSL_IS_PROXY() ?
+ conn->http_proxy.host.name :
+ conn->host.name;
+
+ status = s_pSecFn->QueryContextAttributes(&BACKEND->ctxt->ctxt_handle,
+ SECPKG_ATTR_REMOTE_CERT_CONTEXT,
+ &pCertContextServer);
+
+ if((status != SEC_E_OK) || (pCertContextServer == NULL)) {
+ failf(data, "schannel: Failed to read remote certificate context: %s",
+ Curl_sspi_strerror(conn, status));
+ result = CURLE_PEER_FAILED_VERIFICATION;
+ }
+
+ if(result == CURLE_OK && SSL_CONN_CONFIG(CAfile) &&
+ BACKEND->use_manual_cred_validation) {
+ /*
+ * Create a chain engine that uses the certificates in the CA file as
+ * trusted certificates. This is only supported on Windows 7+.
+ */
+
+ if(Curl_verify_windows_version(6, 1, PLATFORM_WINNT, VERSION_LESS_THAN)) {
+ failf(data, "schannel: this version of Windows is too old to support "
+ "certificate verification via CA bundle file.");
+ result = CURLE_SSL_CACERT_BADFILE;
+ }
+ else {
+ /* Open the certificate store */
+ trust_store = CertOpenStore(CERT_STORE_PROV_MEMORY,
+ 0,
+ (HCRYPTPROV)NULL,
+ CERT_STORE_CREATE_NEW_FLAG,
+ NULL);
+ if(!trust_store) {
+ failf(data, "schannel: failed to create certificate store: %s",
+ Curl_strerror(conn, GetLastError()));
+ result = CURLE_SSL_CACERT_BADFILE;
+ }
+ else {
+ result = add_certs_to_store(trust_store, SSL_CONN_CONFIG(CAfile),
+ conn);
+ }
+ }
+
+ if(result == CURLE_OK) {
+ CERT_CHAIN_ENGINE_CONFIG_WIN7 engine_config;
+ BOOL create_engine_result;
+
+ memset(&engine_config, 0, sizeof(engine_config));
+ engine_config.cbSize = sizeof(engine_config);
+ engine_config.hExclusiveRoot = trust_store;
+
+ /* CertCreateCertificateChainEngine will check the expected size of the
+ * CERT_CHAIN_ENGINE_CONFIG structure and fail if the specified size
+ * does not match the expected size. When this occurs, it indicates that
+ * CAINFO is not supported on the version of Windows in use.
+ */
+ create_engine_result =
+ CertCreateCertificateChainEngine(
+ (CERT_CHAIN_ENGINE_CONFIG *)&engine_config, &cert_chain_engine);
+ if(!create_engine_result) {
+ failf(data,
+ "schannel: failed to create certificate chain engine: %s",
+ Curl_strerror(conn, GetLastError()));
+ result = CURLE_SSL_CACERT_BADFILE;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ if(result == CURLE_OK) {
+ CERT_CHAIN_PARA ChainPara;
+
+ memset(&ChainPara, 0, sizeof(ChainPara));
+ ChainPara.cbSize = sizeof(ChainPara);
+
+ if(!CertGetCertificateChain(cert_chain_engine,
+ pCertContextServer,
+ NULL,
+ pCertContextServer->hCertStore,
+ &ChainPara,
+ (data->set.ssl.no_revoke ? 0 :
+ CERT_CHAIN_REVOCATION_CHECK_CHAIN),
+ NULL,
+ &pChainContext)) {
+ failf(data, "schannel: CertGetCertificateChain failed: %s",
+ Curl_sspi_strerror(conn, GetLastError()));
+ pChainContext = NULL;
+ result = CURLE_PEER_FAILED_VERIFICATION;
+ }
+
+ if(result == CURLE_OK) {
+ CERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN *pSimpleChain = pChainContext->rgpChain[0];
+ DWORD dwTrustErrorMask = ~(DWORD)(CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_TIME_NESTED);
+ dwTrustErrorMask &= pSimpleChain->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus;
+ if(dwTrustErrorMask) {
+ if(dwTrustErrorMask & CERT_TRUST_IS_REVOKED)
+ failf(data, "schannel: CertGetCertificateChain trust error"
+ " CERT_TRUST_IS_REVOKED");
+ else if(dwTrustErrorMask & CERT_TRUST_IS_PARTIAL_CHAIN)
+ failf(data, "schannel: CertGetCertificateChain trust error"
+ " CERT_TRUST_IS_PARTIAL_CHAIN");
+ else if(dwTrustErrorMask & CERT_TRUST_IS_UNTRUSTED_ROOT)
+ failf(data, "schannel: CertGetCertificateChain trust error"
+ " CERT_TRUST_IS_UNTRUSTED_ROOT");
+ else if(dwTrustErrorMask & CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_TIME_VALID)
+ failf(data, "schannel: CertGetCertificateChain trust error"
+ " CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_TIME_VALID");
+ else if(dwTrustErrorMask & CERT_TRUST_REVOCATION_STATUS_UNKNOWN)
+ failf(data, "schannel: CertGetCertificateChain trust error"
+ " CERT_TRUST_REVOCATION_STATUS_UNKNOWN");
+ else
+ failf(data, "schannel: CertGetCertificateChain error mask: 0x%08x",
+ dwTrustErrorMask);
+ result = CURLE_PEER_FAILED_VERIFICATION;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ if(result == CURLE_OK) {
+ if(SSL_CONN_CONFIG(verifyhost)) {
+ result = verify_host(conn->data, pCertContextServer, conn_hostname);
+ }
+ }
+
+ if(cert_chain_engine) {
+ CertFreeCertificateChainEngine(cert_chain_engine);
+ }
+
+ if(trust_store) {
+ CertCloseStore(trust_store, 0);
+ }
+
+ if(pChainContext)
+ CertFreeCertificateChain(pChainContext);
+
+ if(pCertContextServer)
+ CertFreeCertificateContext(pCertContextServer);
+
+ return result;
+}
+
+#endif /* USE_SCHANNEL */