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| author | Quincey Koziol <koziol@hdfgroup.org> | 2016-07-22 22:43:18 (GMT) |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Quincey Koziol <koziol@hdfgroup.org> | 2016-07-22 22:43:18 (GMT) |
| commit | 4af66b09e03af4e9b0b6a1293dfe746f48106aba (patch) | |
| tree | 0cb162e0921a0a774a433f9d3cd9f08c44bbe57d /src/H5Aint.c | |
| parent | 9b597a48552f5201b37793a4c6fece4fd9f1c346 (diff) | |
| download | hdf5-4af66b09e03af4e9b0b6a1293dfe746f48106aba.zip hdf5-4af66b09e03af4e9b0b6a1293dfe746f48106aba.tar.gz hdf5-4af66b09e03af4e9b0b6a1293dfe746f48106aba.tar.bz2 | |
[svn-r30219] Description:
More warning cleaups: down to 770 warnings (from ~940) in 134 files (from
148), with 28 unique kinds of warnings (from 31).
Tested on:
MacOSX/64 10.11.5 (amazon) w/serial & parallel
(h5committest forthcoming)
Diffstat (limited to 'src/H5Aint.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | src/H5Aint.c | 22 |
1 files changed, 14 insertions, 8 deletions
diff --git a/src/H5Aint.c b/src/H5Aint.c index 2730b0b..1b7b830 100644 --- a/src/H5Aint.c +++ b/src/H5Aint.c @@ -1920,15 +1920,16 @@ H5A_t * H5A_attr_copy_file(const H5A_t *attr_src, H5F_t *file_dst, hbool_t *recompute_size, H5O_copy_t *cpy_info, hid_t dxpl_id) { - H5A_t *attr_dst = NULL; - - /* for dataype conversion */ + H5A_t *attr_dst = NULL; /* Destination attribute */ hid_t tid_src = -1; /* Datatype ID for source datatype */ hid_t tid_dst = -1; /* Datatype ID for destination datatype */ hid_t tid_mem = -1; /* Datatype ID for memory datatype */ void *buf = NULL; /* Buffer for copying data */ void *reclaim_buf = NULL; /* Buffer for reclaiming data */ hid_t buf_sid = -1; /* ID for buffer dataspace */ + hssize_t sdst_nelmts; /* # of elements in destination attribute (signed) */ + size_t dst_nelmts; /* # of elements in destination attribute */ + size_t dst_dt_size; /* Size of destination attribute datatype */ H5A_t *ret_value = NULL; /* Return value */ FUNC_ENTER_NOAPI_NOINIT @@ -2014,12 +2015,17 @@ H5A_attr_copy_file(const H5A_t *attr_src, H5F_t *file_dst, hbool_t *recompute_si if(attr_dst->shared->dt_size != attr_src->shared->dt_size || attr_dst->shared->ds_size != attr_src->shared->ds_size) *recompute_size = TRUE; + /* Get # of elements for destination attribute's dataspace */ + if((sdst_nelmts = H5S_GET_EXTENT_NPOINTS(attr_dst->shared->ds)) < 0) + HGOTO_ERROR(H5E_ATTR, H5E_CANTCOUNT, NULL, "dataspace is invalid") + H5_CHECKED_ASSIGN(dst_nelmts, size_t, sdst_nelmts, hssize_t); + + /* Get size of destination attribute's datatype */ + if(0 == (dst_dt_size = H5T_get_size(attr_dst->shared->dt))) + HGOTO_ERROR(H5E_DATATYPE, H5E_CANTINIT, NULL, "unable to determine datatype size") + /* Compute the size of the data */ - /* NOTE: This raises warnings. If we are going to be serious about - * expecting overflow here, we should implement testing similar to - * that described in CERT bulletins INT30-C and INT32-C. - */ - H5_CHECKED_ASSIGN(attr_dst->shared->data_size, size_t, H5S_GET_EXTENT_NPOINTS(attr_dst->shared->ds) * H5T_get_size(attr_dst->shared->dt), hssize_t); + attr_dst->shared->data_size = dst_nelmts * dst_dt_size; /* Copy (& convert) the data, if necessary */ if(attr_src->shared->data) { |