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authorR. David Murray <rdmurray@bitdance.com>2011-01-09 02:35:24 (GMT)
committerR. David Murray <rdmurray@bitdance.com>2011-01-09 02:35:24 (GMT)
commit5b2d9ddf69cecfb9ad4e687fab3f34ecc5a9ea4f (patch)
treebb55bbeaa187a5bea36c3f5a7e3a1bd41d2157a1 /Lib/email/header.py
parente3ee66f141706d1220129dcc53b990e66507f5f2 (diff)
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#5871: protect against header injection attacks.
This makes Header.encode throw a HeaderParseError if it winds up formatting a header such that a continuation line has no leading whitespace and looks like a header. Since Header accepts values containing newlines and preserves them (and this is by design), without this fix any program that took user input (say, a subject in a web form) and passed it to the email package as a header was vulnerable to header injection attacks. (As far as we know this has never been exploited.) Thanks to Jakub Wilk for reporting this vulnerability.
Diffstat (limited to 'Lib/email/header.py')
-rw-r--r--Lib/email/header.py10
1 files changed, 9 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/Lib/email/header.py b/Lib/email/header.py
index f90883f..35cdb2b 100644
--- a/Lib/email/header.py
+++ b/Lib/email/header.py
@@ -47,6 +47,10 @@ ecre = re.compile(r'''
# For use with .match()
fcre = re.compile(r'[\041-\176]+:$')
+# Find a header embeded in a putative header value. Used to check for
+# header injection attack.
+_embeded_header = re.compile(r'\n[^ \t]+:')
+
# Helpers
@@ -320,7 +324,11 @@ class Header:
if len(lines) > 1:
formatter.newline()
formatter.add_transition()
- return formatter._str(linesep)
+ value = formatter._str(linesep)
+ if _embeded_header.search(value):
+ raise HeaderParseError("header value appears to contain "
+ "an embedded header: {!r}".format(value))
+ return value
def _normalize(self):
# Step 1: Normalize the chunks so that all runs of identical charsets