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-rw-r--r--Doc/library/hmac.rst45
-rw-r--r--Modules/operator.c14
2 files changed, 30 insertions, 29 deletions
diff --git a/Doc/library/hmac.rst b/Doc/library/hmac.rst
index e9491fd..3fa0bd6 100644
--- a/Doc/library/hmac.rst
+++ b/Doc/library/hmac.rst
@@ -71,35 +71,36 @@ This module also provides the following helper function:
.. function:: compare_digest(a, b)
- Returns the equivalent of ``a == b``, but avoids content based
- short circuiting behaviour to reduce the vulnerability to timing
- analysis. The inputs must either both support the buffer protocol (e.g.
- :class:`bytes` and :class:`bytearray` instances) or be ASCII only
- :class:`str` instances as returned by :meth:`hexdigest`.
- :class:`bytes` and :class:`str` instances can't be mixed.
-
- Using a short circuiting comparison (that is, one that terminates as soon
- as it finds any difference between the values) to check digests for
- correctness can be problematic, as it introduces a potential
- vulnerability when an attacker can control both the message to be checked
- *and* the purported signature value. By keeping the plaintext consistent
- and supplying different signature values, an attacker may be able to use
- timing variations to search the signature space for the expected value in
- O(n) time rather than the desired O(2**n).
+ Return ``a == b``. This function uses an approach designed to prevent timing
+ analysis by avoiding content based short circuiting behaviour. The inputs
+ must either both support the buffer protocol (e.g. :class:`bytes` and
+ :class:`bytearray` instances) or be ASCII-only :class:`str` instances as
+ returned by :meth:`hexdigest`. :class:`bytes` and :class:`str` instances
+ can't be mixed.
+
+ Using a short circuiting comparison (that is, one that terminates as soon as
+ it finds any difference between the values) to check digests for correctness
+ can be problematic, as it introduces a potential vulnerability when an
+ attacker can control both the message to be checked *and* the purported
+ signature value. By keeping the plaintext consistent and supplying different
+ signature values, an attacker may be able to use timing variations to search
+ the signature space for the expected value in O(n) time rather than the
+ desired O(2**n).
.. note::
- While this function reduces the likelihood of leaking the contents of
- the expected digest via a timing attack, it still may leak some timing
+ While this function reduces the likelihood of leaking the contents of the
+ expected digest via a timing attack, it still may leak some timing
information when the input values differ in lengths as well as in error
- cases like unsupported types or non ASCII strings. When the inputs have
- different length the timing depends solely on the length of ``b``. It
- is assumed that the expected length of the digest is not a secret, as
- it is typically published as part of a file format, network protocol
- or API definition.
+ cases like unsupported types or non ASCII strings. When the inputs have
+ different length the timing depends solely on the length of ``b``. It is
+ assumed that the expected length of the digest is not a secret, as it is
+ typically published as part of a file format, network protocol or API
+ definition.
.. versionadded:: 3.3
+
.. seealso::
Module :mod:`hashlib`
diff --git a/Modules/operator.c b/Modules/operator.c
index bb3752e..8ad5406 100644
--- a/Modules/operator.c
+++ b/Modules/operator.c
@@ -211,14 +211,14 @@ _tscmp(const unsigned char *a, const unsigned char *b,
PyDoc_STRVAR(compare_digest__doc__,
"compare_digest(a, b) -> bool\n"
"\n"
-"Return the equivalent of 'a == b', but avoid any short circuiting to\n"
-"counterfeit timing analysis of input data. The function should be used to\n"
-"compare cryptographic secrets. a and b must both either support the buffer\n"
-"protocol (e.g. bytes) or be ASCII only str instances at the same time.\n"
+"Return 'a == b'. This function uses an approach designed to prevent\n"
+"timing analysis, making it appropriate for cryptography.\n"
+"a and b must both be of the same type: either str (ASCII only),\n"
+"or any type that supports the buffer protocol (e.g. bytes).\n"
"\n"
-"Note: In case of an error or different lengths the function may disclose\n"
-"some timing information about the types and lengths of a and b.\n");
-
+"Note: If a and b are of different lengths, or if an error occurs,\n"
+"a timing attack may be able to infer information about the types\n"
+"and lengths of a and b, but not their values.\n");
static PyObject*
compare_digest(PyObject *self, PyObject *args)