diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'Lib/multiprocessing')
| -rw-r--r-- | Lib/multiprocessing/connection.py | 182 |
1 files changed, 151 insertions, 31 deletions
diff --git a/Lib/multiprocessing/connection.py b/Lib/multiprocessing/connection.py index 1a8822b..04eaea8 100644 --- a/Lib/multiprocessing/connection.py +++ b/Lib/multiprocessing/connection.py @@ -722,11 +722,11 @@ if sys.platform == 'win32': # Authentication stuff # -MESSAGE_LENGTH = 20 +MESSAGE_LENGTH = 40 # MUST be > 20 -CHALLENGE = b'#CHALLENGE#' -WELCOME = b'#WELCOME#' -FAILURE = b'#FAILURE#' +_CHALLENGE = b'#CHALLENGE#' +_WELCOME = b'#WELCOME#' +_FAILURE = b'#FAILURE#' # multiprocessing.connection Authentication Handshake Protocol Description # (as documented for reference after reading the existing code) @@ -750,7 +750,12 @@ FAILURE = b'#FAILURE#' # ------------------------------ --------------------------------------- # 0. Open a connection on the pipe. # 1. Accept connection. -# 2. New random 20 bytes -> MESSAGE +# 2. Random 20+ bytes -> MESSAGE +# Modern servers always send +# more than 20 bytes and include +# a {digest} prefix on it with +# their preferred HMAC digest. +# Legacy ones send ==20 bytes. # 3. send 4 byte length (net order) # prefix followed by: # b'#CHALLENGE#' + MESSAGE @@ -763,14 +768,32 @@ FAILURE = b'#FAILURE#' # 6. Assert that M1 starts with: # b'#CHALLENGE#' # 7. Strip that prefix from M1 into -> M2 -# 8. Compute HMAC-MD5 of AUTHKEY, M2 -> C_DIGEST +# 7.1. Parse M2: if it is exactly 20 bytes in +# length this indicates a legacy server +# supporting only HMAC-MD5. Otherwise the +# 7.2. preferred digest is looked up from an +# expected "{digest}" prefix on M2. No prefix +# or unsupported digest? <- AuthenticationError +# 7.3. Put divined algorithm name in -> D_NAME +# 8. Compute HMAC-D_NAME of AUTHKEY, M2 -> C_DIGEST # 9. Send 4 byte length prefix (net order) # followed by C_DIGEST bytes. -# 10. Compute HMAC-MD5 of AUTHKEY, -# MESSAGE into -> M_DIGEST. -# 11. Receive 4 or 4+8 byte length +# 10. Receive 4 or 4+8 byte length # prefix (#4 dance) -> SIZE. -# 12. Receive min(SIZE, 256) -> C_D. +# 11. Receive min(SIZE, 256) -> C_D. +# 11.1. Parse C_D: legacy servers +# accept it as is, "md5" -> D_NAME +# 11.2. modern servers check the length +# of C_D, IF it is 16 bytes? +# 11.2.1. "md5" -> D_NAME +# and skip to step 12. +# 11.3. longer? expect and parse a "{digest}" +# prefix into -> D_NAME. +# Strip the prefix and store remaining +# bytes in -> C_D. +# 11.4. Don't like D_NAME? <- AuthenticationError +# 12. Compute HMAC-D_NAME of AUTHKEY, +# MESSAGE into -> M_DIGEST. # 13. Compare M_DIGEST == C_D: # 14a: Match? Send length prefix & # b'#WELCOME#' @@ -787,42 +810,139 @@ FAILURE = b'#FAILURE#' # # If this RETURNed, the connection remains open: it has been authenticated. # -# Length prefixes are used consistently even though every step so far has -# always been a singular specific fixed length. This may help us evolve -# the protocol in the future without breaking backwards compatibility. -# -# Similarly the initial challenge message from the serving side has always -# been 20 bytes, but clients can accept a 100+ so using the length of the -# opening challenge message as an indicator of protocol version may work. +# Length prefixes are used consistently. Even on the legacy protocol, this +# was good fortune and allowed us to evolve the protocol by using the length +# of the opening challenge or length of the returned digest as a signal as +# to which protocol the other end supports. + +_ALLOWED_DIGESTS = frozenset( + {b'md5', b'sha256', b'sha384', b'sha3_256', b'sha3_384'}) +_MAX_DIGEST_LEN = max(len(_) for _ in _ALLOWED_DIGESTS) + +# Old hmac-md5 only server versions from Python <=3.11 sent a message of this +# length. It happens to not match the length of any supported digest so we can +# use a message of this length to indicate that we should work in backwards +# compatible md5-only mode without a {digest_name} prefix on our response. +_MD5ONLY_MESSAGE_LENGTH = 20 +_MD5_DIGEST_LEN = 16 +_LEGACY_LENGTHS = (_MD5ONLY_MESSAGE_LENGTH, _MD5_DIGEST_LEN) + + +def _get_digest_name_and_payload(message: bytes) -> (str, bytes): + """Returns a digest name and the payload for a response hash. + + If a legacy protocol is detected based on the message length + or contents the digest name returned will be empty to indicate + legacy mode where MD5 and no digest prefix should be sent. + """ + # modern message format: b"{digest}payload" longer than 20 bytes + # legacy message format: 16 or 20 byte b"payload" + if len(message) in _LEGACY_LENGTHS: + # Either this was a legacy server challenge, or we're processing + # a reply from a legacy client that sent an unprefixed 16-byte + # HMAC-MD5 response. All messages using the modern protocol will + # be longer than either of these lengths. + return '', message + if (message.startswith(b'{') and + (curly := message.find(b'}', 1, _MAX_DIGEST_LEN+2)) > 0): + digest = message[1:curly] + if digest in _ALLOWED_DIGESTS: + payload = message[curly+1:] + return digest.decode('ascii'), payload + raise AuthenticationError( + 'unsupported message length, missing digest prefix, ' + f'or unsupported digest: {message=}') + + +def _create_response(authkey, message): + """Create a MAC based on authkey and message + + The MAC algorithm defaults to HMAC-MD5, unless MD5 is not available or + the message has a '{digest_name}' prefix. For legacy HMAC-MD5, the response + is the raw MAC, otherwise the response is prefixed with '{digest_name}', + e.g. b'{sha256}abcdefg...' + + Note: The MAC protects the entire message including the digest_name prefix. + """ + import hmac + digest_name = _get_digest_name_and_payload(message)[0] + # The MAC protects the entire message: digest header and payload. + if not digest_name: + # Legacy server without a {digest} prefix on message. + # Generate a legacy non-prefixed HMAC-MD5 reply. + try: + return hmac.new(authkey, message, 'md5').digest() + except ValueError: + # HMAC-MD5 is not available (FIPS mode?), fall back to + # HMAC-SHA2-256 modern protocol. The legacy server probably + # doesn't support it and will reject us anyways. :shrug: + digest_name = 'sha256' + # Modern protocol, indicate the digest used in the reply. + response = hmac.new(authkey, message, digest_name).digest() + return b'{%s}%s' % (digest_name.encode('ascii'), response) + + +def _verify_challenge(authkey, message, response): + """Verify MAC challenge + + If our message did not include a digest_name prefix, the client is allowed + to select a stronger digest_name from _ALLOWED_DIGESTS. + + In case our message is prefixed, a client cannot downgrade to a weaker + algorithm, because the MAC is calculated over the entire message + including the '{digest_name}' prefix. + """ + import hmac + response_digest, response_mac = _get_digest_name_and_payload(response) + response_digest = response_digest or 'md5' + try: + expected = hmac.new(authkey, message, response_digest).digest() + except ValueError: + raise AuthenticationError(f'{response_digest=} unsupported') + if len(expected) != len(response_mac): + raise AuthenticationError( + f'expected {response_digest!r} of length {len(expected)} ' + f'got {len(response_mac)}') + if not hmac.compare_digest(expected, response_mac): + raise AuthenticationError('digest received was wrong') -def deliver_challenge(connection, authkey): - import hmac +def deliver_challenge(connection, authkey: bytes, digest_name='sha256'): if not isinstance(authkey, bytes): raise ValueError( "Authkey must be bytes, not {0!s}".format(type(authkey))) + assert MESSAGE_LENGTH > _MD5ONLY_MESSAGE_LENGTH, "protocol constraint" message = os.urandom(MESSAGE_LENGTH) - connection.send_bytes(CHALLENGE + message) - digest = hmac.new(authkey, message, 'md5').digest() + message = b'{%s}%s' % (digest_name.encode('ascii'), message) + # Even when sending a challenge to a legacy client that does not support + # digest prefixes, they'll take the entire thing as a challenge and + # respond to it with a raw HMAC-MD5. + connection.send_bytes(_CHALLENGE + message) response = connection.recv_bytes(256) # reject large message - if response == digest: - connection.send_bytes(WELCOME) + try: + _verify_challenge(authkey, message, response) + except AuthenticationError: + connection.send_bytes(_FAILURE) + raise else: - connection.send_bytes(FAILURE) - raise AuthenticationError('digest received was wrong') + connection.send_bytes(_WELCOME) -def answer_challenge(connection, authkey): - import hmac + +def answer_challenge(connection, authkey: bytes): if not isinstance(authkey, bytes): raise ValueError( "Authkey must be bytes, not {0!s}".format(type(authkey))) message = connection.recv_bytes(256) # reject large message - assert message[:len(CHALLENGE)] == CHALLENGE, 'message = %r' % message - message = message[len(CHALLENGE):] - digest = hmac.new(authkey, message, 'md5').digest() + if not message.startswith(_CHALLENGE): + raise AuthenticationError( + f'Protocol error, expected challenge: {message=}') + message = message[len(_CHALLENGE):] + if len(message) < _MD5ONLY_MESSAGE_LENGTH: + raise AuthenticationError('challenge too short: {len(message)} bytes') + digest = _create_response(authkey, message) connection.send_bytes(digest) response = connection.recv_bytes(256) # reject large message - if response != WELCOME: + if response != _WELCOME: raise AuthenticationError('digest sent was rejected') # |