summaryrefslogtreecommitdiffstats
path: root/Lib/email/message.py
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
authorR. David Murray <rdmurray@bitdance.com>2011-01-09 02:48:04 (GMT)
committerR. David Murray <rdmurray@bitdance.com>2011-01-09 02:48:04 (GMT)
commit389af0037175ec5327d401b3d4a3b13d509cc926 (patch)
tree03ebfea958b3bfee40280bee5e187e6117411ef0 /Lib/email/message.py
parent50778ab4c25f99c8fefeb67bc927bcb3356590cd (diff)
downloadcpython-389af0037175ec5327d401b3d4a3b13d509cc926.zip
cpython-389af0037175ec5327d401b3d4a3b13d509cc926.tar.gz
cpython-389af0037175ec5327d401b3d4a3b13d509cc926.tar.bz2
Merged revisions 87873 via svnmerge from
svn+ssh://pythondev@svn.python.org/python/branches/py3k ........ r87873 | r.david.murray | 2011-01-08 21:35:24 -0500 (Sat, 08 Jan 2011) | 12 lines #5871: protect against header injection attacks. This makes Header.encode throw a HeaderParseError if it winds up formatting a header such that a continuation line has no leading whitespace and looks like a header. Since Header accepts values containing newlines and preserves them (and this is by design), without this fix any program that took user input (say, a subject in a web form) and passed it to the email package as a header was vulnerable to header injection attacks. (As far as we know this has never been exploited.) Thanks to Jakub Wilk for reporting this vulnerability. ........
Diffstat (limited to 'Lib/email/message.py')
0 files changed, 0 insertions, 0 deletions