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author | R. David Murray <rdmurray@bitdance.com> | 2011-01-09 03:02:04 (GMT) |
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committer | R. David Murray <rdmurray@bitdance.com> | 2011-01-09 03:02:04 (GMT) |
commit | d97f5ce3774c9b70a64febb713586501455964b7 (patch) | |
tree | 905d7d5248ae2d3b0b7c54e5dd5bccfb6609e942 /Lib/email | |
parent | c4c52dd23d4d365952fb7f653f72f38154e4d331 (diff) | |
download | cpython-d97f5ce3774c9b70a64febb713586501455964b7.zip cpython-d97f5ce3774c9b70a64febb713586501455964b7.tar.gz cpython-d97f5ce3774c9b70a64febb713586501455964b7.tar.bz2 |
Merged revisions 87873 via svnmerge from
svn+ssh://pythondev@svn.python.org/python/branches/py3k
........
r87873 | r.david.murray | 2011-01-08 21:35:24 -0500 (Sat, 08 Jan 2011) | 12 lines
#5871: protect against header injection attacks.
This makes Header.encode throw a HeaderParseError if it winds up
formatting a header such that a continuation line has no leading
whitespace and looks like a header. Since Header accepts values
containing newlines and preserves them (and this is by design), without
this fix any program that took user input (say, a subject in a web form)
and passed it to the email package as a header was vulnerable to header
injection attacks. (As far as we know this has never been exploited.)
Thanks to Jakub Wilk for reporting this vulnerability.
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Diffstat (limited to 'Lib/email')
-rw-r--r-- | Lib/email/header.py | 10 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | Lib/email/test/test_email.py | 11 |
2 files changed, 20 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/Lib/email/header.py b/Lib/email/header.py index 9e91dc2..702adf1 100644 --- a/Lib/email/header.py +++ b/Lib/email/header.py @@ -47,6 +47,10 @@ ecre = re.compile(r''' # For use with .match() fcre = re.compile(r'[\041-\176]+:$') +# Find a header embeded in a putative header value. Used to check for +# header injection attack. +_embeded_header = re.compile(r'\n[^ \t]+:') + # Helpers @@ -403,7 +407,11 @@ class Header: newchunks += self._split(s, charset, targetlen, splitchars) lastchunk, lastcharset = newchunks[-1] lastlen = lastcharset.encoded_header_len(lastchunk) - return self._encode_chunks(newchunks, maxlinelen) + value = self._encode_chunks(newchunks, maxlinelen) + if _embeded_header.search(value): + raise HeaderParseError("header value appears to contain " + "an embedded header: {!r}".format(value)) + return value diff --git a/Lib/email/test/test_email.py b/Lib/email/test/test_email.py index 4aac500..5c9a725 100644 --- a/Lib/email/test/test_email.py +++ b/Lib/email/test/test_email.py @@ -553,6 +553,17 @@ class TestMessageAPI(TestEmailBase): msg.set_charset(u'us-ascii') self.assertEqual('us-ascii', msg.get_content_charset()) + # Issue 5871: reject an attempt to embed a header inside a header value + # (header injection attack). + def test_embeded_header_via_Header_rejected(self): + msg = Message() + msg['Dummy'] = Header('dummy\nX-Injected-Header: test') + self.assertRaises(Errors.HeaderParseError, msg.as_string) + + def test_embeded_header_via_string_rejected(self): + msg = Message() + msg['Dummy'] = 'dummy\nX-Injected-Header: test' + self.assertRaises(Errors.HeaderParseError, msg.as_string) # Test the email.Encoders module |