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author | Miss Islington (bot) <31488909+miss-islington@users.noreply.github.com> | 2022-11-10 15:57:41 (GMT) |
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committer | GitHub <noreply@github.com> | 2022-11-10 15:57:41 (GMT) |
commit | c09dba57cfbbf74273ce44b1f48f71b46806605c (patch) | |
tree | ff19ab0812ea77de71e7ffafb6578ce4c0f95c04 | |
parent | b43496c01a554cf41ae654a0379efae18609ad39 (diff) | |
download | cpython-c09dba57cfbbf74273ce44b1f48f71b46806605c.zip cpython-c09dba57cfbbf74273ce44b1f48f71b46806605c.tar.gz cpython-c09dba57cfbbf74273ce44b1f48f71b46806605c.tar.bz2 |
[3.9] gh-98433: Fix quadratic time idna decoding. (GH-99092) (GH-99222) (#99230)
There was an unnecessary quadratic loop in idna decoding. This restores
the behavior to linear.
(cherry picked from commit d315722564927c7202dd6e111dc79eaf14240b0d)
(cherry picked from commit a6f6c3a3d6f2b580f2d87885c9b8a9350ad7bf15)
Co-authored-by: Miss Islington (bot) <31488909+miss-islington@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Gregory P. Smith <greg@krypto.org>
-rw-r--r-- | Lib/encodings/idna.py | 32 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | Lib/test/test_codecs.py | 6 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2022-11-04-09-29-36.gh-issue-98433.l76c5G.rst | 6 |
3 files changed, 27 insertions, 17 deletions
diff --git a/Lib/encodings/idna.py b/Lib/encodings/idna.py index ea40585..bf98f51 100644 --- a/Lib/encodings/idna.py +++ b/Lib/encodings/idna.py @@ -39,23 +39,21 @@ def nameprep(label): # Check bidi RandAL = [stringprep.in_table_d1(x) for x in label] - for c in RandAL: - if c: - # There is a RandAL char in the string. Must perform further - # tests: - # 1) The characters in section 5.8 MUST be prohibited. - # This is table C.8, which was already checked - # 2) If a string contains any RandALCat character, the string - # MUST NOT contain any LCat character. - if any(stringprep.in_table_d2(x) for x in label): - raise UnicodeError("Violation of BIDI requirement 2") - - # 3) If a string contains any RandALCat character, a - # RandALCat character MUST be the first character of the - # string, and a RandALCat character MUST be the last - # character of the string. - if not RandAL[0] or not RandAL[-1]: - raise UnicodeError("Violation of BIDI requirement 3") + if any(RandAL): + # There is a RandAL char in the string. Must perform further + # tests: + # 1) The characters in section 5.8 MUST be prohibited. + # This is table C.8, which was already checked + # 2) If a string contains any RandALCat character, the string + # MUST NOT contain any LCat character. + if any(stringprep.in_table_d2(x) for x in label): + raise UnicodeError("Violation of BIDI requirement 2") + # 3) If a string contains any RandALCat character, a + # RandALCat character MUST be the first character of the + # string, and a RandALCat character MUST be the last + # character of the string. + if not RandAL[0] or not RandAL[-1]: + raise UnicodeError("Violation of BIDI requirement 3") return label diff --git a/Lib/test/test_codecs.py b/Lib/test/test_codecs.py index fc50e70d..3520cc0 100644 --- a/Lib/test/test_codecs.py +++ b/Lib/test/test_codecs.py @@ -1532,6 +1532,12 @@ class IDNACodecTest(unittest.TestCase): self.assertEqual("pyth\xf6n.org".encode("idna"), b"xn--pythn-mua.org") self.assertEqual("pyth\xf6n.org.".encode("idna"), b"xn--pythn-mua.org.") + def test_builtin_decode_length_limit(self): + with self.assertRaisesRegex(UnicodeError, "too long"): + (b"xn--016c"+b"a"*1100).decode("idna") + with self.assertRaisesRegex(UnicodeError, "too long"): + (b"xn--016c"+b"a"*70).decode("idna") + def test_stream(self): r = codecs.getreader("idna")(io.BytesIO(b"abc")) r.read(3) diff --git a/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2022-11-04-09-29-36.gh-issue-98433.l76c5G.rst b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2022-11-04-09-29-36.gh-issue-98433.l76c5G.rst new file mode 100644 index 0000000..5185fac --- /dev/null +++ b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2022-11-04-09-29-36.gh-issue-98433.l76c5G.rst @@ -0,0 +1,6 @@ +The IDNA codec decoder used on DNS hostnames by :mod:`socket` or :mod:`asyncio` +related name resolution functions no longer involves a quadratic algorithm. +This prevents a potential CPU denial of service if an out-of-spec excessive +length hostname involving bidirectional characters were decoded. Some protocols +such as :mod:`urllib` http ``3xx`` redirects potentially allow for an attacker +to supply such a name. |