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-rw-r--r--Lib/email/header.py10
-rw-r--r--Lib/email/test/test_email.py13
-rw-r--r--Misc/NEWS7
3 files changed, 29 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/Lib/email/header.py b/Lib/email/header.py
index aaca18a..ce55d61 100644
--- a/Lib/email/header.py
+++ b/Lib/email/header.py
@@ -46,6 +46,10 @@ ecre = re.compile(r'''
# For use with .match()
fcre = re.compile(r'[\041-\176]+:$')
+# Find a header embeded in a putative header value. Used to check for
+# header injection attack.
+_embeded_header = re.compile(r'\n[^ \t]+:')
+
# Helpers
@@ -305,7 +309,11 @@ class Header:
if len(lines) > 1:
formatter.newline()
formatter.add_transition()
- return str(formatter)
+ value = str(formatter)
+ if _embeded_header.search(value):
+ raise HeaderParseError("header value appears to contain "
+ "an embedded header: {!r}".format(value))
+ return value
def _normalize(self):
# Step 1: Normalize the chunks so that all runs of identical charsets
diff --git a/Lib/email/test/test_email.py b/Lib/email/test/test_email.py
index 05eb6a7..5222bab 100644
--- a/Lib/email/test/test_email.py
+++ b/Lib/email/test/test_email.py
@@ -540,6 +540,19 @@ class TestMessageAPI(TestEmailBase):
msg['Content-Disposition'])
+ # Issue 5871: reject an attempt to embed a header inside a header value
+ # (header injection attack).
+ def test_embeded_header_via_Header_rejected(self):
+ msg = Message()
+ msg['Dummy'] = Header('dummy\nX-Injected-Header: test')
+ self.assertRaises(errors.HeaderParseError, msg.as_string)
+
+ def test_embeded_header_via_string_rejected(self):
+ msg = Message()
+ msg['Dummy'] = 'dummy\nX-Injected-Header: test'
+ self.assertRaises(errors.HeaderParseError, msg.as_string)
+
+
# Test the email.encoders module
class TestEncoders(unittest.TestCase):
def test_encode_empty_payload(self):
diff --git a/Misc/NEWS b/Misc/NEWS
index d15a849..7af0b2c 100644
--- a/Misc/NEWS
+++ b/Misc/NEWS
@@ -31,6 +31,13 @@ Core and Builtins
Library
-------
+- Issue #5871: email.header.Header.encode now raises an error if any
+ continuation line in the formatted value has no leading white space
+ and looks like a header. Since Generator uses Header to format all
+ headers, this check is made for all headers in any serialized message
+ at serialization time. This provides protection against header
+ injection attacks.
+
- Issue #7858: Raise an error properly when os.utime() fails under Windows
on an existing file.