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| author | R. David Murray <rdmurray@bitdance.com> | 2011-01-09 02:48:04 (GMT) | 
|---|---|---|
| committer | R. David Murray <rdmurray@bitdance.com> | 2011-01-09 02:48:04 (GMT) | 
| commit | 389af0037175ec5327d401b3d4a3b13d509cc926 (patch) | |
| tree | 03ebfea958b3bfee40280bee5e187e6117411ef0 /Python/codecs.c | |
| parent | 50778ab4c25f99c8fefeb67bc927bcb3356590cd (diff) | |
| download | cpython-389af0037175ec5327d401b3d4a3b13d509cc926.zip cpython-389af0037175ec5327d401b3d4a3b13d509cc926.tar.gz cpython-389af0037175ec5327d401b3d4a3b13d509cc926.tar.bz2  | |
Merged revisions 87873 via svnmerge from
svn+ssh://pythondev@svn.python.org/python/branches/py3k
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  r87873 | r.david.murray | 2011-01-08 21:35:24 -0500 (Sat, 08 Jan 2011) | 12 lines
  #5871: protect against header injection attacks.
  This makes Header.encode throw a HeaderParseError if it winds up
  formatting a header such that a continuation line has no leading
  whitespace and looks like a header.  Since Header accepts values
  containing newlines and preserves them (and this is by design), without
  this fix any program that took user input (say, a subject in a web form)
  and passed it to the email package as a header was vulnerable to header
  injection attacks.  (As far as we know this has never been exploited.)
  Thanks to Jakub Wilk for reporting this vulnerability.
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