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authordkf <donal.k.fellows@manchester.ac.uk>2009-08-25 08:48:16 (GMT)
committerdkf <donal.k.fellows@manchester.ac.uk>2009-08-25 08:48:16 (GMT)
commit04186cac679b0f544237dd1c8be70e4f3a79a2e7 (patch)
tree01e8083e454fe4409f999a44309f7a6e286bc143
parente9044ae71084142ae100561370c6c291dd279a4c (diff)
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[Bug 1909931]: Add support for server-interpreted access control addreses.
-rw-r--r--ChangeLog5
-rw-r--r--unix/tkUnixSend.c50
2 files changed, 52 insertions, 3 deletions
diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index bcd3594..534e6af 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -1,3 +1,8 @@
+2009-08-25 Donal K. Fellows <dkf@users.sf.net>
+
+ * unix/tkUnixSend.c (ServerSecure): [Bug 1909931]: Added some support
+ for server-interpreted access control addreses.
+
2009-08-24 Donal K. Fellows <dkf@users.sf.net>
* library/msgbox.tcl (::tk::MessageBox): Correct bindings so that they
diff --git a/unix/tkUnixSend.c b/unix/tkUnixSend.c
index b2083f3..1c8c67c 100644
--- a/unix/tkUnixSend.c
+++ b/unix/tkUnixSend.c
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@
* See the file "license.terms" for information on usage and redistribution of
* this file, and for a DISCLAIMER OF ALL WARRANTIES.
*
- * RCS: @(#) $Id: tkUnixSend.c,v 1.20 2007/12/13 15:28:51 dgp Exp $
+ * RCS: @(#) $Id: tkUnixSend.c,v 1.20.2.1 2009/08/25 08:48:16 dkf Exp $
*/
#include "tkUnixInt.h"
@@ -681,8 +681,52 @@ ServerSecure(
secure = 0;
addrPtr = XListHosts(dispPtr->display, &numHosts, &enabled);
- if (enabled && (numHosts == 0)) {
- secure = 1;
+ if (enabled) {
+ if (numHosts == 0) {
+ secure = 1;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Recent versions of X11 have the extra feature of allowing more
+ * sophisticated authorization checks to be performed than the dozy
+ * old ones that used to plague xhost usage. However, not all deployed
+ * versions of Xlib know how to deal with this feature, so this code
+ * is conditional on having the right #def in place. [Bug 1909931]
+ */
+
+#ifdef FamilyServerInterpreted
+ if (numHosts == 1 && addrPtr[0].family == FamilyServerInterpreted) {
+ XServerInterpretedAddress *siPtr =
+ (XServerInterpretedAddress *) addrPtr[0].address;
+
+ if (siPtr->typelength==9 && !memcmp(siPtr->type,"localuser",9)) {
+ /*
+ * We don't check the username here. This is because it's
+ * officially non-portable and we are just making sure there
+ * aren't silly misconfigurations. (Apparently 'root' is not a
+ * very good choice, but we still don't put any effort in to
+ * spot that.)
+ */
+
+ secure = 1;
+ } else if (siPtr->typelength == 10
+ && !memcmp(siPtr->type, "localgroup", 10)) {
+ /*
+ * Similarly to above, we don't attempt to peek inside server
+ * interpreted group names. If someone set it, it's what they
+ * want and we assume it's OK.
+ */
+
+ secure = 1;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * The other defined types of server-interpreted controls involve
+ * particular hosts; these are still insecure for the same reasons
+ * that classic xhost access is insecure.
+ */
+ }
+#endif
}
if (addrPtr != NULL) {
XFree((char *) addrPtr);