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authorR. David Murray <rdmurray@bitdance.com>2011-01-09 02:48:04 (GMT)
committerR. David Murray <rdmurray@bitdance.com>2011-01-09 02:48:04 (GMT)
commit389af0037175ec5327d401b3d4a3b13d509cc926 (patch)
tree03ebfea958b3bfee40280bee5e187e6117411ef0 /Lib/email
parent50778ab4c25f99c8fefeb67bc927bcb3356590cd (diff)
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Merged revisions 87873 via svnmerge from
svn+ssh://pythondev@svn.python.org/python/branches/py3k ........ r87873 | r.david.murray | 2011-01-08 21:35:24 -0500 (Sat, 08 Jan 2011) | 12 lines #5871: protect against header injection attacks. This makes Header.encode throw a HeaderParseError if it winds up formatting a header such that a continuation line has no leading whitespace and looks like a header. Since Header accepts values containing newlines and preserves them (and this is by design), without this fix any program that took user input (say, a subject in a web form) and passed it to the email package as a header was vulnerable to header injection attacks. (As far as we know this has never been exploited.) Thanks to Jakub Wilk for reporting this vulnerability. ........
Diffstat (limited to 'Lib/email')
-rw-r--r--Lib/email/header.py10
-rw-r--r--Lib/email/test/test_email.py13
2 files changed, 22 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/Lib/email/header.py b/Lib/email/header.py
index aaca18a..ce55d61 100644
--- a/Lib/email/header.py
+++ b/Lib/email/header.py
@@ -46,6 +46,10 @@ ecre = re.compile(r'''
# For use with .match()
fcre = re.compile(r'[\041-\176]+:$')
+# Find a header embeded in a putative header value. Used to check for
+# header injection attack.
+_embeded_header = re.compile(r'\n[^ \t]+:')
+
# Helpers
@@ -305,7 +309,11 @@ class Header:
if len(lines) > 1:
formatter.newline()
formatter.add_transition()
- return str(formatter)
+ value = str(formatter)
+ if _embeded_header.search(value):
+ raise HeaderParseError("header value appears to contain "
+ "an embedded header: {!r}".format(value))
+ return value
def _normalize(self):
# Step 1: Normalize the chunks so that all runs of identical charsets
diff --git a/Lib/email/test/test_email.py b/Lib/email/test/test_email.py
index 05eb6a7..5222bab 100644
--- a/Lib/email/test/test_email.py
+++ b/Lib/email/test/test_email.py
@@ -540,6 +540,19 @@ class TestMessageAPI(TestEmailBase):
msg['Content-Disposition'])
+ # Issue 5871: reject an attempt to embed a header inside a header value
+ # (header injection attack).
+ def test_embeded_header_via_Header_rejected(self):
+ msg = Message()
+ msg['Dummy'] = Header('dummy\nX-Injected-Header: test')
+ self.assertRaises(errors.HeaderParseError, msg.as_string)
+
+ def test_embeded_header_via_string_rejected(self):
+ msg = Message()
+ msg['Dummy'] = 'dummy\nX-Injected-Header: test'
+ self.assertRaises(errors.HeaderParseError, msg.as_string)
+
+
# Test the email.encoders module
class TestEncoders(unittest.TestCase):
def test_encode_empty_payload(self):