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author | William Joye <wjoye@cfa.harvard.edu> | 2017-05-02 16:06:33 (GMT) |
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committer | William Joye <wjoye@cfa.harvard.edu> | 2017-05-02 16:06:33 (GMT) |
commit | 335ca9eb0d2337314cbbec5eb19f9aeea0eaaca7 (patch) | |
tree | 0a0e8d65ee114cb89f58c3159488dd5523123309 /openssl/bugs/SSLv3 | |
parent | a90d8737b83a4a5bb2bf91a9bdf48a3dad4b51fa (diff) | |
download | blt-335ca9eb0d2337314cbbec5eb19f9aeea0eaaca7.zip blt-335ca9eb0d2337314cbbec5eb19f9aeea0eaaca7.tar.gz blt-335ca9eb0d2337314cbbec5eb19f9aeea0eaaca7.tar.bz2 |
initial commit
Diffstat (limited to 'openssl/bugs/SSLv3')
-rw-r--r-- | openssl/bugs/SSLv3 | 49 |
1 files changed, 49 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/openssl/bugs/SSLv3 b/openssl/bugs/SSLv3 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a75a165 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssl/bugs/SSLv3 @@ -0,0 +1,49 @@ +So far... + +ssl3.netscape.com:443 does not support client side dynamic +session-renegotiation. + +ssl3.netscape.com:444 (asks for client cert) sends out all the CA RDN +in an invalid format (the outer sequence is removed). + +Netscape-Commerce/1.12, when talking SSLv2, accepts a 32 byte +challenge but then appears to only use 16 bytes when generating the +encryption keys. Using 16 bytes is ok but it should be ok to use 32. +According to the SSLv3 spec, one should use 32 bytes for the challenge +when opperating in SSLv2/v3 compatablity mode, but as mentioned above, +this breaks this server so 16 bytes is the way to go. + +www.microsoft.com - when talking SSLv2, if session-id reuse is +performed, the session-id passed back in the server-finished message +is different from the one decided upon. + +ssl3.netscape.com:443, first a connection is established with RC4-MD5. +If it is then resumed, we end up using DES-CBC3-SHA. It should be +RC4-MD5 according to 7.6.1.3, 'cipher_suite'. +Netscape-Enterprise/2.01 (https://merchant.netscape.com) has this bug. +It only really shows up when connecting via SSLv2/v3 then reconnecting +via SSLv3. The cipher list changes.... +NEW INFORMATION. Try connecting with a cipher list of just +DES-CBC-SHA:RC4-MD5. For some weird reason, each new connection uses +RC4-MD5, but a re-connect tries to use DES-CBC-SHA. So netscape, when +doing a re-connect, always takes the first cipher in the cipher list. + +If we accept a netscape connection, demand a client cert, have a +non-self-signed CA which does not have it's CA in netscape, and the +browser has a cert, it will crash/hang. Works for 3.x and 4.xbeta + +Netscape browsers do not really notice the server sending a +close notify message. I was sending one, and then some invalid data. +netscape complained of an invalid mac. (a fork()ed child doing a +SSL_shutdown() and still sharing the socket with its parent). + +Netscape, when using export ciphers, will accept a 1024 bit temporary +RSA key. It is supposed to only accept 512. + +If Netscape connects to a server which requests a client certificate +it will frequently hang after the user has selected one and never +complete the connection. Hitting "Stop" and reload fixes this and +all subsequent connections work fine. This appears to be because +Netscape wont read any new records in when it is awaiting a server +done message at this point. The fix is to send the certificate request +and server done messages in one record. |