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author | R. David Murray <rdmurray@bitdance.com> | 2011-01-09 02:48:04 (GMT) |
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committer | R. David Murray <rdmurray@bitdance.com> | 2011-01-09 02:48:04 (GMT) |
commit | 389af0037175ec5327d401b3d4a3b13d509cc926 (patch) | |
tree | 03ebfea958b3bfee40280bee5e187e6117411ef0 /Lib/email | |
parent | 50778ab4c25f99c8fefeb67bc927bcb3356590cd (diff) | |
download | cpython-389af0037175ec5327d401b3d4a3b13d509cc926.zip cpython-389af0037175ec5327d401b3d4a3b13d509cc926.tar.gz cpython-389af0037175ec5327d401b3d4a3b13d509cc926.tar.bz2 |
Merged revisions 87873 via svnmerge from
svn+ssh://pythondev@svn.python.org/python/branches/py3k
........
r87873 | r.david.murray | 2011-01-08 21:35:24 -0500 (Sat, 08 Jan 2011) | 12 lines
#5871: protect against header injection attacks.
This makes Header.encode throw a HeaderParseError if it winds up
formatting a header such that a continuation line has no leading
whitespace and looks like a header. Since Header accepts values
containing newlines and preserves them (and this is by design), without
this fix any program that took user input (say, a subject in a web form)
and passed it to the email package as a header was vulnerable to header
injection attacks. (As far as we know this has never been exploited.)
Thanks to Jakub Wilk for reporting this vulnerability.
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Diffstat (limited to 'Lib/email')
-rw-r--r-- | Lib/email/header.py | 10 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | Lib/email/test/test_email.py | 13 |
2 files changed, 22 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/Lib/email/header.py b/Lib/email/header.py index aaca18a..ce55d61 100644 --- a/Lib/email/header.py +++ b/Lib/email/header.py @@ -46,6 +46,10 @@ ecre = re.compile(r''' # For use with .match() fcre = re.compile(r'[\041-\176]+:$') +# Find a header embeded in a putative header value. Used to check for +# header injection attack. +_embeded_header = re.compile(r'\n[^ \t]+:') + # Helpers @@ -305,7 +309,11 @@ class Header: if len(lines) > 1: formatter.newline() formatter.add_transition() - return str(formatter) + value = str(formatter) + if _embeded_header.search(value): + raise HeaderParseError("header value appears to contain " + "an embedded header: {!r}".format(value)) + return value def _normalize(self): # Step 1: Normalize the chunks so that all runs of identical charsets diff --git a/Lib/email/test/test_email.py b/Lib/email/test/test_email.py index 05eb6a7..5222bab 100644 --- a/Lib/email/test/test_email.py +++ b/Lib/email/test/test_email.py @@ -540,6 +540,19 @@ class TestMessageAPI(TestEmailBase): msg['Content-Disposition']) + # Issue 5871: reject an attempt to embed a header inside a header value + # (header injection attack). + def test_embeded_header_via_Header_rejected(self): + msg = Message() + msg['Dummy'] = Header('dummy\nX-Injected-Header: test') + self.assertRaises(errors.HeaderParseError, msg.as_string) + + def test_embeded_header_via_string_rejected(self): + msg = Message() + msg['Dummy'] = 'dummy\nX-Injected-Header: test' + self.assertRaises(errors.HeaderParseError, msg.as_string) + + # Test the email.encoders module class TestEncoders(unittest.TestCase): def test_encode_empty_payload(self): |