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authorWilliam Joye <wjoye@cfa.harvard.edu>2017-05-02 16:41:35 (GMT)
committerWilliam Joye <wjoye@cfa.harvard.edu>2017-05-02 16:41:35 (GMT)
commit3d328008deedc58cd7a11c79063cefa7d662d4fc (patch)
treecb41a048885ce7b493f406360cf5f6edf689c468 /openssl/demos/tunala
parent0a2b8b8e0bc2e91a9f10659b30e2e4f5b79ce692 (diff)
downloadblt-3d328008deedc58cd7a11c79063cefa7d662d4fc.zip
blt-3d328008deedc58cd7a11c79063cefa7d662d4fc.tar.gz
blt-3d328008deedc58cd7a11c79063cefa7d662d4fc.tar.bz2
inital commit
Diffstat (limited to 'openssl/demos/tunala')
-rw-r--r--openssl/demos/tunala/A-client.pem84
-rw-r--r--openssl/demos/tunala/A-server.pem84
-rw-r--r--openssl/demos/tunala/CA.pem24
-rw-r--r--openssl/demos/tunala/INSTALL107
-rw-r--r--openssl/demos/tunala/Makefile41
-rw-r--r--openssl/demos/tunala/Makefile.am7
-rw-r--r--openssl/demos/tunala/README233
-rwxr-xr-xopenssl/demos/tunala/autogunk.sh25
-rwxr-xr-xopenssl/demos/tunala/autoungunk.sh19
-rw-r--r--openssl/demos/tunala/breakage.c68
-rw-r--r--openssl/demos/tunala/buffer.c236
-rw-r--r--openssl/demos/tunala/cb.c173
-rw-r--r--openssl/demos/tunala/configure.in29
-rw-r--r--openssl/demos/tunala/ip.c149
-rw-r--r--openssl/demos/tunala/sm.c164
-rwxr-xr-xopenssl/demos/tunala/test.sh107
-rw-r--r--openssl/demos/tunala/tunala.c1183
-rw-r--r--openssl/demos/tunala/tunala.h244
18 files changed, 2977 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/openssl/demos/tunala/A-client.pem b/openssl/demos/tunala/A-client.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a4caf6e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl/demos/tunala/A-client.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,84 @@
+Certificate:
+ Data:
+ Version: 3 (0x2)
+ Serial Number: 2 (0x2)
+ Signature Algorithm: md5WithRSAEncryption
+ Issuer: C=NZ, L=Wellington, O=Really Irresponsible Authorisation Authority (RIAA), OU=Cert-stamping, CN=Jackov al-Trades/Email=none@fake.domain
+ Validity
+ Not Before: Jan 16 05:19:30 2002 GMT
+ Not After : Jan 14 05:19:30 2012 GMT
+ Subject: C=NZ, L=Auckland, O=Mordor, OU=SSL grunt things, CN=tunala-client/Email=client@fake.domain
+ Subject Public Key Info:
+ Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption
+ RSA Public Key: (1024 bit)
+ Modulus (1024 bit):
+ 00:b0:d3:56:5c:c8:7f:fb:f4:95:9d:04:84:4f:82:
+ b7:a2:75:5c:81:48:8c:56:5d:52:ee:38:e1:5c:c8:
+ 9a:70:8e:72:f2:00:1c:17:ef:df:b7:06:59:82:04:
+ f1:f6:49:11:12:a6:4d:cb:1e:ed:ac:59:1c:4a:d0:
+ 3d:de:e6:f2:8d:cd:39:c2:0f:e0:46:2f:db:cb:9f:
+ 47:f7:56:e7:f8:16:5f:68:71:fb:3a:e3:ab:d2:e5:
+ 05:b7:da:65:61:fe:6d:30:e4:12:a8:b5:c1:71:24:
+ 6b:aa:80:05:41:17:a0:8b:6e:8b:e6:04:cf:85:7b:
+ 2a:ac:a1:79:7d:f4:96:6e:77
+ Exponent: 65537 (0x10001)
+ X509v3 extensions:
+ X509v3 Basic Constraints:
+ CA:FALSE
+ Netscape Comment:
+ OpenSSL Generated Certificate
+ X509v3 Subject Key Identifier:
+ F8:43:CB:4F:4D:4F:BC:6E:52:1A:FD:F9:7B:E1:12:3F:A7:A3:BA:93
+ X509v3 Authority Key Identifier:
+ keyid:49:FB:45:72:12:C4:CC:E1:45:A1:D3:08:9E:95:C4:2C:6D:55:3F:17
+ DirName:/C=NZ/L=Wellington/O=Really Irresponsible Authorisation Authority (RIAA)/OU=Cert-stamping/CN=Jackov al-Trades/Email=none@fake.domain
+ serial:00
+
+ Signature Algorithm: md5WithRSAEncryption
+ 8f:5f:0e:43:da:9d:61:43:7e:03:38:9a:e6:50:9d:42:e8:95:
+ 34:49:75:ec:04:8d:5c:85:99:94:70:a0:e7:1f:1e:a0:8b:0f:
+ d6:e2:cb:f7:35:d9:96:72:bd:a6:e9:8d:4e:b1:e2:ac:97:7f:
+ 2f:70:01:9d:aa:04:bc:d4:01:2b:63:77:a5:de:63:3c:a8:f5:
+ f2:72:af:ec:11:12:c0:d4:70:cf:71:a6:fb:e9:1d:b3:27:07:
+ aa:f2:b1:f3:87:d6:ab:8b:ce:c2:08:1b:3c:f9:ba:ff:77:71:
+ 86:09:ef:9e:4e:04:06:63:44:e9:93:20:90:c7:2d:50:c6:50:
+ f8:66
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
+-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----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+-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/openssl/demos/tunala/A-server.pem b/openssl/demos/tunala/A-server.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e9f37b1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl/demos/tunala/A-server.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,84 @@
+Certificate:
+ Data:
+ Version: 3 (0x2)
+ Serial Number: 1 (0x1)
+ Signature Algorithm: md5WithRSAEncryption
+ Issuer: C=NZ, L=Wellington, O=Really Irresponsible Authorisation Authority (RIAA), OU=Cert-stamping, CN=Jackov al-Trades/Email=none@fake.domain
+ Validity
+ Not Before: Jan 16 05:14:06 2002 GMT
+ Not After : Jan 14 05:14:06 2012 GMT
+ Subject: C=NZ, L=Wellington, O=Middle Earth, OU=SSL dev things, CN=tunala-server/Email=server@fake.domain
+ Subject Public Key Info:
+ Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption
+ RSA Public Key: (1024 bit)
+ Modulus (1024 bit):
+ 00:a9:3e:62:87:97:13:6b:de:8f:bc:1d:0a:3f:65:
+ 0c:f9:76:a3:53:ce:97:30:27:0d:c6:df:72:1f:8d:
+ 5a:ce:58:23:6a:65:e5:e3:72:1a:8d:7f:fe:90:01:
+ ea:42:f1:9f:6e:7b:0a:bd:eb:52:15:7b:f4:3d:9c:
+ 4e:db:74:29:2b:d1:81:9d:b9:9e:18:2b:87:e1:da:
+ 50:20:3c:59:6c:c9:83:3e:2c:11:0b:78:1e:03:f4:
+ 56:3a:db:95:6a:75:33:85:a9:7b:cc:3c:4a:67:96:
+ f2:24:b2:a0:cb:2e:cc:52:18:16:6f:44:d9:29:64:
+ 07:2e:fb:56:cc:7c:dc:a2:d7
+ Exponent: 65537 (0x10001)
+ X509v3 extensions:
+ X509v3 Basic Constraints:
+ CA:FALSE
+ Netscape Comment:
+ OpenSSL Generated Certificate
+ X509v3 Subject Key Identifier:
+ 70:AC:7A:B5:6E:97:C2:82:AF:11:9E:32:CB:8D:48:49:93:B7:DC:22
+ X509v3 Authority Key Identifier:
+ keyid:49:FB:45:72:12:C4:CC:E1:45:A1:D3:08:9E:95:C4:2C:6D:55:3F:17
+ DirName:/C=NZ/L=Wellington/O=Really Irresponsible Authorisation Authority (RIAA)/OU=Cert-stamping/CN=Jackov al-Trades/Email=none@fake.domain
+ serial:00
+
+ Signature Algorithm: md5WithRSAEncryption
+ 2e:cb:a3:cd:6d:a8:9d:d1:dc:e5:f0:e0:27:7e:4b:5a:90:a8:
+ 85:43:f0:05:f7:04:43:d7:5f:d1:a5:8f:5c:58:eb:fc:da:c6:
+ 7c:e0:0b:2b:98:72:95:f6:79:48:96:7a:fa:0c:6b:09:ec:c6:
+ 8c:91:74:45:9f:8f:0f:16:78:e3:66:14:fa:1e:f4:f0:23:ec:
+ cd:a9:52:77:20:4d:c5:05:2c:52:b6:7b:f3:42:33:fd:90:1f:
+ 3e:88:6f:9b:23:61:c8:80:3b:e6:57:84:2e:f7:26:c7:35:ed:
+ 00:8b:08:30:9b:aa:21:83:b6:6d:b8:7c:8a:9b:2a:ef:79:3d:
+ 96:31
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
+MIID+zCCA2SgAwIBAgIBATANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQQFADCBtDELMAkGA1UEBhMCTlox
+EzARBgNVBAcTCldlbGxpbmd0b24xPDA6BgNVBAoTM1JlYWxseSBJcnJlc3BvbnNp
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+A1UEAxMNdHVuYWxhLXNlcnZlcjEhMB8GCSqGSIb3DQEJARYSc2VydmVyQGZha2Uu
+ZG9tYWluMIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQCpPmKHlxNr3o+8HQo/
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+dCkr0YGduZ4YK4fh2lAgPFlsyYM+LBELeB4D9FY625VqdTOFqXvMPEpnlvIksqDL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+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
+-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----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+-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/openssl/demos/tunala/CA.pem b/openssl/demos/tunala/CA.pem
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7a55b54
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl/demos/tunala/CA.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
+MIID9zCCA2CgAwIBAgIBADANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQQFADCBtDELMAkGA1UEBhMCTlox
+EzARBgNVBAcTCldlbGxpbmd0b24xPDA6BgNVBAoTM1JlYWxseSBJcnJlc3BvbnNp
+YmxlIEF1dGhvcmlzYXRpb24gQXV0aG9yaXR5IChSSUFBKTEWMBQGA1UECxMNQ2Vy
+dC1zdGFtcGluZzEZMBcGA1UEAxMQSmFja292IGFsLVRyYWRlczEfMB0GCSqGSIb3
+DQEJARYQbm9uZUBmYWtlLmRvbWFpbjAeFw0wMjAxMTYwNTA5NTlaFw0xMjAxMTQw
+NTA5NTlaMIG0MQswCQYDVQQGEwJOWjETMBEGA1UEBxMKV2VsbGluZ3RvbjE8MDoG
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+CkBTTW2y9d0SgQIDAQABo4IBFTCCAREwHQYDVR0OBBYEFEn7RXISxMzhRaHTCJ6V
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+MIG0MQswCQYDVQQGEwJOWjETMBEGA1UEBxMKV2VsbGluZ3RvbjE8MDoGA1UEChMz
+UmVhbGx5IElycmVzcG9uc2libGUgQXV0aG9yaXNhdGlvbiBBdXRob3JpdHkgKFJJ
+QUEpMRYwFAYDVQQLEw1DZXJ0LXN0YW1waW5nMRkwFwYDVQQDExBKYWNrb3YgYWwt
+VHJhZGVzMR8wHQYJKoZIhvcNAQkBFhBub25lQGZha2UuZG9tYWluggEAMAwGA1Ud
+EwQFMAMBAf8wDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEEBQADgYEAYQo95V/NY+eKxYxkhibZiUQygph+
+gTfgbDG20MsnH6+8//w5ArHauFCgDrf0P2VyACgq+N4pBTWFGaAaLwbjKy9HCe2E
+j9C91tO1CqDS4MJkDB5AP13FTkK6fP1ZCiTQranOAp3DlGWTTWsFVyW5kVfQ9diS
+ZOyJZ9Fit5XM2X0=
+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
diff --git a/openssl/demos/tunala/INSTALL b/openssl/demos/tunala/INSTALL
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a65bbeb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl/demos/tunala/INSTALL
@@ -0,0 +1,107 @@
+There are two ways to build this code;
+
+(1) Manually
+
+(2) Using all-singing all-dancing (all-confusing) autotools, ie. autoconf,
+automake, and their little friends (autoheader, etc).
+
+=================
+Building Manually
+=================
+
+There is a basic "Makefile" in this directory that gets moved out of the way and
+ignored when building with autoconf et al. This Makefile is suitable for
+building tunala on Linux using gcc. Any other platform probably requires some
+tweaking. Here are the various bits you might need to do if you want to build
+this way and the default Makefile isn't sufficient;
+
+* Compiler: Edit the "CC" definition in Makefile
+
+* Headers, features: tunala.h controls what happens in the non-autoconf world.
+ It, by default, assumes the system has *everything* (except autoconf's
+ "config.h") so if a target system is missing something it must define the
+ appropriate "NO_***" symbols in CFLAGS. These include;
+
+ - NO_HAVE_UNISTD_H, NO_HAVE_FCNTL_H, NO_HAVE_LIMITS_H
+ Indicates the compiling system doesn't have (or need) these header files.
+ - NO_HAVE_STRSTR, NO_HAVE_STRTOUL
+ Indicates the compiling system doesn't have these functions. Replacements
+ are compiled and used in breakage.c
+ - NO_HAVE_SELECT, NO_HAVE_SOCKET
+ Pointless symbols - these indicate select() and/or socket() are missing in
+ which case the program won't compile anyway.
+
+ If you want to specify any of these, add them with "-D" prefixed to each in
+ the CFLAGS definition in Makefile.
+
+* Compilation flags: edit DEBUG_FLAGS and/or CFLAGS directly to control the
+ flags passed to the compiler. This can also be used to change the degree of
+ optimisation.
+
+* Linker flags: some systems (eg. Solaris) require extra linker flags such as;
+ -ldl, -lsocket, -lnsl, etc. If unsure, bring up the man page for whichever
+ function is "undefined" when the linker fails - that usually indicates what
+ you need to add. Make changes to the LINK_FLAGS symbol.
+
+* Linker command: if a different linker syntax or even a different program is
+ required to link, edit the linker line directly in the "tunala:" target
+ definition - it currently assumes the "CC" (compiler) program is used to link.
+
+======================
+Building Automagically
+======================
+
+Automagic building is handled courtesy of autoconf, automake, etc. There are in
+fact two steps required to build, and only the first has to be done on a system
+with these tools installed (and if I was prepared to bloat out the CVS
+repository, I could store these extra files, but I'm not).
+
+First step: "autogunk.sh"
+-------------------------
+
+The "./autogunk.sh" script will call all the necessary autotool commands to
+create missing files and run automake and autoconf. The result is that a
+"./configure" script should be generated and a "Makefile.in" generated from the
+supplied "Makefile.am". NB: This script also moves the "manual" Makefile (see
+above) out of the way and calls it "Makefile.plain" - the "ungunk" script
+reverses this to leave the directory it was previously.
+
+Once "ungunk" has been run, the resulting directory should be able to build on
+other systems without autoconf, automake, or libtool. Which is what the second
+step describes;
+
+Second step: "./configure"
+--------------------------
+
+The second step is to run the generated "./configure" script to create a
+config.h header for your system and to generate a "Makefile" (generated from
+"Makefile.in") tweaked to compile on your system. This is the standard sort of
+thing you see in GNU packages, for example, and the standard tricks also work.
+Eg. to override "configure"'s choice of compiler, set the CC environment
+variable prior to running configure, eg.
+
+ CC=gcc ./configure
+
+would cause "gcc" to be used even if there is an otherwise preferable (to
+autoconf) native compiler on your system.
+
+After this run "make" and it should build the "tunala" executable.
+
+Notes
+-----
+
+- Some versions of autoconf (or automake?) generate a Makefile syntax that gives
+ trouble to some "make" programs on some systems (eg. OpenBSD). If this
+ happens, either build 'Manually' (see above) or use "gmake" instead of "make".
+ I don't like this either but like even less the idea of sifting into all the
+ script magic crud that's involved.
+
+- On a solaris system I tried, the "configure" script specified some broken
+ compiler flags in the resulting Makefile that don't even get echoed to
+ stdout/err when the error happens (evil!). If this happens, go into the
+ generated Makefile, find the two affected targets ("%.o:" and "%.lo"), and
+ remove the offending hidden option in the $(COMPILE) line all the sludge after
+ the two first lines of script (ie. after the "echo" and the "COMPILE" lines).
+ NB: This will probably only function if "--disable-shared" was used, otherwise
+ who knows what would result ...
+
diff --git a/openssl/demos/tunala/Makefile b/openssl/demos/tunala/Makefile
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..bef1704
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl/demos/tunala/Makefile
@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+# Edit these to suit
+#
+# Oh yeah, and please read the README too.
+
+
+SSL_HOMEDIR=../..
+SSL_INCLUDEDIR=$(SSL_HOMEDIR)/include
+SSL_LIBDIR=$(SSL_HOMEDIR)
+
+RM=rm -f
+CC=gcc
+DEBUG_FLAGS=-g -ggdb3 -Wall -Wshadow
+INCLUDE_FLAGS=-I$(SSL_INCLUDEDIR)
+CFLAGS=$(DEBUG_FLAGS) $(INCLUDE_FLAGS) -DNO_CONFIG_H
+COMPILE=$(CC) $(CFLAGS) -c
+
+# Edit, particularly the "-ldl" if not building with "dlfcn" support
+LINK_FLAGS=-L$(SSL_LIBDIR) -lssl -lcrypto -ldl
+
+SRCS=buffer.c cb.c ip.c sm.c tunala.c breakage.c
+OBJS=buffer.o cb.o ip.o sm.o tunala.o breakage.o
+
+TARGETS=tunala
+
+default: $(TARGETS)
+
+clean:
+ $(RM) $(OBJS) $(TARGETS) *.bak core
+
+.c.o:
+ $(COMPILE) $<
+
+tunala: $(OBJS)
+ $(CC) -o tunala $(OBJS) $(LINK_FLAGS)
+
+# Extra dependencies, should really use makedepend
+buffer.o: buffer.c tunala.h
+cb.o: cb.c tunala.h
+ip.o: ip.c tunala.h
+sm.o: sm.c tunala.h
+tunala.o: tunala.c tunala.h
diff --git a/openssl/demos/tunala/Makefile.am b/openssl/demos/tunala/Makefile.am
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..706c780
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl/demos/tunala/Makefile.am
@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+# Our includes come from the OpenSSL build-tree we're in
+INCLUDES = -I$(top_builddir)/../../include
+
+bin_PROGRAMS = tunala
+
+tunala_SOURCES = tunala.c buffer.c cb.c ip.c sm.c breakage.c
+tunala_LDADD = -L$(top_builddir)/../.. -lssl -lcrypto
diff --git a/openssl/demos/tunala/README b/openssl/demos/tunala/README
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1569008
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl/demos/tunala/README
@@ -0,0 +1,233 @@
+This is intended to be an example of a state-machine driven SSL application. It
+acts as an SSL tunneler (functioning as either the server or client half,
+depending on command-line arguments). *PLEASE* read the comments in tunala.h
+before you treat this stuff as anything more than a curiosity - YOU HAVE BEEN
+WARNED!! There, that's the draconian bit out of the way ...
+
+
+Why "tunala"??
+--------------
+
+I thought I asked you to read tunala.h?? :-)
+
+
+Show me
+-------
+
+If you want to simply see it running, skip to the end and see some example
+command-line arguments to demonstrate with.
+
+
+Where to look and what to do?
+-----------------------------
+
+The code is split up roughly coinciding with the detaching of an "abstract" SSL
+state machine (which is the purpose of all this) and its surrounding application
+specifics. This is primarily to make it possible for me to know when I could cut
+corners and when I needed to be rigorous (or at least maintain the pretense as
+such :-).
+
+Network stuff:
+
+Basically, the network part of all this is what is supposed to be abstracted out
+of the way. The intention is to illustrate one way to stick OpenSSL's mechanisms
+inside a little memory-driven sandbox and operate it like a pure state-machine.
+So, the network code is inside both ip.c (general utility functions and gory
+IPv4 details) and tunala.c itself, which takes care of application specifics
+like the main select() loop. The connectivity between the specifics of this
+application (TCP/IP tunneling and the associated network code) and the
+underlying abstract SSL state machine stuff is through the use of the "buffer_t"
+type, declared in tunala.h and implemented in buffer.c.
+
+State machine:
+
+Which leaves us, generally speaking, with the abstract "state machine" code left
+over and this is sitting inside sm.c, with declarations inside tunala.h. As can
+be seen by the definition of the state_machine_t structure and the associated
+functions to manipulate it, there are the 3 OpenSSL "handles" plus 4 buffer_t
+structures dealing with IO on both the encrypted and unencrypted sides ("dirty"
+and "clean" respectively). The "SSL" handle is what facilitates the reading and
+writing of the unencrypted (tunneled) data. The two "BIO" handles act as the
+read and write channels for encrypted tunnel traffic - in other applications
+these are often socket BIOs so that the OpenSSL framework operates with the
+network layer directly. In this example, those two BIOs are memory BIOs
+(BIO_s_mem()) so that the sending and receiving of the tunnel traffic stays
+within the state-machine, and we can handle where this gets send to (or read
+from) ourselves.
+
+
+Why?
+----
+
+If you take a look at the "state_machine_t" section of tunala.h and the code in
+sm.c, you will notice that nothing related to the concept of 'transport' is
+involved. The binding to TCP/IP networking occurs in tunala.c, specifically
+within the "tunala_item_t" structure that associates a state_machine_t object
+with 4 file-descriptors. The way to best see where the bridge between the
+outside world (TCP/IP reads, writes, select()s, file-descriptors, etc) and the
+state machine is, is to examine the "tunala_item_io()" function in tunala.c.
+This is currently around lines 641-732 but of course could be subject to change.
+
+
+And...?
+-------
+
+Well, although that function is around 90 lines of code, it could easily have
+been a lot less only I was trying to address an easily missed "gotcha" (item (2)
+below). The main() code that drives the select/accept/IO loop initialises new
+tunala_item_t structures when connections arrive, and works out which
+file-descriptors go where depending on whether we're an SSL client or server
+(client --> accepted connection is clean and proxied is dirty, server -->
+accepted connection is dirty and proxied is clean). What that tunala_item_io()
+function is attempting to do is 2 things;
+
+ (1) Perform all reads and writes on the network directly into the
+ state_machine_t's buffers (based on a previous select() result), and only
+ then allow the abstact state_machine_t to "churn()" using those buffers.
+ This will cause the SSL machine to consume as much input data from the two
+ "IN" buffers as possible, and generate as much output data into the two
+ "OUT" buffers as possible. Back up in the main() function, the next main
+ loop loop will examine these output buffers and select() for writability
+ on the corresponding sockets if the buffers are non-empty.
+
+ (2) Handle the complicated tunneling-specific issue of cascading "close"s.
+ This is the reason for most of the complexity in the logic - if one side
+ of the tunnel is closed, you can't simply close the other side and throw
+ away the whole thing - (a) there may still be outgoing data on the other
+ side of the tunnel that hasn't been sent yet, (b) the close (or things
+ happening during the close) may cause more data to be generated that needs
+ sending on the other side. Of course, this logic is complicated yet futher
+ by the fact that it's different depending on which side closes first :-)
+ state_machine_close_clean() will indicate to the state machine that the
+ unencrypted side of the tunnel has closed, so any existing outgoing data
+ needs to be flushed, and the SSL stream needs to be closed down using the
+ appropriate shutdown sequence. state_machine_close_dirty() is simpler
+ because it indicates that the SSL stream has been disconnected, so all
+ that remains before closing the other side is to flush out anything that
+ remains and wait for it to all be sent.
+
+Anyway, with those things in mind, the code should be a little easier to follow
+in terms of "what is *this* bit supposed to achieve??!!".
+
+
+How might this help?
+--------------------
+
+Well, the reason I wrote this is that there seemed to be rather a flood of
+questions of late on the openssl-dev and openssl-users lists about getting this
+whole IO logic thing sorted out, particularly by those who were trying to either
+use non-blocking IO, or wanted SSL in an environment where "something else" was
+handling the network already and they needed to operate in memory only. This
+code is loosely based on some other stuff I've been working on, although that
+stuff is far more complete, far more dependant on a whole slew of other
+network/framework code I don't want to incorporate here, and far harder to look
+at for 5 minutes and follow where everything is going. I will be trying over
+time to suck in a few things from that into this demo in the hopes it might be
+more useful, and maybe to even make this demo usable as a utility of its own.
+Possible things include:
+
+ * controlling multiple processes/threads - this can be used to combat
+ latencies and get passed file-descriptor limits on some systems, and it uses
+ a "controller" process/thread that maintains IPC links with the
+ processes/threads doing the real work.
+
+ * cert verification rules - having some say over which certs get in or out :-)
+
+ * control over SSL protocols and cipher suites
+
+ * A few other things you can already do in s_client and s_server :-)
+
+ * Support (and control over) session resuming, particularly when functioning
+ as an SSL client.
+
+If you have a particular environment where this model might work to let you "do
+SSL" without having OpenSSL be aware of the transport, then you should find you
+could use the state_machine_t structure (or your own variant thereof) and hook
+it up to your transport stuff in much the way tunala.c matches it up with those
+4 file-descriptors. The state_machine_churn(), state_machine_close_clean(), and
+state_machine_close_dirty() functions are the main things to understand - after
+that's done, you just have to ensure you're feeding and bleeding the 4
+state_machine buffers in a logical fashion. This state_machine loop handles not
+only handshakes and normal streaming, but also renegotiates - there's no special
+handling required beyond keeping an eye on those 4 buffers and keeping them in
+sync with your outer "loop" logic. Ie. if one of the OUT buffers is not empty,
+you need to find an opportunity to try and forward its data on. If one of the IN
+buffers is not full, you should keep an eye out for data arriving that should be
+placed there.
+
+This approach could hopefully also allow you to run the SSL protocol in very
+different environments. As an example, you could support encrypted event-driven
+IPC where threads/processes pass messages to each other inside an SSL layer;
+each IPC-message's payload would be in fact the "dirty" content, and the "clean"
+payload coming out of the tunnel at each end would be the real intended message.
+Likewise, this could *easily* be made to work across unix domain sockets, or
+even entirely different network/comms protocols.
+
+This is also a quick and easy way to do VPN if you (and the remote network's
+gateway) support virtual network devices that are encapsulted in a single
+network connection, perhaps PPP going through an SSL tunnel?
+
+
+Suggestions
+-----------
+
+Please let me know if you find this useful, or if there's anything wrong or
+simply too confusing about it. Patches are also welcome, but please attach a
+description of what it changes and why, and "diff -urN" format is preferred.
+Mail to geoff@openssl.org should do the trick.
+
+
+Example
+-------
+
+Here is an example of how to use "tunala" ...
+
+First, it's assumed that OpenSSL has already built, and that you are building
+inside the ./demos/tunala/ directory. If not - please correct the paths and
+flags inside the Makefile. Likewise, if you want to tweak the building, it's
+best to try and do so in the makefile (eg. removing the debug flags and adding
+optimisation flags).
+
+Secondly, this code has mostly only been tested on Linux. However, some
+autoconf/etc support has been added and the code has been compiled on openbsd
+and solaris using that.
+
+Thirdly, if you are Win32, you probably need to do some *major* rewriting of
+ip.c to stand a hope in hell. Good luck, and please mail me the diff if you do
+this, otherwise I will take a look at another time. It can certainly be done,
+but it's very non-POSIXy.
+
+See the INSTALL document for details on building.
+
+Now, if you don't have an executable "tunala" compiled, go back to "First,...".
+Rinse and repeat.
+
+Inside one console, try typing;
+
+(i) ./tunala -listen localhost:8080 -proxy localhost:8081 -cacert CA.pem \
+ -cert A-client.pem -out_totals -v_peer -v_strict
+
+In another console, type;
+
+(ii) ./tunala -listen localhost:8081 -proxy localhost:23 -cacert CA.pem \
+ -cert A-server.pem -server 1 -out_totals -v_peer -v_strict
+
+Now if you open another console and "telnet localhost 8080", you should be
+tunneled through to the telnet service on your local machine (if it's running -
+you could change it to port "22" and tunnel ssh instead if you so desired). When
+you logout of the telnet session, the tunnel should cleanly shutdown and show
+you some traffic stats in both consoles. Feel free to experiment. :-)
+
+Notes:
+
+ - the format for the "-listen" argument can skip the host part (eg. "-listen
+ 8080" is fine). If you do, the listening socket will listen on all interfaces
+ so you can connect from other machines for example. Using the "localhost"
+ form listens only on 127.0.0.1 so you can only connect locally (unless, of
+ course, you've set up weird stuff with your networking in which case probably
+ none of the above applies).
+
+ - ./tunala -? gives you a list of other command-line options, but tunala.c is
+ also a good place to look :-)
+
+
diff --git a/openssl/demos/tunala/autogunk.sh b/openssl/demos/tunala/autogunk.sh
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..c9783c6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl/demos/tunala/autogunk.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+
+# This script tries to follow the "GNU way" w.r.t. the autobits.
+# This does of course generate a number of irritating files.
+# Try to get over it (I am getting there myself).
+
+# This should generate any missing crud, and then run autoconf which should turn
+# configure.in into a "./configure" script and "Makefile.am" into a
+# "Makefile.in". Then running "./configure" should turn "Makefile.in" into
+# "Makefile" and should generate the config.h containing your systems various
+# settings. I know ... what a hassle ...
+
+# Also, sometimes these autobits things generate bizarre output (looking like
+# errors). So I direct everything "elsewhere" ...
+
+(aclocal
+autoheader
+libtoolize --copy --force
+automake --foreign --add-missing --copy
+autoconf) 1> /dev/null 2>&1
+
+# Move the "no-autotools" Makefile out of the way
+if test ! -f Makefile.plain; then
+ mv Makefile Makefile.plain
+fi
diff --git a/openssl/demos/tunala/autoungunk.sh b/openssl/demos/tunala/autoungunk.sh
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..2179088
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl/demos/tunala/autoungunk.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+
+# This script tries to clean up as much as is possible from whatever diabolical
+# mess has been left in the directory thanks to autoconf, automake, and their
+# friends.
+
+if test -f Makefile.plain; then
+ if test -f Makefile; then
+ make distclean
+ fi
+ mv Makefile.plain Makefile
+else
+ make clean
+fi
+
+rm -f aclocal.m4 config.* configure install-sh \
+ missing mkinstalldirs stamp-h.* Makefile.in \
+ ltconfig ltmain.sh depcomp
+rm -rf autom4te.cache
diff --git a/openssl/demos/tunala/breakage.c b/openssl/demos/tunala/breakage.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..16a3b9e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl/demos/tunala/breakage.c
@@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
+#include "tunala.h"
+
+int int_strtoul(const char *str, unsigned long *val)
+{
+#ifdef HAVE_STRTOUL
+ char *tmp;
+ unsigned long ret = strtoul(str, &tmp, 10);
+ if ((str == tmp) || (*tmp != '\0'))
+ /* The value didn't parse cleanly */
+ return 0;
+ if (ret == ULONG_MAX)
+ /* We hit a limit */
+ return 0;
+ *val = ret;
+ return 1;
+#else
+ char buf[2];
+ unsigned long ret = 0;
+ buf[1] = '\0';
+ if (str == '\0')
+ /* An empty string ... */
+ return 0;
+ while (*str != '\0') {
+ /*
+ * We have to multiply 'ret' by 10 before absorbing the next digit.
+ * If this will overflow, catch it now.
+ */
+ if (ret && (((ULONG_MAX + 10) / ret) < 10))
+ return 0;
+ ret *= 10;
+ if (!isdigit(*str))
+ return 0;
+ buf[0] = *str;
+ ret += atoi(buf);
+ str++;
+ }
+ *val = ret;
+ return 1;
+#endif
+}
+
+#ifndef HAVE_STRSTR
+char *int_strstr(const char *haystack, const char *needle)
+{
+ const char *sub_haystack = haystack, *sub_needle = needle;
+ unsigned int offset = 0;
+ if (!needle)
+ return haystack;
+ if (!haystack)
+ return NULL;
+ while ((*sub_haystack != '\0') && (*sub_needle != '\0')) {
+ if (sub_haystack[offset] == sub_needle) {
+ /* sub_haystack is still a candidate */
+ offset++;
+ sub_needle++;
+ } else {
+ /* sub_haystack is no longer a possibility */
+ sub_haystack++;
+ offset = 0;
+ sub_needle = needle;
+ }
+ }
+ if (*sub_haystack == '\0')
+ /* Found nothing */
+ return NULL;
+ return sub_haystack;
+}
+#endif
diff --git a/openssl/demos/tunala/buffer.c b/openssl/demos/tunala/buffer.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8e2cc9d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl/demos/tunala/buffer.c
@@ -0,0 +1,236 @@
+#include "tunala.h"
+
+#ifndef NO_BUFFER
+
+void buffer_init(buffer_t * buf)
+{
+ buf->used = 0;
+ buf->total_in = buf->total_out = 0;
+}
+
+void buffer_close(buffer_t * buf)
+{
+ /* Our data is static - nothing needs "release", just reset it */
+ buf->used = 0;
+}
+
+/* Code these simple ones in compact form */
+unsigned int buffer_used(buffer_t * buf)
+{
+ return buf->used;
+}
+
+unsigned int buffer_unused(buffer_t * buf)
+{
+ return (MAX_DATA_SIZE - buf->used);
+}
+
+int buffer_full(buffer_t * buf)
+{
+ return (buf->used == MAX_DATA_SIZE ? 1 : 0);
+}
+
+int buffer_notfull(buffer_t * buf)
+{
+ return (buf->used < MAX_DATA_SIZE ? 1 : 0);
+}
+
+int buffer_empty(buffer_t * buf)
+{
+ return (buf->used == 0 ? 1 : 0);
+}
+
+int buffer_notempty(buffer_t * buf)
+{
+ return (buf->used > 0 ? 1 : 0);
+}
+
+unsigned long buffer_total_in(buffer_t * buf)
+{
+ return buf->total_in;
+}
+
+unsigned long buffer_total_out(buffer_t * buf)
+{
+ return buf->total_out;
+}
+
+/*
+ * These 3 static (internal) functions don't adjust the "total" variables as
+ * it's not sure when they're called how it should be interpreted. Only the
+ * higher-level "buffer_[to|from]_[fd|SSL|BIO]" functions should alter these
+ * values.
+ */
+# if 0 /* To avoid "unused" warnings */
+static unsigned int buffer_adddata(buffer_t * buf, const unsigned char *ptr,
+ unsigned int size)
+{
+ unsigned int added = MAX_DATA_SIZE - buf->used;
+ if (added > size)
+ added = size;
+ if (added == 0)
+ return 0;
+ memcpy(buf->data + buf->used, ptr, added);
+ buf->used += added;
+ buf->total_in += added;
+ return added;
+}
+
+static unsigned int buffer_tobuffer(buffer_t * to, buffer_t * from, int cap)
+{
+ unsigned int moved, tomove = from->used;
+ if ((int)tomove > cap)
+ tomove = cap;
+ if (tomove == 0)
+ return 0;
+ moved = buffer_adddata(to, from->data, tomove);
+ if (moved == 0)
+ return 0;
+ buffer_takedata(from, NULL, moved);
+ return moved;
+}
+# endif
+
+static unsigned int buffer_takedata(buffer_t * buf, unsigned char *ptr,
+ unsigned int size)
+{
+ unsigned int taken = buf->used;
+ if (taken > size)
+ taken = size;
+ if (taken == 0)
+ return 0;
+ if (ptr)
+ memcpy(ptr, buf->data, taken);
+ buf->used -= taken;
+ /* Do we have to scroll? */
+ if (buf->used > 0)
+ memmove(buf->data, buf->data + taken, buf->used);
+ return taken;
+}
+
+# ifndef NO_IP
+
+int buffer_from_fd(buffer_t * buf, int fd)
+{
+ int toread = buffer_unused(buf);
+ if (toread == 0)
+ /* Shouldn't be called in this case! */
+ abort();
+ toread = read(fd, buf->data + buf->used, toread);
+ if (toread > 0) {
+ buf->used += toread;
+ buf->total_in += toread;
+ }
+ return toread;
+}
+
+int buffer_to_fd(buffer_t * buf, int fd)
+{
+ int towrite = buffer_used(buf);
+ if (towrite == 0)
+ /* Shouldn't be called in this case! */
+ abort();
+ towrite = write(fd, buf->data, towrite);
+ if (towrite > 0) {
+ buffer_takedata(buf, NULL, towrite);
+ buf->total_out += towrite;
+ }
+ return towrite;
+}
+
+# endif /* !defined(NO_IP) */
+
+# ifndef NO_OPENSSL
+
+static void int_ssl_check(SSL *s, int ret)
+{
+ int e = SSL_get_error(s, ret);
+ switch (e) {
+ /*
+ * These seem to be harmless and already "dealt with" by our
+ * non-blocking environment. NB: "ZERO_RETURN" is the clean "error"
+ * indicating a successfully closed SSL tunnel. We let this happen
+ * because our IO loop should not appear to have broken on this
+ * condition - and outside the IO loop, the "shutdown" state is
+ * checked.
+ */
+ case SSL_ERROR_NONE:
+ case SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ:
+ case SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE:
+ case SSL_ERROR_WANT_X509_LOOKUP:
+ case SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN:
+ return;
+ /*
+ * These seem to be indications of a genuine error that should result
+ * in the SSL tunnel being regarded as "dead".
+ */
+ case SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL:
+ case SSL_ERROR_SSL:
+ SSL_set_app_data(s, (char *)1);
+ return;
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+ /*
+ * For any other errors that (a) exist, and (b) crop up - we need to
+ * interpret what to do with them - so "politely inform" the caller that
+ * the code needs updating here.
+ */
+ abort();
+}
+
+void buffer_from_SSL(buffer_t * buf, SSL *ssl)
+{
+ int ret;
+ if (!ssl || buffer_full(buf))
+ return;
+ ret = SSL_read(ssl, buf->data + buf->used, buffer_unused(buf));
+ if (ret > 0) {
+ buf->used += ret;
+ buf->total_in += ret;
+ }
+ if (ret < 0)
+ int_ssl_check(ssl, ret);
+}
+
+void buffer_to_SSL(buffer_t * buf, SSL *ssl)
+{
+ int ret;
+ if (!ssl || buffer_empty(buf))
+ return;
+ ret = SSL_write(ssl, buf->data, buf->used);
+ if (ret > 0) {
+ buffer_takedata(buf, NULL, ret);
+ buf->total_out += ret;
+ }
+ if (ret < 0)
+ int_ssl_check(ssl, ret);
+}
+
+void buffer_from_BIO(buffer_t * buf, BIO *bio)
+{
+ int ret;
+ if (!bio || buffer_full(buf))
+ return;
+ ret = BIO_read(bio, buf->data + buf->used, buffer_unused(buf));
+ if (ret > 0) {
+ buf->used += ret;
+ buf->total_in += ret;
+ }
+}
+
+void buffer_to_BIO(buffer_t * buf, BIO *bio)
+{
+ int ret;
+ if (!bio || buffer_empty(buf))
+ return;
+ ret = BIO_write(bio, buf->data, buf->used);
+ if (ret > 0) {
+ buffer_takedata(buf, NULL, ret);
+ buf->total_out += ret;
+ }
+}
+
+# endif /* !defined(NO_OPENSSL) */
+
+#endif /* !defined(NO_BUFFER) */
diff --git a/openssl/demos/tunala/cb.c b/openssl/demos/tunala/cb.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..684a07f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl/demos/tunala/cb.c
@@ -0,0 +1,173 @@
+#include "tunala.h"
+
+#ifndef NO_OPENSSL
+
+/* For callbacks generating output, here are their file-descriptors. */
+static FILE *fp_cb_ssl_info = NULL;
+static FILE *fp_cb_ssl_verify = NULL;
+/*-
+ * Output level:
+ * 0 = nothing,
+ * 1 = minimal, just errors,
+ * 2 = minimal, all steps,
+ * 3 = detail, all steps */
+static unsigned int cb_ssl_verify_level = 1;
+
+/* Other static rubbish (to mirror s_cb.c where required) */
+static int int_verify_depth = 10;
+
+/*
+ * This function is largely borrowed from the one used in OpenSSL's
+ * "s_client" and "s_server" utilities.
+ */
+void cb_ssl_info(const SSL *s, int where, int ret)
+{
+ const char *str1, *str2;
+ int w;
+
+ if (!fp_cb_ssl_info)
+ return;
+
+ w = where & ~SSL_ST_MASK;
+ str1 = (w & SSL_ST_CONNECT ? "SSL_connect" : (w & SSL_ST_ACCEPT ?
+ "SSL_accept" :
+ "undefined")), str2 =
+ SSL_state_string_long(s);
+
+ if (where & SSL_CB_LOOP)
+ fprintf(fp_cb_ssl_info, "(%s) %s\n", str1, str2);
+ else if (where & SSL_CB_EXIT) {
+ if (ret == 0)
+ fprintf(fp_cb_ssl_info, "(%s) failed in %s\n", str1, str2);
+ /*
+ * In a non-blocking model, we get a few of these "error"s simply
+ * because we're calling "reads" and "writes" on the state-machine
+ * that are virtual NOPs simply to avoid wasting the time seeing if
+ * we *should* call them. Removing this case makes the "-out_state"
+ * output a lot easier on the eye.
+ */
+# if 0
+ else if (ret < 0)
+ fprintf(fp_cb_ssl_info, "%s:error in %s\n", str1, str2);
+# endif
+ }
+}
+
+void cb_ssl_info_set_output(FILE *fp)
+{
+ fp_cb_ssl_info = fp;
+}
+
+static const char *int_reason_no_issuer =
+ "X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT";
+static const char *int_reason_not_yet = "X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID";
+static const char *int_reason_before =
+ "X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD";
+static const char *int_reason_expired = "X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED";
+static const char *int_reason_after =
+ "X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD";
+
+/* Stolen wholesale from apps/s_cb.c :-) And since then, mutilated ... */
+int cb_ssl_verify(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ char buf1[256]; /* Used for the subject name */
+ char buf2[256]; /* Used for the issuer name */
+ const char *reason = NULL; /* Error reason (if any) */
+ X509 *err_cert;
+ int err, depth;
+
+ if (!fp_cb_ssl_verify || (cb_ssl_verify_level == 0))
+ return ok;
+ err_cert = X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(ctx);
+ err = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(ctx);
+ depth = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(ctx);
+
+ buf1[0] = buf2[0] = '\0';
+ /* Fill buf1 */
+ X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(err_cert), buf1, 256);
+ /* Fill buf2 */
+ X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_issuer_name(ctx->current_cert), buf2, 256);
+ switch (ctx->error) {
+ case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT:
+ reason = int_reason_no_issuer;
+ break;
+ case X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID:
+ reason = int_reason_not_yet;
+ break;
+ case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD:
+ reason = int_reason_before;
+ break;
+ case X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED:
+ reason = int_reason_expired;
+ break;
+ case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD:
+ reason = int_reason_after;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if ((cb_ssl_verify_level == 1) && ok)
+ return ok;
+ fprintf(fp_cb_ssl_verify, "chain-depth=%d, ", depth);
+ if (reason)
+ fprintf(fp_cb_ssl_verify, "error=%s\n", reason);
+ else
+ fprintf(fp_cb_ssl_verify, "error=%d\n", err);
+ if (cb_ssl_verify_level < 3)
+ return ok;
+ fprintf(fp_cb_ssl_verify, "--> subject = %s\n", buf1);
+ fprintf(fp_cb_ssl_verify, "--> issuer = %s\n", buf2);
+ if (!ok)
+ fprintf(fp_cb_ssl_verify, "--> verify error:num=%d:%s\n", err,
+ X509_verify_cert_error_string(err));
+ fprintf(fp_cb_ssl_verify, "--> verify return:%d\n", ok);
+ return ok;
+}
+
+void cb_ssl_verify_set_output(FILE *fp)
+{
+ fp_cb_ssl_verify = fp;
+}
+
+void cb_ssl_verify_set_depth(unsigned int verify_depth)
+{
+ int_verify_depth = verify_depth;
+}
+
+void cb_ssl_verify_set_level(unsigned int level)
+{
+ if (level < 4)
+ cb_ssl_verify_level = level;
+}
+
+RSA *cb_generate_tmp_rsa(SSL *s, int is_export, int keylength)
+{
+ /*
+ * TODO: Perhaps make it so our global key can be generated on-the-fly
+ * after certain intervals?
+ */
+ static RSA *rsa_tmp = NULL;
+ BIGNUM *bn = NULL;
+ int ok = 1;
+ if (!rsa_tmp) {
+ ok = 0;
+ if (!(bn = BN_new()))
+ goto end;
+ if (!BN_set_word(bn, RSA_F4))
+ goto end;
+ if (!(rsa_tmp = RSA_new()))
+ goto end;
+ if (!RSA_generate_key_ex(rsa_tmp, keylength, bn, NULL))
+ goto end;
+ ok = 1;
+ }
+ end:
+ if (bn)
+ BN_free(bn);
+ if (!ok) {
+ RSA_free(rsa_tmp);
+ rsa_tmp = NULL;
+ }
+ return rsa_tmp;
+}
+
+#endif /* !defined(NO_OPENSSL) */
diff --git a/openssl/demos/tunala/configure.in b/openssl/demos/tunala/configure.in
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..590cdbf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl/demos/tunala/configure.in
@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+dnl Process this file with autoconf to produce a configure script.
+AC_INIT(tunala.c)
+AM_CONFIG_HEADER(config.h)
+AM_INIT_AUTOMAKE(tunala, 0.0.1-dev)
+
+dnl Checks for programs. (Though skip libtool)
+AC_PROG_CC
+dnl AC_PROG_LIBTOOL
+dnl AM_PROG_LIBTOOL
+
+dnl Checks for libraries.
+AC_CHECK_LIB(dl, dlopen)
+AC_CHECK_LIB(z, inflate)
+AC_CHECK_LIB(socket, socket)
+AC_CHECK_LIB(nsl, gethostbyname)
+
+dnl Checks for header files.
+AC_HEADER_STDC
+AC_CHECK_HEADERS(fcntl.h limits.h unistd.h)
+
+dnl Checks for typedefs, structures, and compiler characteristics.
+AC_C_CONST
+
+dnl Checks for library functions.
+AC_CHECK_FUNCS(strstr strtoul)
+AC_CHECK_FUNCS(select socket)
+AC_CHECK_FUNCS(dlopen)
+
+AC_OUTPUT(Makefile)
diff --git a/openssl/demos/tunala/ip.c b/openssl/demos/tunala/ip.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b172d2e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl/demos/tunala/ip.c
@@ -0,0 +1,149 @@
+#include "tunala.h"
+
+#ifndef NO_IP
+
+# define IP_LISTENER_BACKLOG 511/* So if it gets masked by 256 or some other
+ * such value it'll still be respectable */
+
+/* Any IP-related initialisations. For now, this means blocking SIGPIPE */
+int ip_initialise(void)
+{
+ struct sigaction sa;
+
+ sa.sa_handler = SIG_IGN;
+ sa.sa_flags = 0;
+ sigemptyset(&sa.sa_mask);
+ if (sigaction(SIGPIPE, &sa, NULL) != 0)
+ return 0;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int ip_create_listener_split(const char *ip, unsigned short port)
+{
+ struct sockaddr_in in_addr;
+ int fd = -1;
+ int reuseVal = 1;
+
+ /* Create the socket */
+ if ((fd = socket(PF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0)) == -1)
+ goto err;
+ /* Set the SO_REUSEADDR flag - servers act weird without it */
+ if (setsockopt(fd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR, (char *)(&reuseVal),
+ sizeof(reuseVal)) != 0)
+ goto err;
+ /* Prepare the listen address stuff */
+ in_addr.sin_family = AF_INET;
+ memcpy(&in_addr.sin_addr.s_addr, ip, 4);
+ in_addr.sin_port = htons(port);
+ /* Bind to the required port/address/interface */
+ if (bind(fd, (struct sockaddr *)&in_addr, sizeof(struct sockaddr_in)) !=
+ 0)
+ goto err;
+ /* Start "listening" */
+ if (listen(fd, IP_LISTENER_BACKLOG) != 0)
+ goto err;
+ return fd;
+ err:
+ if (fd != -1)
+ close(fd);
+ return -1;
+}
+
+int ip_create_connection_split(const char *ip, unsigned short port)
+{
+ struct sockaddr_in in_addr;
+ int flags, fd = -1;
+
+ /* Create the socket */
+ if ((fd = socket(PF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0)) == -1)
+ goto err;
+ /* Make it non-blocking */
+ if (((flags = fcntl(fd, F_GETFL, 0)) < 0) ||
+ (fcntl(fd, F_SETFL, flags | O_NONBLOCK) < 0))
+ goto err;
+ /* Prepare the connection address stuff */
+ in_addr.sin_family = AF_INET;
+ memcpy(&in_addr.sin_addr.s_addr, ip, 4);
+ in_addr.sin_port = htons(port);
+ /* Start a connect (non-blocking, in all likelihood) */
+ if ((connect(fd, (struct sockaddr *)&in_addr,
+ sizeof(struct sockaddr_in)) != 0) && (errno != EINPROGRESS))
+ goto err;
+ return fd;
+ err:
+ if (fd != -1)
+ close(fd);
+ return -1;
+}
+
+static char all_local_ip[] = { 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 };
+
+int ip_parse_address(const char *address, const char **parsed_ip,
+ unsigned short *parsed_port, int accept_all_ip)
+{
+ char buf[256];
+ struct hostent *lookup;
+ unsigned long port;
+ const char *ptr = strstr(address, ":");
+ const char *ip = all_local_ip;
+
+ if (!ptr) {
+ /*
+ * We assume we're listening on all local interfaces and have only
+ * specified a port.
+ */
+ if (!accept_all_ip)
+ return 0;
+ ptr = address;
+ goto determine_port;
+ }
+ if ((ptr - address) > 255)
+ return 0;
+ memset(buf, 0, 256);
+ memcpy(buf, address, ptr - address);
+ ptr++;
+ if ((lookup = gethostbyname(buf)) == NULL) {
+ /*
+ * Spit a message to differentiate between lookup failures and bad
+ * strings.
+ */
+ fprintf(stderr, "hostname lookup for '%s' failed\n", buf);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ ip = lookup->h_addr_list[0];
+ determine_port:
+ if (strlen(ptr) < 1)
+ return 0;
+ if (!int_strtoul(ptr, &port) || (port > 65535))
+ return 0;
+ *parsed_ip = ip;
+ *parsed_port = (unsigned short)port;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int ip_create_listener(const char *address)
+{
+ const char *ip;
+ unsigned short port;
+
+ if (!ip_parse_address(address, &ip, &port, 1))
+ return -1;
+ return ip_create_listener_split(ip, port);
+}
+
+int ip_create_connection(const char *address)
+{
+ const char *ip;
+ unsigned short port;
+
+ if (!ip_parse_address(address, &ip, &port, 0))
+ return -1;
+ return ip_create_connection_split(ip, port);
+}
+
+int ip_accept_connection(int listen_fd)
+{
+ return accept(listen_fd, NULL, NULL);
+}
+
+#endif /* !defined(NO_IP) */
diff --git a/openssl/demos/tunala/sm.c b/openssl/demos/tunala/sm.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5658dff
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl/demos/tunala/sm.c
@@ -0,0 +1,164 @@
+#include "tunala.h"
+
+#ifndef NO_TUNALA
+
+void state_machine_init(state_machine_t * machine)
+{
+ machine->ssl = NULL;
+ machine->bio_intossl = machine->bio_fromssl = NULL;
+ buffer_init(&machine->clean_in);
+ buffer_init(&machine->clean_out);
+ buffer_init(&machine->dirty_in);
+ buffer_init(&machine->dirty_out);
+}
+
+void state_machine_close(state_machine_t * machine)
+{
+ if (machine->ssl)
+ SSL_free(machine->ssl);
+ /*
+ * SSL_free seems to decrement the reference counts already so doing this
+ * goes kaboom.
+ */
+# if 0
+ if (machine->bio_intossl)
+ BIO_free(machine->bio_intossl);
+ if (machine->bio_fromssl)
+ BIO_free(machine->bio_fromssl);
+# endif
+ buffer_close(&machine->clean_in);
+ buffer_close(&machine->clean_out);
+ buffer_close(&machine->dirty_in);
+ buffer_close(&machine->dirty_out);
+ state_machine_init(machine);
+}
+
+buffer_t *state_machine_get_buffer(state_machine_t * machine,
+ sm_buffer_t type)
+{
+ switch (type) {
+ case SM_CLEAN_IN:
+ return &machine->clean_in;
+ case SM_CLEAN_OUT:
+ return &machine->clean_out;
+ case SM_DIRTY_IN:
+ return &machine->dirty_in;
+ case SM_DIRTY_OUT:
+ return &machine->dirty_out;
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+ /* Should never get here */
+ abort();
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+SSL *state_machine_get_SSL(state_machine_t * machine)
+{
+ return machine->ssl;
+}
+
+int state_machine_set_SSL(state_machine_t * machine, SSL *ssl, int is_server)
+{
+ if (machine->ssl)
+ /* Shouldn't ever be set twice */
+ abort();
+ machine->ssl = ssl;
+ /* Create the BIOs to handle the dirty side of the SSL */
+ if ((machine->bio_intossl = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem())) == NULL)
+ abort();
+ if ((machine->bio_fromssl = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem())) == NULL)
+ abort();
+ /* Hook up the BIOs on the dirty side of the SSL */
+ SSL_set_bio(machine->ssl, machine->bio_intossl, machine->bio_fromssl);
+ if (is_server)
+ SSL_set_accept_state(machine->ssl);
+ else
+ SSL_set_connect_state(machine->ssl);
+ /*
+ * If we're the first one to generate traffic - do it now otherwise we go
+ * into the next select empty-handed and our peer will not send data but
+ * will similarly wait for us.
+ */
+ return state_machine_churn(machine);
+}
+
+/* Performs the data-IO loop and returns zero if the machine should close */
+int state_machine_churn(state_machine_t * machine)
+{
+ unsigned int loop;
+ if (machine->ssl == NULL) {
+ if (buffer_empty(&machine->clean_out))
+ /* Time to close this state-machine altogether */
+ return 0;
+ else
+ /* Still buffered data on the clean side to go out */
+ return 1;
+ }
+ /*
+ * Do this loop twice to cover any dependencies about which precise order
+ * of reads and writes is required.
+ */
+ for (loop = 0; loop < 2; loop++) {
+ buffer_to_SSL(&machine->clean_in, machine->ssl);
+ buffer_to_BIO(&machine->dirty_in, machine->bio_intossl);
+ buffer_from_SSL(&machine->clean_out, machine->ssl);
+ buffer_from_BIO(&machine->dirty_out, machine->bio_fromssl);
+ }
+ /*
+ * We close on the SSL side if the info callback noticed some problems or
+ * an SSL shutdown was underway and shutdown traffic had all been sent.
+ */
+ if (SSL_get_app_data(machine->ssl) || (SSL_get_shutdown(machine->ssl) &&
+ buffer_empty(&machine->dirty_out)))
+ {
+ /* Great, we can seal off the dirty side completely */
+ if (!state_machine_close_dirty(machine))
+ return 0;
+ }
+ /*
+ * Either the SSL is alive and well, or the closing process still has
+ * outgoing data waiting to be sent
+ */
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/* Called when the clean side of the SSL has lost its connection */
+int state_machine_close_clean(state_machine_t * machine)
+{
+ /*
+ * Well, first thing to do is null out the clean-side buffers - they're
+ * no use any more.
+ */
+ buffer_close(&machine->clean_in);
+ buffer_close(&machine->clean_out);
+ /* And start an SSL shutdown */
+ if (machine->ssl)
+ SSL_shutdown(machine->ssl);
+ /* This is an "event", so flush the SSL of any generated traffic */
+ state_machine_churn(machine);
+ if (buffer_empty(&machine->dirty_in) && buffer_empty(&machine->dirty_out))
+ return 0;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Called when the dirty side of the SSL has lost its connection. This is
+ * pretty terminal as all that can be left to do is send any buffered output
+ * on the clean side - after that, we're done.
+ */
+int state_machine_close_dirty(state_machine_t * machine)
+{
+ buffer_close(&machine->dirty_in);
+ buffer_close(&machine->dirty_out);
+ buffer_close(&machine->clean_in);
+ if (machine->ssl)
+ SSL_free(machine->ssl);
+ machine->ssl = NULL;
+ machine->bio_intossl = machine->bio_fromssl = NULL;
+ if (buffer_empty(&machine->clean_out))
+ return 0;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+#endif /* !defined(NO_TUNALA) */
diff --git a/openssl/demos/tunala/test.sh b/openssl/demos/tunala/test.sh
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..105b447
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl/demos/tunala/test.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,107 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+
+HTTP="localhost:8080"
+CLIENT_PORT="9020"
+SERVER_PORT="9021"
+
+sub_test ()
+{
+ echo "STARTING - $VER $CIPHER"
+ ./tunala -listen localhost:$CLIENT_PORT -proxy localhost:$SERVER_PORT \
+ -cacert CA.pem -cert A-client.pem -server 0 \
+ -dh_special standard -v_peer -v_strict \
+ $VER -cipher $CIPHER 1> tc1.txt 2> tc2.txt &
+ ./tunala -listen localhost:$SERVER_PORT -proxy $HTTP \
+ -cacert CA.pem -cert A-server.pem -server 1 \
+ -dh_special standard -v_peer -v_strict \
+ $VER -cipher $CIPHER 1> ts1.txt 2> ts2.txt &
+ # Wait for the servers to be listening before starting the wget test
+ DONE="no"
+ while [ "$DONE" != "yes" ]; do
+ L1=`netstat -a | egrep "LISTEN[\t ]*$" | grep ":$CLIENT_PORT"`
+ L2=`netstat -a | egrep "LISTEN[\t ]*$" | grep ":$SERVER_PORT"`
+ if [ "x$L1" != "x" ]; then
+ DONE="yes"
+ elif [ "x$L2" != "x" ]; then
+ DONE="yes"
+ else
+ sleep 1
+ fi
+ done
+ HTML=`wget -O - -T 1 http://localhost:$CLIENT_PORT 2> /dev/null | grep "<HTML>"`
+ if [ "x$HTML" != "x" ]; then
+ echo "OK - $CIPHER ($VER)"
+ else
+ echo "FAIL - $CIPHER ($VER)"
+ killall tunala
+ exit 1
+ fi
+ killall tunala
+ # Wait for the servers to stop before returning - otherwise the next
+ # test my fail to start ... (fscking race conditions)
+ DONE="yes"
+ while [ "$DONE" != "no" ]; do
+ L1=`netstat -a | egrep "LISTEN[\t ]*$" | grep ":$CLIENT_PORT"`
+ L2=`netstat -a | egrep "LISTEN[\t ]*$" | grep ":$SERVER_PORT"`
+ if [ "x$L1" != "x" ]; then
+ DONE="yes"
+ elif [ "x$L2" != "x" ]; then
+ DONE="yes"
+ else
+ DONE="no"
+ fi
+ done
+ exit 0
+}
+
+run_test ()
+{
+ (sub_test 1> /dev/null) || exit 1
+}
+
+run_ssl_test ()
+{
+killall tunala 1> /dev/null 2> /dev/null
+echo ""
+echo "Starting all $PRETTY tests"
+if [ "$PRETTY" != "SSLv2" ]; then
+ if [ "$PRETTY" != "SSLv3" ]; then
+ export VER="-no_ssl2 -no_ssl3"
+ export OSSL="-tls1"
+ else
+ export VER="-no_ssl2 -no_tls1"
+ export OSSL="-ssl3"
+ fi
+else
+ export VER="-no_ssl3 -no_tls1"
+ export OSSL="-ssl2"
+fi
+LIST="`../../apps/openssl ciphers $OSSL | sed -e 's/:/ /g'`"
+#echo "$LIST"
+for i in $LIST; do \
+ DSS=`echo "$i" | grep "DSS"`
+ if [ "x$DSS" != "x" ]; then
+ echo "---- skipping $i (no DSA cert/keys) ----"
+ else
+ export CIPHER=$i
+ run_test
+ echo "SUCCESS: $i"
+ fi
+done;
+}
+
+# Welcome the user
+echo "Tests will assume an http server running at $HTTP"
+
+# TLSv1 test
+export PRETTY="TLSv1"
+run_ssl_test
+
+# SSLv3 test
+export PRETTY="SSLv3"
+run_ssl_test
+
+# SSLv2 test
+export PRETTY="SSLv2"
+run_ssl_test
+
diff --git a/openssl/demos/tunala/tunala.c b/openssl/demos/tunala/tunala.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3ceea02
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl/demos/tunala/tunala.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1183 @@
+#if defined(NO_BUFFER) || defined(NO_IP) || defined(NO_OPENSSL)
+# error "Badness, NO_BUFFER, NO_IP or NO_OPENSSL is defined, turn them *off*"
+#endif
+
+/* Include our bits'n'pieces */
+#include "tunala.h"
+
+/********************************************/
+/* Our local types that specify our "world" */
+/********************************************/
+
+/*
+ * These represent running "tunnels". Eg. if you wanted to do SSL in a
+ * "message-passing" scanario, the "int" file-descriptors might be replaced
+ * by thread or process IDs, and the "select" code might be replaced by
+ * message handling code. Whatever.
+ */
+typedef struct _tunala_item_t {
+ /*
+ * The underlying SSL state machine. This is a data-only processing unit
+ * and we communicate with it by talking to its four "buffers".
+ */
+ state_machine_t sm;
+ /*
+ * The file-descriptors for the "dirty" (encrypted) side of the SSL
+ * setup. In actuality, this is typically a socket and both values are
+ * identical.
+ */
+ int dirty_read, dirty_send;
+ /*
+ * The file-descriptors for the "clean" (unencrypted) side of the SSL
+ * setup. These could be stdin/stdout, a socket (both values the same),
+ * or whatever you like.
+ */
+ int clean_read, clean_send;
+} tunala_item_t;
+
+/*
+ * This structure is used as the data for running the main loop. Namely, in a
+ * network format such as this, it is stuff for select() - but as pointed out,
+ * when moving the real-world to somewhere else, this might be replaced by
+ * something entirely different. It's basically the stuff that controls when
+ * it's time to do some "work".
+ */
+typedef struct _select_sets_t {
+ int max; /* As required as the first argument to
+ * select() */
+ fd_set reads, sends, excepts; /* As passed to select() */
+} select_sets_t;
+typedef struct _tunala_selector_t {
+ select_sets_t last_selected; /* Results of the last select() */
+ select_sets_t next_select; /* What we'll next select on */
+} tunala_selector_t;
+
+/*
+ * This structure is *everything*. We do it to avoid the use of globals so
+ * that, for example, it would be easier to shift things around between
+ * async-IO, thread-based, or multi-fork()ed (or combinations thereof).
+ */
+typedef struct _tunala_world_t {
+ /* The file-descriptor we "listen" on for new connections */
+ int listen_fd;
+ /* The array of tunnels */
+ tunala_item_t *tunnels;
+ /* the number of tunnels in use and allocated, respectively */
+ unsigned int tunnels_used, tunnels_size;
+ /* Our outside "loop" context stuff */
+ tunala_selector_t selector;
+ /*
+ * Our SSL_CTX, which is configured as the SSL client or server and has
+ * the various cert-settings and callbacks configured.
+ */
+ SSL_CTX *ssl_ctx;
+ /*
+ * Simple flag with complex logic :-) Indicates whether we're an SSL
+ * server or an SSL client.
+ */
+ int server_mode;
+} tunala_world_t;
+
+/*****************************/
+/* Internal static functions */
+/*****************************/
+
+static SSL_CTX *initialise_ssl_ctx(int server_mode, const char *engine_id,
+ const char *CAfile, const char *cert,
+ const char *key, const char *dcert,
+ const char *dkey, const char *cipher_list,
+ const char *dh_file,
+ const char *dh_special, int tmp_rsa,
+ int ctx_options, int out_state,
+ int out_verify, int verify_mode,
+ unsigned int verify_depth);
+static void selector_init(tunala_selector_t * selector);
+static void selector_add_listener(tunala_selector_t * selector, int fd);
+static void selector_add_tunala(tunala_selector_t * selector,
+ tunala_item_t * t);
+static int selector_select(tunala_selector_t * selector);
+/*
+ * This returns -1 for error, 0 for no new connections, or 1 for success, in
+ * which case *newfd is populated.
+ */
+static int selector_get_listener(tunala_selector_t * selector, int fd,
+ int *newfd);
+static int tunala_world_new_item(tunala_world_t * world, int fd,
+ const char *ip, unsigned short port,
+ int flipped);
+static void tunala_world_del_item(tunala_world_t * world, unsigned int idx);
+static int tunala_item_io(tunala_selector_t * selector, tunala_item_t * item);
+
+/*********************************************/
+/* MAIN FUNCTION (and its utility functions) */
+/*********************************************/
+
+static const char *def_proxyhost = "127.0.0.1:443";
+static const char *def_listenhost = "127.0.0.1:8080";
+static int def_max_tunnels = 50;
+static const char *def_cacert = NULL;
+static const char *def_cert = NULL;
+static const char *def_key = NULL;
+static const char *def_dcert = NULL;
+static const char *def_dkey = NULL;
+static const char *def_engine_id = NULL;
+static int def_server_mode = 0;
+static int def_flipped = 0;
+static const char *def_cipher_list = NULL;
+static const char *def_dh_file = NULL;
+static const char *def_dh_special = NULL;
+static int def_tmp_rsa = 1;
+static int def_ctx_options = 0;
+static int def_verify_mode = 0;
+static unsigned int def_verify_depth = 10;
+static int def_out_state = 0;
+static unsigned int def_out_verify = 0;
+static int def_out_totals = 0;
+static int def_out_conns = 0;
+
+static const char *helpstring =
+ "\n'Tunala' (A tunneler with a New Zealand accent)\n"
+ "Usage: tunala [options], where options are from;\n"
+ " -listen [host:]<port> (default = 127.0.0.1:8080)\n"
+ " -proxy <host>:<port> (default = 127.0.0.1:443)\n"
+ " -maxtunnels <num> (default = 50)\n"
+ " -cacert <path|NULL> (default = NULL)\n"
+ " -cert <path|NULL> (default = NULL)\n"
+ " -key <path|NULL> (default = whatever '-cert' is)\n"
+ " -dcert <path|NULL> (usually for DSA, default = NULL)\n"
+ " -dkey <path|NULL> (usually for DSA, default = whatever '-dcert' is)\n"
+ " -engine <id|NULL> (default = NULL)\n"
+ " -server <0|1> (default = 0, ie. an SSL client)\n"
+ " -flipped <0|1> (makes SSL servers be network clients, and vice versa)\n"
+ " -cipher <list> (specifies cipher list to use)\n"
+ " -dh_file <path> (a PEM file containing DH parameters to use)\n"
+ " -dh_special <NULL|generate|standard> (see below: def=NULL)\n"
+ " -no_tmp_rsa (don't generate temporary RSA keys)\n"
+ " -no_ssl2 (disable SSLv2)\n"
+ " -no_ssl3 (disable SSLv3)\n"
+ " -no_tls1 (disable TLSv1)\n"
+ " -v_peer (verify the peer certificate)\n"
+ " -v_strict (do not continue if peer doesn't authenticate)\n"
+ " -v_once (no verification in renegotiates)\n"
+ " -v_depth <num> (limit certificate chain depth, default = 10)\n"
+ " -out_conns (prints client connections and disconnections)\n"
+ " -out_state (prints SSL handshake states)\n"
+ " -out_verify <0|1|2|3> (prints certificate verification states: def=1)\n"
+ " -out_totals (prints out byte-totals when a tunnel closes)\n"
+ " -<h|help|?> (displays this help screen)\n"
+ "Notes:\n"
+ "(1) It is recommended to specify a cert+key when operating as an SSL server.\n"
+ " If you only specify '-cert', the same file must contain a matching\n"
+ " private key.\n"
+ "(2) Either dh_file or dh_special can be used to specify where DH parameters\n"
+ " will be obtained from (or '-dh_special NULL' for the default choice) but\n"
+ " you cannot specify both. For dh_special, 'generate' will create new DH\n"
+ " parameters on startup, and 'standard' will use embedded parameters\n"
+ " instead.\n"
+ "(3) Normally an ssl client connects to an ssl server - so that an 'ssl client\n"
+ " tunala' listens for 'clean' client connections and proxies ssl, and an\n"
+ " 'ssl server tunala' listens for ssl connections and proxies 'clean'. With\n"
+ " '-flipped 1', this behaviour is reversed so that an 'ssl server tunala'\n"
+ " listens for clean client connections and proxies ssl (but participating\n"
+ " as an ssl *server* in the SSL/TLS protocol), and an 'ssl client tunala'\n"
+ " listens for ssl connections (participating as an ssl *client* in the\n"
+ " SSL/TLS protocol) and proxies 'clean' to the end destination. This can\n"
+ " be useful for allowing network access to 'servers' where only the server\n"
+ " needs to authenticate the client (ie. the other way is not required).\n"
+ " Even with client and server authentication, this 'technique' mitigates\n"
+ " some DoS (denial-of-service) potential as it will be the network client\n"
+ " having to perform the first private key operation rather than the other\n"
+ " way round.\n"
+ "(4) The 'technique' used by setting '-flipped 1' is probably compatible with\n"
+ " absolutely nothing except another complimentary instance of 'tunala'\n"
+ " running with '-flipped 1'. :-)\n";
+
+/*
+ * Default DH parameters for use with "-dh_special standard" ... stolen
+ * striaght from s_server.
+ */
+static unsigned char dh512_p[] = {
+ 0xDA, 0x58, 0x3C, 0x16, 0xD9, 0x85, 0x22, 0x89, 0xD0, 0xE4, 0xAF, 0x75,
+ 0x6F, 0x4C, 0xCA, 0x92, 0xDD, 0x4B, 0xE5, 0x33, 0xB8, 0x04, 0xFB, 0x0F,
+ 0xED, 0x94, 0xEF, 0x9C, 0x8A, 0x44, 0x03, 0xED, 0x57, 0x46, 0x50, 0xD3,
+ 0x69, 0x99, 0xDB, 0x29, 0xD7, 0x76, 0x27, 0x6B, 0xA2, 0xD3, 0xD4, 0x12,
+ 0xE2, 0x18, 0xF4, 0xDD, 0x1E, 0x08, 0x4C, 0xF6, 0xD8, 0x00, 0x3E, 0x7C,
+ 0x47, 0x74, 0xE8, 0x33,
+};
+
+static unsigned char dh512_g[] = {
+ 0x02,
+};
+
+/*
+ * And the function that parses the above "standard" parameters, again,
+ * straight out of s_server.
+ */
+static DH *get_dh512(void)
+{
+ DH *dh = NULL;
+
+ if ((dh = DH_new()) == NULL)
+ return (NULL);
+ dh->p = BN_bin2bn(dh512_p, sizeof(dh512_p), NULL);
+ dh->g = BN_bin2bn(dh512_g, sizeof(dh512_g), NULL);
+ if ((dh->p == NULL) || (dh->g == NULL))
+ return (NULL);
+ return (dh);
+}
+
+/* Various help/error messages used by main() */
+static int usage(const char *errstr, int isunknownarg)
+{
+ if (isunknownarg)
+ fprintf(stderr, "Error: unknown argument '%s'\n", errstr);
+ else
+ fprintf(stderr, "Error: %s\n", errstr);
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s\n", helpstring);
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int err_str0(const char *str0)
+{
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s\n", str0);
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int err_str1(const char *fmt, const char *str1)
+{
+ fprintf(stderr, fmt, str1);
+ fprintf(stderr, "\n");
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int parse_max_tunnels(const char *s, unsigned int *maxtunnels)
+{
+ unsigned long l;
+ if (!int_strtoul(s, &l) || (l < 1) || (l > 1024)) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Error, '%s' is an invalid value for "
+ "maxtunnels\n", s);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ *maxtunnels = (unsigned int)l;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int parse_server_mode(const char *s, int *servermode)
+{
+ unsigned long l;
+ if (!int_strtoul(s, &l) || (l > 1)) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Error, '%s' is an invalid value for the "
+ "server mode\n", s);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ *servermode = (int)l;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int parse_dh_special(const char *s, const char **dh_special)
+{
+ if ((strcmp(s, "NULL") == 0) || (strcmp(s, "generate") == 0) ||
+ (strcmp(s, "standard") == 0)) {
+ *dh_special = s;
+ return 1;
+ }
+ fprintf(stderr, "Error, '%s' is an invalid value for 'dh_special'\n", s);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int parse_verify_level(const char *s, unsigned int *verify_level)
+{
+ unsigned long l;
+ if (!int_strtoul(s, &l) || (l > 3)) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Error, '%s' is an invalid value for "
+ "out_verify\n", s);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ *verify_level = (unsigned int)l;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int parse_verify_depth(const char *s, unsigned int *verify_depth)
+{
+ unsigned long l;
+ if (!int_strtoul(s, &l) || (l < 1) || (l > 50)) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Error, '%s' is an invalid value for "
+ "verify_depth\n", s);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ *verify_depth = (unsigned int)l;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/* Some fprintf format strings used when tunnels close */
+static const char *io_stats_dirty =
+ " SSL traffic; %8lu bytes in, %8lu bytes out\n";
+static const char *io_stats_clean =
+ " clear traffic; %8lu bytes in, %8lu bytes out\n";
+
+int main(int argc, char *argv[])
+{
+ unsigned int loop;
+ int newfd;
+ tunala_world_t world;
+ tunala_item_t *t_item;
+ const char *proxy_ip;
+ unsigned short proxy_port;
+ /* Overridables */
+ const char *proxyhost = def_proxyhost;
+ const char *listenhost = def_listenhost;
+ unsigned int max_tunnels = def_max_tunnels;
+ const char *cacert = def_cacert;
+ const char *cert = def_cert;
+ const char *key = def_key;
+ const char *dcert = def_dcert;
+ const char *dkey = def_dkey;
+ const char *engine_id = def_engine_id;
+ int server_mode = def_server_mode;
+ int flipped = def_flipped;
+ const char *cipher_list = def_cipher_list;
+ const char *dh_file = def_dh_file;
+ const char *dh_special = def_dh_special;
+ int tmp_rsa = def_tmp_rsa;
+ int ctx_options = def_ctx_options;
+ int verify_mode = def_verify_mode;
+ unsigned int verify_depth = def_verify_depth;
+ int out_state = def_out_state;
+ unsigned int out_verify = def_out_verify;
+ int out_totals = def_out_totals;
+ int out_conns = def_out_conns;
+
+/* Parse command-line arguments */
+ next_arg:
+ argc--;
+ argv++;
+ if (argc > 0) {
+ if (strcmp(*argv, "-listen") == 0) {
+ if (argc < 2)
+ return usage("-listen requires an argument", 0);
+ argc--;
+ argv++;
+ listenhost = *argv;
+ goto next_arg;
+ } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-proxy") == 0) {
+ if (argc < 2)
+ return usage("-proxy requires an argument", 0);
+ argc--;
+ argv++;
+ proxyhost = *argv;
+ goto next_arg;
+ } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-maxtunnels") == 0) {
+ if (argc < 2)
+ return usage("-maxtunnels requires an argument", 0);
+ argc--;
+ argv++;
+ if (!parse_max_tunnels(*argv, &max_tunnels))
+ return 1;
+ goto next_arg;
+ } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-cacert") == 0) {
+ if (argc < 2)
+ return usage("-cacert requires an argument", 0);
+ argc--;
+ argv++;
+ if (strcmp(*argv, "NULL") == 0)
+ cacert = NULL;
+ else
+ cacert = *argv;
+ goto next_arg;
+ } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-cert") == 0) {
+ if (argc < 2)
+ return usage("-cert requires an argument", 0);
+ argc--;
+ argv++;
+ if (strcmp(*argv, "NULL") == 0)
+ cert = NULL;
+ else
+ cert = *argv;
+ goto next_arg;
+ } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-key") == 0) {
+ if (argc < 2)
+ return usage("-key requires an argument", 0);
+ argc--;
+ argv++;
+ if (strcmp(*argv, "NULL") == 0)
+ key = NULL;
+ else
+ key = *argv;
+ goto next_arg;
+ } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-dcert") == 0) {
+ if (argc < 2)
+ return usage("-dcert requires an argument", 0);
+ argc--;
+ argv++;
+ if (strcmp(*argv, "NULL") == 0)
+ dcert = NULL;
+ else
+ dcert = *argv;
+ goto next_arg;
+ } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-dkey") == 0) {
+ if (argc < 2)
+ return usage("-dkey requires an argument", 0);
+ argc--;
+ argv++;
+ if (strcmp(*argv, "NULL") == 0)
+ dkey = NULL;
+ else
+ dkey = *argv;
+ goto next_arg;
+ } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-engine") == 0) {
+ if (argc < 2)
+ return usage("-engine requires an argument", 0);
+ argc--;
+ argv++;
+ engine_id = *argv;
+ goto next_arg;
+ } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-server") == 0) {
+ if (argc < 2)
+ return usage("-server requires an argument", 0);
+ argc--;
+ argv++;
+ if (!parse_server_mode(*argv, &server_mode))
+ return 1;
+ goto next_arg;
+ } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-flipped") == 0) {
+ if (argc < 2)
+ return usage("-flipped requires an argument", 0);
+ argc--;
+ argv++;
+ if (!parse_server_mode(*argv, &flipped))
+ return 1;
+ goto next_arg;
+ } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-cipher") == 0) {
+ if (argc < 2)
+ return usage("-cipher requires an argument", 0);
+ argc--;
+ argv++;
+ cipher_list = *argv;
+ goto next_arg;
+ } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-dh_file") == 0) {
+ if (argc < 2)
+ return usage("-dh_file requires an argument", 0);
+ if (dh_special)
+ return usage("cannot mix -dh_file with " "-dh_special", 0);
+ argc--;
+ argv++;
+ dh_file = *argv;
+ goto next_arg;
+ } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-dh_special") == 0) {
+ if (argc < 2)
+ return usage("-dh_special requires an argument", 0);
+ if (dh_file)
+ return usage("cannot mix -dh_file with " "-dh_special", 0);
+ argc--;
+ argv++;
+ if (!parse_dh_special(*argv, &dh_special))
+ return 1;
+ goto next_arg;
+ } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-no_tmp_rsa") == 0) {
+ tmp_rsa = 0;
+ goto next_arg;
+ } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-no_ssl2") == 0) {
+ ctx_options |= SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2;
+ goto next_arg;
+ } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-no_ssl3") == 0) {
+ ctx_options |= SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3;
+ goto next_arg;
+ } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-no_tls1") == 0) {
+ ctx_options |= SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1;
+ goto next_arg;
+ } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-v_peer") == 0) {
+ verify_mode |= SSL_VERIFY_PEER;
+ goto next_arg;
+ } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-v_strict") == 0) {
+ verify_mode |= SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT;
+ goto next_arg;
+ } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-v_once") == 0) {
+ verify_mode |= SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE;
+ goto next_arg;
+ } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-v_depth") == 0) {
+ if (argc < 2)
+ return usage("-v_depth requires an argument", 0);
+ argc--;
+ argv++;
+ if (!parse_verify_depth(*argv, &verify_depth))
+ return 1;
+ goto next_arg;
+ } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-out_state") == 0) {
+ out_state = 1;
+ goto next_arg;
+ } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-out_verify") == 0) {
+ if (argc < 2)
+ return usage("-out_verify requires an argument", 0);
+ argc--;
+ argv++;
+ if (!parse_verify_level(*argv, &out_verify))
+ return 1;
+ goto next_arg;
+ } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-out_totals") == 0) {
+ out_totals = 1;
+ goto next_arg;
+ } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-out_conns") == 0) {
+ out_conns = 1;
+ goto next_arg;
+ } else if ((strcmp(*argv, "-h") == 0) ||
+ (strcmp(*argv, "-help") == 0) ||
+ (strcmp(*argv, "-?") == 0)) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s\n", helpstring);
+ return 0;
+ } else
+ return usage(*argv, 1);
+ }
+ /* Run any sanity checks we want here */
+ if (!cert && !dcert && server_mode)
+ fprintf(stderr, "WARNING: you are running an SSL server without "
+ "a certificate - this may not work!\n");
+
+ /* Initialise network stuff */
+ if (!ip_initialise())
+ return err_str0("ip_initialise failed");
+ /* Create the SSL_CTX */
+ if ((world.ssl_ctx = initialise_ssl_ctx(server_mode, engine_id,
+ cacert, cert, key, dcert, dkey,
+ cipher_list, dh_file, dh_special,
+ tmp_rsa, ctx_options, out_state,
+ out_verify, verify_mode,
+ verify_depth)) == NULL)
+ return err_str1("initialise_ssl_ctx(engine_id=%s) failed",
+ (engine_id == NULL) ? "NULL" : engine_id);
+ if (engine_id)
+ fprintf(stderr, "Info, engine '%s' initialised\n", engine_id);
+ /* Create the listener */
+ if ((world.listen_fd = ip_create_listener(listenhost)) == -1)
+ return err_str1("ip_create_listener(%s) failed", listenhost);
+ fprintf(stderr, "Info, listening on '%s'\n", listenhost);
+ if (!ip_parse_address(proxyhost, &proxy_ip, &proxy_port, 0))
+ return err_str1("ip_parse_address(%s) failed", proxyhost);
+ fprintf(stderr, "Info, proxying to '%s' (%d.%d.%d.%d:%d)\n", proxyhost,
+ (int)proxy_ip[0], (int)proxy_ip[1],
+ (int)proxy_ip[2], (int)proxy_ip[3], (int)proxy_port);
+ fprintf(stderr, "Info, set maxtunnels to %d\n", (int)max_tunnels);
+ fprintf(stderr, "Info, set to operate as an SSL %s\n",
+ (server_mode ? "server" : "client"));
+ /* Initialise the rest of the stuff */
+ world.tunnels_used = world.tunnels_size = 0;
+ world.tunnels = NULL;
+ world.server_mode = server_mode;
+ selector_init(&world.selector);
+
+/* We're ready to loop */
+ main_loop:
+ /* Should we listen for *new* tunnels? */
+ if (world.tunnels_used < max_tunnels)
+ selector_add_listener(&world.selector, world.listen_fd);
+ /* We should add in our existing tunnels */
+ for (loop = 0; loop < world.tunnels_used; loop++)
+ selector_add_tunala(&world.selector, world.tunnels + loop);
+ /* Now do the select */
+ switch (selector_select(&world.selector)) {
+ case -1:
+ if (errno != EINTR) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "selector_select returned a " "badness error.\n");
+ goto shouldnt_happen;
+ }
+ fprintf(stderr, "Warn, selector interrupted by a signal\n");
+ goto main_loop;
+ case 0:
+ fprintf(stderr, "Warn, selector_select returned 0 - signal?" "?\n");
+ goto main_loop;
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+ /* Accept new connection if we should and can */
+ if ((world.tunnels_used < max_tunnels)
+ && (selector_get_listener(&world.selector, world.listen_fd, &newfd) ==
+ 1)) {
+ /* We have a new connection */
+ if (!tunala_world_new_item(&world, newfd, proxy_ip,
+ proxy_port, flipped))
+ fprintf(stderr, "tunala_world_new_item failed\n");
+ else if (out_conns)
+ fprintf(stderr, "Info, new tunnel opened, now up to "
+ "%d\n", world.tunnels_used);
+ }
+ /*
+ * Give each tunnel its moment, note the while loop is because it makes
+ * the logic easier than with "for" to deal with an array that may shift
+ * because of deletes.
+ */
+ loop = 0;
+ t_item = world.tunnels;
+ while (loop < world.tunnels_used) {
+ if (!tunala_item_io(&world.selector, t_item)) {
+ /*
+ * We're closing whether for reasons of an error or a natural
+ * close. Don't increment loop or t_item because the next item is
+ * moving to us!
+ */
+ if (!out_totals)
+ goto skip_totals;
+ fprintf(stderr, "Tunnel closing, traffic stats follow\n");
+ /* Display the encrypted (over the network) stats */
+ fprintf(stderr, io_stats_dirty,
+ buffer_total_in(state_machine_get_buffer
+ (&t_item->sm, SM_DIRTY_IN)),
+ buffer_total_out(state_machine_get_buffer
+ (&t_item->sm, SM_DIRTY_OUT)));
+ /*
+ * Display the local (tunnelled) stats. NB: Data we *receive* is
+ * data sent *out* of the state_machine on its 'clean' side.
+ * Hence the apparent back-to-front OUT/IN mixup here :-)
+ */
+ fprintf(stderr, io_stats_clean,
+ buffer_total_out(state_machine_get_buffer
+ (&t_item->sm, SM_CLEAN_OUT)),
+ buffer_total_in(state_machine_get_buffer
+ (&t_item->sm, SM_CLEAN_IN)));
+ skip_totals:
+ tunala_world_del_item(&world, loop);
+ if (out_conns)
+ fprintf(stderr, "Info, tunnel closed, down to %d\n",
+ world.tunnels_used);
+ } else {
+ /* Move to the next item */
+ loop++;
+ t_item++;
+ }
+ }
+ goto main_loop;
+ /* Should never get here */
+ shouldnt_happen:
+ abort();
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/****************/
+/* OpenSSL bits */
+/****************/
+
+static int ctx_set_cert(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *cert, const char *key)
+{
+ FILE *fp = NULL;
+ X509 *x509 = NULL;
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
+ int toret = 0; /* Assume an error */
+
+ /* cert */
+ if (cert) {
+ if ((fp = fopen(cert, "r")) == NULL) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Error opening cert file '%s'\n", cert);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (!PEM_read_X509(fp, &x509, NULL, NULL)) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Error reading PEM cert from '%s'\n", cert);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (!SSL_CTX_use_certificate(ctx, x509)) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Error, cert in '%s' can not be used\n", cert);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ /* Clear the FILE* for reuse in the "key" code */
+ fclose(fp);
+ fp = NULL;
+ fprintf(stderr, "Info, operating with cert in '%s'\n", cert);
+ /*
+ * If a cert was given without matching key, we assume the same file
+ * contains the required key.
+ */
+ if (!key)
+ key = cert;
+ } else {
+ if (key)
+ fprintf(stderr, "Error, can't specify a key without a "
+ "corresponding certificate\n");
+ else
+ fprintf(stderr, "Error, ctx_set_cert called with " "NULLs!\n");
+ goto err;
+ }
+ /* key */
+ if (key) {
+ if ((fp = fopen(key, "r")) == NULL) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Error opening key file '%s'\n", key);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (!PEM_read_PrivateKey(fp, &pkey, NULL, NULL)) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Error reading PEM key from '%s'\n", key);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (!SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey(ctx, pkey)) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Error, key in '%s' can not be used\n", key);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ fprintf(stderr, "Info, operating with key in '%s'\n", key);
+ } else
+ fprintf(stderr, "Info, operating without a cert or key\n");
+ /* Success */
+ toret = 1;
+ err:
+ if (x509)
+ X509_free(x509);
+ if (pkey)
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+ if (fp)
+ fclose(fp);
+ return toret;
+}
+
+static int ctx_set_dh(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *dh_file,
+ const char *dh_special)
+{
+ DH *dh = NULL;
+ FILE *fp = NULL;
+
+ if (dh_special) {
+ if (strcmp(dh_special, "NULL") == 0)
+ return 1;
+ if (strcmp(dh_special, "standard") == 0) {
+ if ((dh = get_dh512()) == NULL) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Error, can't parse 'standard'"
+ " DH parameters\n");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ fprintf(stderr, "Info, using 'standard' DH parameters\n");
+ goto do_it;
+ }
+ if (strcmp(dh_special, "generate") != 0)
+ /*
+ * This shouldn't happen - screening values is handled in main().
+ */
+ abort();
+ fprintf(stderr, "Info, generating DH parameters ... ");
+ fflush(stderr);
+ if (!(dh = DH_new()) || !DH_generate_parameters_ex(dh, 512,
+ DH_GENERATOR_5,
+ NULL)) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "error!\n");
+ if (dh)
+ DH_free(dh);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ fprintf(stderr, "complete\n");
+ goto do_it;
+ }
+ /* So, we're loading dh_file */
+ if ((fp = fopen(dh_file, "r")) == NULL) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Error, couldn't open '%s' for DH parameters\n",
+ dh_file);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ dh = PEM_read_DHparams(fp, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+ fclose(fp);
+ if (dh == NULL) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Error, could not parse DH parameters from '%s'\n",
+ dh_file);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ fprintf(stderr, "Info, using DH parameters from file '%s'\n", dh_file);
+ do_it:
+ SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh(ctx, dh);
+ DH_free(dh);
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static SSL_CTX *initialise_ssl_ctx(int server_mode, const char *engine_id,
+ const char *CAfile, const char *cert,
+ const char *key, const char *dcert,
+ const char *dkey, const char *cipher_list,
+ const char *dh_file,
+ const char *dh_special, int tmp_rsa,
+ int ctx_options, int out_state,
+ int out_verify, int verify_mode,
+ unsigned int verify_depth)
+{
+ SSL_CTX *ctx = NULL, *ret = NULL;
+ const SSL_METHOD *meth;
+ ENGINE *e = NULL;
+
+ OpenSSL_add_ssl_algorithms();
+ SSL_load_error_strings();
+
+ meth = (server_mode ? SSLv23_server_method() : SSLv23_client_method());
+ if (meth == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ if (engine_id) {
+ ENGINE_load_builtin_engines();
+ if ((e = ENGINE_by_id(engine_id)) == NULL) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Error obtaining '%s' engine, openssl "
+ "errors follow\n", engine_id);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (!ENGINE_set_default(e, ENGINE_METHOD_ALL)) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Error assigning '%s' engine, openssl "
+ "errors follow\n", engine_id);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ ENGINE_free(e);
+ }
+ if ((ctx = SSL_CTX_new(meth)) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ /* cacert */
+ if (CAfile) {
+ if (!X509_STORE_load_locations(SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(ctx),
+ CAfile, NULL)) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Error loading CA cert(s) in '%s'\n", CAfile);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ fprintf(stderr, "Info, operating with CA cert(s) in '%s'\n", CAfile);
+ } else
+ fprintf(stderr, "Info, operating without a CA cert(-list)\n");
+ if (!SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_paths(ctx)) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Error setting default verify paths\n");
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* cert and key */
+ if ((cert || key) && !ctx_set_cert(ctx, cert, key))
+ goto err;
+ /* dcert and dkey */
+ if ((dcert || dkey) && !ctx_set_cert(ctx, dcert, dkey))
+ goto err;
+ /* temporary RSA key generation */
+ if (tmp_rsa)
+ SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa_callback(ctx, cb_generate_tmp_rsa);
+
+ /* cipher_list */
+ if (cipher_list) {
+ if (!SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(ctx, cipher_list)) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Error setting cipher list '%s'\n", cipher_list);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ fprintf(stderr, "Info, set cipher list '%s'\n", cipher_list);
+ } else
+ fprintf(stderr, "Info, operating with default cipher list\n");
+
+ /* dh_file & dh_special */
+ if ((dh_file || dh_special) && !ctx_set_dh(ctx, dh_file, dh_special))
+ goto err;
+
+ /* ctx_options */
+ SSL_CTX_set_options(ctx, ctx_options);
+
+ /* out_state (output of SSL handshake states to screen). */
+ if (out_state)
+ cb_ssl_info_set_output(stderr);
+
+ /* out_verify */
+ if (out_verify > 0) {
+ cb_ssl_verify_set_output(stderr);
+ cb_ssl_verify_set_level(out_verify);
+ }
+
+ /* verify_depth */
+ cb_ssl_verify_set_depth(verify_depth);
+
+ /* Success! (includes setting verify_mode) */
+ SSL_CTX_set_info_callback(ctx, cb_ssl_info);
+ SSL_CTX_set_verify(ctx, verify_mode, cb_ssl_verify);
+ ret = ctx;
+ err:
+ if (!ret) {
+ ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
+ if (ctx)
+ SSL_CTX_free(ctx);
+ }
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*****************/
+/* Selector bits */
+/*****************/
+
+static void selector_sets_init(select_sets_t * s)
+{
+ s->max = 0;
+ FD_ZERO(&s->reads);
+ FD_ZERO(&s->sends);
+ FD_ZERO(&s->excepts);
+}
+
+static void selector_init(tunala_selector_t * selector)
+{
+ selector_sets_init(&selector->last_selected);
+ selector_sets_init(&selector->next_select);
+}
+
+#define SEL_EXCEPTS 0x00
+#define SEL_READS 0x01
+#define SEL_SENDS 0x02
+static void selector_add_raw_fd(tunala_selector_t * s, int fd, int flags)
+{
+ FD_SET(fd, &s->next_select.excepts);
+ if (flags & SEL_READS)
+ FD_SET(fd, &s->next_select.reads);
+ if (flags & SEL_SENDS)
+ FD_SET(fd, &s->next_select.sends);
+ /* Adjust "max" */
+ if (s->next_select.max < (fd + 1))
+ s->next_select.max = fd + 1;
+}
+
+static void selector_add_listener(tunala_selector_t * selector, int fd)
+{
+ selector_add_raw_fd(selector, fd, SEL_READS);
+}
+
+static void selector_add_tunala(tunala_selector_t * s, tunala_item_t * t)
+{
+ /* Set clean read if sm.clean_in is not full */
+ if (t->clean_read != -1) {
+ selector_add_raw_fd(s, t->clean_read,
+ (buffer_full(state_machine_get_buffer(&t->sm,
+ SM_CLEAN_IN))
+ ? SEL_EXCEPTS : SEL_READS));
+ }
+ /* Set clean send if sm.clean_out is not empty */
+ if (t->clean_send != -1) {
+ selector_add_raw_fd(s, t->clean_send,
+ (buffer_empty(state_machine_get_buffer(&t->sm,
+ SM_CLEAN_OUT))
+ ? SEL_EXCEPTS : SEL_SENDS));
+ }
+ /* Set dirty read if sm.dirty_in is not full */
+ if (t->dirty_read != -1) {
+ selector_add_raw_fd(s, t->dirty_read,
+ (buffer_full(state_machine_get_buffer(&t->sm,
+ SM_DIRTY_IN))
+ ? SEL_EXCEPTS : SEL_READS));
+ }
+ /* Set dirty send if sm.dirty_out is not empty */
+ if (t->dirty_send != -1) {
+ selector_add_raw_fd(s, t->dirty_send,
+ (buffer_empty(state_machine_get_buffer(&t->sm,
+ SM_DIRTY_OUT))
+ ? SEL_EXCEPTS : SEL_SENDS));
+ }
+}
+
+static int selector_select(tunala_selector_t * selector)
+{
+ memcpy(&selector->last_selected, &selector->next_select,
+ sizeof(select_sets_t));
+ selector_sets_init(&selector->next_select);
+ return select(selector->last_selected.max,
+ &selector->last_selected.reads,
+ &selector->last_selected.sends,
+ &selector->last_selected.excepts, NULL);
+}
+
+/*
+ * This returns -1 for error, 0 for no new connections, or 1 for success, in
+ * which case *newfd is populated.
+ */
+static int selector_get_listener(tunala_selector_t * selector, int fd,
+ int *newfd)
+{
+ if (FD_ISSET(fd, &selector->last_selected.excepts))
+ return -1;
+ if (!FD_ISSET(fd, &selector->last_selected.reads))
+ return 0;
+ if ((*newfd = ip_accept_connection(fd)) == -1)
+ return -1;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/************************/
+/* "Tunala" world stuff */
+/************************/
+
+static int tunala_world_make_room(tunala_world_t * world)
+{
+ unsigned int newsize;
+ tunala_item_t *newarray;
+
+ if (world->tunnels_used < world->tunnels_size)
+ return 1;
+ newsize = (world->tunnels_size == 0 ? 16 :
+ ((world->tunnels_size * 3) / 2));
+ if ((newarray = malloc(newsize * sizeof(tunala_item_t))) == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ memset(newarray, 0, newsize * sizeof(tunala_item_t));
+ if (world->tunnels_used > 0)
+ memcpy(newarray, world->tunnels,
+ world->tunnels_used * sizeof(tunala_item_t));
+ if (world->tunnels_size > 0)
+ free(world->tunnels);
+ /* migrate */
+ world->tunnels = newarray;
+ world->tunnels_size = newsize;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int tunala_world_new_item(tunala_world_t * world, int fd,
+ const char *ip, unsigned short port,
+ int flipped)
+{
+ tunala_item_t *item;
+ int newfd;
+ SSL *new_ssl = NULL;
+
+ if (!tunala_world_make_room(world))
+ return 0;
+ if ((new_ssl = SSL_new(world->ssl_ctx)) == NULL) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Error creating new SSL\n");
+ ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ item = world->tunnels + (world->tunnels_used++);
+ state_machine_init(&item->sm);
+ item->clean_read = item->clean_send =
+ item->dirty_read = item->dirty_send = -1;
+ if ((newfd = ip_create_connection_split(ip, port)) == -1)
+ goto err;
+ /*
+ * Which way round? If we're a server, "fd" is the dirty side and the
+ * connection we open is the clean one. For a client, it's the other way
+ * around. Unless, of course, we're "flipped" in which case everything
+ * gets reversed. :-)
+ */
+ if ((world->server_mode && !flipped) || (!world->server_mode && flipped)) {
+ item->dirty_read = item->dirty_send = fd;
+ item->clean_read = item->clean_send = newfd;
+ } else {
+ item->clean_read = item->clean_send = fd;
+ item->dirty_read = item->dirty_send = newfd;
+ }
+ /*
+ * We use the SSL's "app_data" to indicate a call-back induced "kill"
+ */
+ SSL_set_app_data(new_ssl, NULL);
+ if (!state_machine_set_SSL(&item->sm, new_ssl, world->server_mode))
+ goto err;
+ return 1;
+ err:
+ tunala_world_del_item(world, world->tunnels_used - 1);
+ return 0;
+
+}
+
+static void tunala_world_del_item(tunala_world_t * world, unsigned int idx)
+{
+ tunala_item_t *item = world->tunnels + idx;
+ if (item->clean_read != -1)
+ close(item->clean_read);
+ if (item->clean_send != item->clean_read)
+ close(item->clean_send);
+ item->clean_read = item->clean_send = -1;
+ if (item->dirty_read != -1)
+ close(item->dirty_read);
+ if (item->dirty_send != item->dirty_read)
+ close(item->dirty_send);
+ item->dirty_read = item->dirty_send = -1;
+ state_machine_close(&item->sm);
+ /* OK, now we fix the item array */
+ if (idx + 1 < world->tunnels_used)
+ /* We need to scroll entries to the left */
+ memmove(world->tunnels + idx,
+ world->tunnels + (idx + 1),
+ (world->tunnels_used - (idx + 1)) * sizeof(tunala_item_t));
+ world->tunnels_used--;
+}
+
+static int tunala_item_io(tunala_selector_t * selector, tunala_item_t * item)
+{
+ int c_r, c_s, d_r, d_s; /* Four boolean flags */
+
+ /* Take ourselves out of the gene-pool if there was an except */
+ if ((item->clean_read != -1) && FD_ISSET(item->clean_read,
+ &selector->
+ last_selected.excepts))
+ return 0;
+ if ((item->clean_send != -1) && FD_ISSET(item->clean_send,
+ &selector->
+ last_selected.excepts))
+ return 0;
+ if ((item->dirty_read != -1) && FD_ISSET(item->dirty_read,
+ &selector->
+ last_selected.excepts))
+ return 0;
+ if ((item->dirty_send != -1) && FD_ISSET(item->dirty_send,
+ &selector->
+ last_selected.excepts))
+ return 0;
+ /* Grab our 4 IO flags */
+ c_r = c_s = d_r = d_s = 0;
+ if (item->clean_read != -1)
+ c_r = FD_ISSET(item->clean_read, &selector->last_selected.reads);
+ if (item->clean_send != -1)
+ c_s = FD_ISSET(item->clean_send, &selector->last_selected.sends);
+ if (item->dirty_read != -1)
+ d_r = FD_ISSET(item->dirty_read, &selector->last_selected.reads);
+ if (item->dirty_send != -1)
+ d_s = FD_ISSET(item->dirty_send, &selector->last_selected.sends);
+ /* If no IO has happened for us, skip needless data looping */
+ if (!c_r && !c_s && !d_r && !d_s)
+ return 1;
+ if (c_r)
+ c_r = (buffer_from_fd(state_machine_get_buffer(&item->sm,
+ SM_CLEAN_IN),
+ item->clean_read) <= 0);
+ if (c_s)
+ c_s = (buffer_to_fd(state_machine_get_buffer(&item->sm,
+ SM_CLEAN_OUT),
+ item->clean_send) <= 0);
+ if (d_r)
+ d_r = (buffer_from_fd(state_machine_get_buffer(&item->sm,
+ SM_DIRTY_IN),
+ item->dirty_read) <= 0);
+ if (d_s)
+ d_s = (buffer_to_fd(state_machine_get_buffer(&item->sm,
+ SM_DIRTY_OUT),
+ item->dirty_send) <= 0);
+ /* If any of the flags is non-zero, that means they need closing */
+ if (c_r) {
+ close(item->clean_read);
+ if (item->clean_send == item->clean_read)
+ item->clean_send = -1;
+ item->clean_read = -1;
+ }
+ if (c_s && (item->clean_send != -1)) {
+ close(item->clean_send);
+ if (item->clean_send == item->clean_read)
+ item->clean_read = -1;
+ item->clean_send = -1;
+ }
+ if (d_r) {
+ close(item->dirty_read);
+ if (item->dirty_send == item->dirty_read)
+ item->dirty_send = -1;
+ item->dirty_read = -1;
+ }
+ if (d_s && (item->dirty_send != -1)) {
+ close(item->dirty_send);
+ if (item->dirty_send == item->dirty_read)
+ item->dirty_read = -1;
+ item->dirty_send = -1;
+ }
+ /*
+ * This function name is attributed to the term donated by David Schwartz
+ * on openssl-dev, message-ID:
+ * <NCBBLIEPOCNJOAEKBEAKEEDGLIAA.davids@webmaster.com>. :-)
+ */
+ if (!state_machine_churn(&item->sm))
+ /*
+ * If the SSL closes, it will also zero-out the _in buffers and will
+ * in future process just outgoing data. As and when the outgoing
+ * data has gone, it will return zero here to tell us to bail out.
+ */
+ return 0;
+ /* Otherwise, we return zero if both sides are dead. */
+ if (((item->clean_read == -1) || (item->clean_send == -1)) &&
+ ((item->dirty_read == -1) || (item->dirty_send == -1)))
+ return 0;
+ /*
+ * If only one side closed, notify the SSL of this so it can take
+ * appropriate action.
+ */
+ if ((item->clean_read == -1) || (item->clean_send == -1)) {
+ if (!state_machine_close_clean(&item->sm))
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if ((item->dirty_read == -1) || (item->dirty_send == -1)) {
+ if (!state_machine_close_dirty(&item->sm))
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
diff --git a/openssl/demos/tunala/tunala.h b/openssl/demos/tunala/tunala.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..28860d7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl/demos/tunala/tunala.h
@@ -0,0 +1,244 @@
+/*
+ * Tunala ("Tunneler with a New Zealand accent") Written by Geoff Thorpe,
+ * but endorsed/supported by noone. Please use this is if it's useful or
+ * informative to you, but it's only here as a scratchpad for ideas about how
+ * you might (or might not) program with OpenSSL. If you deploy this is in a
+ * mission-critical environment, and have not read, understood, audited, and
+ * modified this code to your satisfaction, and the result is that all hell
+ * breaks loose and you are looking for a new employer, then it proves
+ * nothing except perhaps that Darwinism is alive and well. Let's just say,
+ * *I* don't use this in a mission-critical environment, so it would be
+ * stupid for anyone to assume that it is solid and/or tested enough when
+ * even its author doesn't place that much trust in it. You have been warned.
+ * With thanks to Cryptographic Appliances, Inc.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _TUNALA_H
+# define _TUNALA_H
+
+/* pull in autoconf fluff */
+# ifndef NO_CONFIG_H
+# include "config.h"
+# else
+/*
+ * We don't have autoconf, we have to set all of these unless a tweaked
+ * Makefile tells us not to ...
+ */
+/* headers */
+# ifndef NO_HAVE_SELECT
+# define HAVE_SELECT
+# endif
+# ifndef NO_HAVE_SOCKET
+# define HAVE_SOCKET
+# endif
+# ifndef NO_HAVE_UNISTD_H
+# define HAVE_UNISTD_H
+# endif
+# ifndef NO_HAVE_FCNTL_H
+# define HAVE_FCNTL_H
+# endif
+# ifndef NO_HAVE_LIMITS_H
+# define HAVE_LIMITS_H
+# endif
+/* features */
+# ifndef NO_HAVE_STRSTR
+# define HAVE_STRSTR
+# endif
+# ifndef NO_HAVE_STRTOUL
+# define HAVE_STRTOUL
+# endif
+# endif
+
+# if !defined(HAVE_SELECT) || !defined(HAVE_SOCKET)
+# error "can't build without some network basics like select() and socket()"
+# endif
+
+# include <stdlib.h>
+# ifndef NO_SYSTEM_H
+# include <string.h>
+# ifdef HAVE_UNISTD_H
+# include <unistd.h>
+# endif
+# ifdef HAVE_FCNTL_H
+# include <fcntl.h>
+# endif
+# ifdef HAVE_LIMITS_H
+# include <limits.h>
+# endif
+# include <netdb.h>
+# include <signal.h>
+# include <sys/socket.h>
+# include <sys/types.h>
+# include <netinet/in.h>
+# endif /* !defined(NO_SYSTEM_H) */
+
+# ifndef NO_OPENSSL
+# include <openssl/err.h>
+# include <openssl/engine.h>
+# include <openssl/ssl.h>
+# endif /* !defined(NO_OPENSSL) */
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_BUFFER
+/*
+ * This is the generic "buffer" type that is used when feeding the
+ * state-machine. It's basically a FIFO with respect to the "adddata" &
+ * "takedata" type functions that operate on it.
+ */
+# define MAX_DATA_SIZE 16384
+typedef struct _buffer_t {
+ unsigned char data[MAX_DATA_SIZE];
+ unsigned int used;
+ /*
+ * Statistical values - counts the total number of bytes read in and read
+ * out (respectively) since "buffer_init()"
+ */
+ unsigned long total_in, total_out;
+} buffer_t;
+
+/* Initialise a buffer structure before use */
+void buffer_init(buffer_t * buf);
+/*
+ * Cleanup a buffer structure - presently not needed, but if buffer_t is
+ * converted to using dynamic allocation, this would be required - so should
+ * be called to protect against an explosion of memory leaks later if the
+ * change is made.
+ */
+void buffer_close(buffer_t * buf);
+
+/* Basic functions to manipulate buffers */
+
+unsigned int buffer_used(buffer_t * buf); /* How much data in the buffer */
+unsigned int buffer_unused(buffer_t * buf); /* How much space in the buffer */
+int buffer_full(buffer_t * buf); /* Boolean, is it full? */
+int buffer_notfull(buffer_t * buf); /* Boolean, is it not full? */
+int buffer_empty(buffer_t * buf); /* Boolean, is it empty? */
+int buffer_notempty(buffer_t * buf); /* Boolean, is it not empty? */
+unsigned long buffer_total_in(buffer_t * buf); /* Total bytes written to
+ * buffer */
+unsigned long buffer_total_out(buffer_t * buf); /* Total bytes read from
+ * buffer */
+
+# if 0 /* Currently used only within buffer.c -
+ * better to expose only higher-level
+ * functions anyway */
+/*
+ * Add data to the tail of the buffer, returns the amount that was actually
+ * added (so, you need to check if return value is less than size)
+ */
+unsigned int buffer_adddata(buffer_t * buf, const unsigned char *ptr,
+ unsigned int size);
+
+/*
+ * Take data from the front of the buffer (and scroll the rest forward). If
+ * "ptr" is NULL, this just removes data off the front of the buffer. Return
+ * value is the amount actually removed (can be less than size if the buffer
+ * has too little data).
+ */
+unsigned int buffer_takedata(buffer_t * buf, unsigned char *ptr,
+ unsigned int size);
+
+/*
+ * Flushes as much data as possible out of the "from" buffer into the "to"
+ * buffer. Return value is the amount moved. The amount moved can be
+ * restricted to a maximum by specifying "cap" - setting it to -1 means no
+ * limit.
+ */
+unsigned int buffer_tobuffer(buffer_t * to, buffer_t * from, int cap);
+# endif
+
+# ifndef NO_IP
+/* Read or write between a file-descriptor and a buffer */
+int buffer_from_fd(buffer_t * buf, int fd);
+int buffer_to_fd(buffer_t * buf, int fd);
+# endif /* !defined(NO_IP) */
+
+# ifndef NO_OPENSSL
+/* Read or write between an SSL or BIO and a buffer */
+void buffer_from_SSL(buffer_t * buf, SSL *ssl);
+void buffer_to_SSL(buffer_t * buf, SSL *ssl);
+void buffer_from_BIO(buffer_t * buf, BIO *bio);
+void buffer_to_BIO(buffer_t * buf, BIO *bio);
+
+/* Callbacks */
+void cb_ssl_info(const SSL *s, int where, int ret);
+/* Called if output should be sent too */
+void cb_ssl_info_set_output(FILE *fp);
+int cb_ssl_verify(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
+void cb_ssl_verify_set_output(FILE *fp);
+void cb_ssl_verify_set_depth(unsigned int verify_depth);
+void cb_ssl_verify_set_level(unsigned int level);
+RSA *cb_generate_tmp_rsa(SSL *s, int is_export, int keylength);
+# endif /* !defined(NO_OPENSSL) */
+# endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_NO_BUFFER) */
+
+# ifndef NO_TUNALA
+# ifdef OPENSSL_NO_BUFFER
+# error "TUNALA section of tunala.h requires BUFFER support"
+# endif
+typedef struct _state_machine_t {
+ SSL *ssl;
+ BIO *bio_intossl;
+ BIO *bio_fromssl;
+ buffer_t clean_in, clean_out;
+ buffer_t dirty_in, dirty_out;
+} state_machine_t;
+typedef enum {
+ SM_CLEAN_IN, SM_CLEAN_OUT,
+ SM_DIRTY_IN, SM_DIRTY_OUT
+} sm_buffer_t;
+void state_machine_init(state_machine_t * machine);
+void state_machine_close(state_machine_t * machine);
+buffer_t *state_machine_get_buffer(state_machine_t * machine,
+ sm_buffer_t type);
+SSL *state_machine_get_SSL(state_machine_t * machine);
+int state_machine_set_SSL(state_machine_t * machine, SSL *ssl, int is_server);
+/* Performs the data-IO loop and returns zero if the machine should close */
+int state_machine_churn(state_machine_t * machine);
+/*
+ * Is used to handle closing conditions - namely when one side of the tunnel
+ * has closed but the other should finish flushing.
+ */
+int state_machine_close_clean(state_machine_t * machine);
+int state_machine_close_dirty(state_machine_t * machine);
+# endif /* !defined(NO_TUNALA) */
+
+# ifndef NO_IP
+/*
+ * Initialise anything related to the networking. This includes blocking
+ * pesky SIGPIPE signals.
+ */
+int ip_initialise(void);
+/*
+ * ip is the 4-byte ip address (eg. 127.0.0.1 is {0x7F,0x00,0x00,0x01}), port
+ * is the port to listen on (host byte order), and the return value is the
+ * file-descriptor or -1 on error.
+ */
+int ip_create_listener_split(const char *ip, unsigned short port);
+/* Same semantics as above. */
+int ip_create_connection_split(const char *ip, unsigned short port);
+/* Converts a string into the ip/port before calling the above */
+int ip_create_listener(const char *address);
+int ip_create_connection(const char *address);
+/*
+ * Just does a string conversion on its own. NB: If accept_all_ip is
+ * non-zero, then the address string could be just a port. Ie. it's suitable
+ * for a listening address but not a connecting address.
+ */
+int ip_parse_address(const char *address, const char **parsed_ip,
+ unsigned short *port, int accept_all_ip);
+/*
+ * Accepts an incoming connection through the listener. Assumes selects and
+ * what-not have deemed it an appropriate thing to do.
+ */
+int ip_accept_connection(int listen_fd);
+# endif /* !defined(NO_IP) */
+
+/* These functions wrap up things that can be portability hassles. */
+int int_strtoul(const char *str, unsigned long *val);
+# ifdef HAVE_STRSTR
+# define int_strstr strstr
+# else
+char *int_strstr(const char *haystack, const char *needle);
+# endif
+
+#endif /* !defined(_TUNALA_H) */