diff options
author | William Joye <wjoye@cfa.harvard.edu> | 2017-05-02 16:41:35 (GMT) |
---|---|---|
committer | William Joye <wjoye@cfa.harvard.edu> | 2017-05-02 16:41:35 (GMT) |
commit | 3d328008deedc58cd7a11c79063cefa7d662d4fc (patch) | |
tree | cb41a048885ce7b493f406360cf5f6edf689c468 /openssl/ssl/s3_clnt.c | |
parent | 0a2b8b8e0bc2e91a9f10659b30e2e4f5b79ce692 (diff) | |
download | blt-3d328008deedc58cd7a11c79063cefa7d662d4fc.zip blt-3d328008deedc58cd7a11c79063cefa7d662d4fc.tar.gz blt-3d328008deedc58cd7a11c79063cefa7d662d4fc.tar.bz2 |
inital commit
Diffstat (limited to 'openssl/ssl/s3_clnt.c')
-rw-r--r-- | openssl/ssl/s3_clnt.c | 3781 |
1 files changed, 3781 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/s3_clnt.c b/openssl/ssl/s3_clnt.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..32f2f1a --- /dev/null +++ b/openssl/ssl/s3_clnt.c @@ -0,0 +1,3781 @@ +/* ssl/s3_clnt.c */ +/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) + * All rights reserved. + * + * This package is an SSL implementation written + * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). + * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. + * + * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as + * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions + * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, + * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation + * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms + * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). + * + * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in + * the code are not to be removed. + * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution + * as the author of the parts of the library used. + * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or + * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software + * must display the following acknowledgement: + * "This product includes cryptographic software written by + * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" + * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library + * being used are not cryptographic related :-). + * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from + * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: + * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + * + * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or + * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be + * copied and put under another distribution licence + * [including the GNU Public Licence.] + */ +/* ==================================================================== + * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in + * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the + * distribution. + * + * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this + * software must display the following acknowledgment: + * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project + * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" + * + * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to + * endorse or promote products derived from this software without + * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact + * openssl-core@openssl.org. + * + * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" + * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written + * permission of the OpenSSL Project. + * + * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following + * acknowledgment: + * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project + * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY + * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR + * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR + * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, + * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; + * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, + * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) + * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED + * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * ==================================================================== + * + * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young + * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim + * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). + * + */ +/* ==================================================================== + * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. + * + * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by + * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project. + * + * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source + * license provided above. + * + * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by + * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories. + * + */ +/* ==================================================================== + * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved. + * + * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by + * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source + * license. + * + * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of + * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites + * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL. + * + * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in + * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received + * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise. + * + * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not + * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third + * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights + * to make use of the Contribution. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN + * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA + * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY + * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR + * OTHERWISE. + */ + +#include <stdio.h> +#include "ssl_locl.h" +#include "kssl_lcl.h" +#include <openssl/buffer.h> +#include <openssl/rand.h> +#include <openssl/objects.h> +#include <openssl/evp.h> +#include <openssl/md5.h> +#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS +# include <openssl/fips.h> +#endif +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH +# include <openssl/dh.h> +#endif +#include <openssl/bn.h> +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE +# include <openssl/engine.h> +#endif + +static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b); +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT +static int ssl3_check_finished(SSL *s); +#endif + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3_METHOD +static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_client_method(int ver) +{ + if (ver == SSL3_VERSION) + return (SSLv3_client_method()); + else + return (NULL); +} + +IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_client_method, + ssl_undefined_function, + ssl3_connect, ssl3_get_client_method) +#endif +int ssl3_connect(SSL *s) +{ + BUF_MEM *buf = NULL; + unsigned long Time = (unsigned long)time(NULL); + void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL; + int ret = -1; + int new_state, state, skip = 0; + + RAND_add(&Time, sizeof(Time), 0); + ERR_clear_error(); + clear_sys_error(); + + if (s->info_callback != NULL) + cb = s->info_callback; + else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL) + cb = s->ctx->info_callback; + + s->in_handshake++; + if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) + SSL_clear(s); + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS + /* + * If we're awaiting a HeartbeatResponse, pretend we already got and + * don't await it anymore, because Heartbeats don't make sense during + * handshakes anyway. + */ + if (s->tlsext_hb_pending) { + s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0; + s->tlsext_hb_seq++; + } +#endif + + for (;;) { + state = s->state; + + switch (s->state) { + case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE: + s->renegotiate = 1; + s->state = SSL_ST_CONNECT; + s->ctx->stats.sess_connect_renegotiate++; + /* break */ + case SSL_ST_BEFORE: + case SSL_ST_CONNECT: + case SSL_ST_BEFORE | SSL_ST_CONNECT: + case SSL_ST_OK | SSL_ST_CONNECT: + + s->server = 0; + if (cb != NULL) + cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START, 1); + + if ((s->version & 0xff00) != 0x0300) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CONNECT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; + ret = -1; + goto end; + } + + /* s->version=SSL3_VERSION; */ + s->type = SSL_ST_CONNECT; + + if (s->init_buf == NULL) { + if ((buf = BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL) { + ret = -1; + s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; + goto end; + } + if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) { + ret = -1; + s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; + goto end; + } + s->init_buf = buf; + buf = NULL; + } + + if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) { + ret = -1; + goto end; + } + + /* setup buffing BIO */ + if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s, 0)) { + ret = -1; + s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; + goto end; + } + + /* don't push the buffering BIO quite yet */ + + ssl3_init_finished_mac(s); + + s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A; + s->ctx->stats.sess_connect++; + s->init_num = 0; + s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK; + /* + * Should have been reset by ssl3_get_finished, too. + */ + s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 0; + break; + + case SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A: + case SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B: + + s->shutdown = 0; + ret = ssl3_client_hello(s); + if (ret <= 0) + goto end; + s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A; + s->init_num = 0; + + /* turn on buffering for the next lot of output */ + if (s->bbio != s->wbio) + s->wbio = BIO_push(s->bbio, s->wbio); + + break; + + case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A: + case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_B: + ret = ssl3_get_server_hello(s); + if (ret <= 0) + goto end; + + if (s->hit) { + s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A; +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT + if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) { + /* receive renewed session ticket */ + s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A; + } +#endif + } else { + s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A; + } + s->init_num = 0; + break; + case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A: + case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_B: +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT + /* Noop (ret = 0) for everything but EAP-FAST. */ + ret = ssl3_check_finished(s); + if (ret < 0) + goto end; + if (ret == 1) { + s->hit = 1; + s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A; + s->init_num = 0; + break; + } +#endif + /* Check if it is anon DH/ECDH, SRP auth */ + /* or PSK */ + if (! + (s->s3->tmp. + new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP)) + && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) { + ret = ssl3_get_server_certificate(s); + if (ret <= 0) + goto end; +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT + if (s->tlsext_status_expected) + s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A; + else + s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A; + } else { + skip = 1; + s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A; + } +#else + } else + skip = 1; + + s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A; +#endif + s->init_num = 0; + break; + + case SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A: + case SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_B: + ret = ssl3_get_key_exchange(s); + if (ret <= 0) + goto end; + s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A; + s->init_num = 0; + + /* + * at this point we check that we have the required stuff from + * the server + */ + if (!ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) { + ret = -1; + s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; + goto end; + } + break; + + case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A: + case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_B: + ret = ssl3_get_certificate_request(s); + if (ret <= 0) + goto end; + s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A; + s->init_num = 0; + break; + + case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A: + case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_B: + ret = ssl3_get_server_done(s); + if (ret <= 0) + goto end; +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP + if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) { + if ((ret = SRP_Calc_A_param(s)) <= 0) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CONNECT, SSL_R_SRP_A_CALC); + ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); + s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; + goto end; + } + } +#endif + if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req) + s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A; + else + s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A; + s->init_num = 0; + + break; + + case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A: + case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B: + case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C: + case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D: + ret = ssl3_send_client_certificate(s); + if (ret <= 0) + goto end; + s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A; + s->init_num = 0; + break; + + case SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A: + case SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B: + ret = ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(s); + if (ret <= 0) + goto end; + /* + * EAY EAY EAY need to check for DH fix cert sent back + */ + /* + * For TLS, cert_req is set to 2, so a cert chain of nothing is + * sent, but no verify packet is sent + */ + /* + * XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication in ECDH + * cipher suites with ECDH (rather than ECDSA) certificates. We + * need to skip the certificate verify message when client's + * ECDH public key is sent inside the client certificate. + */ + if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 1) { + s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A; + } else { + s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A; + } + if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY) { + s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A; + } + + s->init_num = 0; + break; + + case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A: + case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_B: + ret = ssl3_send_client_verify(s); + if (ret <= 0) + goto end; + s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A; + s->init_num = 0; + break; + + case SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A: + case SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B: + ret = ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s, + SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A, + SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B); + if (ret <= 0) + goto end; + +#if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) + s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A; +#else + if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) + s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_A; + else + s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A; +#endif + s->init_num = 0; + + s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher; +#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP + s->session->compress_meth = 0; +#else + if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL) + s->session->compress_meth = 0; + else + s->session->compress_meth = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id; +#endif + if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) { + ret = -1; + s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; + goto end; + } + + if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, + SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE)) + { + ret = -1; + s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; + goto end; + } + + break; + +#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) + case SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_A: + case SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_B: + ret = ssl3_send_next_proto(s); + if (ret <= 0) + goto end; + s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A; + break; +#endif + + case SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A: + case SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_B: + ret = ssl3_send_finished(s, + SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A, + SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_B, + s->method-> + ssl3_enc->client_finished_label, + s->method-> + ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len); + if (ret <= 0) + goto end; + s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_FLUSH; + + /* clear flags */ + s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER; + if (s->hit) { + s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL_ST_OK; + if (s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_DELAY_CLIENT_FINISHED) { + s->state = SSL_ST_OK; + s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER; + s->s3->delay_buf_pop_ret = 0; + } + } else { +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT + /* + * Allow NewSessionTicket if ticket expected + */ + if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) + s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A; + else +#endif + + s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A; + } + s->init_num = 0; + break; + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT + case SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A: + case SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_B: + ret = ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(s); + if (ret <= 0) + goto end; + s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A; + s->init_num = 0; + break; + + case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A: + case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_B: + ret = ssl3_get_cert_status(s); + if (ret <= 0) + goto end; + s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A; + s->init_num = 0; + break; +#endif + + case SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A: + case SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_B: + if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec) + s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK; + ret = ssl3_get_finished(s, SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A, + SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_B); + if (ret <= 0) + goto end; + + if (s->hit) + s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A; + else + s->state = SSL_ST_OK; + s->init_num = 0; + break; + + case SSL3_ST_CW_FLUSH: + s->rwstate = SSL_WRITING; + if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0) { + ret = -1; + goto end; + } + s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; + s->state = s->s3->tmp.next_state; + break; + + case SSL_ST_OK: + /* clean a few things up */ + ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s); + + if (s->init_buf != NULL) { + BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf); + s->init_buf = NULL; + } + + /* + * If we are not 'joining' the last two packets, remove the + * buffering now + */ + if (!(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER)) + ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s); + /* else do it later in ssl3_write */ + + s->init_num = 0; + s->renegotiate = 0; + s->new_session = 0; + + ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT); + if (s->hit) + s->ctx->stats.sess_hit++; + + ret = 1; + /* s->server=0; */ + s->handshake_func = ssl3_connect; + s->ctx->stats.sess_connect_good++; + + if (cb != NULL) + cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1); + + goto end; + /* break; */ + + case SSL_ST_ERR: + default: + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CONNECT, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE); + ret = -1; + goto end; + /* break; */ + } + + /* did we do anything */ + if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip) { + if (s->debug) { + if ((ret = BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0) + goto end; + } + + if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state)) { + new_state = s->state; + s->state = state; + cb(s, SSL_CB_CONNECT_LOOP, 1); + s->state = new_state; + } + } + skip = 0; + } + end: + s->in_handshake--; + if (buf != NULL) + BUF_MEM_free(buf); + if (cb != NULL) + cb(s, SSL_CB_CONNECT_EXIT, ret); + return (ret); +} + +int ssl3_client_hello(SSL *s) +{ + unsigned char *buf; + unsigned char *p, *d; + int i; + unsigned long l; + int al = 0; +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP + int j; + SSL_COMP *comp; +#endif + + buf = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; + if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) { + SSL_SESSION *sess = s->session; + if ((sess == NULL) || (sess->ssl_version != s->version) || +#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT + !sess->session_id_length || +#else + /* + * In the case of EAP-FAST, we can have a pre-shared + * "ticket" without a session ID. + */ + (!sess->session_id_length && !sess->tlsext_tick) || +#endif + (sess->not_resumable)) { + if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0)) + goto err; + } + if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) { + /* Determine which DTLS version to use */ + int options = s->options; + /* If DTLS 1.2 disabled correct the version number */ + if (options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1_2) { + if (tls1_suiteb(s)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO, + SSL_R_ONLY_DTLS_1_2_ALLOWED_IN_SUITEB_MODE); + goto err; + } + /* + * Disabling all versions is silly: return an error. + */ + if (options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION); + goto err; + } + /* + * Update method so we don't use any DTLS 1.2 features. + */ + s->method = DTLSv1_client_method(); + s->version = DTLS1_VERSION; + } else { + /* + * We only support one version: update method + */ + if (options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1) + s->method = DTLSv1_2_client_method(); + s->version = DTLS1_2_VERSION; + } + s->client_version = s->version; + } + /* else use the pre-loaded session */ + + p = s->s3->client_random; + + /* + * for DTLS if client_random is initialized, reuse it, we are + * required to use same upon reply to HelloVerify + */ + if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { + size_t idx; + i = 1; + for (idx = 0; idx < sizeof(s->s3->client_random); idx++) { + if (p[idx]) { + i = 0; + break; + } + } + } else + i = 1; + + if (i && ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 0, p, + sizeof(s->s3->client_random)) <= 0) + goto err; + + /* Do the message type and length last */ + d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s); + + /*- + * version indicates the negotiated version: for example from + * an SSLv2/v3 compatible client hello). The client_version + * field is the maximum version we permit and it is also + * used in RSA encrypted premaster secrets. Some servers can + * choke if we initially report a higher version then + * renegotiate to a lower one in the premaster secret. This + * didn't happen with TLS 1.0 as most servers supported it + * but it can with TLS 1.1 or later if the server only supports + * 1.0. + * + * Possible scenario with previous logic: + * 1. Client hello indicates TLS 1.2 + * 2. Server hello says TLS 1.0 + * 3. RSA encrypted premaster secret uses 1.2. + * 4. Handhaked proceeds using TLS 1.0. + * 5. Server sends hello request to renegotiate. + * 6. Client hello indicates TLS v1.0 as we now + * know that is maximum server supports. + * 7. Server chokes on RSA encrypted premaster secret + * containing version 1.0. + * + * For interoperability it should be OK to always use the + * maximum version we support in client hello and then rely + * on the checking of version to ensure the servers isn't + * being inconsistent: for example initially negotiating with + * TLS 1.0 and renegotiating with TLS 1.2. We do this by using + * client_version in client hello and not resetting it to + * the negotiated version. + */ +#if 0 + *(p++) = s->version >> 8; + *(p++) = s->version & 0xff; + s->client_version = s->version; +#else + *(p++) = s->client_version >> 8; + *(p++) = s->client_version & 0xff; +#endif + + /* Random stuff */ + memcpy(p, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); + p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; + + /* Session ID */ + if (s->new_session) + i = 0; + else + i = s->session->session_id_length; + *(p++) = i; + if (i != 0) { + if (i > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + memcpy(p, s->session->session_id, i); + p += i; + } + + /* cookie stuff for DTLS */ + if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { + if (s->d1->cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + *(p++) = s->d1->cookie_len; + memcpy(p, s->d1->cookie, s->d1->cookie_len); + p += s->d1->cookie_len; + } + + /* Ciphers supported */ + i = ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s, SSL_get_ciphers(s), &(p[2]), 0); + if (i == 0) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE); + goto err; + } +#ifdef OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH + /* + * Some servers hang if client hello > 256 bytes as hack workaround + * chop number of supported ciphers to keep it well below this if we + * use TLS v1.2 + */ + if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION + && i > OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH) + i = OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH & ~1; +#endif + s2n(i, p); + p += i; + + /* COMPRESSION */ +#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP + *(p++) = 1; +#else + + if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) + || !s->ctx->comp_methods) + j = 0; + else + j = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); + *(p++) = 1 + j; + for (i = 0; i < j; i++) { + comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, i); + *(p++) = comp->id; + } +#endif + *(p++) = 0; /* Add the NULL method */ + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT + /* TLS extensions */ + if (ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(s) <= 0) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT); + goto err; + } + if ((p = + ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(s, p, buf + SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, + &al)) == NULL) { + ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } +#endif + + l = p - d; + ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO, l); + s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B; + } + + /* SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B */ + return ssl_do_write(s); + err: + s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; + return (-1); +} + +int ssl3_get_server_hello(SSL *s) +{ + STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk; + const SSL_CIPHER *c; + CERT *ct = s->cert; + unsigned char *p, *d; + int i, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ok; + unsigned int j; + long n; +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP + SSL_COMP *comp; +#endif + /* + * Hello verify request and/or server hello version may not match so set + * first packet if we're negotiating version. + */ + if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) + s->first_packet = 1; + + n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s, + SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A, + SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_B, -1, 20000, &ok); + + if (!ok) + return ((int)n); + + if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { + s->first_packet = 0; + if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) { + if (s->d1->send_cookie == 0) { + s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1; + return 1; + } else { /* already sent a cookie */ + + al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_BAD_MESSAGE_TYPE); + goto f_err; + } + } + } + + if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) { + al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_BAD_MESSAGE_TYPE); + goto f_err; + } + + d = p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg; + if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) { + /* Work out correct protocol version to use */ + int hversion = (p[0] << 8) | p[1]; + int options = s->options; + if (hversion == DTLS1_2_VERSION && !(options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1_2)) + s->method = DTLSv1_2_client_method(); + else if (tls1_suiteb(s)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, + SSL_R_ONLY_DTLS_1_2_ALLOWED_IN_SUITEB_MODE); + s->version = hversion; + al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; + goto f_err; + } else if (hversion == DTLS1_VERSION && !(options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1)) + s->method = DTLSv1_client_method(); + else { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION); + s->version = hversion; + al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; + goto f_err; + } + s->session->ssl_version = s->version = s->method->version; + } + + if ((p[0] != (s->version >> 8)) || (p[1] != (s->version & 0xff))) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION); + s->version = (s->version & 0xff00) | p[1]; + al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; + goto f_err; + } + p += 2; + + /* load the server hello data */ + /* load the server random */ + memcpy(s->s3->server_random, p, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); + p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; + + s->hit = 0; + + /* get the session-id */ + j = *(p++); + + if ((j > sizeof s->session->session_id) || (j > SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE)) { + al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG); + goto f_err; + } +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT + /* + * Check if we can resume the session based on external pre-shared secret. + * EAP-FAST (RFC 4851) supports two types of session resumption. + * Resumption based on server-side state works with session IDs. + * Resumption based on pre-shared Protected Access Credentials (PACs) + * works by overriding the SessionTicket extension at the application + * layer, and does not send a session ID. (We do not know whether EAP-FAST + * servers would honour the session ID.) Therefore, the session ID alone + * is not a reliable indicator of session resumption, so we first check if + * we can resume, and later peek at the next handshake message to see if the + * server wants to resume. + */ + if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb && + s->session->tlsext_tick) { + SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL; + s->session->master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key); + if (s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key, + &s->session->master_key_length, + NULL, &pref_cipher, + s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg)) { + s->session->cipher = pref_cipher ? + pref_cipher : ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, p + j); + } else { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + goto f_err; + } + } +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */ + + if (j != 0 && j == s->session->session_id_length + && memcmp(p, s->session->session_id, j) == 0) { + if (s->sid_ctx_length != s->session->sid_ctx_length + || memcmp(s->session->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx_length)) { + /* actually a client application bug */ + al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, + SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT); + goto f_err; + } + s->hit = 1; + } else { + /* + * If we were trying for session-id reuse but the server + * didn't echo the ID, make a new SSL_SESSION. + * In the case of EAP-FAST and PAC, we do not send a session ID, + * so the PAC-based session secret is always preserved. It'll be + * overwritten if the server refuses resumption. + */ + if (s->session->session_id_length > 0) { + if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0)) { + goto f_err; + } + } + s->session->session_id_length = j; + memcpy(s->session->session_id, p, j); /* j could be 0 */ + } + p += j; + c = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, p); + if (c == NULL) { + /* unknown cipher */ + al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED); + goto f_err; + } + /* Set version disabled mask now we know version */ + if (!SSL_USE_TLS1_2_CIPHERS(s)) + ct->mask_ssl = SSL_TLSV1_2; + else + ct->mask_ssl = 0; + /* + * If it is a disabled cipher we didn't send it in client hello, so + * return an error. + */ + if (c->algorithm_ssl & ct->mask_ssl || + c->algorithm_mkey & ct->mask_k || c->algorithm_auth & ct->mask_a) { + al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED); + goto f_err; + } + p += ssl_put_cipher_by_char(s, NULL, NULL); + + sk = ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(s); + i = sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(sk, c); + if (i < 0) { + /* we did not say we would use this cipher */ + al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED); + goto f_err; + } + + /* + * Depending on the session caching (internal/external), the cipher + * and/or cipher_id values may not be set. Make sure that cipher_id is + * set and use it for comparison. + */ + if (s->session->cipher) + s->session->cipher_id = s->session->cipher->id; + if (s->hit && (s->session->cipher_id != c->id)) { +/* Workaround is now obsolete */ +#if 0 + if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG)) +#endif + { + al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, + SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED); + goto f_err; + } + } + s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = c; + /* + * Don't digest cached records if no sigalgs: we may need them for client + * authentication. + */ + if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) + goto f_err; + /* lets get the compression algorithm */ + /* COMPRESSION */ +#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP + if (*(p++) != 0) { + al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, + SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM); + goto f_err; + } + /* + * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session + * using compression. + */ + if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION); + goto f_err; + } +#else + j = *(p++); + if (s->hit && j != s->session->compress_meth) { + al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, + SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_NOT_RETURNED); + goto f_err; + } + if (j == 0) + comp = NULL; + else if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) { + al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_DISABLED); + goto f_err; + } else + comp = ssl3_comp_find(s->ctx->comp_methods, j); + + if ((j != 0) && (comp == NULL)) { + al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, + SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM); + goto f_err; + } else { + s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp; + } +#endif + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT + /* TLS extensions */ + if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(s, &p, d, n)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT); + goto err; + } +#endif + + if (p != (d + n)) { + /* wrong packet length */ + al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH); + goto f_err; + } + + return (1); + f_err: + ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); + err: + s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; + return (-1); +} + +int ssl3_get_server_certificate(SSL *s) +{ + int al, i, ok, ret = -1; + unsigned long n, nc, llen, l; + X509 *x = NULL; + const unsigned char *q, *p; + unsigned char *d; + STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL; + SESS_CERT *sc; + EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; + int need_cert = 1; /* VRS: 0=> will allow null cert if auth == + * KRB5 */ + + n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s, + SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A, + SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_B, + -1, s->max_cert_list, &ok); + + if (!ok) + return ((int)n); + + if ((s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) || + ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5) && + (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE))) { + s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1; + return (1); + } + + if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) { + al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_BAD_MESSAGE_TYPE); + goto f_err; + } + p = d = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg; + + if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + + n2l3(p, llen); + if (llen + 3 != n) { + al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + goto f_err; + } + for (nc = 0; nc < llen;) { + if (nc + 3 > llen) { + al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, + SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + goto f_err; + } + n2l3(p, l); + if ((l + nc + 3) > llen) { + al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, + SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + goto f_err; + } + + q = p; + x = d2i_X509(NULL, &q, l); + if (x == NULL) { + al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB); + goto f_err; + } + if (q != (p + l)) { + al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, + SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + goto f_err; + } + if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + x = NULL; + nc += l + 3; + p = q; + } + + i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk); + if ((s->verify_mode != SSL_VERIFY_NONE) && (i <= 0) +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 + && !((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5) && + (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5)) +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */ + ) { + al = ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result); + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, + SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED); + goto f_err; + } + ERR_clear_error(); /* but we keep s->verify_result */ + + sc = ssl_sess_cert_new(); + if (sc == NULL) + goto err; + + if (s->session->sess_cert) + ssl_sess_cert_free(s->session->sess_cert); + s->session->sess_cert = sc; + + sc->cert_chain = sk; + /* + * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does include the peer's certificate, + * which we don't include in s3_srvr.c + */ + x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0); + sk = NULL; + /* + * VRS 19990621: possible memory leak; sk=null ==> !sk_pop_free() @end + */ + + pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x); + + /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */ + need_cert = ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5) && + (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5)) + ? 0 : 1; + +#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG + fprintf(stderr, "pkey,x = %p, %p\n", pkey, x); + fprintf(stderr, "ssl_cert_type(x,pkey) = %d\n", ssl_cert_type(x, pkey)); + fprintf(stderr, "cipher, alg, nc = %s, %lx, %lx, %d\n", + s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->name, + s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey, + s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth, need_cert); +#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ + + if (need_cert && ((pkey == NULL) || EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey))) { + x = NULL; + al = SSL3_AL_FATAL; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, + SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PUBLIC_KEY_PARAMETERS); + goto f_err; + } + + i = ssl_cert_type(x, pkey); + if (need_cert && i < 0) { + x = NULL; + al = SSL3_AL_FATAL; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, + SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE); + goto f_err; + } + + if (need_cert) { + int exp_idx = ssl_cipher_get_cert_index(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher); + if (exp_idx >= 0 && i != exp_idx) { + x = NULL; + al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, + SSL_R_WRONG_CERTIFICATE_TYPE); + goto f_err; + } + sc->peer_cert_type = i; + CRYPTO_add(&x->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); + /* + * Why would the following ever happen? We just created sc a couple + * of lines ago. + */ + if (sc->peer_pkeys[i].x509 != NULL) + X509_free(sc->peer_pkeys[i].x509); + sc->peer_pkeys[i].x509 = x; + sc->peer_key = &(sc->peer_pkeys[i]); + + if (s->session->peer != NULL) + X509_free(s->session->peer); + CRYPTO_add(&x->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); + s->session->peer = x; + } else { + sc->peer_cert_type = i; + sc->peer_key = NULL; + + if (s->session->peer != NULL) + X509_free(s->session->peer); + s->session->peer = NULL; + } + s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result; + + x = NULL; + ret = 1; + if (0) { + f_err: + ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); + err: + s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; + } + + EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); + X509_free(x); + sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free); + return (ret); +} + +int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s) +{ +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA + unsigned char *q, md_buf[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE * 2]; +#endif + EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx; + unsigned char *param, *p; + int al, j, ok; + long i, param_len, n, alg_k, alg_a; + EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; + const EVP_MD *md = NULL; +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA + RSA *rsa = NULL; +#endif +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH + DH *dh = NULL; +#endif +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH + EC_KEY *ecdh = NULL; + BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL; + EC_POINT *srvr_ecpoint = NULL; + int curve_nid = 0; + int encoded_pt_len = 0; +#endif + + EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx); + + /* + * use same message size as in ssl3_get_certificate_request() as + * ServerKeyExchange message may be skipped + */ + n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s, + SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A, + SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_B, + -1, s->max_cert_list, &ok); + if (!ok) + return ((int)n); + + alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; + + if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) { + /* + * Can't skip server key exchange if this is an ephemeral + * ciphersuite. + */ + if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); + al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; + goto f_err; + } +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK + /* + * In plain PSK ciphersuite, ServerKeyExchange can be omitted if no + * identity hint is sent. Set session->sess_cert anyway to avoid + * problems later. + */ + if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) { + s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new(); + if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint) + OPENSSL_free(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint); + s->ctx->psk_identity_hint = NULL; + } +#endif + s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1; + return (1); + } + + param = p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg; + if (s->session->sess_cert != NULL) { +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA + if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp != NULL) { + RSA_free(s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp); + s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp = NULL; + } +#endif +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH + if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp) { + DH_free(s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp); + s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp = NULL; + } +#endif +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH + if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp) { + EC_KEY_free(s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp); + s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp = NULL; + } +#endif + } else { + s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new(); + } + + /* Total length of the parameters including the length prefix */ + param_len = 0; + + alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth; + + al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK + if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) { + param_len = 2; + if (param_len > n) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); + goto f_err; + } + n2s(p, i); + + /* + * Store PSK identity hint for later use, hint is used in + * ssl3_send_client_key_exchange. Assume that the maximum length of + * a PSK identity hint can be as long as the maximum length of a PSK + * identity. + */ + if (i > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) { + al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); + goto f_err; + } + if (i > n - param_len) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, + SSL_R_BAD_PSK_IDENTITY_HINT_LENGTH); + goto f_err; + } + param_len += i; + + s->session->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strndup((char *)p, i); + if (s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL) { + al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto f_err; + } + + p += i; + n -= param_len; + } else +#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */ +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP + if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) { + param_len = 2; + if (param_len > n) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); + goto f_err; + } + n2s(p, i); + + if (i > n - param_len) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_N_LENGTH); + goto f_err; + } + param_len += i; + + if (!(s->srp_ctx.N = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL))) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB); + goto err; + } + p += i; + + if (2 > n - param_len) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); + goto f_err; + } + param_len += 2; + + n2s(p, i); + + if (i > n - param_len) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_G_LENGTH); + goto f_err; + } + param_len += i; + + if (!(s->srp_ctx.g = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL))) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB); + goto err; + } + p += i; + + if (1 > n - param_len) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); + goto f_err; + } + param_len += 1; + + i = (unsigned int)(p[0]); + p++; + + if (i > n - param_len) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_S_LENGTH); + goto f_err; + } + param_len += i; + + if (!(s->srp_ctx.s = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL))) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB); + goto err; + } + p += i; + + if (2 > n - param_len) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); + goto f_err; + } + param_len += 2; + + n2s(p, i); + + if (i > n - param_len) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_B_LENGTH); + goto f_err; + } + param_len += i; + + if (!(s->srp_ctx.B = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL))) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB); + goto err; + } + p += i; + n -= param_len; + + if (!srp_verify_server_param(s, &al)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS); + goto f_err; + } + +/* We must check if there is a certificate */ +# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA + if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA) + pkey = + X509_get_pubkey(s->session-> + sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509); +# else + if (0) ; +# endif +# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA + else if (alg_a & SSL_aDSS) + pkey = + X509_get_pubkey(s->session-> + sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN]. + x509); +# endif + } else +#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_SRP */ +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA + if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) { + /* Temporary RSA keys only allowed in export ciphersuites */ + if (!SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) { + al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); + goto f_err; + } + if ((rsa = RSA_new()) == NULL) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + + param_len = 2; + if (param_len > n) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); + goto f_err; + } + n2s(p, i); + + if (i > n - param_len) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_MODULUS_LENGTH); + goto f_err; + } + param_len += i; + + if (!(rsa->n = BN_bin2bn(p, i, rsa->n))) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB); + goto err; + } + p += i; + + if (2 > n - param_len) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); + goto f_err; + } + param_len += 2; + + n2s(p, i); + + if (i > n - param_len) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_E_LENGTH); + goto f_err; + } + param_len += i; + + if (!(rsa->e = BN_bin2bn(p, i, rsa->e))) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB); + goto err; + } + p += i; + n -= param_len; + + /* this should be because we are using an export cipher */ + if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA) + pkey = + X509_get_pubkey(s->session-> + sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509); + else { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + + if (EVP_PKEY_bits(pkey) <= SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) { + al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); + goto f_err; + } + + s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp = rsa; + rsa = NULL; + } +#else /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */ + if (0) ; +#endif +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH + else if (alg_k & SSL_kEDH) { + if ((dh = DH_new()) == NULL) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB); + goto err; + } + + param_len = 2; + if (param_len > n) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); + goto f_err; + } + n2s(p, i); + + if (i > n - param_len) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_DH_P_LENGTH); + goto f_err; + } + param_len += i; + + if (!(dh->p = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL))) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB); + goto err; + } + p += i; + + if (2 > n - param_len) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); + goto f_err; + } + param_len += 2; + + n2s(p, i); + + if (i > n - param_len) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_DH_G_LENGTH); + goto f_err; + } + param_len += i; + + if (!(dh->g = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL))) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB); + goto err; + } + p += i; + + if (2 > n - param_len) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); + goto f_err; + } + param_len += 2; + + n2s(p, i); + + if (i > n - param_len) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_DH_PUB_KEY_LENGTH); + goto f_err; + } + param_len += i; + + if (!(dh->pub_key = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL))) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB); + goto err; + } + p += i; + n -= param_len; + + if (BN_is_zero(dh->pub_key)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_DH_PUB_KEY_VALUE); + goto f_err; + } + + /*- + * Check that p and g are suitable enough + * + * p is odd + * 1 < g < p - 1 + */ + { + BIGNUM *tmp = NULL; + + if (!BN_is_odd(dh->p)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_DH_P_VALUE); + goto f_err; + } + if (BN_is_negative(dh->g) || BN_is_zero(dh->g) + || BN_is_one(dh->g)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_DH_G_VALUE); + goto f_err; + } + if ((tmp = BN_new()) == NULL + || BN_copy(tmp, dh->p) == NULL + || !BN_sub_word(tmp, 1)) { + BN_free(tmp); + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB); + goto err; + } + if (BN_cmp(dh->g, tmp) >= 0) { + BN_free(tmp); + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_DH_G_VALUE); + goto f_err; + } + BN_free(tmp); + } + +# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA + if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA) + pkey = + X509_get_pubkey(s->session-> + sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509); +# else + if (0) ; +# endif +# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA + else if (alg_a & SSL_aDSS) + pkey = + X509_get_pubkey(s->session-> + sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN]. + x509); +# endif + /* else anonymous DH, so no certificate or pkey. */ + + s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp = dh; + dh = NULL; + } else if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHr) || (alg_k & SSL_kDHd)) { + al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, + SSL_R_TRIED_TO_USE_UNSUPPORTED_CIPHER); + goto f_err; + } +#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_DH */ + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH + else if (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH) { + EC_GROUP *ngroup; + const EC_GROUP *group; + + if ((ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + + /* + * Extract elliptic curve parameters and the server's ephemeral ECDH + * public key. Keep accumulating lengths of various components in + * param_len and make sure it never exceeds n. + */ + + /* + * XXX: For now we only support named (not generic) curves and the + * ECParameters in this case is just three bytes. We also need one + * byte for the length of the encoded point + */ + param_len = 4; + if (param_len > n) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); + goto f_err; + } + /* + * Check curve is one of our preferences, if not server has sent an + * invalid curve. ECParameters is 3 bytes. + */ + if (!tls1_check_curve(s, p, 3)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE); + goto f_err; + } + + if ((curve_nid = tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(*(p + 2))) == 0) { + al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, + SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS); + goto f_err; + } + + ngroup = EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(curve_nid); + if (ngroup == NULL) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB); + goto err; + } + if (EC_KEY_set_group(ecdh, ngroup) == 0) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB); + goto err; + } + EC_GROUP_free(ngroup); + + group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh); + + if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) && + (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163)) { + al = SSL_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, + SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER); + goto f_err; + } + + p += 3; + + /* Next, get the encoded ECPoint */ + if (((srvr_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) || + ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + + encoded_pt_len = *p; /* length of encoded point */ + p += 1; + + if ((encoded_pt_len > n - param_len) || + (EC_POINT_oct2point(group, srvr_ecpoint, + p, encoded_pt_len, bn_ctx) == 0)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT); + goto f_err; + } + param_len += encoded_pt_len; + + n -= param_len; + p += encoded_pt_len; + + /* + * The ECC/TLS specification does not mention the use of DSA to sign + * ECParameters in the server key exchange message. We do support RSA + * and ECDSA. + */ + if (0) ; +# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA + else if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA) + pkey = + X509_get_pubkey(s->session-> + sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509); +# endif +# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA + else if (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA) + pkey = + X509_get_pubkey(s->session-> + sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].x509); +# endif + /* else anonymous ECDH, so no certificate or pkey. */ + EC_KEY_set_public_key(ecdh, srvr_ecpoint); + s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp = ecdh; + ecdh = NULL; + BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); + bn_ctx = NULL; + EC_POINT_free(srvr_ecpoint); + srvr_ecpoint = NULL; + } else if (alg_k) { + al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); + goto f_err; + } +#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */ + + /* p points to the next byte, there are 'n' bytes left */ + + /* if it was signed, check the signature */ + if (pkey != NULL) { + if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { + int rv; + if (2 > n) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); + goto f_err; + } + rv = tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md, s, p, pkey); + if (rv == -1) + goto err; + else if (rv == 0) { + goto f_err; + } +#ifdef SSL_DEBUG + fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md)); +#endif + p += 2; + n -= 2; + } else + md = EVP_sha1(); + + if (2 > n) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); + goto f_err; + } + n2s(p, i); + n -= 2; + j = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey); + + /* + * Check signature length. If n is 0 then signature is empty + */ + if ((i != n) || (n > j) || (n <= 0)) { + /* wrong packet length */ + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH); + goto f_err; + } +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA + if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA && !SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { + int num; + unsigned int size; + + j = 0; + q = md_buf; + for (num = 2; num > 0; num--) { + EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW); + if (EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx, + (num == 2) ? s->ctx->md5 : s->ctx->sha1, + NULL) <= 0 + || EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]), + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0 + || EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]), + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0 + || EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, param, param_len) <= 0 + || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx, q, &size) <= 0) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + goto f_err; + } + q += size; + j += size; + } + i = RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j, p, n, pkey->pkey.rsa); + if (i < 0) { + al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT); + goto f_err; + } + if (i == 0) { + /* bad signature */ + al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE); + goto f_err; + } + } else +#endif + { + if (EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL) <= 0 + || EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]), + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0 + || EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]), + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0 + || EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx, param, param_len) <= 0) { + al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); + goto f_err; + } + if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&md_ctx, p, (int)n, pkey) <= 0) { + /* bad signature */ + al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE); + goto f_err; + } + } + } else { + /* aNULL, aSRP or kPSK do not need public keys */ + if (!(alg_a & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP)) && !(alg_k & SSL_kPSK)) { + /* Might be wrong key type, check it */ + if (ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) + /* Otherwise this shouldn't happen */ + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + /* still data left over */ + if (n != 0) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE); + goto f_err; + } + } + EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); + EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx); + return (1); + f_err: + ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); + err: + EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA + if (rsa != NULL) + RSA_free(rsa); +#endif +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH + if (dh != NULL) + DH_free(dh); +#endif +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH + BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); + EC_POINT_free(srvr_ecpoint); + if (ecdh != NULL) + EC_KEY_free(ecdh); +#endif + EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx); + s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; + return (-1); +} + +int ssl3_get_certificate_request(SSL *s) +{ + int ok, ret = 0; + unsigned long n, nc, l; + unsigned int llen, ctype_num, i; + X509_NAME *xn = NULL; + const unsigned char *p, *q; + unsigned char *d; + STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk = NULL; + + n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s, + SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A, + SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_B, + -1, s->max_cert_list, &ok); + + if (!ok) + return ((int)n); + + s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 0; + + if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) { + s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1; + /* + * If we get here we don't need any cached handshake records as we + * wont be doing client auth. + */ + if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) { + if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) + goto err; + } + return (1); + } + + if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) { + ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE); + goto err; + } + + /* TLS does not like anon-DH with client cert */ + if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION) { + if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) { + ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, + SSL_R_TLS_CLIENT_CERT_REQ_WITH_ANON_CIPHER); + goto err; + } + } + + p = d = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg; + + if ((ca_sk = sk_X509_NAME_new(ca_dn_cmp)) == NULL) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + + /* get the certificate types */ + ctype_num = *(p++); + if (s->cert->ctypes) { + OPENSSL_free(s->cert->ctypes); + s->cert->ctypes = NULL; + } + if (ctype_num > SSL3_CT_NUMBER) { + /* If we exceed static buffer copy all to cert structure */ + s->cert->ctypes = OPENSSL_malloc(ctype_num); + if (s->cert->ctypes == NULL) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + memcpy(s->cert->ctypes, p, ctype_num); + s->cert->ctype_num = (size_t)ctype_num; + ctype_num = SSL3_CT_NUMBER; + } + for (i = 0; i < ctype_num; i++) + s->s3->tmp.ctype[i] = p[i]; + p += p[-1]; + if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { + n2s(p, llen); + /* + * Check we have enough room for signature algorithms and following + * length value. + */ + if ((unsigned long)(p - d + llen + 2) > n) { + ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, + SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); + goto err; + } + /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */ + for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) { + s->cert->pkeys[i].digest = NULL; + s->cert->pkeys[i].valid_flags = 0; + } + if ((llen & 1) || !tls1_save_sigalgs(s, p, llen)) { + ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, + SSL_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_ERROR); + goto err; + } + if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) { + ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + p += llen; + } + + /* get the CA RDNs */ + n2s(p, llen); +#if 0 + { + FILE *out; + out = fopen("/tmp/vsign.der", "w"); + fwrite(p, 1, llen, out); + fclose(out); + } +#endif + + if ((unsigned long)(p - d + llen) != n) { + ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + goto err; + } + + for (nc = 0; nc < llen;) { + if (nc + 2 > llen) { + ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, SSL_R_CA_DN_TOO_LONG); + goto err; + } + n2s(p, l); + if ((l + nc + 2) > llen) { + if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG)) + goto cont; /* netscape bugs */ + ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, SSL_R_CA_DN_TOO_LONG); + goto err; + } + + q = p; + + if ((xn = d2i_X509_NAME(NULL, &q, l)) == NULL) { + /* If netscape tolerance is on, ignore errors */ + if (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG) + goto cont; + else { + ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB); + goto err; + } + } + + if (q != (p + l)) { + ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, + SSL_R_CA_DN_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + goto err; + } + if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(ca_sk, xn)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + xn = NULL; + + p += l; + nc += l + 2; + } + + if (0) { + cont: + ERR_clear_error(); + } + + /* we should setup a certificate to return.... */ + s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 1; + s->s3->tmp.ctype_num = ctype_num; + if (s->s3->tmp.ca_names != NULL) + sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s->s3->tmp.ca_names, X509_NAME_free); + s->s3->tmp.ca_names = ca_sk; + ca_sk = NULL; + + ret = 1; + goto done; + err: + s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; + done: + X509_NAME_free(xn); + if (ca_sk != NULL) + sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ca_sk, X509_NAME_free); + return (ret); +} + +static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b) +{ + return (X509_NAME_cmp(*a, *b)); +} + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT +int ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(SSL *s) +{ + int ok, al, ret = 0, ticklen; + long n; + const unsigned char *p; + unsigned char *d; + unsigned long ticket_lifetime_hint; + + n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s, + SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A, + SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_B, + SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET, 16384, &ok); + + if (!ok) + return ((int)n); + + if (n < 6) { + /* need at least ticket_lifetime_hint + ticket length */ + al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + goto f_err; + } + + p = d = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg; + + n2l(p, ticket_lifetime_hint); + n2s(p, ticklen); + /* ticket_lifetime_hint + ticket_length + ticket */ + if (ticklen + 6 != n) { + al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + goto f_err; + } + + /* Server is allowed to change its mind and send an empty ticket. */ + if (ticklen == 0) + return 1; + + if (s->session->session_id_length > 0) { + int i = s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode; + SSL_SESSION *new_sess; + /* + * We reused an existing session, so we need to replace it with a new + * one + */ + if (i & SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT) { + /* + * Remove the old session from the cache + */ + if (i & SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_STORE) { + if (s->session_ctx->remove_session_cb != NULL) + s->session_ctx->remove_session_cb(s->session_ctx, + s->session); + } else { + /* We carry on if this fails */ + SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session); + } + } + + if ((new_sess = ssl_session_dup(s->session, 0)) == 0) { + al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto f_err; + } + + SSL_SESSION_free(s->session); + s->session = new_sess; + } + + if (s->session->tlsext_tick) { + OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_tick); + s->session->tlsext_ticklen = 0; + } + s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen); + if (!s->session->tlsext_tick) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick, p, ticklen); + s->session->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint = ticket_lifetime_hint; + s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen; + /* + * There are two ways to detect a resumed ticket session. One is to set + * an appropriate session ID and then the server must return a match in + * ServerHello. This allows the normal client session ID matching to work + * and we know much earlier that the ticket has been accepted. The + * other way is to set zero length session ID when the ticket is + * presented and rely on the handshake to determine session resumption. + * We choose the former approach because this fits in with assumptions + * elsewhere in OpenSSL. The session ID is set to the SHA256 (or SHA1 is + * SHA256 is disabled) hash of the ticket. + */ + EVP_Digest(p, ticklen, + s->session->session_id, &s->session->session_id_length, +# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256 + EVP_sha256(), NULL); +# else + EVP_sha1(), NULL); +# endif + ret = 1; + return (ret); + f_err: + ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); + err: + s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; + return (-1); +} + +int ssl3_get_cert_status(SSL *s) +{ + int ok, al; + unsigned long resplen, n; + const unsigned char *p; + + n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s, + SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A, + SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_B, + -1, 16384, &ok); + + if (!ok) + return ((int)n); + + if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS) { + /* + * The CertificateStatus message is optional even if + * tlsext_status_expected is set + */ + s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1; + } else { + if (n < 4) { + /* need at least status type + length */ + al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + goto f_err; + } + p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg; + if (*p++ != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) { + al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_STATUS_TYPE); + goto f_err; + } + n2l3(p, resplen); + if (resplen + 4 != n) { + al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + goto f_err; + } + s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = BUF_memdup(p, resplen); + if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp == NULL) { + al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto f_err; + } + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = resplen; + } + if (s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) { + int ret; + ret = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg); + if (ret == 0) { + al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS, SSL_R_INVALID_STATUS_RESPONSE); + goto f_err; + } + if (ret < 0) { + al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto f_err; + } + } + return 1; + f_err: + ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); + s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; + return (-1); +} +#endif + +int ssl3_get_server_done(SSL *s) +{ + int ok, ret = 0; + long n; + + /* Second to last param should be very small, like 0 :-) */ + n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s, + SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A, + SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_B, + SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE, 30, &ok); + + if (!ok) + return ((int)n); + if (n > 0) { + /* should contain no data */ + ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_DONE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; + return -1; + } + ret = 1; + return (ret); +} + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH +static DH *get_server_static_dh_key(SESS_CERT *scert) +{ + DH *dh_srvr = NULL; + EVP_PKEY *spkey = NULL; + int idx = scert->peer_cert_type; + + if (idx >= 0) + spkey = X509_get_pubkey(scert->peer_pkeys[idx].x509); + if (spkey) { + dh_srvr = EVP_PKEY_get1_DH(spkey); + EVP_PKEY_free(spkey); + } + if (dh_srvr == NULL) + SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_SERVER_STATIC_DH_KEY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return dh_srvr; +} +#endif + +int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s) +{ + unsigned char *p; + int n; + unsigned long alg_k; +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA + unsigned char *q; + EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; +#endif +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 + KSSL_ERR kssl_err; +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */ +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH + EC_KEY *clnt_ecdh = NULL; + const EC_POINT *srvr_ecpoint = NULL; + EVP_PKEY *srvr_pub_pkey = NULL; + unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL; + int encoded_pt_len = 0; + BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL; +#endif + + if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A) { + p = ssl_handshake_start(s); + + alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; + + /* Fool emacs indentation */ + if (0) { + } +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA + else if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) { + RSA *rsa; + unsigned char tmp_buf[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH]; + + if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) { + /* + * We should always have a server certificate with SSL_kRSA. + */ + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + + if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp != NULL) + rsa = s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp; + else { + pkey = + X509_get_pubkey(s->session-> + sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC]. + x509); + if ((pkey == NULL) || (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) + || (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); + goto err; + } + rsa = pkey->pkey.rsa; + EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); + } + + tmp_buf[0] = s->client_version >> 8; + tmp_buf[1] = s->client_version & 0xff; + if (RAND_bytes(&(tmp_buf[2]), sizeof tmp_buf - 2) <= 0) + goto err; + + s->session->master_key_length = sizeof tmp_buf; + + q = p; + /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */ + if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION) + p += 2; + n = RSA_public_encrypt(sizeof tmp_buf, + tmp_buf, p, rsa, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING); +# ifdef PKCS1_CHECK + if (s->options & SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_1) + p[1]++; + if (s->options & SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_2) + tmp_buf[0] = 0x70; +# endif + if (n <= 0) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, + SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT); + goto err; + } + + /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */ + if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION) { + s2n(n, q); + n += 2; + } + + s->session->master_key_length = + s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, + s-> + session->master_key, + tmp_buf, + sizeof tmp_buf); + OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_buf, sizeof tmp_buf); + } +#endif +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 + else if (alg_k & SSL_kKRB5) { + krb5_error_code krb5rc; + KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx; + /* krb5_data krb5_ap_req; */ + krb5_data *enc_ticket; + krb5_data authenticator, *authp = NULL; + EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx; + const EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL; + unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH]; + unsigned char tmp_buf[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH]; + unsigned char epms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH]; + int padl, outl = sizeof(epms); + + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx); + +# ifdef KSSL_DEBUG + fprintf(stderr, "ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(%lx & %lx)\n", + alg_k, SSL_kKRB5); +# endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ + + authp = NULL; +# ifdef KRB5SENDAUTH + if (KRB5SENDAUTH) + authp = &authenticator; +# endif /* KRB5SENDAUTH */ + + krb5rc = kssl_cget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, authp, &kssl_err); + enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype); + if (enc == NULL) + goto err; +# ifdef KSSL_DEBUG + { + fprintf(stderr, "kssl_cget_tkt rtn %d\n", krb5rc); + if (krb5rc && kssl_err.text) + fprintf(stderr, "kssl_cget_tkt kssl_err=%s\n", + kssl_err.text); + } +# endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ + + if (krb5rc) { + ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, kssl_err.reason); + goto err; + } + + /*- + * 20010406 VRS - Earlier versions used KRB5 AP_REQ + * in place of RFC 2712 KerberosWrapper, as in: + * + * Send ticket (copy to *p, set n = length) + * n = krb5_ap_req.length; + * memcpy(p, krb5_ap_req.data, krb5_ap_req.length); + * if (krb5_ap_req.data) + * kssl_krb5_free_data_contents(NULL,&krb5_ap_req); + * + * Now using real RFC 2712 KerberosWrapper + * (Thanks to Simon Wilkinson <sxw@sxw.org.uk>) + * Note: 2712 "opaque" types are here replaced + * with a 2-byte length followed by the value. + * Example: + * KerberosWrapper= xx xx asn1ticket 0 0 xx xx encpms + * Where "xx xx" = length bytes. Shown here with + * optional authenticator omitted. + */ + + /* KerberosWrapper.Ticket */ + s2n(enc_ticket->length, p); + memcpy(p, enc_ticket->data, enc_ticket->length); + p += enc_ticket->length; + n = enc_ticket->length + 2; + + /* KerberosWrapper.Authenticator */ + if (authp && authp->length) { + s2n(authp->length, p); + memcpy(p, authp->data, authp->length); + p += authp->length; + n += authp->length + 2; + + free(authp->data); + authp->data = NULL; + authp->length = 0; + } else { + s2n(0, p); /* null authenticator length */ + n += 2; + } + + tmp_buf[0] = s->client_version >> 8; + tmp_buf[1] = s->client_version & 0xff; + if (RAND_bytes(&(tmp_buf[2]), sizeof tmp_buf - 2) <= 0) + goto err; + + /*- + * 20010420 VRS. Tried it this way; failed. + * EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc, NULL,NULL); + * EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length(&ciph_ctx, + * kssl_ctx->length); + * EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,NULL, key,iv); + */ + + memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */ + EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx, enc, NULL, kssl_ctx->key, iv); + EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx, epms, &outl, tmp_buf, + sizeof tmp_buf); + EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx, &(epms[outl]), &padl); + outl += padl; + if (outl > (int)sizeof epms) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx); + + /* KerberosWrapper.EncryptedPreMasterSecret */ + s2n(outl, p); + memcpy(p, epms, outl); + p += outl; + n += outl + 2; + + s->session->master_key_length = + s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, + s-> + session->master_key, + tmp_buf, + sizeof tmp_buf); + + OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_buf, sizeof tmp_buf); + OPENSSL_cleanse(epms, outl); + } +#endif +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH + else if (alg_k & (SSL_kEDH | SSL_kDHr | SSL_kDHd)) { + DH *dh_srvr, *dh_clnt; + SESS_CERT *scert = s->session->sess_cert; + + if (scert == NULL) { + ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, + SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); + goto err; + } + + if (scert->peer_dh_tmp != NULL) { + dh_srvr = scert->peer_dh_tmp; + } else { + dh_srvr = get_server_static_dh_key(scert); + if (dh_srvr == NULL) + goto err; + } + + if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY) { + /* Use client certificate key */ + EVP_PKEY *clkey = s->cert->key->privatekey; + dh_clnt = NULL; + if (clkey) + dh_clnt = EVP_PKEY_get1_DH(clkey); + if (dh_clnt == NULL) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + } else { + /* generate a new random key */ + if ((dh_clnt = DHparams_dup(dh_srvr)) == NULL) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB); + goto err; + } + if (!DH_generate_key(dh_clnt)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB); + DH_free(dh_clnt); + goto err; + } + } + + /* + * use the 'p' output buffer for the DH key, but make sure to + * clear it out afterwards + */ + + n = DH_compute_key(p, dh_srvr->pub_key, dh_clnt); + if (scert->peer_dh_tmp == NULL) + DH_free(dh_srvr); + + if (n <= 0) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB); + DH_free(dh_clnt); + goto err; + } + + /* generate master key from the result */ + s->session->master_key_length = + s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, + s-> + session->master_key, + p, n); + /* clean up */ + memset(p, 0, n); + + if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY) + n = 0; + else { + /* send off the data */ + n = BN_num_bytes(dh_clnt->pub_key); + s2n(n, p); + BN_bn2bin(dh_clnt->pub_key, p); + n += 2; + } + + DH_free(dh_clnt); + } +#endif + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH + else if (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) { + const EC_GROUP *srvr_group = NULL; + EC_KEY *tkey; + int ecdh_clnt_cert = 0; + int field_size = 0; + + if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) { + ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, + SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); + goto err; + } + + /* + * Did we send out the client's ECDH share for use in premaster + * computation as part of client certificate? If so, set + * ecdh_clnt_cert to 1. + */ + if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) && (s->cert != NULL)) { + /*- + * XXX: For now, we do not support client + * authentication using ECDH certificates. + * To add such support, one needs to add + * code that checks for appropriate + * conditions and sets ecdh_clnt_cert to 1. + * For example, the cert have an ECC + * key on the same curve as the server's + * and the key should be authorized for + * key agreement. + * + * One also needs to add code in ssl3_connect + * to skip sending the certificate verify + * message. + * + * if ((s->cert->key->privatekey != NULL) && + * (s->cert->key->privatekey->type == + * EVP_PKEY_EC) && ...) + * ecdh_clnt_cert = 1; + */ + } + + if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp != NULL) { + tkey = s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp; + } else { + /* Get the Server Public Key from Cert */ + srvr_pub_pkey = + X509_get_pubkey(s->session-> + sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].x509); + if ((srvr_pub_pkey == NULL) + || (srvr_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC) + || (srvr_pub_pkey->pkey.ec == NULL)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + + tkey = srvr_pub_pkey->pkey.ec; + } + + srvr_group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey); + srvr_ecpoint = EC_KEY_get0_public_key(tkey); + + if ((srvr_group == NULL) || (srvr_ecpoint == NULL)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + + if ((clnt_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, + ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + + if (!EC_KEY_set_group(clnt_ecdh, srvr_group)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB); + goto err; + } + if (ecdh_clnt_cert) { + /* + * Reuse key info from our certificate We only need our + * private key to perform the ECDH computation. + */ + const BIGNUM *priv_key; + tkey = s->cert->key->privatekey->pkey.ec; + priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey); + if (priv_key == NULL) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, + ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + if (!EC_KEY_set_private_key(clnt_ecdh, priv_key)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB); + goto err; + } + } else { + /* Generate a new ECDH key pair */ + if (!(EC_KEY_generate_key(clnt_ecdh))) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, + ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); + goto err; + } + } + + /* + * use the 'p' output buffer for the ECDH key, but make sure to + * clear it out afterwards + */ + + field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(srvr_group); + if (field_size <= 0) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); + goto err; + } + n = ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size + 7) / 8, srvr_ecpoint, + clnt_ecdh, NULL); + if (n <= 0) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); + goto err; + } + + /* generate master key from the result */ + s->session->master_key_length = + s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, + s-> + session->master_key, + p, n); + + memset(p, 0, n); /* clean up */ + + if (ecdh_clnt_cert) { + /* Send empty client key exch message */ + n = 0; + } else { + /* + * First check the size of encoding and allocate memory + * accordingly. + */ + encoded_pt_len = + EC_POINT_point2oct(srvr_group, + EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_ecdh), + POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, + NULL, 0, NULL); + + encodedPoint = (unsigned char *) + OPENSSL_malloc(encoded_pt_len * sizeof(unsigned char)); + bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new(); + if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, + ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + + /* Encode the public key */ + n = EC_POINT_point2oct(srvr_group, + EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_ecdh), + POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, + encodedPoint, encoded_pt_len, bn_ctx); + + *p = n; /* length of encoded point */ + /* Encoded point will be copied here */ + p += 1; + /* copy the point */ + memcpy((unsigned char *)p, encodedPoint, n); + /* increment n to account for length field */ + n += 1; + } + + /* Free allocated memory */ + BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); + if (encodedPoint != NULL) + OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint); + if (clnt_ecdh != NULL) + EC_KEY_free(clnt_ecdh); + EVP_PKEY_free(srvr_pub_pkey); + } +#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */ + else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) { + /* GOST key exchange message creation */ + EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx; + X509 *peer_cert; + size_t msglen; + unsigned int md_len; + int keytype; + unsigned char premaster_secret[32], shared_ukm[32], tmp[256]; + EVP_MD_CTX *ukm_hash; + EVP_PKEY *pub_key; + + /* + * Get server sertificate PKEY and create ctx from it + */ + peer_cert = + s->session-> + sess_cert->peer_pkeys[(keytype = SSL_PKEY_GOST01)].x509; + if (!peer_cert) + peer_cert = + s->session-> + sess_cert->peer_pkeys[(keytype = SSL_PKEY_GOST94)].x509; + if (!peer_cert) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, + SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER); + goto err; + } + + pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pub_key = + X509_get_pubkey(peer_cert), NULL); + if (pkey_ctx == NULL) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, + ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + /* + * If we have send a certificate, and certificate key + * + * * parameters match those of server certificate, use + * certificate key for key exchange + */ + + /* Otherwise, generate ephemeral key pair */ + + if (pkey_ctx == NULL + || EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0 + /* Generate session key */ + || RAND_bytes(premaster_secret, 32) <= 0) { + EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx); + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + /* + * Compute shared IV and store it in algorithm-specific context + * data + */ + ukm_hash = EVP_MD_CTX_create(); + if (EVP_DigestInit(ukm_hash, + EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_94)) <= 0 + || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->client_random, + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0 + || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->server_random, + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0 + || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ukm_hash, shared_ukm, &md_len) <= 0) { + EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(ukm_hash); + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(ukm_hash); + if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl + (pkey_ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV, 8, + shared_ukm) < 0) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, + SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG); + goto err; + } + /* Make GOST keytransport blob message */ + /* + * Encapsulate it into sequence + */ + *(p++) = V_ASN1_SEQUENCE | V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED; + msglen = 255; + if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx, tmp, &msglen, premaster_secret, 32) + <= 0) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, + SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG); + goto err; + } + if (msglen >= 0x80) { + *(p++) = 0x81; + *(p++) = msglen & 0xff; + n = msglen + 3; + } else { + *(p++) = msglen & 0xff; + n = msglen + 2; + } + memcpy(p, tmp, msglen); + EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx); + s->session->master_key_length = + s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, + s-> + session->master_key, + premaster_secret, + 32); + EVP_PKEY_free(pub_key); + + } +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP + else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) { + if (s->srp_ctx.A != NULL) { + /* send off the data */ + n = BN_num_bytes(s->srp_ctx.A); + s2n(n, p); + BN_bn2bin(s->srp_ctx.A, p); + n += 2; + } else { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + if (s->session->srp_username != NULL) + OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username); + s->session->srp_username = BUF_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login); + if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, + ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + + if ((s->session->master_key_length = + SRP_generate_client_master_secret(s, + s->session->master_key)) < + 0) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + } +#endif +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK + else if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) { + /* + * The callback needs PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 bytes to return a + * \0-terminated identity. The last byte is for us for simulating + * strnlen. + */ + char identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 2]; + size_t identity_len; + unsigned char *t = NULL; + unsigned char psk_or_pre_ms[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN * 2 + 4]; + unsigned int pre_ms_len = 0, psk_len = 0; + int psk_err = 1; + + n = 0; + if (s->psk_client_callback == NULL) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, + SSL_R_PSK_NO_CLIENT_CB); + goto err; + } + + memset(identity, 0, sizeof(identity)); + psk_len = s->psk_client_callback(s, s->session->psk_identity_hint, + identity, sizeof(identity) - 1, + psk_or_pre_ms, + sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms)); + if (psk_len > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto psk_err; + } else if (psk_len == 0) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, + SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND); + goto psk_err; + } + identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1] = '\0'; + identity_len = strlen(identity); + if (identity_len > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto psk_err; + } + /* create PSK pre_master_secret */ + pre_ms_len = 2 + psk_len + 2 + psk_len; + t = psk_or_pre_ms; + memmove(psk_or_pre_ms + psk_len + 4, psk_or_pre_ms, psk_len); + s2n(psk_len, t); + memset(t, 0, psk_len); + t += psk_len; + s2n(psk_len, t); + + if (s->session->psk_identity_hint != NULL) + OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint); + s->session->psk_identity_hint = + BUF_strdup(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint); + if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL + && s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, + ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto psk_err; + } + + if (s->session->psk_identity != NULL) + OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity); + s->session->psk_identity = BUF_strdup(identity); + if (s->session->psk_identity == NULL) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, + ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto psk_err; + } + + s->session->master_key_length = + s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, + s-> + session->master_key, + psk_or_pre_ms, + pre_ms_len); + s2n(identity_len, p); + memcpy(p, identity, identity_len); + n = 2 + identity_len; + psk_err = 0; + psk_err: + OPENSSL_cleanse(identity, sizeof(identity)); + OPENSSL_cleanse(psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms)); + if (psk_err != 0) { + ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + } +#endif + else { + ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + + ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, n); + s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B; + } + + /* SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B */ + return ssl_do_write(s); + err: +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH + BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); + if (encodedPoint != NULL) + OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint); + if (clnt_ecdh != NULL) + EC_KEY_free(clnt_ecdh); + EVP_PKEY_free(srvr_pub_pkey); +#endif + s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; + return (-1); +} + +int ssl3_send_client_verify(SSL *s) +{ + unsigned char *p; + unsigned char data[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH]; + EVP_PKEY *pkey; + EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL; + EVP_MD_CTX mctx; + unsigned u = 0; + unsigned long n; + int j; + + EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx); + + if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A) { + p = ssl_handshake_start(s); + pkey = s->cert->key->privatekey; +/* Create context from key and test if sha1 is allowed as digest */ + pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL); + if (pctx == NULL || EVP_PKEY_sign_init(pctx) <= 0) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_signature_md(pctx, EVP_sha1()) > 0) { + if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) + s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s, + NID_sha1, + &(data + [MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH])); + } else { + ERR_clear_error(); + } + /* + * For TLS v1.2 send signature algorithm and signature using agreed + * digest and cached handshake records. + */ + if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { + long hdatalen = 0; + void *hdata; + const EVP_MD *md = s->cert->key->digest; + hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata); + if (hdatalen <= 0 || !tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + p += 2; +#ifdef SSL_DEBUG + fprintf(stderr, "Using TLS 1.2 with client alg %s\n", + EVP_MD_name(md)); +#endif + if (!EVP_SignInit_ex(&mctx, md, NULL) + || !EVP_SignUpdate(&mctx, hdata, hdatalen) + || !EVP_SignFinal(&mctx, p + 2, &u, pkey)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); + goto err; + } + s2n(u, p); + n = u + 4; + if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) + goto err; + } else +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA + if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA) { + s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s, NID_md5, &(data[0])); + if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, data, + MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, + &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_RSA_LIB); + goto err; + } + s2n(u, p); + n = u + 2; + } else +#endif +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA + if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA) { + if (!DSA_sign(pkey->save_type, + &(data[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]), + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, &(p[2]), + (unsigned int *)&j, pkey->pkey.dsa)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_DSA_LIB); + goto err; + } + s2n(j, p); + n = j + 2; + } else +#endif +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA + if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) { + if (!ECDSA_sign(pkey->save_type, + &(data[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]), + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, &(p[2]), + (unsigned int *)&j, pkey->pkey.ec)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_ECDSA_LIB); + goto err; + } + s2n(j, p); + n = j + 2; + } else +#endif + if (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94 + || pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) { + unsigned char signbuf[64]; + int i; + size_t sigsize = 64; + s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s, + NID_id_GostR3411_94, data); + if (EVP_PKEY_sign(pctx, signbuf, &sigsize, data, 32) <= 0) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + for (i = 63, j = 0; i >= 0; j++, i--) { + p[2 + j] = signbuf[i]; + } + s2n(j, p); + n = j + 2; + } else { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY, n); + s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_B; + } + EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx); + EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx); + return ssl_do_write(s); + err: + EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx); + EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx); + s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; + return (-1); +} + +/* + * Check a certificate can be used for client authentication. Currently check + * cert exists, if we have a suitable digest for TLS 1.2 if static DH client + * certificates can be used and optionally checks suitability for Suite B. + */ +static int ssl3_check_client_certificate(SSL *s) +{ + unsigned long alg_k; + if (!s->cert || !s->cert->key->x509 || !s->cert->key->privatekey) + return 0; + /* If no suitable signature algorithm can't use certificate */ + if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) && !s->cert->key->digest) + return 0; + /* + * If strict mode check suitability of chain before using it. This also + * adjusts suite B digest if necessary. + */ + if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT && + !tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, -2)) + return 0; + alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; + /* See if we can use client certificate for fixed DH */ + if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHr | SSL_kDHd)) { + SESS_CERT *scert = s->session->sess_cert; + int i = scert->peer_cert_type; + EVP_PKEY *clkey = NULL, *spkey = NULL; + clkey = s->cert->key->privatekey; + /* If client key not DH assume it can be used */ + if (EVP_PKEY_id(clkey) != EVP_PKEY_DH) + return 1; + if (i >= 0) + spkey = X509_get_pubkey(scert->peer_pkeys[i].x509); + if (spkey) { + /* Compare server and client parameters */ + i = EVP_PKEY_cmp_parameters(clkey, spkey); + EVP_PKEY_free(spkey); + if (i != 1) + return 0; + } + s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY; + } + return 1; +} + +int ssl3_send_client_certificate(SSL *s) +{ + X509 *x509 = NULL; + EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; + int i; + + if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A) { + /* Let cert callback update client certificates if required */ + if (s->cert->cert_cb) { + i = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg); + if (i < 0) { + s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP; + return -1; + } + if (i == 0) { + ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); + s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; + return 0; + } + s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; + } + if (ssl3_check_client_certificate(s)) + s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C; + else + s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B; + } + + /* We need to get a client cert */ + if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B) { + /* + * If we get an error, we need to ssl->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP; + * return(-1); We then get retied later + */ + i = ssl_do_client_cert_cb(s, &x509, &pkey); + if (i < 0) { + s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP; + return (-1); + } + s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; + if ((i == 1) && (pkey != NULL) && (x509 != NULL)) { + s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B; + if (!SSL_use_certificate(s, x509) || !SSL_use_PrivateKey(s, pkey)) + i = 0; + } else if (i == 1) { + i = 0; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, + SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK); + } + + if (x509 != NULL) + X509_free(x509); + if (pkey != NULL) + EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); + if (i && !ssl3_check_client_certificate(s)) + i = 0; + if (i == 0) { + if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) { + s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 0; + ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE); + return (1); + } else { + s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 2; + } + } + + /* Ok, we have a cert */ + s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C; + } + + if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C) { + s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D; + if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, + (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == + 2) ? NULL : s->cert->key)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); + s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; + return 0; + } + } + /* SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D */ + return ssl_do_write(s); +} + +#define has_bits(i,m) (((i)&(m)) == (m)) + +int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s) +{ + int i, idx; + long alg_k, alg_a; + EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; + int pkey_bits; + SESS_CERT *sc; +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA + RSA *rsa; +#endif +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH + DH *dh; +#endif + int al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; + + alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; + alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth; + + /* we don't have a certificate */ + if ((alg_a & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aKRB5)) || (alg_k & SSL_kPSK)) + return (1); + + sc = s->session->sess_cert; + if (sc == NULL) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA + rsa = s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp; +#endif +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH + dh = s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp; +#endif + + /* This is the passed certificate */ + + idx = sc->peer_cert_type; +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH + if (idx == SSL_PKEY_ECC) { + if (ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(sc->peer_pkeys[idx].x509, s) == 0) { + /* check failed */ + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT); + goto f_err; + } else { + return 1; + } + } else if (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, + SSL_R_MISSING_ECDSA_SIGNING_CERT); + goto f_err; + } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, SSL_R_MISSING_ECDH_CERT); + goto f_err; + } +#endif + pkey = X509_get_pubkey(sc->peer_pkeys[idx].x509); + pkey_bits = EVP_PKEY_bits(pkey); + i = X509_certificate_type(sc->peer_pkeys[idx].x509, pkey); + EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); + + /* Check that we have a certificate if we require one */ + if ((alg_a & SSL_aRSA) && !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_RSA | EVP_PKT_SIGN)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, + SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_SIGNING_CERT); + goto f_err; + } +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA + else if ((alg_a & SSL_aDSS) && !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_DSA | EVP_PKT_SIGN)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, + SSL_R_MISSING_DSA_SIGNING_CERT); + goto f_err; + } +#endif +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA + if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) { + if (!SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) && + !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_RSA | EVP_PKT_ENC)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, + SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT); + goto f_err; + } else if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) { + if (pkey_bits <= SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) { + if (!has_bits(i, EVP_PK_RSA | EVP_PKT_ENC)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, + SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT); + goto f_err; + } + if (rsa != NULL) { + /* server key exchange is not allowed. */ + al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto f_err; + } + } + } + } +#endif +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH + if ((alg_k & SSL_kEDH) && dh == NULL) { + al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto f_err; + } + if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHr) && !SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) && + !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_DH | EVP_PKS_RSA)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, + SSL_R_MISSING_DH_RSA_CERT); + goto f_err; + } +# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA + if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHd) && !SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) && + !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_DH | EVP_PKS_DSA)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, + SSL_R_MISSING_DH_DSA_CERT); + goto f_err; + } +# endif + + if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHr | SSL_kDHd)) { + int dh_size; + if (alg_k & SSL_kDHE) { + dh_size = BN_num_bits(dh->p); + } else { + DH *dh_srvr = get_server_static_dh_key(sc); + if (dh_srvr == NULL) + goto f_err; + dh_size = BN_num_bits(dh_srvr->p); + DH_free(dh_srvr); + } + + if ((!SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) && dh_size < 1024) + || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) && dh_size < 512)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL); + goto f_err; + } + } +#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_DH */ + + if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) && + pkey_bits > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) { +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA + if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) { + if (rsa == NULL) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, + SSL_R_MISSING_EXPORT_TMP_RSA_KEY); + goto f_err; + } else if (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) > + SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) { + /* We have a temporary RSA key but it's too large. */ + al = SSL_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, + SSL_R_MISSING_EXPORT_TMP_RSA_KEY); + goto f_err; + } + } else +#endif +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH + if (alg_k & SSL_kDHE) { + if (BN_num_bits(dh->p) > + SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) { + /* We have a temporary DH key but it's too large. */ + al = SSL_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, + SSL_R_MISSING_EXPORT_TMP_DH_KEY); + goto f_err; + } + } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHr | SSL_kDHd)) { + /* The cert should have had an export DH key. */ + al = SSL_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, + SSL_R_MISSING_EXPORT_TMP_DH_KEY); + goto f_err; + } else +#endif + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, + SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE); + goto f_err; + } + } + return (1); + f_err: + ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); + err: + return (0); +} + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT +/* + * Normally, we can tell if the server is resuming the session from + * the session ID. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851), however, relies on the next server + * message after the ServerHello to determine if the server is resuming. + * Therefore, we allow EAP-FAST to peek ahead. + * ssl3_check_finished returns 1 if we are resuming from an external + * pre-shared secret, we have a "ticket" and the next server handshake message + * is Finished; and 0 otherwise. It returns -1 upon an error. + */ +static int ssl3_check_finished(SSL *s) +{ + int ok = 0; + + if (s->version < TLS1_VERSION || !s->tls_session_secret_cb || + !s->session->tlsext_tick) + return 0; + + /* Need to permit this temporarily, in case the next message is Finished. */ + s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK; + /* + * This function is called when we might get a Certificate message instead, + * so permit appropriate message length. + * We ignore the return value as we're only interested in the message type + * and not its length. + */ + s->method->ssl_get_message(s, + SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A, + SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_B, + -1, s->max_cert_list, &ok); + s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK; + + if (!ok) + return -1; + + s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1; + + if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) + return 1; + + /* If we're not done, then the CCS arrived early and we should bail. */ + if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_FINISHED, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); + ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); + return -1; + } + + return 0; +} + +# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG +int ssl3_send_next_proto(SSL *s) +{ + unsigned int len, padding_len; + unsigned char *d; + + if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_A) { + len = s->next_proto_negotiated_len; + padding_len = 32 - ((len + 2) % 32); + d = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; + d[4] = len; + memcpy(d + 5, s->next_proto_negotiated, len); + d[5 + len] = padding_len; + memset(d + 6 + len, 0, padding_len); + *(d++) = SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO; + l2n3(2 + len + padding_len, d); + s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_B; + s->init_num = 4 + 2 + len + padding_len; + s->init_off = 0; + } + + return ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE); +} +#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG */ +#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */ + +int ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL *s, X509 **px509, EVP_PKEY **ppkey) +{ + int i = 0; +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE + if (s->ctx->client_cert_engine) { + i = ENGINE_load_ssl_client_cert(s->ctx->client_cert_engine, s, + SSL_get_client_CA_list(s), + px509, ppkey, NULL, NULL, NULL); + if (i != 0) + return i; + } +#endif + if (s->ctx->client_cert_cb) + i = s->ctx->client_cert_cb(s, px509, ppkey); + return i; +} |