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Diffstat (limited to 'openssl/ssl/t1_lib.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | openssl/ssl/t1_lib.c | 4550 |
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 4550 deletions
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/t1_lib.c b/openssl/ssl/t1_lib.c deleted file mode 100644 index e60c88b..0000000 --- a/openssl/ssl/t1_lib.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,4550 +0,0 @@ -/* ssl/t1_lib.c */ -/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) - * All rights reserved. - * - * This package is an SSL implementation written - * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). - * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. - * - * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as - * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions - * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, - * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation - * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms - * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). - * - * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in - * the code are not to be removed. - * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution - * as the author of the parts of the library used. - * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or - * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without - * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions - * are met: - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the - * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software - * must display the following acknowledgement: - * "This product includes cryptographic software written by - * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" - * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library - * being used are not cryptographic related :-). - * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from - * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: - * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND - * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE - * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE - * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE - * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL - * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS - * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) - * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT - * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY - * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF - * SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or - * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be - * copied and put under another distribution licence - * [including the GNU Public Licence.] - */ -/* ==================================================================== - * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without - * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions - * are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in - * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the - * distribution. - * - * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this - * software must display the following acknowledgment: - * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project - * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" - * - * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to - * endorse or promote products derived from this software without - * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact - * openssl-core@openssl.org. - * - * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" - * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written - * permission of the OpenSSL Project. - * - * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following - * acknowledgment: - * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project - * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY - * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE - * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR - * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR - * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, - * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT - * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; - * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) - * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, - * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) - * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED - * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * ==================================================================== - * - * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young - * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim - * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). - * - */ - -#include <stdio.h> -#include <openssl/objects.h> -#include <openssl/evp.h> -#include <openssl/hmac.h> -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC -#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M -# include <openssl/ec.h> -#endif -#endif -#include <openssl/ocsp.h> -#include <openssl/rand.h> -#include "ssl_locl.h" - -const char tls1_version_str[] = "TLSv1" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT; - -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT -static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen, - const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen, - SSL_SESSION **psess); -static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s); -int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s); -#endif - -#define CHECKLEN(curr, val, limit) \ - (((curr) >= (limit)) || (size_t)((limit) - (curr)) < (size_t)(val)) - -SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_enc_data = { - tls1_enc, - tls1_mac, - tls1_setup_key_block, - tls1_generate_master_secret, - tls1_change_cipher_state, - tls1_final_finish_mac, - TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH, - tls1_cert_verify_mac, - TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE, - TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE, - tls1_alert_code, - tls1_export_keying_material, - 0, - SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, - ssl3_set_handshake_header, - ssl3_handshake_write -}; - -SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_1_enc_data = { - tls1_enc, - tls1_mac, - tls1_setup_key_block, - tls1_generate_master_secret, - tls1_change_cipher_state, - tls1_final_finish_mac, - TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH, - tls1_cert_verify_mac, - TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE, - TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE, - tls1_alert_code, - tls1_export_keying_material, - SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV, - SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, - ssl3_set_handshake_header, - ssl3_handshake_write -}; - -SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_2_enc_data = { - tls1_enc, - tls1_mac, - tls1_setup_key_block, - tls1_generate_master_secret, - tls1_change_cipher_state, - tls1_final_finish_mac, - TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH, - tls1_cert_verify_mac, - TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE, - TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE, - tls1_alert_code, - tls1_export_keying_material, - SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF - | SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS, - SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, - ssl3_set_handshake_header, - ssl3_handshake_write -}; - -long tls1_default_timeout(void) -{ - /* - * 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec is way too long for - * http, the cache would over fill - */ - return (60 * 60 * 2); -} - -int tls1_new(SSL *s) -{ - if (!ssl3_new(s)) - return (0); - s->method->ssl_clear(s); - return (1); -} - -void tls1_free(SSL *s) -{ -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT - if (s->tlsext_session_ticket) { - OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket); - } -#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */ - ssl3_free(s); -} - -void tls1_clear(SSL *s) -{ - ssl3_clear(s); - s->version = s->method->version; -} - -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC - -static int nid_list[] = { - NID_sect163k1, /* sect163k1 (1) */ - NID_sect163r1, /* sect163r1 (2) */ - NID_sect163r2, /* sect163r2 (3) */ - NID_sect193r1, /* sect193r1 (4) */ - NID_sect193r2, /* sect193r2 (5) */ - NID_sect233k1, /* sect233k1 (6) */ - NID_sect233r1, /* sect233r1 (7) */ - NID_sect239k1, /* sect239k1 (8) */ - NID_sect283k1, /* sect283k1 (9) */ - NID_sect283r1, /* sect283r1 (10) */ - NID_sect409k1, /* sect409k1 (11) */ - NID_sect409r1, /* sect409r1 (12) */ - NID_sect571k1, /* sect571k1 (13) */ - NID_sect571r1, /* sect571r1 (14) */ - NID_secp160k1, /* secp160k1 (15) */ - NID_secp160r1, /* secp160r1 (16) */ - NID_secp160r2, /* secp160r2 (17) */ - NID_secp192k1, /* secp192k1 (18) */ - NID_X9_62_prime192v1, /* secp192r1 (19) */ - NID_secp224k1, /* secp224k1 (20) */ - NID_secp224r1, /* secp224r1 (21) */ - NID_secp256k1, /* secp256k1 (22) */ - NID_X9_62_prime256v1, /* secp256r1 (23) */ - NID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */ - NID_secp521r1, /* secp521r1 (25) */ - NID_brainpoolP256r1, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */ - NID_brainpoolP384r1, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */ - NID_brainpoolP512r1 /* brainpool512r1 (28) */ -}; - -static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] = { - TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed, - TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime, - TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2 -}; - -/* The client's default curves / the server's 'auto' curves. */ -static const unsigned char eccurves_auto[] = { - /* Prefer P-256 which has the fastest and most secure implementations. */ - 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */ - /* Other >= 256-bit prime curves. */ - 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */ - 0, 28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */ - 0, 27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */ - 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */ - 0, 26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */ - 0, 22, /* secp256k1 (22) */ -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M - /* >= 256-bit binary curves. */ - 0, 14, /* sect571r1 (14) */ - 0, 13, /* sect571k1 (13) */ - 0, 11, /* sect409k1 (11) */ - 0, 12, /* sect409r1 (12) */ - 0, 9, /* sect283k1 (9) */ - 0, 10, /* sect283r1 (10) */ -# endif -}; - -static const unsigned char eccurves_all[] = { - /* Prefer P-256 which has the fastest and most secure implementations. */ - 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */ - /* Other >= 256-bit prime curves. */ - 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */ - 0, 28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */ - 0, 27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */ - 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */ - 0, 26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */ - 0, 22, /* secp256k1 (22) */ -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M - /* >= 256-bit binary curves. */ - 0, 14, /* sect571r1 (14) */ - 0, 13, /* sect571k1 (13) */ - 0, 11, /* sect409k1 (11) */ - 0, 12, /* sect409r1 (12) */ - 0, 9, /* sect283k1 (9) */ - 0, 10, /* sect283r1 (10) */ -# endif - /* - * Remaining curves disabled by default but still permitted if set - * via an explicit callback or parameters. - */ - 0, 20, /* secp224k1 (20) */ - 0, 21, /* secp224r1 (21) */ - 0, 18, /* secp192k1 (18) */ - 0, 19, /* secp192r1 (19) */ - 0, 15, /* secp160k1 (15) */ - 0, 16, /* secp160r1 (16) */ - 0, 17, /* secp160r2 (17) */ -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M - 0, 8, /* sect239k1 (8) */ - 0, 6, /* sect233k1 (6) */ - 0, 7, /* sect233r1 (7) */ - 0, 4, /* sect193r1 (4) */ - 0, 5, /* sect193r2 (5) */ - 0, 1, /* sect163k1 (1) */ - 0, 2, /* sect163r1 (2) */ - 0, 3, /* sect163r2 (3) */ -# endif -}; - -static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] = { - 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256, - 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384 -}; - -# ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS -/* Brainpool not allowed in FIPS mode */ -static const unsigned char fips_curves_default[] = { -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M - 0, 14, /* sect571r1 (14) */ - 0, 13, /* sect571k1 (13) */ -# endif - 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */ -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M - 0, 11, /* sect409k1 (11) */ - 0, 12, /* sect409r1 (12) */ -# endif - 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */ -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M - 0, 9, /* sect283k1 (9) */ - 0, 10, /* sect283r1 (10) */ -# endif - 0, 22, /* secp256k1 (22) */ - 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */ -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M - 0, 8, /* sect239k1 (8) */ - 0, 6, /* sect233k1 (6) */ - 0, 7, /* sect233r1 (7) */ -# endif - 0, 20, /* secp224k1 (20) */ - 0, 21, /* secp224r1 (21) */ -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M - 0, 4, /* sect193r1 (4) */ - 0, 5, /* sect193r2 (5) */ -# endif - 0, 18, /* secp192k1 (18) */ - 0, 19, /* secp192r1 (19) */ -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M - 0, 1, /* sect163k1 (1) */ - 0, 2, /* sect163r1 (2) */ - 0, 3, /* sect163r2 (3) */ -# endif - 0, 15, /* secp160k1 (15) */ - 0, 16, /* secp160r1 (16) */ - 0, 17, /* secp160r2 (17) */ -}; -# endif - -int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id) -{ - /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */ - if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id > - sizeof(nid_list) / sizeof(nid_list[0]))) - return 0; - return nid_list[curve_id - 1]; -} - -int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid) -{ - /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */ - switch (nid) { - case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */ - return 1; - case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */ - return 2; - case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */ - return 3; - case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */ - return 4; - case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */ - return 5; - case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */ - return 6; - case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */ - return 7; - case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */ - return 8; - case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */ - return 9; - case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */ - return 10; - case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */ - return 11; - case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */ - return 12; - case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */ - return 13; - case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */ - return 14; - case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */ - return 15; - case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */ - return 16; - case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */ - return 17; - case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */ - return 18; - case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */ - return 19; - case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */ - return 20; - case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */ - return 21; - case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */ - return 22; - case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */ - return 23; - case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */ - return 24; - case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */ - return 25; - case NID_brainpoolP256r1: /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */ - return 26; - case NID_brainpoolP384r1: /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */ - return 27; - case NID_brainpoolP512r1: /* brainpool512r1 (28) */ - return 28; - default: - return 0; - } -} - -/* - * Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise - * preferred list. - * Sets |num_curves| to the number of curves in the list, i.e., - * the length of |pcurves| is 2 * num_curves. - * Returns 1 on success and 0 if the client curves list has invalid format. - * The latter indicates an internal error: we should not be accepting such - * lists in the first place. - * TODO(emilia): we should really be storing the curves list in explicitly - * parsed form instead. (However, this would affect binary compatibility - * so cannot happen in the 1.0.x series.) - */ -static int tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess, - const unsigned char **pcurves, - size_t *num_curves) -{ - size_t pcurveslen = 0; - if (sess) { - *pcurves = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist; - pcurveslen = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; - } else { - /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */ - switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) { - case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS: - *pcurves = suiteb_curves; - pcurveslen = sizeof(suiteb_curves); - break; - - case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY: - *pcurves = suiteb_curves; - pcurveslen = 2; - break; - - case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS: - *pcurves = suiteb_curves + 2; - pcurveslen = 2; - break; - default: - *pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist; - pcurveslen = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; - } - if (!*pcurves) { -# ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS - if (FIPS_mode()) { - *pcurves = fips_curves_default; - pcurveslen = sizeof(fips_curves_default); - } else -# endif - { - if (!s->server || s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto) { - *pcurves = eccurves_auto; - pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_auto); - } else { - *pcurves = eccurves_all; - pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_all); - } - } - } - } - /* We do not allow odd length arrays to enter the system. */ - if (pcurveslen & 1) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_GET_CURVELIST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - *num_curves = 0; - return 0; - } else { - *num_curves = pcurveslen / 2; - return 1; - } -} - -/* Check a curve is one of our preferences */ -int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len) -{ - const unsigned char *curves; - size_t num_curves, i; - unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s); - if (len != 3 || p[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE) - return 0; - /* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */ - if (suiteb_flags) { - unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id; - if (p[1]) - return 0; - if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) { - if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_256) - return 0; - } else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) { - if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_384) - return 0; - } else /* Should never happen */ - return 0; - } - if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &num_curves)) - return 0; - for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, curves += 2) { - if (p[1] == curves[0] && p[2] == curves[1]) - return 1; - } - return 0; -} - -/*- - * Return |nmatch|th shared curve or NID_undef if there is no match. - * For nmatch == -1, return number of matches - * For nmatch == -2, return the NID of the curve to use for - * an EC tmp key, or NID_undef if there is no match. - */ -int tls1_shared_curve(SSL *s, int nmatch) -{ - const unsigned char *pref, *supp; - size_t num_pref, num_supp, i, j; - int k; - /* Can't do anything on client side */ - if (s->server == 0) - return -1; - if (nmatch == -2) { - if (tls1_suiteb(s)) { - /* - * For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we already know - * these are acceptable due to previous checks. - */ - unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id; - if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) - return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */ - if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) - return NID_secp384r1; /* P-384 */ - /* Should never happen */ - return NID_undef; - } - /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */ - nmatch = 0; - } - /* - * Avoid truncation. tls1_get_curvelist takes an int - * but s->options is a long... - */ - if (!tls1_get_curvelist - (s, (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0, &supp, - &num_supp)) - /* In practice, NID_undef == 0 but let's be precise. */ - return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef; - if (!tls1_get_curvelist - (s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE), &pref, - &num_pref)) - return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef; - - /* - * If the client didn't send the elliptic_curves extension all of them - * are allowed. - */ - if (num_supp == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0) { - supp = eccurves_all; - num_supp = sizeof(eccurves_all) / 2; - } else if (num_pref == 0 && - (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) == 0) { - pref = eccurves_all; - num_pref = sizeof(eccurves_all) / 2; - } - - k = 0; - for (i = 0; i < num_pref; i++, pref += 2) { - const unsigned char *tsupp = supp; - for (j = 0; j < num_supp; j++, tsupp += 2) { - if (pref[0] == tsupp[0] && pref[1] == tsupp[1]) { - if (nmatch == k) { - int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1]; - return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id); - } - k++; - } - } - } - if (nmatch == -1) - return k; - /* Out of range (nmatch > k). */ - return NID_undef; -} - -int tls1_set_curves(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen, - int *curves, size_t ncurves) -{ - unsigned char *clist, *p; - size_t i; - /* - * Bitmap of curves included to detect duplicates: only works while curve - * ids < 32 - */ - unsigned long dup_list = 0; -# ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M - EC_GROUP *curve; -# endif - - clist = OPENSSL_malloc(ncurves * 2); - if (!clist) - return 0; - for (i = 0, p = clist; i < ncurves; i++) { - unsigned long idmask; - int id; - id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(curves[i]); -# ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS - /* NB: 25 is last curve ID supported by FIPS module */ - if (FIPS_mode() && id > 25) { - OPENSSL_free(clist); - return 0; - } -# endif -# ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M - curve = EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(curves[i]); - if (!curve || EC_METHOD_get_field_type(EC_GROUP_method_of(curve)) - == NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field) { - if (curve) - EC_GROUP_free(curve); - OPENSSL_free(clist); - return 0; - } else - EC_GROUP_free(curve); -# endif - idmask = 1L << id; - if (!id || (dup_list & idmask)) { - OPENSSL_free(clist); - return 0; - } - dup_list |= idmask; - s2n(id, p); - } - if (*pext) - OPENSSL_free(*pext); - *pext = clist; - *pextlen = ncurves * 2; - return 1; -} - -# define MAX_CURVELIST 28 - -typedef struct { - size_t nidcnt; - int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST]; -} nid_cb_st; - -static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg) -{ - nid_cb_st *narg = arg; - size_t i; - int nid; - char etmp[20]; - if (elem == NULL) - return 0; - if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST) - return 0; - if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1)) - return 0; - memcpy(etmp, elem, len); - etmp[len] = 0; - nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp); - if (nid == NID_undef) - nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp); - if (nid == NID_undef) - nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp); - if (nid == NID_undef) - return 0; - for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++) - if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid) - return 0; - narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid; - return 1; -} - -/* Set curves based on a colon separate list */ -int tls1_set_curves_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen, - const char *str) -{ - nid_cb_st ncb; - ncb.nidcnt = 0; - if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb)) - return 0; - if (pext == NULL) - return 1; - return tls1_set_curves(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt); -} - -/* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */ -static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id, - EC_KEY *ec) -{ - int is_prime, id; - const EC_GROUP *grp; - const EC_METHOD *meth; - if (!ec) - return 0; - /* Determine if it is a prime field */ - grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec); - if (!grp) - return 0; - meth = EC_GROUP_method_of(grp); - if (!meth) - return 0; - if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(meth) == NID_X9_62_prime_field) - is_prime = 1; - else - is_prime = 0; - /* Determine curve ID */ - id = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp); - id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id); - /* If we have an ID set it, otherwise set arbitrary explicit curve */ - if (id) { - curve_id[0] = 0; - curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id; - } else { - curve_id[0] = 0xff; - if (is_prime) - curve_id[1] = 0x01; - else - curve_id[1] = 0x02; - } - if (comp_id) { - if (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec) == NULL) - return 0; - if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED) { - if (is_prime) - *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime; - else - *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2; - } else - *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed; - } - return 1; -} - -/* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */ -static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s, - unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id) -{ - const unsigned char *pformats, *pcurves; - size_t num_formats, num_curves, i; - int j; - /* - * If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything is - * supported (see RFC4492). - */ - if (comp_id && s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) { - pformats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist; - num_formats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; - for (i = 0; i < num_formats; i++, pformats++) { - if (*comp_id == *pformats) - break; - } - if (i == num_formats) - return 0; - } - if (!curve_id) - return 1; - /* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */ - for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++) { - if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &pcurves, &num_curves)) - return 0; - if (j == 1 && num_curves == 0) { - /* - * If we've not received any curves then skip this check. - * RFC 4492 does not require the supported elliptic curves extension - * so if it is not sent we can just choose any curve. - * It is invalid to send an empty list in the elliptic curves - * extension, so num_curves == 0 always means no extension. - */ - break; - } - for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2) { - if (pcurves[0] == curve_id[0] && pcurves[1] == curve_id[1]) - break; - } - if (i == num_curves) - return 0; - /* For clients can only check sent curve list */ - if (!s->server) - return 1; - } - return 1; -} - -static void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats, - size_t *num_formats) -{ - /* - * If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise use default - */ - if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) { - *pformats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist; - *num_formats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; - } else { - *pformats = ecformats_default; - /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */ - if (tls1_suiteb(s)) - *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1; - else - *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default); - } -} - -/* - * Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks EC - * certificates have compatible curves and compression. - */ -static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md) -{ - unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2]; - EVP_PKEY *pkey; - int rv; - pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x); - if (!pkey) - return 0; - /* If not EC nothing to do */ - if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC) { - EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); - return 1; - } - rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec); - EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); - if (!rv) - return 0; - /* - * Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a supported - * curves extension. - */ - rv = tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? curve_id : NULL, &comp_id); - if (!rv) - return 0; - /* - * Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or - * SHA384+P-384, adjust digest if necessary. - */ - if (set_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s)) { - int check_md; - size_t i; - CERT *c = s->cert; - if (curve_id[0]) - return 0; - /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */ - if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256) - check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256; - else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384) - check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384; - else - return 0; /* Should never happen */ - for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++) - if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid) - break; - if (i == c->shared_sigalgslen) - return 0; - if (set_ee_md == 2) { - if (check_md == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256) - c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha256(); - else - c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha384(); - } - } - return rv; -} - -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH -/* Check EC temporary key is compatible with client extensions */ -int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid) -{ - unsigned char curve_id[2]; - EC_KEY *ec = s->cert->ecdh_tmp; -# ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL - /* Allow any curve: not just those peer supports */ - if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL) - return 1; -# endif - /* - * If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384, no other - * curves permitted. - */ - if (tls1_suiteb(s)) { - /* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */ - if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) - curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256; - else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) - curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_384; - else - return 0; - curve_id[0] = 0; - /* Check this curve is acceptable */ - if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL)) - return 0; - /* If auto or setting curve from callback assume OK */ - if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto || s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb) - return 1; - /* Otherwise check curve is acceptable */ - else { - unsigned char curve_tmp[2]; - if (!ec) - return 0; - if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_tmp, NULL, ec)) - return 0; - if (!curve_tmp[0] || curve_tmp[1] == curve_id[1]) - return 1; - return 0; - } - - } - if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto) { - /* Need a shared curve */ - if (tls1_shared_curve(s, 0)) - return 1; - else - return 0; - } - if (!ec) { - if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb) - return 1; - else - return 0; - } - if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, NULL, ec)) - return 0; -/* Set this to allow use of invalid curves for testing */ -# if 0 - return 1; -# else - return tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL); -# endif -} -# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */ - -#else - -static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md) -{ - return 1; -} - -#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ - -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT - -/* - * List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this - * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support. - */ - -# ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA -# define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */ -# else -# define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa, -# endif - -# ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA -# define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */ -# else -# define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa, -# endif - -# ifdef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA -# define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) - /* */ -# else -# define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa, -# endif - -# define tlsext_sigalg(md) \ - tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \ - tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \ - tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) - -static unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = { -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512 - tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512) - tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384) -# endif -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256 - tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256) - tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224) -# endif -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA - tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1) -# endif -}; - -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA -static unsigned char suiteb_sigalgs[] = { - tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha256) - tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha384) -}; -# endif -size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char **psigs) -{ - /* - * If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other - * preferences. - */ -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC - switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) { - case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS: - *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs; - return sizeof(suiteb_sigalgs); - - case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY: - *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs; - return 2; - - case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS: - *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 2; - return 2; - } -# endif - /* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */ - if (s->server && s->cert->client_sigalgs) { - *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs; - return s->cert->client_sigalgslen; - } else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs) { - *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs; - return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen; - } else { - *psigs = tls12_sigalgs; - return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs); - } -} - -/* - * Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature - * algorithms and if so return relevant digest. - */ -int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s, - const unsigned char *sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey) -{ - const unsigned char *sent_sigs; - size_t sent_sigslen, i; - int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey); - /* Should never happen */ - if (sigalg == -1) - return -1; - /* Check key type is consistent with signature */ - if (sigalg != (int)sig[1]) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE); - return 0; - } -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC - if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) { - unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id; - /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */ - if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec)) - return 0; - if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE); - return 0; - } - /* If Suite B only P-384+SHA384 or P-256+SHA-256 allowed */ - if (tls1_suiteb(s)) { - if (curve_id[0]) - return 0; - if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256) { - if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha256) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, - SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST); - return 0; - } - } else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384) { - if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha384) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, - SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST); - return 0; - } - } else - return 0; - } - } else if (tls1_suiteb(s)) - return 0; -# endif - - /* Check signature matches a type we sent */ - sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sent_sigs); - for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i += 2, sent_sigs += 2) { - if (sig[0] == sent_sigs[0] && sig[1] == sent_sigs[1]) - break; - } - /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */ - if (i == sent_sigslen - && (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha1 - || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE); - return 0; - } - *pmd = tls12_get_hash(sig[0]); - if (*pmd == NULL) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST); - return 0; - } - /* - * Store the digest used so applications can retrieve it if they wish. - */ - if (s->session && s->session->sess_cert) - s->session->sess_cert->peer_key->digest = *pmd; - return 1; -} - -/* - * Get a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled if it isn't - * supported or doesn't appear in supported signature algorithms. Unlike - * ssl_cipher_get_disabled this applies to a specific session and not global - * settings. - */ -void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s) -{ - CERT *c = s->cert; - const unsigned char *sigalgs; - size_t i, sigalgslen; - int have_rsa = 0, have_dsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0; - c->mask_a = 0; - c->mask_k = 0; - /* Don't allow TLS 1.2 only ciphers if we don't suppport them */ - if (!SSL_CLIENT_USE_TLS1_2_CIPHERS(s)) - c->mask_ssl = SSL_TLSV1_2; - else - c->mask_ssl = 0; - /* - * Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support any for - * RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just TLS 1.2. - */ - sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sigalgs); - for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i += 2, sigalgs += 2) { - switch (sigalgs[1]) { -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA - case TLSEXT_signature_rsa: - have_rsa = 1; - break; -# endif -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA - case TLSEXT_signature_dsa: - have_dsa = 1; - break; -# endif -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA - case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa: - have_ecdsa = 1; - break; -# endif - } - } - /* - * Disable auth and static DH if we don't include any appropriate - * signature algorithms. - */ - if (!have_rsa) { - c->mask_a |= SSL_aRSA; - c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHr | SSL_kECDHr; - } - if (!have_dsa) { - c->mask_a |= SSL_aDSS; - c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHd; - } - if (!have_ecdsa) { - c->mask_a |= SSL_aECDSA; - c->mask_k |= SSL_kECDHe; - } -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 - if (!kssl_tgt_is_available(s->kssl_ctx)) { - c->mask_a |= SSL_aKRB5; - c->mask_k |= SSL_kKRB5; - } -# endif -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK - /* with PSK there must be client callback set */ - if (!s->psk_client_callback) { - c->mask_a |= SSL_aPSK; - c->mask_k |= SSL_kPSK; - } -# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */ -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP - if (!(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP)) { - c->mask_a |= SSL_aSRP; - c->mask_k |= SSL_kSRP; - } -# endif - c->valid = 1; -} - -unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, - unsigned char *limit, int *al) -{ - int extdatalen = 0; - unsigned char *orig = buf; - unsigned char *ret = buf; -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC - /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */ - int using_ecc = 0; - if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION || SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { - int i; - unsigned long alg_k, alg_a; - STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s); - - for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++) { - SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i); - - alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey; - alg_a = c->algorithm_auth; - if ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe) - || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) { - using_ecc = 1; - break; - } - } - } -# endif - - /* don't add extensions for SSLv3 unless doing secure renegotiation */ - if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding) - return orig; - - ret += 2; - - if (ret >= limit) - return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */ - - if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL) { - /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */ - size_t size_str; - - /*- - * check for enough space. - * 4 for the servername type and entension length - * 2 for servernamelist length - * 1 for the hostname type - * 2 for hostname length - * + hostname length - */ - size_str = strlen(s->tlsext_hostname); - if (CHECKLEN(ret, 9 + size_str, limit)) - return NULL; - - /* extension type and length */ - s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, ret); - s2n(size_str + 5, ret); - - /* length of servername list */ - s2n(size_str + 3, ret); - - /* hostname type, length and hostname */ - *(ret++) = (unsigned char)TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name; - s2n(size_str, ret); - memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str); - ret += size_str; - } - - /* Add RI if renegotiating */ - if (s->renegotiate) { - int el; - - if (!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return NULL; - } - - if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) - return NULL; - - s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate, ret); - s2n(el, ret); - - if (!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return NULL; - } - - ret += el; - } -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP - /* Add SRP username if there is one */ - if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) { /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the - * Client Hello message */ - - size_t login_len = strlen(s->srp_ctx.login); - if (login_len > 255 || login_len == 0) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return NULL; - } - - /*- - * check for enough space. - * 4 for the srp type type and entension length - * 1 for the srp user identity - * + srp user identity length - */ - if (CHECKLEN(ret, 5 + login_len, limit)) - return NULL; - - /* fill in the extension */ - s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp, ret); - s2n(login_len + 1, ret); - (*ret++) = (unsigned char)login_len; - memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, login_len); - ret += login_len; - } -# endif - -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC - if (using_ecc) { - /* - * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message - */ - const unsigned char *pcurves, *pformats; - size_t num_curves, num_formats, curves_list_len; - - tls1_get_formatlist(s, &pformats, &num_formats); - - if (num_formats > 255) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return NULL; - } - /*- - * check for enough space. - * 4 bytes for the ec point formats type and extension length - * 1 byte for the length of the formats - * + formats length - */ - if (CHECKLEN(ret, 5 + num_formats, limit)) - return NULL; - - s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats, ret); - /* The point format list has 1-byte length. */ - s2n(num_formats + 1, ret); - *(ret++) = (unsigned char)num_formats; - memcpy(ret, pformats, num_formats); - ret += num_formats; - - /* - * Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message - */ - pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist; - if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &pcurves, &num_curves)) - return NULL; - - if (num_curves > 65532 / 2) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return NULL; - } - curves_list_len = 2 * num_curves; - /*- - * check for enough space. - * 4 bytes for the ec curves type and extension length - * 2 bytes for the curve list length - * + curve list length - */ - if (CHECKLEN(ret, 6 + curves_list_len, limit)) - return NULL; - - s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves, ret); - s2n(curves_list_len + 2, ret); - s2n(curves_list_len, ret); - memcpy(ret, pcurves, curves_list_len); - ret += curves_list_len; - } -# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ - - if (!(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)) { - size_t ticklen; - if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick) - ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen; - else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket && - s->tlsext_session_ticket->data) { - ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length; - s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen); - if (!s->session->tlsext_tick) - return NULL; - memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick, - s->tlsext_session_ticket->data, ticklen); - s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen; - } else - ticklen = 0; - if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket && - s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL) - goto skip_ext; - /* - * Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len rest for - * ticket - */ - if (CHECKLEN(ret, 4 + ticklen, limit)) - return NULL; - s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, ret); - s2n(ticklen, ret); - if (ticklen > 0) { - memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen); - ret += ticklen; - } - } - skip_ext: - - if (SSL_CLIENT_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { - size_t salglen; - const unsigned char *salg; - salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &salg); - - /*- - * check for enough space. - * 4 bytes for the sigalgs type and extension length - * 2 bytes for the sigalg list length - * + sigalg list length - */ - if (CHECKLEN(ret, salglen + 6, limit)) - return NULL; - s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms, ret); - s2n(salglen + 2, ret); - s2n(salglen, ret); - memcpy(ret, salg, salglen); - ret += salglen; - } -# ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input - if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) { - size_t col = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len; - - if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - col < 0)) - return NULL; - if (col > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */ - return NULL; - - s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret); - s2n(col + 2, ret); - s2n(col, ret); - memcpy(ret, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input, col); - ret += col; - } -# endif - - if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) { - int i; - size_t extlen, idlen; - int lentmp; - OCSP_RESPID *id; - - idlen = 0; - for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) { - id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i); - lentmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL); - if (lentmp <= 0) - return NULL; - idlen += (size_t)lentmp + 2; - } - - if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts) { - lentmp = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL); - if (lentmp < 0) - return NULL; - extlen = (size_t)lentmp; - } else - extlen = 0; - - if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0) - return NULL; - /* - * 2 bytes for status request type - * 2 bytes for status request len - * 1 byte for OCSP request type - * 2 bytes for length of ids - * 2 bytes for length of extensions - * + length of ids - * + length of extensions - */ - if (CHECKLEN(ret, 9 + idlen + extlen, limit)) - return NULL; - - s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret); - s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret); - *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp; - s2n(idlen, ret); - for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) { - /* save position of id len */ - unsigned char *q = ret; - id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i); - /* skip over id len */ - ret += 2; - lentmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret); - /* write id len */ - s2n(lentmp, q); - } - s2n(extlen, ret); - if (extlen > 0) - i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret); - } -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS - /* Add Heartbeat extension */ - - /*- - * check for enough space. - * 4 bytes for the heartbeat ext type and extension length - * 1 byte for the mode - */ - if (CHECKLEN(ret, 5, limit)) - return NULL; - - s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat, ret); - s2n(1, ret); - /*- - * Set mode: - * 1: peer may send requests - * 2: peer not allowed to send requests - */ - if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS) - *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS; - else - *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED; -# endif - -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG - if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) { - /* - * The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its support - * for Next Protocol Negotiation - */ - - /*- - * check for enough space. - * 4 bytes for the NPN ext type and extension length - */ - if (CHECKLEN(ret, 4, limit)) - return NULL; - s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg, ret); - s2n(0, ret); - } -# endif - - if (s->alpn_client_proto_list && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) { - /*- - * check for enough space. - * 4 bytes for the ALPN type and extension length - * 2 bytes for the ALPN protocol list length - * + ALPN protocol list length - */ - if (CHECKLEN(ret, 6 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len, limit)) - return NULL; - s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation, ret); - s2n(2 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len, ret); - s2n(s->alpn_client_proto_list_len, ret); - memcpy(ret, s->alpn_client_proto_list, s->alpn_client_proto_list_len); - ret += s->alpn_client_proto_list_len; - s->cert->alpn_sent = 1; - } -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP - if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)) { - int el; - - ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0); - - /*- - * check for enough space. - * 4 bytes for the SRTP type and extension length - * + SRTP profiles length - */ - if (CHECKLEN(ret, 4 + el, limit)) - return NULL; - - s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp, ret); - s2n(el, ret); - - if (ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return NULL; - } - ret += el; - } -# endif - custom_ext_init(&s->cert->cli_ext); - /* Add custom TLS Extensions to ClientHello */ - if (!custom_ext_add(s, 0, &ret, limit, al)) - return NULL; - - /* - * Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators. See - * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03 NB: because this - * code works out the length of all existing extensions it MUST always - * appear last. - */ - if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING) { - int hlen = ret - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; - /* - * The code in s23_clnt.c to build ClientHello messages includes the - * 5-byte record header in the buffer, while the code in s3_clnt.c - * does not. - */ - if (s->state == SSL23_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) - hlen -= 5; - if (hlen > 0xff && hlen < 0x200) { - hlen = 0x200 - hlen; - if (hlen >= 4) - hlen -= 4; - else - hlen = 0; - - /*- - * check for enough space. Strictly speaking we know we've already - * got enough space because to get here the message size is < 0x200, - * but we know that we've allocated far more than that in the buffer - * - but for consistency and robustness we're going to check anyway. - * - * 4 bytes for the padding type and extension length - * + padding length - */ - if (CHECKLEN(ret, 4 + hlen, limit)) - return NULL; - s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_padding, ret); - s2n(hlen, ret); - memset(ret, 0, hlen); - ret += hlen; - } - } - - if ((extdatalen = ret - orig - 2) == 0) - return orig; - - s2n(extdatalen, orig); - return ret; -} - -unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, - unsigned char *limit, int *al) -{ - int extdatalen = 0; - unsigned char *orig = buf; - unsigned char *ret = buf; -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG - int next_proto_neg_seen; -# endif -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC - unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; - unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth; - int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) - || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA); - using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL); -# endif - /* - * don't add extensions for SSLv3, unless doing secure renegotiation - */ - if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding) - return orig; - - ret += 2; - if (ret >= limit) - return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */ - - if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1 - && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL) { - if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) - return NULL; - - s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, ret); - s2n(0, ret); - } - - if (s->s3->send_connection_binding) { - int el; - - if (!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return NULL; - } - - /*- - * check for enough space. - * 4 bytes for the reneg type and extension length - * + reneg data length - */ - if (CHECKLEN(ret, 4 + el, limit)) - return NULL; - - s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate, ret); - s2n(el, ret); - - if (!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return NULL; - } - - ret += el; - } -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC - if (using_ecc) { - const unsigned char *plist; - size_t plistlen; - /* - * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message - */ - - tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen); - - if (plistlen > 255) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return NULL; - } - - /*- - * check for enough space. - * 4 bytes for the ec points format type and extension length - * 1 byte for the points format list length - * + length of points format list - */ - if (CHECKLEN(ret, 5 + plistlen, limit)) - return NULL; - - s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats, ret); - s2n(plistlen + 1, ret); - *(ret++) = (unsigned char)plistlen; - memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen); - ret += plistlen; - - } - /* - * Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves - * extension - */ -# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ - - if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected && !(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)) { - /*- - * check for enough space. - * 4 bytes for the Ticket type and extension length - */ - if (CHECKLEN(ret, 4, limit)) - return NULL; - s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, ret); - s2n(0, ret); - } - - if (s->tlsext_status_expected) { - /*- - * check for enough space. - * 4 bytes for the Status request type and extension length - */ - if (CHECKLEN(ret, 4, limit)) - return NULL; - s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret); - s2n(0, ret); - } -# ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input - if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) { - size_t sol = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len; - - if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - sol) < 0) - return NULL; - if (sol > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */ - return NULL; - - s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret); - s2n(sol + 2, ret); - s2n(sol, ret); - memcpy(ret, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input, sol); - ret += sol; - } -# endif - -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP - if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->srtp_profile) { - int el; - - ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0); - - /*- - * check for enough space. - * 4 bytes for the SRTP profiles type and extension length - * + length of the SRTP profiles list - */ - if (CHECKLEN(ret, 4 + el, limit)) - return NULL; - - s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp, ret); - s2n(el, ret); - - if (ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return NULL; - } - ret += el; - } -# endif - - if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x80 - || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x81) - && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG)) { - const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = { - 0xfd, 0xe8, /* 65000 */ - 0x00, 0x20, /* 32 bytes length */ - 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, - 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, - 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08, - 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17 - }; - - /* check for enough space. */ - if (CHECKLEN(ret, sizeof(cryptopro_ext), limit)) - return NULL; - memcpy(ret, cryptopro_ext, sizeof(cryptopro_ext)); - ret += sizeof(cryptopro_ext); - - } -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS - /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */ - if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) { - /*- - * check for enough space. - * 4 bytes for the Heartbeat type and extension length - * 1 byte for the mode - */ - if (CHECKLEN(ret, 5, limit)) - return NULL; - s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat, ret); - s2n(1, ret); - /*- - * Set mode: - * 1: peer may send requests - * 2: peer not allowed to send requests - */ - if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS) - *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS; - else - *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED; - - } -# endif - -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG - next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen; - s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0; - if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb) { - const unsigned char *npa; - unsigned int npalen; - int r; - - r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen, - s-> - ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg); - if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) { - /*- - * check for enough space. - * 4 bytes for the NPN type and extension length - * + length of protocols list - */ - if (CHECKLEN(ret, 4 + npalen, limit)) - return NULL; - s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg, ret); - s2n(npalen, ret); - memcpy(ret, npa, npalen); - ret += npalen; - s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1; - } - } -# endif - if (!custom_ext_add(s, 1, &ret, limit, al)) - return NULL; - - if (s->s3->alpn_selected) { - const unsigned char *selected = s->s3->alpn_selected; - size_t len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len; - - /*- - * check for enough space. - * 4 bytes for the ALPN type and extension length - * 2 bytes for ALPN data length - * 1 byte for selected protocol length - * + length of the selected protocol - */ - if (CHECKLEN(ret, 7 + len, limit)) - return NULL; - s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation, ret); - s2n(3 + len, ret); - s2n(1 + len, ret); - *ret++ = len; - memcpy(ret, selected, len); - ret += len; - } - - if ((extdatalen = ret - orig - 2) == 0) - return orig; - - s2n(extdatalen, orig); - return ret; -} - -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC -/*- - * ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X - * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |d|, of length |n|. - * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order: - * SNI, - * elliptic_curves - * ec_point_formats - * - * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8, - * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them. - * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from - * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work). - */ -static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, - const unsigned char *limit) -{ - unsigned short type, size; - static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = { - 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */ - 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */ - 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */ - 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */ - 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */ - 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */ - - 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */ - 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */ - 0x01, /* 1 point format */ - 0x00, /* uncompressed */ - }; - - /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */ - static const unsigned char kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock[] = { - 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */ - 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */ - 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */ - 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */ - 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */ - 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */ - 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */ - 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */ - }; - - if (limit - data <= 2) - return; - data += 2; - - if (limit - data < 4) - return; - n2s(data, type); - n2s(data, size); - - if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) - return; - - if (limit - data < size) - return; - data += size; - - if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) { - const size_t len1 = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock); - const size_t len2 = sizeof(kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock); - - if (limit - data != (int)(len1 + len2)) - return; - if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len1) != 0) - return; - if (memcmp(data + len1, kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock, len2) != 0) - return; - } else { - const size_t len = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock); - - if (limit - data != (int)(len)) - return; - if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len) != 0) - return; - } - - s->s3->is_probably_safari = 1; -} -# endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */ - -/* - * tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello is called to save the ALPN extension in a - * ClientHello. data: the contents of the extension, not including the type - * and length. data_len: the number of bytes in |data| al: a pointer to the - * alert value to send in the event of a non-zero return. returns: 0 on - * success. - */ -static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, - unsigned data_len, int *al) -{ - unsigned i; - unsigned proto_len; - - if (data_len < 2) - goto parse_error; - - /* - * data should contain a uint16 length followed by a series of 8-bit, - * length-prefixed strings. - */ - i = ((unsigned)data[0]) << 8 | ((unsigned)data[1]); - data_len -= 2; - data += 2; - if (data_len != i) - goto parse_error; - - if (data_len < 2) - goto parse_error; - - for (i = 0; i < data_len;) { - proto_len = data[i]; - i++; - - if (proto_len == 0) - goto parse_error; - - if (i + proto_len < i || i + proto_len > data_len) - goto parse_error; - - i += proto_len; - } - - if (s->cert->alpn_proposed != NULL) - OPENSSL_free(s->cert->alpn_proposed); - s->cert->alpn_proposed = OPENSSL_malloc(data_len); - if (s->cert->alpn_proposed == NULL) { - *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - return -1; - } - memcpy(s->cert->alpn_proposed, data, data_len); - s->cert->alpn_proposed_len = data_len; - return 0; - - parse_error: - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - return -1; -} - -/* - * Process the ALPN extension in a ClientHello. - * al: a pointer to the alert value to send in the event of a failure. - * returns 1 on success, 0 on failure: al set only on failure - */ -static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello_late(SSL *s, int *al) -{ - const unsigned char *selected = NULL; - unsigned char selected_len = 0; - - if (s->ctx->alpn_select_cb != NULL && s->cert->alpn_proposed != NULL) { - int r = s->ctx->alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, - s->cert->alpn_proposed, - s->cert->alpn_proposed_len, - s->ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg); - - if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) { - OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected); - s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len); - if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) { - *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - return 0; - } - memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, selected, selected_len); - s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len; -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG - /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */ - s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0; -# endif - } - } - - return 1; -} - -static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, - unsigned char *limit, int *al) -{ - unsigned short type; - unsigned short size; - unsigned short len; - unsigned char *data = *p; - int renegotiate_seen = 0; - - s->servername_done = 0; - s->tlsext_status_type = -1; -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG - s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0; -# endif - - if (s->s3->alpn_selected) { - OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected); - s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL; - } - s->s3->alpn_selected_len = 0; - if (s->cert->alpn_proposed) { - OPENSSL_free(s->cert->alpn_proposed); - s->cert->alpn_proposed = NULL; - } - s->cert->alpn_proposed_len = 0; -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS - s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED | - SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS); -# endif - -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC - if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG) - ssl_check_for_safari(s, data, limit); -# endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */ - - /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */ - if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs) { - OPENSSL_free(s->cert->peer_sigalgs); - s->cert->peer_sigalgs = NULL; - } -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP - if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) { - OPENSSL_free(s->srp_ctx.login); - s->srp_ctx.login = NULL; - } -# endif - - s->srtp_profile = NULL; - - if (data == limit) - goto ri_check; - - if (limit - data < 2) - goto err; - - n2s(data, len); - - if (limit - data != len) - goto err; - - while (limit - data >= 4) { - n2s(data, type); - n2s(data, size); - - if (limit - data < size) - goto err; -# if 0 - fprintf(stderr, "Received extension type %d size %d\n", type, size); -# endif - if (s->tlsext_debug_cb) - s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size, s->tlsext_debug_arg); -/*- - * The servername extension is treated as follows: - * - * - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255. - * - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros, - * in which case an fatal alert is generated. - * - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache. - * - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order - * to allow the application to position itself to the right context. - * - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when - * it is identical to a previously used for the same session. - * Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time - * set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the - * case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and - * a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername - * presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches - * the value of the Host: field. - * - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION - * if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the - * session, i.e. when the session has been established with a servername - * extension. - * - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent. - * - */ - - if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) { - unsigned char *sdata; - int servname_type; - int dsize; - - if (size < 2) - goto err; - n2s(data, dsize); - size -= 2; - if (dsize > size) - goto err; - - sdata = data; - while (dsize > 3) { - servname_type = *(sdata++); - n2s(sdata, len); - dsize -= 3; - - if (len > dsize) - goto err; - - if (s->servername_done == 0) - switch (servname_type) { - case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name: - if (!s->hit) { - if (s->session->tlsext_hostname) - goto err; - - if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name) { - *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; - return 0; - } - if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname = - OPENSSL_malloc(len + 1)) == NULL) { - *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - return 0; - } - memcpy(s->session->tlsext_hostname, sdata, len); - s->session->tlsext_hostname[len] = '\0'; - if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) { - OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname); - s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL; - *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; - return 0; - } - s->servername_done = 1; - - } else - s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname - && strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len - && strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname, - (char *)sdata, len) == 0; - - break; - - default: - break; - } - - dsize -= len; - } - if (dsize != 0) - goto err; - - } -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP - else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp) { - if (size == 0 || ((len = data[0])) != (size - 1)) - goto err; - if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) - goto err; - if ((s->srp_ctx.login = OPENSSL_malloc(len + 1)) == NULL) - return -1; - memcpy(s->srp_ctx.login, &data[1], len); - s->srp_ctx.login[len] = '\0'; - - if (strlen(s->srp_ctx.login) != len) - goto err; - } -# endif - -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC - else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) { - unsigned char *sdata = data; - int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++); - - if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1 || - ecpointformatlist_length < 1) - goto err; - if (!s->hit) { - if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) { - OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist); - s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL; - } - s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0; - if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = - OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) { - *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - return 0; - } - s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = - ecpointformatlist_length; - memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, - ecpointformatlist_length); - } -# if 0 - fprintf(stderr, - "ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist (length=%i) ", - s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length); - sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist; - for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++) - fprintf(stderr, "%i ", *(sdata++)); - fprintf(stderr, "\n"); -# endif - } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves) { - unsigned char *sdata = data; - int ellipticcurvelist_length = (*(sdata++) << 8); - ellipticcurvelist_length += (*(sdata++)); - - if (ellipticcurvelist_length != size - 2 || - ellipticcurvelist_length < 1 || - /* Each NamedCurve is 2 bytes. */ - ellipticcurvelist_length & 1) - goto err; - - if (!s->hit) { - if (s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist) - goto err; - - s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0; - if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = - OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL) { - *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - return 0; - } - s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = - ellipticcurvelist_length; - memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, sdata, - ellipticcurvelist_length); - } -# if 0 - fprintf(stderr, - "ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist (length=%i) ", - s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length); - sdata = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist; - for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; i++) - fprintf(stderr, "%i ", *(sdata++)); - fprintf(stderr, "\n"); -# endif - } -# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ -# ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input - else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input) { - unsigned char *sdata = data; - - if (size < 2) { - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - return 0; - } - n2s(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len); - if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2) { - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - return 0; - } - - if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) { - /* shouldn't really happen */ - OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input); - } - - /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */ - if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == 0) - s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); - else - s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = - BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len); - if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL) { - *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - return 0; - } - } -# endif - else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) { - if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb && - !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, - s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg)) - { - *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - return 0; - } - } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) { - if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al)) - return 0; - renegotiate_seen = 1; - } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms) { - int dsize; - if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs || size < 2) - goto err; - n2s(data, dsize); - size -= 2; - if (dsize != size || dsize & 1 || !dsize) - goto err; - if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s, data, dsize)) - goto err; - } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) { - - if (size < 5) - goto err; - - s->tlsext_status_type = *data++; - size--; - if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) { - const unsigned char *sdata; - int dsize; - /* Read in responder_id_list */ - n2s(data, dsize); - size -= 2; - if (dsize > size) - goto err; - - /* - * We remove any OCSP_RESPIDs from a previous handshake - * to prevent unbounded memory growth - CVE-2016-6304 - */ - sk_OCSP_RESPID_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, - OCSP_RESPID_free); - if (dsize > 0) { - s->tlsext_ocsp_ids = sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null(); - if (s->tlsext_ocsp_ids == NULL) { - *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - return 0; - } - } else { - s->tlsext_ocsp_ids = NULL; - } - - while (dsize > 0) { - OCSP_RESPID *id; - int idsize; - if (dsize < 4) - goto err; - n2s(data, idsize); - dsize -= 2 + idsize; - size -= 2 + idsize; - if (dsize < 0) - goto err; - sdata = data; - data += idsize; - id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL, &sdata, idsize); - if (!id) - goto err; - if (data != sdata) { - OCSP_RESPID_free(id); - goto err; - } - if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id)) { - OCSP_RESPID_free(id); - *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - return 0; - } - } - - /* Read in request_extensions */ - if (size < 2) - goto err; - n2s(data, dsize); - size -= 2; - if (dsize != size) - goto err; - sdata = data; - if (dsize > 0) { - if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts) { - sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, - X509_EXTENSION_free); - } - - s->tlsext_ocsp_exts = - d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL, &sdata, dsize); - if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts || (data + dsize != sdata)) - goto err; - } - } - /* - * We don't know what to do with any other type * so ignore it. - */ - else - s->tlsext_status_type = -1; - } -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS - else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) { - switch (data[0]) { - case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */ - s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED; - break; - case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */ - s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED; - s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS; - break; - default: - *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; - return 0; - } - } -# endif -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG - else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg && - s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) { - /*- - * We shouldn't accept this extension on a - * renegotiation. - * - * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we - * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on - * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when - * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an - * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing - * anything like that, but this might change). - * - * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake - * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len > - * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen - * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new - * Finished message could have been computed.) - */ - s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1; - } -# endif - - else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation && - s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) { - if (tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(s, data, size, al) != 0) - return 0; - } - - /* session ticket processed earlier */ -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP - else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s) - && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) { - if (ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size, al)) - return 0; - } -# endif - - data += size; - } - - /* Spurious data on the end */ - if (data != limit) - goto err; - - *p = data; - - ri_check: - - /* Need RI if renegotiating */ - - if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate && - !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) { - *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, - SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED); - return 0; - } - - return 1; -err: - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - return 0; -} - -/* - * Parse any custom extensions found. "data" is the start of the extension data - * and "limit" is the end of the record. TODO: add strict syntax checking. - */ - -static int ssl_scan_clienthello_custom_tlsext(SSL *s, - const unsigned char *data, - const unsigned char *limit, - int *al) -{ - unsigned short type, size, len; - /* If resumed session or no custom extensions nothing to do */ - if (s->hit || s->cert->srv_ext.meths_count == 0) - return 1; - - if (limit - data <= 2) - return 1; - n2s(data, len); - - if (limit - data < len) - return 1; - - while (limit - data >= 4) { - n2s(data, type); - n2s(data, size); - - if (limit - data < size) - return 1; - if (custom_ext_parse(s, 1 /* server */ , type, data, size, al) <= 0) - return 0; - - data += size; - } - - return 1; -} - -int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, - unsigned char *limit) -{ - int al = -1; - unsigned char *ptmp = *p; - /* - * Internally supported extensions are parsed first so SNI can be handled - * before custom extensions. An application processing SNI will typically - * switch the parent context using SSL_set_SSL_CTX and custom extensions - * need to be handled by the new SSL_CTX structure. - */ - if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, p, limit, &al) <= 0) { - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); - return 0; - } - - if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT); - return 0; - } - - custom_ext_init(&s->cert->srv_ext); - if (ssl_scan_clienthello_custom_tlsext(s, ptmp, limit, &al) <= 0) { - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); - return 0; - } - - return 1; -} - -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG -/* - * ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No - * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly - * fill the length of the block. - */ -static char ssl_next_proto_validate(unsigned char *d, unsigned len) -{ - unsigned int off = 0; - - while (off < len) { - if (d[off] == 0) - return 0; - off += d[off]; - off++; - } - - return off == len; -} -# endif - -static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, - unsigned char *d, int n, int *al) -{ - unsigned short length; - unsigned short type; - unsigned short size; - unsigned char *data = *p; - int tlsext_servername = 0; - int renegotiate_seen = 0; - -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG - s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0; -# endif - s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0; - - if (s->s3->alpn_selected) { - OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected); - s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL; - } -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS - s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED | - SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS); -# endif - - if ((d + n) - data <= 2) - goto ri_check; - - n2s(data, length); - if ((d + n) - data != length) { - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - return 0; - } - - while ((d + n) - data >= 4) { - n2s(data, type); - n2s(data, size); - - if ((d + n) - data < size) - goto ri_check; - - if (s->tlsext_debug_cb) - s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size, s->tlsext_debug_arg); - - if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) { - if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0) { - *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; - return 0; - } - tlsext_servername = 1; - } -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC - else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) { - unsigned char *sdata = data; - int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++); - - if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1) { - *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - return 0; - } - if (!s->hit) { - s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0; - if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) - OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist); - if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = - OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) { - *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - return 0; - } - s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = - ecpointformatlist_length; - memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, - ecpointformatlist_length); - } -# if 0 - fprintf(stderr, - "ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist "); - sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist; - for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++) - fprintf(stderr, "%i ", *(sdata++)); - fprintf(stderr, "\n"); -# endif - } -# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ - - else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) { - if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb && - !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, - s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg)) - { - *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - return 0; - } - if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET) - || (size > 0)) { - *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION; - return 0; - } - s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1; - } -# ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input - else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input) { - unsigned char *sdata = data; - - if (size < 2) { - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - return 0; - } - n2s(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len); - if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2) { - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - return 0; - } - - if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) { - /* shouldn't really happen */ - OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input); - } - if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len == 0) { - /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */ - s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); - } else { - s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = - BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len); - } - - if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL) { - *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - return 0; - } - } -# endif - else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) { - /* - * MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested a status - * request message. - */ - if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0)) { - *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION; - return 0; - } - /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */ - s->tlsext_status_expected = 1; - } -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG - else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg && - s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) { - unsigned char *selected; - unsigned char selected_len; - - /* We must have requested it. */ - if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL) { - *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION; - return 0; - } - /* The data must be valid */ - if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(data, size)) { - *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - return 0; - } - if (s-> - ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, - size, - s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) != - SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) { - *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - return 0; - } - /* - * Could be non-NULL if server has sent multiple NPN extensions in - * a single Serverhello - */ - OPENSSL_free(s->next_proto_negotiated); - s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len); - if (!s->next_proto_negotiated) { - *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - return 0; - } - memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len); - s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len; - s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1; - } -# endif - - else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation) { - unsigned len; - - /* We must have requested it. */ - if (!s->cert->alpn_sent) { - *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION; - return 0; - } - if (size < 4) { - *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - return 0; - } - /*- - * The extension data consists of: - * uint16 list_length - * uint8 proto_length; - * uint8 proto[proto_length]; - */ - len = data[0]; - len <<= 8; - len |= data[1]; - if (len != (unsigned)size - 2) { - *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - return 0; - } - len = data[2]; - if (len != (unsigned)size - 3) { - *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - return 0; - } - if (s->s3->alpn_selected) - OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected); - s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(len); - if (!s->s3->alpn_selected) { - *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - return 0; - } - memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, data + 3, len); - s->s3->alpn_selected_len = len; - } - - else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) { - if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al)) - return 0; - renegotiate_seen = 1; - } -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS - else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) { - switch (data[0]) { - case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */ - s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED; - break; - case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */ - s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED; - s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS; - break; - default: - *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; - return 0; - } - } -# endif -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP - else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) { - if (ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size, al)) - return 0; - } -# endif - /* - * If this extension type was not otherwise handled, but matches a - * custom_cli_ext_record, then send it to the c callback - */ - else if (custom_ext_parse(s, 0, type, data, size, al) <= 0) - return 0; - - data += size; - } - - if (data != d + n) { - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - return 0; - } - - if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1) { - if (s->tlsext_hostname) { - if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL) { - s->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname); - if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname) { - *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; - return 0; - } - } else { - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - return 0; - } - } - } - - *p = data; - - ri_check: - - /* - * Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to avoid - * an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server hello - * because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an attack. - * However this would mean we could not connect to any server which - * doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI absence on - * initial connect only. - */ - if (!renegotiate_seen && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT) - && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) { - *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, - SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED); - return 0; - } - - return 1; -} - -int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s) -{ - -# ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input - { - int r = 1; - - if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0) { - r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, - s-> - ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg); - if (!r) - return -1; - } - - if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL) { - if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) { - /* shouldn't really happen */ - OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input); - } - - if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0) { - /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */ - s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); - } else { - s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = - BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, - s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len); - } - if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, - ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - return -1; - } - s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len = - s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len; - } - - if (r == 2) - /* - * at callback's request, insist on receiving an appropriate - * server opaque PRF input - */ - s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = - s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len; - } -# endif - - s->cert->alpn_sent = 0; - return 1; -} - -int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s) -{ - return 1; -} - -static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s) -{ - int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK; - int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; - -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC - /* - * The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely - * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c. - */ - /* - * The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely - * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c. - */ -# endif - - if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) - ret = - s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, - s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg); - else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL - && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) - ret = - s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, - s-> - initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg); - -# ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input - { - /* - * This sort of belongs into ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(), but we - * might be sending an alert in response to the client hello, so this - * has to happen here in ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(). - */ - - int r = 1; - - if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0) { - r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, - s-> - ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg); - if (!r) { - ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; - al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - goto err; - } - } - - if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) { - /* shouldn't really happen */ - OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input); - } - s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = NULL; - - if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL) { - if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL && - s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == - s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len) { - /* - * can only use this extension if we have a server opaque PRF - * input of the same length as the client opaque PRF input! - */ - - if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0) { - /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */ - s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); - } else { - s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = - BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, - s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len); - } - if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL) { - ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; - al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - goto err; - } - s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = - s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len; - } - } - - if (r == 2 && s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL) { - /* - * The callback wants to enforce use of the extension, but we - * can't do that with the client opaque PRF input; abort the - * handshake. - */ - ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; - al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; - } - } - - err: -# endif - switch (ret) { - case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL: - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); - return -1; - - case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING: - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al); - return 1; - - case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK: - s->servername_done = 0; - default: - return 1; - } -} - -int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL *s) -{ - int al; - size_t i; - /* Clear any shared sigtnature algorithms */ - if (s->cert->shared_sigalgs) { - OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs); - s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL; - s->cert->shared_sigalgslen = 0; - } - /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */ - for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) { - s->cert->pkeys[i].digest = NULL; - s->cert->pkeys[i].valid_flags = 0; - } - - /* If sigalgs received process it. */ - if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs) { - if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - goto err; - } - /* Fatal error is no shared signature algorithms */ - if (!s->cert->shared_sigalgs) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS, - SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGATURE_ALGORITHMS); - al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; - goto err; - } - } else - ssl_cert_set_default_md(s->cert); - return 1; - err: - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); - return 0; -} - -/* - * Upon success, returns 1. - * Upon failure, returns 0 and sets |al| to the appropriate fatal alert. - */ -int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s, int *al) -{ - - /* - * If status request then ask callback what to do. Note: this must be - * called after servername callbacks in case the certificate has changed, - * and must be called after the cipher has been chosen because this may - * influence which certificate is sent - */ - if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) { - int ret; - CERT_PKEY *certpkey; - certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s); - /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */ - if (certpkey != NULL) { - /* - * Set current certificate to one we will use so SSL_get_certificate - * et al can pick it up. - */ - s->cert->key = certpkey; - ret = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg); - switch (ret) { - /* We don't want to send a status request response */ - case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK: - s->tlsext_status_expected = 0; - break; - /* status request response should be sent */ - case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK: - if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp) - s->tlsext_status_expected = 1; - break; - /* something bad happened */ - case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL: - default: - *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - return 0; - } - } - } - - if (!tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello_late(s, al)) { - return 0; - } - - return 1; -} - -int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s) -{ - int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK; - int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; - -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC - /* - * If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher - * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension it - * must contain uncompressed. - */ - unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; - unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth; - if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) - && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) - && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) - && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) - && ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) - || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) { - /* we are using an ECC cipher */ - size_t i; - unsigned char *list; - int found_uncompressed = 0; - list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist; - for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++) { - if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed) { - found_uncompressed = 1; - break; - } - } - if (!found_uncompressed) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, - SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST); - return -1; - } - } - ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK; -# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ - - if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) - ret = - s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, - s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg); - else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL - && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) - ret = - s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, - s-> - initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg); - -# ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input - if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len > 0) { - /* - * This case may indicate that we, as a client, want to insist on - * using opaque PRF inputs. So first verify that we really have a - * value from the server too. - */ - - if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL) { - ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; - al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; - } - - /* - * Anytime the server *has* sent an opaque PRF input, we need to - * check that we have a client opaque PRF input of the same size. - */ - if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL || - s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != - s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len) { - ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; - al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; - } - } -# endif - - OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp); - s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL; - s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1; - /* - * If we've requested certificate status and we wont get one tell the - * callback - */ - if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && !(s->tlsext_status_expected) - && !(s->hit) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) { - int r; - /* - * Call callback with resp == NULL and resplen == -1 so callback - * knows there is no response - */ - r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg); - if (r == 0) { - al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE; - ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; - } - if (r < 0) { - al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; - } - } - - switch (ret) { - case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL: - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); - return -1; - - case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING: - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al); - return 1; - - case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK: - s->servername_done = 0; - default: - return 1; - } -} - -int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, - int n) -{ - int al = -1; - if (s->version < SSL3_VERSION) - return 1; - if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0) { - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); - return 0; - } - - if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT); - return 0; - } - return 1; -} - -/*- - * Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the - * ClientHello, and other operations depend on the result, we need to handle - * any TLS session ticket extension at the same time. - * - * session_id: points at the session ID in the ClientHello. This code will - * read past the end of this in order to parse out the session ticket - * extension, if any. - * len: the length of the session ID. - * limit: a pointer to the first byte after the ClientHello. - * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to - * point to the resulting session. - * - * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key - * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will - * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1. - * - * Returns: - * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket. - * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings). - * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports - * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer. - * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but - * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error. - * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set. - * - * Side effects: - * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue - * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support - * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have - * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if - * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket. - * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0. - */ -int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len, - const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret) -{ - /* Point after session ID in client hello */ - const unsigned char *p = session_id + len; - unsigned short i; - - *ret = NULL; - s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0; - - /* - * If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present to permit stateful - * resumption. - */ - if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET) - return 0; - if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION) || !limit) - return 0; - if (p >= limit) - return -1; - /* Skip past DTLS cookie */ - if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { - i = *(p++); - - if (limit - p <= i) - return -1; - - p += i; - } - /* Skip past cipher list */ - n2s(p, i); - if (limit - p <= i) - return -1; - p += i; - - /* Skip past compression algorithm list */ - i = *(p++); - if (limit - p < i) - return -1; - p += i; - - /* Now at start of extensions */ - if (limit - p <= 2) - return 0; - n2s(p, i); - while (limit - p >= 4) { - unsigned short type, size; - n2s(p, type); - n2s(p, size); - if (limit - p < size) - return 0; - if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) { - int r; - if (size == 0) { - /* - * The client will accept a ticket but doesn't currently have - * one. - */ - s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1; - return 1; - } - if (s->tls_session_secret_cb) { - /* - * Indicate that the ticket couldn't be decrypted rather than - * generating the session from ticket now, trigger - * abbreviated handshake based on external mechanism to - * calculate the master secret later. - */ - return 2; - } - r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, p, size, session_id, len, ret); - switch (r) { - case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */ - s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1; - return 2; - case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */ - return r; - case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */ - s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1; - return 3; - default: /* fatal error */ - return -1; - } - } - p += size; - } - return 0; -} - -/*- - * tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket. - * - * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension. - * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extenion. - * sess_id: points at the session ID. - * sesslen: the length of the session ID. - * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to - * point to the resulting session. - * - * Returns: - * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket. - * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted. - * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set. - * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed. - */ -static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, - int eticklen, const unsigned char *sess_id, - int sesslen, SSL_SESSION **psess) -{ - SSL_SESSION *sess; - unsigned char *sdec; - const unsigned char *p; - int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0; - unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; - HMAC_CTX hctx; - EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx; - SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx; - - /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */ - HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx); - EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx); - if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) { - unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick; - int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16, - &ctx, &hctx, 0); - if (rv < 0) - return -1; - if (rv == 0) - return 2; - if (rv == 2) - renew_ticket = 1; - } else { - /* Check key name matches */ - if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16)) - return 2; - if (HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16, - tlsext_tick_md(), NULL) <= 0 - || EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL, - tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, - etick + 16) <= 0) { - goto err; - } - } - /* - * Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and integrity - * checks on ticket. - */ - mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx); - if (mlen < 0) { - goto err; - } - /* Sanity check ticket length: must exceed keyname + IV + HMAC */ - if (eticklen <= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx) + mlen) { - HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx); - EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); - return 2; - } - - eticklen -= mlen; - /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */ - if (HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen) <= 0 - || HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL) <= 0) { - goto err; - } - HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx); - if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen)) { - EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); - return 2; - } - /* Attempt to decrypt session data */ - /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */ - p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx); - eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx); - sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen); - if (sdec == NULL - || EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen) <= 0) { - EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); - OPENSSL_free(sdec); - return -1; - } - if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0) { - EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); - OPENSSL_free(sdec); - return 2; - } - slen += mlen; - EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); - p = sdec; - - sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen); - OPENSSL_free(sdec); - if (sess) { - /* - * The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to detect - * that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to the session - * structure. If it is empty set length to zero as required by - * standard. - */ - if (sesslen) - memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen); - sess->session_id_length = sesslen; - *psess = sess; - if (renew_ticket) - return 4; - else - return 3; - } - ERR_clear_error(); - /* - * For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new ticket. - */ - return 2; -err: - EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); - HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx); - return -1; -} - -/* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */ - -typedef struct { - int nid; - int id; -} tls12_lookup; - -static tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = { - {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5}, - {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1}, - {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224}, - {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256}, - {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384}, - {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512} -}; - -static tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = { - {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa}, - {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa}, - {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa} -}; - -static int tls12_find_id(int nid, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen) -{ - size_t i; - for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) { - if (table[i].nid == nid) - return table[i].id; - } - return -1; -} - -static int tls12_find_nid(int id, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen) -{ - size_t i; - for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) { - if ((table[i].id) == id) - return table[i].nid; - } - return NID_undef; -} - -int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk, - const EVP_MD *md) -{ - int sig_id, md_id; - if (!md) - return 0; - md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md, - sizeof(tls12_md) / sizeof(tls12_lookup)); - if (md_id == -1) - return 0; - sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk); - if (sig_id == -1) - return 0; - p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id; - p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id; - return 1; -} - -int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk) -{ - return tls12_find_id(pk->type, tls12_sig, - sizeof(tls12_sig) / sizeof(tls12_lookup)); -} - -const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg) -{ - switch (hash_alg) { -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5 - case TLSEXT_hash_md5: -# ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS - if (FIPS_mode()) - return NULL; -# endif - return EVP_md5(); -# endif -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA - case TLSEXT_hash_sha1: - return EVP_sha1(); -# endif -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256 - case TLSEXT_hash_sha224: - return EVP_sha224(); - - case TLSEXT_hash_sha256: - return EVP_sha256(); -# endif -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512 - case TLSEXT_hash_sha384: - return EVP_sha384(); - - case TLSEXT_hash_sha512: - return EVP_sha512(); -# endif - default: - return NULL; - - } -} - -static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg) -{ - switch (sig_alg) { -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA - case TLSEXT_signature_rsa: - return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN; -# endif -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA - case TLSEXT_signature_dsa: - return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN; -# endif -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA - case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa: - return SSL_PKEY_ECC; -# endif - } - return -1; -} - -/* Convert TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension values into NIDs */ -static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid, - int *psignhash_nid, const unsigned char *data) -{ - int sign_nid = NID_undef, hash_nid = NID_undef; - if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid) - return; - if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid) { - hash_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[0], tls12_md, - sizeof(tls12_md) / sizeof(tls12_lookup)); - if (phash_nid) - *phash_nid = hash_nid; - } - if (psign_nid || psignhash_nid) { - sign_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[1], tls12_sig, - sizeof(tls12_sig) / sizeof(tls12_lookup)); - if (psign_nid) - *psign_nid = sign_nid; - } - if (psignhash_nid) { - if (sign_nid == NID_undef || hash_nid == NID_undef - || OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid, hash_nid, - sign_nid) <= 0) - *psignhash_nid = NID_undef; - } -} - -/* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */ -static int tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(TLS_SIGALGS *shsig, - const unsigned char *pref, size_t preflen, - const unsigned char *allow, - size_t allowlen) -{ - const unsigned char *ptmp, *atmp; - size_t i, j, nmatch = 0; - for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i += 2, ptmp += 2) { - /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */ - if (tls12_get_hash(ptmp[0]) == NULL) - continue; - if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(ptmp[1]) == -1) - continue; - for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j += 2, atmp += 2) { - if (ptmp[0] == atmp[0] && ptmp[1] == atmp[1]) { - nmatch++; - if (shsig) { - shsig->rhash = ptmp[0]; - shsig->rsign = ptmp[1]; - tls1_lookup_sigalg(&shsig->hash_nid, - &shsig->sign_nid, - &shsig->signandhash_nid, ptmp); - shsig++; - } - break; - } - } - } - return nmatch; -} - -/* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */ -static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s) -{ - const unsigned char *pref, *allow, *conf; - size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen; - size_t nmatch; - TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL; - CERT *c = s->cert; - unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s); - if (c->shared_sigalgs) { - OPENSSL_free(c->shared_sigalgs); - c->shared_sigalgs = NULL; - c->shared_sigalgslen = 0; - } - /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */ - if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) { - conf = c->client_sigalgs; - conflen = c->client_sigalgslen; - } else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) { - conf = c->conf_sigalgs; - conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen; - } else - conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &conf); - if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb) { - pref = conf; - preflen = conflen; - allow = c->peer_sigalgs; - allowlen = c->peer_sigalgslen; - } else { - allow = conf; - allowlen = conflen; - pref = c->peer_sigalgs; - preflen = c->peer_sigalgslen; - } - nmatch = tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen); - if (nmatch) { - salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS)); - if (!salgs) - return 0; - nmatch = tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen); - } else { - salgs = NULL; - } - c->shared_sigalgs = salgs; - c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch; - return 1; -} - -/* Set preferred digest for each key type */ - -int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize) -{ - CERT *c = s->cert; - /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */ - if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) - return 1; - /* Should never happen */ - if (!c) - return 0; - - if (c->peer_sigalgs) - OPENSSL_free(c->peer_sigalgs); - c->peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(dsize); - if (!c->peer_sigalgs) - return 0; - c->peer_sigalgslen = dsize; - memcpy(c->peer_sigalgs, data, dsize); - return 1; -} - -int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s) -{ - int idx; - size_t i; - const EVP_MD *md; - CERT *c = s->cert; - TLS_SIGALGS *sigptr; - if (!tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s)) - return 0; - -# ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL - if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL) { - /* - * Use first set signature preference to force message digest, - * ignoring any peer preferences. - */ - const unsigned char *sigs = NULL; - if (s->server) - sigs = c->conf_sigalgs; - else - sigs = c->client_sigalgs; - if (sigs) { - idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigs[1]); - md = tls12_get_hash(sigs[0]); - c->pkeys[idx].digest = md; - c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN; - if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN) { - c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags = - CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN; - c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md; - } - } - } -# endif - - for (i = 0, sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs; - i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++, sigptr++) { - idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->rsign); - if (idx > 0 && c->pkeys[idx].digest == NULL) { - md = tls12_get_hash(sigptr->rhash); - c->pkeys[idx].digest = md; - c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN; - if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN) { - c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags = - CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN; - c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md; - } - } - - } - /* - * In strict mode leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't use - * the certificate for signing. - */ - if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) { - /* - * Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is not - * supported it stays as NULL. - */ -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA - if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest) - c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1(); -# endif -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA - if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest) { - c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1(); - c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = EVP_sha1(); - } -# endif -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA - if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest) - c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha1(); -# endif - } - return 1; -} - -int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx, - int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash, - unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash) -{ - const unsigned char *psig = s->cert->peer_sigalgs; - if (psig == NULL) - return 0; - if (idx >= 0) { - idx <<= 1; - if (idx >= (int)s->cert->peer_sigalgslen) - return 0; - psig += idx; - if (rhash) - *rhash = psig[0]; - if (rsig) - *rsig = psig[1]; - tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash, psign, psignhash, psig); - } - return s->cert->peer_sigalgslen / 2; -} - -int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx, - int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash, - unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash) -{ - TLS_SIGALGS *shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs; - if (!shsigalgs || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen) - return 0; - shsigalgs += idx; - if (phash) - *phash = shsigalgs->hash_nid; - if (psign) - *psign = shsigalgs->sign_nid; - if (psignhash) - *psignhash = shsigalgs->signandhash_nid; - if (rsig) - *rsig = shsigalgs->rsign; - if (rhash) - *rhash = shsigalgs->rhash; - return s->cert->shared_sigalgslen; -} - -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS -int tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s) -{ - unsigned char *p = &s->s3->rrec.data[0], *pl; - unsigned short hbtype; - unsigned int payload; - unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */ - - if (s->msg_callback) - s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, - &s->s3->rrec.data[0], s->s3->rrec.length, - s, s->msg_callback_arg); - - /* Read type and payload length first */ - if (1 + 2 + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length) - return 0; /* silently discard */ - hbtype = *p++; - n2s(p, payload); - if (1 + 2 + payload + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length) - return 0; /* silently discard per RFC 6520 sec. 4 */ - pl = p; - - if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST) { - unsigned char *buffer, *bp; - int r; - - /* - * Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 bytes message type, - * plus 2 bytes payload length, plus payload, plus padding - */ - buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding); - if (buffer == NULL) - return -1; - bp = buffer; - - /* Enter response type, length and copy payload */ - *bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE; - s2n(payload, bp); - memcpy(bp, pl, payload); - bp += payload; - /* Random padding */ - if (RAND_bytes(bp, padding) <= 0) { - OPENSSL_free(buffer); - return -1; - } - - r = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer, - 3 + payload + padding); - - if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback) - s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, - buffer, 3 + payload + padding, - s, s->msg_callback_arg); - - OPENSSL_free(buffer); - - if (r < 0) - return r; - } else if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_RESPONSE) { - unsigned int seq; - - /* - * We only send sequence numbers (2 bytes unsigned int), and 16 - * random bytes, so we just try to read the sequence number - */ - n2s(pl, seq); - - if (payload == 18 && seq == s->tlsext_hb_seq) { - s->tlsext_hb_seq++; - s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0; - } - } - - return 0; -} - -int tls1_heartbeat(SSL *s) -{ - unsigned char *buf, *p; - int ret = -1; - unsigned int payload = 18; /* Sequence number + random bytes */ - unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */ - - /* Only send if peer supports and accepts HB requests... */ - if (!(s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) || - s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT); - return -1; - } - - /* ...and there is none in flight yet... */ - if (s->tlsext_hb_pending) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING); - return -1; - } - - /* ...and no handshake in progress. */ - if (SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); - return -1; - } - - /* - * Check if padding is too long, payload and padding must not exceed 2^14 - * - 3 = 16381 bytes in total. - */ - OPENSSL_assert(payload + padding <= 16381); - - /*- - * Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number - * as payload to distuingish different messages and add - * some random stuff. - * - Message Type, 1 byte - * - Payload Length, 2 bytes (unsigned int) - * - Payload, the sequence number (2 bytes uint) - * - Payload, random bytes (16 bytes uint) - * - Padding - */ - buf = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding); - if (buf == NULL) - return -1; - p = buf; - /* Message Type */ - *p++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST; - /* Payload length (18 bytes here) */ - s2n(payload, p); - /* Sequence number */ - s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p); - /* 16 random bytes */ - if (RAND_bytes(p, 16) <= 0) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto err; - } - p += 16; - /* Random padding */ - if (RAND_bytes(p, padding) <= 0) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto err; - } - - ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3 + payload + padding); - if (ret >= 0) { - if (s->msg_callback) - s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, - buf, 3 + payload + padding, - s, s->msg_callback_arg); - - s->tlsext_hb_pending = 1; - } - -err: - OPENSSL_free(buf); - - return ret; -} -# endif - -# define MAX_SIGALGLEN (TLSEXT_hash_num * TLSEXT_signature_num * 2) - -typedef struct { - size_t sigalgcnt; - int sigalgs[MAX_SIGALGLEN]; -} sig_cb_st; - -static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg) -{ - sig_cb_st *sarg = arg; - size_t i; - char etmp[20], *p; - int sig_alg, hash_alg; - if (elem == NULL) - return 0; - if (sarg->sigalgcnt == MAX_SIGALGLEN) - return 0; - if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1)) - return 0; - memcpy(etmp, elem, len); - etmp[len] = 0; - p = strchr(etmp, '+'); - if (!p) - return 0; - *p = 0; - p++; - if (!*p) - return 0; - - if (!strcmp(etmp, "RSA")) - sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_RSA; - else if (!strcmp(etmp, "DSA")) - sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_DSA; - else if (!strcmp(etmp, "ECDSA")) - sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_EC; - else - return 0; - - hash_alg = OBJ_sn2nid(p); - if (hash_alg == NID_undef) - hash_alg = OBJ_ln2nid(p); - if (hash_alg == NID_undef) - return 0; - - for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt; i += 2) { - if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sig_alg && sarg->sigalgs[i + 1] == hash_alg) - return 0; - } - sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = hash_alg; - sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = sig_alg; - return 1; -} - -/* - * Set suppored signature algorithms based on a colon separated list of the - * form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512 - */ -int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client) -{ - sig_cb_st sig; - sig.sigalgcnt = 0; - if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig)) - return 0; - if (c == NULL) - return 1; - return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client); -} - -int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen, - int client) -{ - unsigned char *sigalgs, *sptr; - int rhash, rsign; - size_t i; - if (salglen & 1) - return 0; - sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen); - if (sigalgs == NULL) - return 0; - for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i += 2) { - rhash = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_md, - sizeof(tls12_md) / sizeof(tls12_lookup)); - rsign = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_sig, - sizeof(tls12_sig) / sizeof(tls12_lookup)); - - if (rhash == -1 || rsign == -1) - goto err; - *sptr++ = rhash; - *sptr++ = rsign; - } - - if (client) { - if (c->client_sigalgs) - OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs); - c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs; - c->client_sigalgslen = salglen; - } else { - if (c->conf_sigalgs) - OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs); - c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs; - c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen; - } - - return 1; - - err: - OPENSSL_free(sigalgs); - return 0; -} - -static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid) -{ - int sig_nid; - size_t i; - if (default_nid == -1) - return 1; - sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x); - if (default_nid) - return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0; - for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++) - if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid) - return 1; - return 0; -} - -/* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */ -static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x) -{ - X509_NAME *nm; - int i; - nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x); - for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++) { - if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i))) - return 1; - } - return 0; -} - -/* - * Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is usable by - * server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to check chains before - * passing them to the server and it allows the server to check chains before - * attempting to use them. - */ - -/* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when stict mode not set */ - -# define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \ - (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM) -/* Strict mode flags */ -# define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \ - (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \ - | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) - -int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain, - int idx) -{ - int i; - int rv = 0; - int check_flags = 0, strict_mode; - CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL; - CERT *c = s->cert; - unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s); - /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */ - if (idx != -1) { - /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */ - if (idx == -2) { - cpk = c->key; - idx = cpk - c->pkeys; - } else - cpk = c->pkeys + idx; - x = cpk->x509; - pk = cpk->privatekey; - chain = cpk->chain; - strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT; - /* If no cert or key, forget it */ - if (!x || !pk) - goto end; -# ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL - /* Allow any certificate to pass test */ - if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL) { - rv = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS | CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | - CERT_PKEY_VALID | CERT_PKEY_SIGN; - cpk->valid_flags = rv; - return rv; - } -# endif - } else { - if (!x || !pk) - return 0; - idx = ssl_cert_type(x, pk); - if (idx == -1) - return 0; - cpk = c->pkeys + idx; - if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT) - check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS; - else - check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS; - strict_mode = 1; - } - - if (suiteb_flags) { - int ok; - if (check_flags) - check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB; - ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags); - if (ok == X509_V_OK) - rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB; - else if (!check_flags) - goto end; - } - - /* - * Check all signature algorithms are consistent with signature - * algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later and strict mode. - */ - if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode) { - int default_nid; - unsigned char rsign = 0; - if (c->peer_sigalgs) - default_nid = 0; - /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */ - else { - switch (idx) { - case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC: - case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN: - case SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA: - rsign = TLSEXT_signature_rsa; - default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption; - break; - - case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN: - case SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA: - rsign = TLSEXT_signature_dsa; - default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1; - break; - - case SSL_PKEY_ECC: - rsign = TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa; - default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1; - break; - - default: - default_nid = -1; - break; - } - } - /* - * If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we have set - * preferred signature algorithms check we support sha1. - */ - if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs) { - size_t j; - const unsigned char *p = c->conf_sigalgs; - for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j += 2, p += 2) { - if (p[0] == TLSEXT_hash_sha1 && p[1] == rsign) - break; - } - if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen) { - if (check_flags) - goto skip_sigs; - else - goto end; - } - } - /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */ - if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid)) { - if (!check_flags) - goto end; - } else - rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE; - rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE; - for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) { - if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i), default_nid)) { - if (check_flags) { - rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE; - break; - } else - goto end; - } - } - } - /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */ - else if (check_flags) - rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE | CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE; - skip_sigs: - /* Check cert parameters are consistent */ - if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, check_flags ? 1 : 2)) - rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM; - else if (!check_flags) - goto end; - if (!s->server) - rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM; - /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */ - else if (strict_mode) { - rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM; - for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) { - X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i); - if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0)) { - if (check_flags) { - rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM; - break; - } else - goto end; - } - } - } - if (!s->server && strict_mode) { - STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn; - int check_type = 0; - switch (pk->type) { - case EVP_PKEY_RSA: - check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN; - break; - case EVP_PKEY_DSA: - check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN; - break; - case EVP_PKEY_EC: - check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN; - break; - case EVP_PKEY_DH: - case EVP_PKEY_DHX: - { - int cert_type = X509_certificate_type(x, pk); - if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_RSA) - check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_FIXED_DH; - if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_DSA) - check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_FIXED_DH; - } - } - if (check_type) { - const unsigned char *ctypes; - int ctypelen; - if (c->ctypes) { - ctypes = c->ctypes; - ctypelen = (int)c->ctype_num; - } else { - ctypes = (unsigned char *)s->s3->tmp.ctype; - ctypelen = s->s3->tmp.ctype_num; - } - for (i = 0; i < ctypelen; i++) { - if (ctypes[i] == check_type) { - rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE; - break; - } - } - if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags) - goto end; - } else - rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE; - - ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.ca_names; - - if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn)) - rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME; - - if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) { - if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x)) - rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME; - } - if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) { - for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) { - X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i); - if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp)) { - rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME; - break; - } - } - } - if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) - goto end; - } else - rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME | CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE; - - if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags) - rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID; - - end: - - if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) { - if (cpk->valid_flags & CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN) - rv |= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN; - else if (cpk->digest) - rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN; - } else - rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN; - - /* - * When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant if the - * chain is invalid. - */ - if (!check_flags) { - if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID) - cpk->valid_flags = rv; - else { - /* Preserve explicit sign flag, clear rest */ - cpk->valid_flags &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN; - return 0; - } - } - return rv; -} - -/* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */ -void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s) -{ - tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC); - tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN); - tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN); - tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA); - tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA); - tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC); -} - -/* User level utiity function to check a chain is suitable */ -int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain) -{ - return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1); -} - -#endif |