bpo-30458: Use InvalidURL instead of ValueError. (GH-13044)

Use http.client.InvalidURL instead of ValueError as the new error case's exception.

3 files changed, 8 insertions, 6 deletions

diff --git a/Lib/http/client.py b/Lib/http/client.py
index 99d6a68..f71a062 100644
--- a/Lib/http/client.py
+++ b/Lib/http/client.py
@@ -1091,7 +1091,7 @@ class HTTPConnection:
             url = '/'
         # Prevent CVE-2019-9740.
         if match := _contains_disallowed_url_pchar_re.search(url):
-            raise ValueError(f"URL can't contain control characters. {url!r} "
+            raise InvalidURL(f"URL can't contain control characters. {url!r} "
                              f"(found at least {match.group()!r})")
         request = '%s %s %s' % (method, url, self._http_vsn_str)
 
diff --git a/Lib/test/test_urllib.py b/Lib/test/test_urllib.py
index c5b23f9..7214492 100644
--- a/Lib/test/test_urllib.py
+++ b/Lib/test/test_urllib.py
@@ -343,11 +343,12 @@ class urlopen_HttpTests(unittest.TestCase, FakeHTTPMixin, FakeFTPMixin):
                 # calls urllib.parse.quote() on the URL which makes all of the
                 # above attempts at injection within the url _path_ safe.
                 escaped_char_repr = repr(char).replace('\\', r'\\')
+                InvalidURL = http.client.InvalidURL
                 with self.assertRaisesRegex(
-                    ValueError, f"contain control.*{escaped_char_repr}"):
+                    InvalidURL, f"contain control.*{escaped_char_repr}"):
                     urllib.request.urlopen(f"http:{schemeless_url}")
                 with self.assertRaisesRegex(
-                    ValueError, f"contain control.*{escaped_char_repr}"):
+                    InvalidURL, f"contain control.*{escaped_char_repr}"):
                     urllib.request.urlopen(f"https:{schemeless_url}")
                 # This code path quotes the URL so there is no injection.
                 resp = urlopen(f"http:{schemeless_url}")
@@ -367,10 +368,11 @@ class urlopen_HttpTests(unittest.TestCase, FakeHTTPMixin, FakeFTPMixin):
             # urlopen uses FancyURLOpener which goes via a codepath that
             # calls urllib.parse.quote() on the URL which makes all of the
             # above attempts at injection within the url _path_ safe.
+            InvalidURL = http.client.InvalidURL
             with self.assertRaisesRegex(
-                ValueError, r"contain control.*\\r.*(found at least . .)"):
+                InvalidURL, r"contain control.*\\r.*(found at least . .)"):
                 urllib.request.urlopen(f"http:{schemeless_url}")
-            with self.assertRaisesRegex(ValueError, r"contain control.*\\n"):
+            with self.assertRaisesRegex(InvalidURL, r"contain control.*\\n"):
                 urllib.request.urlopen(f"https:{schemeless_url}")
             # This code path quotes the URL so there is no injection.
             resp = urlopen(f"http:{schemeless_url}")
diff --git a/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2019-04-10-08-53-30.bpo-36276.51E-DA.rst b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2019-04-10-08-53-30.bpo-30458.51E-DA.rst
index 4fed4d5..ed8027f 100644
--- a/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2019-04-10-08-53-30.bpo-36276.51E-DA.rst
+++ b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2019-04-10-08-53-30.bpo-30458.51E-DA.rst
@@ -1 +1 @@
-Address CVE-2019-9740 by disallowing URL paths with embedded whitespace or control characters through into the underlying http client request.  Such potentially malicious header injection URLs now cause a ValueError to be raised.
\ No newline at end of file
+Address CVE-2019-9740 by disallowing URL paths with embedded whitespace or control characters through into the underlying http client request.  Such potentially malicious header injection URLs now cause an http.client.InvalidURL exception to be raised.