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author | Tim Peters <tim.peters@gmail.com> | 2004-08-08 01:00:47 (GMT) |
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committer | Tim Peters <tim.peters@gmail.com> | 2004-08-08 01:00:47 (GMT) |
commit | ec8c5a931136b61231b295f2aded8dc04035e9b7 (patch) | |
tree | 76a240b7d477eb976027695d05b116037afe3873 /Modules | |
parent | 95334a5d1e224548d16b358c1314be444625b925 (diff) | |
download | cpython-ec8c5a931136b61231b295f2aded8dc04035e9b7.zip cpython-ec8c5a931136b61231b295f2aded8dc04035e9b7.tar.gz cpython-ec8c5a931136b61231b295f2aded8dc04035e9b7.tar.bz2 |
Bug 1003471: Python 1.5.2 security vulnerability still present in 2.3.4
That's the title of the report, but the hole was probably plugged since
Python 2.0. See corresponding checkin to PC/getpathp.c: a crucial
precondition for joinpath() was neither documented nor verified, and there
are so many callers with so many conditional paths that no "eyeball
analysis" is satisfactory. Now Python dies with a fatal error if the
precondition isn't satisfied, instead of allowing a buffer overrun.
NOT TESTED! The Windows version of the patch was, but not this one. I
don't feel like waiting for someone to notice the patch I attached to the
bug report. If it doesn't compile, sorry, but fix it <wink>. If it
does compile, it's "obviously correct".
Diffstat (limited to 'Modules')
-rw-r--r-- | Modules/getpath.c | 14 |
1 files changed, 10 insertions, 4 deletions
diff --git a/Modules/getpath.c b/Modules/getpath.c index 10ad509..418c683 100644 --- a/Modules/getpath.c +++ b/Modules/getpath.c @@ -190,10 +190,14 @@ isdir(char *filename) /* Is directory */ } -/* joinpath requires that any buffer argument passed to it has at - least MAXPATHLEN + 1 bytes allocated. If this requirement is met, - it guarantees that it will never overflow the buffer. If stuff - is too long, buffer will contain a truncated copy of stuff. +/* Add a path component, by appending stuff to buffer. + buffer must have at least MAXPATHLEN + 1 bytes allocated, and contain a + NUL-terminated string with no more than MAXPATHLEN characters (not counting + the trailing NUL). It's a fatal error if it contains a string longer than + that (callers must be careful!). If these requirements are met, it's + guaranteed that buffer will still be a NUL-terminated string with no more + than MAXPATHLEN characters at exit. If stuff is too long, only as much of + stuff as fits will be appended. */ static void joinpath(char *buffer, char *stuff) @@ -206,6 +210,8 @@ joinpath(char *buffer, char *stuff) if (n > 0 && buffer[n-1] != SEP && n < MAXPATHLEN) buffer[n++] = SEP; } + if (n > MAXPATHLEN) + Py_FatalError("buffer overflow in getpath.c's joinpath()"); k = strlen(stuff); if (n + k > MAXPATHLEN) k = MAXPATHLEN - n; |