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author | Binh-Minh Ribler <bmribler@hdfgroup.org> | 2020-08-02 20:32:08 (GMT) |
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committer | Binh-Minh Ribler <bmribler@hdfgroup.org> | 2020-08-02 20:32:08 (GMT) |
commit | 127fb757f815187865e9f14947ed43987a8a47cc (patch) | |
tree | 0922b06b0731c474dca9cbfc598800a813ccd3e5 /src | |
parent | ece92e9d8e336aa3dcec0e53132fb5871d5ce695 (diff) | |
download | hdf5-127fb757f815187865e9f14947ed43987a8a47cc.zip hdf5-127fb757f815187865e9f14947ed43987a8a47cc.tar.gz hdf5-127fb757f815187865e9f14947ed43987a8a47cc.tar.bz2 |
Fix HDFFV-11120 and HDFFV-11121 (CVE-2018-13870 and CVE-2018-13869)
Description:
When a buffer overflow occurred because a name length was corrupted
and became very large, h5dump produced a segfault on one file and a
memcpy parameter overlap on another file. This commit added checks
that detect a read pass the end of the buffer to prevent these error
conditions.
Platforms tested:
Linux/64 (jelly)
Diffstat (limited to 'src')
-rw-r--r-- | src/H5Olink.c | 19 |
1 files changed, 18 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/src/H5Olink.c b/src/H5Olink.c index 0a74381..436522a 100644 --- a/src/H5Olink.c +++ b/src/H5Olink.c @@ -118,11 +118,12 @@ H5FL_DEFINE_STATIC(H5O_link_t); static void * H5O_link_decode(H5F_t *f, hid_t H5_ATTR_UNUSED dxpl_id, H5O_t H5_ATTR_UNUSED *open_oh, unsigned H5_ATTR_UNUSED mesg_flags, unsigned H5_ATTR_UNUSED *ioflags, - size_t H5_ATTR_UNUSED p_size, const uint8_t *p) + size_t p_size, const uint8_t *p) { H5O_link_t *lnk = NULL; /* Pointer to link message */ size_t len = 0; /* Length of a string in the message */ unsigned char link_flags; /* Flags for encoding link info */ + const uint8_t *p_end = p + p_size; /* End of the p buffer */ void *ret_value; /* Return value */ FUNC_ENTER_NOAPI_NOINIT @@ -198,6 +199,11 @@ H5O_link_decode(H5F_t *f, hid_t H5_ATTR_UNUSED dxpl_id, H5O_t H5_ATTR_UNUSED *op if(len == 0) HGOTO_ERROR(H5E_OHDR, H5E_CANTLOAD, NULL, "invalid name length") + /* Make sure that length doesn't exceed buffer size, which could occur + when the file is corrupted */ + if(p + len > p_end) + HGOTO_ERROR(H5E_OHDR, H5E_OVERFLOW, NULL, "name length causes read past end of buffer") + /* Get the link's name */ if(NULL == (lnk->name = (char *)H5MM_malloc(len + 1))) HGOTO_ERROR(H5E_RESOURCE, H5E_NOSPACE, NULL, "memory allocation failed") @@ -217,6 +223,12 @@ H5O_link_decode(H5F_t *f, hid_t H5_ATTR_UNUSED dxpl_id, H5O_t H5_ATTR_UNUSED *op UINT16DECODE(p, len) if(len == 0) HGOTO_ERROR(H5E_OHDR, H5E_CANTLOAD, NULL, "invalid link length") + + /* Make sure that length doesn't exceed buffer size, which could occur + when the file is corrupted */ + if(p + len > p_end) + HGOTO_ERROR(H5E_OHDR, H5E_OVERFLOW, NULL, "name length causes read past end of buffer") + if(NULL == (lnk->u.soft.name = (char *)H5MM_malloc((size_t)len + 1))) HGOTO_ERROR(H5E_RESOURCE, H5E_NOSPACE, NULL, "memory allocation failed") HDmemcpy(lnk->u.soft.name, p, len); @@ -237,6 +249,11 @@ H5O_link_decode(H5F_t *f, hid_t H5_ATTR_UNUSED dxpl_id, H5O_t H5_ATTR_UNUSED *op lnk->u.ud.size = len; if(len > 0) { + /* Make sure that length doesn't exceed buffer size, which could + occur when the file is corrupted */ + if(p + len > p_end) + HGOTO_ERROR(H5E_OHDR, H5E_OVERFLOW, NULL, "name length causes read past end of buffer") + if(NULL == (lnk->u.ud.udata = H5MM_malloc((size_t)len))) HGOTO_ERROR(H5E_RESOURCE, H5E_NOSPACE, NULL, "memory allocation failed") HDmemcpy(lnk->u.ud.udata, p, len); |