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authorWilliam Joye <wjoye@cfa.harvard.edu>2017-05-02 16:41:35 (GMT)
committerWilliam Joye <wjoye@cfa.harvard.edu>2017-05-02 16:41:35 (GMT)
commit3d328008deedc58cd7a11c79063cefa7d662d4fc (patch)
treecb41a048885ce7b493f406360cf5f6edf689c468 /openssl/ssl/s3_clnt.c
parent0a2b8b8e0bc2e91a9f10659b30e2e4f5b79ce692 (diff)
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inital commit
Diffstat (limited to 'openssl/ssl/s3_clnt.c')
-rw-r--r--openssl/ssl/s3_clnt.c3781
1 files changed, 3781 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/s3_clnt.c b/openssl/ssl/s3_clnt.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..32f2f1a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl/ssl/s3_clnt.c
@@ -0,0 +1,3781 @@
+/* ssl/s3_clnt.c */
+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This package is an SSL implementation written
+ * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
+ * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
+ *
+ * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
+ * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
+ * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
+ * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
+ * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
+ * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
+ * the code are not to be removed.
+ * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
+ * as the author of the parts of the library used.
+ * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
+ * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ * must display the following acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
+ * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ * distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ * software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ * openssl-core@openssl.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ * acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
+ *
+ * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
+ * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
+ *
+ * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
+ * license provided above.
+ *
+ * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
+ * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
+ *
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
+ * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
+ * license.
+ *
+ * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
+ * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
+ * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
+ *
+ * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
+ * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
+ * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
+ *
+ * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
+ * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
+ * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
+ * to make use of the Contribution.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
+ * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
+ * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
+ * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
+ * OTHERWISE.
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "ssl_locl.h"
+#include "kssl_lcl.h"
+#include <openssl/buffer.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/md5.h>
+#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
+# include <openssl/fips.h>
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+# include <openssl/dh.h>
+#endif
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+# include <openssl/engine.h>
+#endif
+
+static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+static int ssl3_check_finished(SSL *s);
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3_METHOD
+static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_client_method(int ver)
+{
+ if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
+ return (SSLv3_client_method());
+ else
+ return (NULL);
+}
+
+IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_client_method,
+ ssl_undefined_function,
+ ssl3_connect, ssl3_get_client_method)
+#endif
+int ssl3_connect(SSL *s)
+{
+ BUF_MEM *buf = NULL;
+ unsigned long Time = (unsigned long)time(NULL);
+ void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL;
+ int ret = -1;
+ int new_state, state, skip = 0;
+
+ RAND_add(&Time, sizeof(Time), 0);
+ ERR_clear_error();
+ clear_sys_error();
+
+ if (s->info_callback != NULL)
+ cb = s->info_callback;
+ else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
+ cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
+
+ s->in_handshake++;
+ if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s))
+ SSL_clear(s);
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
+ /*
+ * If we're awaiting a HeartbeatResponse, pretend we already got and
+ * don't await it anymore, because Heartbeats don't make sense during
+ * handshakes anyway.
+ */
+ if (s->tlsext_hb_pending) {
+ s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
+ s->tlsext_hb_seq++;
+ }
+#endif
+
+ for (;;) {
+ state = s->state;
+
+ switch (s->state) {
+ case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
+ s->renegotiate = 1;
+ s->state = SSL_ST_CONNECT;
+ s->ctx->stats.sess_connect_renegotiate++;
+ /* break */
+ case SSL_ST_BEFORE:
+ case SSL_ST_CONNECT:
+ case SSL_ST_BEFORE | SSL_ST_CONNECT:
+ case SSL_ST_OK | SSL_ST_CONNECT:
+
+ s->server = 0;
+ if (cb != NULL)
+ cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START, 1);
+
+ if ((s->version & 0xff00) != 0x0300) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CONNECT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
+ ret = -1;
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ /* s->version=SSL3_VERSION; */
+ s->type = SSL_ST_CONNECT;
+
+ if (s->init_buf == NULL) {
+ if ((buf = BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL) {
+ ret = -1;
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
+ goto end;
+ }
+ if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) {
+ ret = -1;
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
+ goto end;
+ }
+ s->init_buf = buf;
+ buf = NULL;
+ }
+
+ if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) {
+ ret = -1;
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ /* setup buffing BIO */
+ if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s, 0)) {
+ ret = -1;
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ /* don't push the buffering BIO quite yet */
+
+ ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
+
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A;
+ s->ctx->stats.sess_connect++;
+ s->init_num = 0;
+ s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
+ /*
+ * Should have been reset by ssl3_get_finished, too.
+ */
+ s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 0;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B:
+
+ s->shutdown = 0;
+ ret = ssl3_client_hello(s);
+ if (ret <= 0)
+ goto end;
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A;
+ s->init_num = 0;
+
+ /* turn on buffering for the next lot of output */
+ if (s->bbio != s->wbio)
+ s->wbio = BIO_push(s->bbio, s->wbio);
+
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_B:
+ ret = ssl3_get_server_hello(s);
+ if (ret <= 0)
+ goto end;
+
+ if (s->hit) {
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) {
+ /* receive renewed session ticket */
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A;
+ }
+#endif
+ } else {
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A;
+ }
+ s->init_num = 0;
+ break;
+ case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_B:
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ /* Noop (ret = 0) for everything but EAP-FAST. */
+ ret = ssl3_check_finished(s);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto end;
+ if (ret == 1) {
+ s->hit = 1;
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A;
+ s->init_num = 0;
+ break;
+ }
+#endif
+ /* Check if it is anon DH/ECDH, SRP auth */
+ /* or PSK */
+ if (!
+ (s->s3->tmp.
+ new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP))
+ && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
+ ret = ssl3_get_server_certificate(s);
+ if (ret <= 0)
+ goto end;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A;
+ else
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A;
+ } else {
+ skip = 1;
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A;
+ }
+#else
+ } else
+ skip = 1;
+
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A;
+#endif
+ s->init_num = 0;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_B:
+ ret = ssl3_get_key_exchange(s);
+ if (ret <= 0)
+ goto end;
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A;
+ s->init_num = 0;
+
+ /*
+ * at this point we check that we have the required stuff from
+ * the server
+ */
+ if (!ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) {
+ ret = -1;
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
+ goto end;
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_B:
+ ret = ssl3_get_certificate_request(s);
+ if (ret <= 0)
+ goto end;
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A;
+ s->init_num = 0;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_B:
+ ret = ssl3_get_server_done(s);
+ if (ret <= 0)
+ goto end;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+ if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) {
+ if ((ret = SRP_Calc_A_param(s)) <= 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CONNECT, SSL_R_SRP_A_CALC);
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
+ goto end;
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+ if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req)
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A;
+ else
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A;
+ s->init_num = 0;
+
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B:
+ case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C:
+ case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D:
+ ret = ssl3_send_client_certificate(s);
+ if (ret <= 0)
+ goto end;
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A;
+ s->init_num = 0;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B:
+ ret = ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(s);
+ if (ret <= 0)
+ goto end;
+ /*
+ * EAY EAY EAY need to check for DH fix cert sent back
+ */
+ /*
+ * For TLS, cert_req is set to 2, so a cert chain of nothing is
+ * sent, but no verify packet is sent
+ */
+ /*
+ * XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication in ECDH
+ * cipher suites with ECDH (rather than ECDSA) certificates. We
+ * need to skip the certificate verify message when client's
+ * ECDH public key is sent inside the client certificate.
+ */
+ if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 1) {
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A;
+ } else {
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A;
+ }
+ if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY) {
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A;
+ }
+
+ s->init_num = 0;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_B:
+ ret = ssl3_send_client_verify(s);
+ if (ret <= 0)
+ goto end;
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A;
+ s->init_num = 0;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B:
+ ret = ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s,
+ SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A,
+ SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B);
+ if (ret <= 0)
+ goto end;
+
+#if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A;
+#else
+ if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_A;
+ else
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A;
+#endif
+ s->init_num = 0;
+
+ s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+ s->session->compress_meth = 0;
+#else
+ if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
+ s->session->compress_meth = 0;
+ else
+ s->session->compress_meth = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
+#endif
+ if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) {
+ ret = -1;
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
+ SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))
+ {
+ ret = -1;
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ break;
+
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
+ case SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_B:
+ ret = ssl3_send_next_proto(s);
+ if (ret <= 0)
+ goto end;
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A;
+ break;
+#endif
+
+ case SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_B:
+ ret = ssl3_send_finished(s,
+ SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A,
+ SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_B,
+ s->method->
+ ssl3_enc->client_finished_label,
+ s->method->
+ ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len);
+ if (ret <= 0)
+ goto end;
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_FLUSH;
+
+ /* clear flags */
+ s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER;
+ if (s->hit) {
+ s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL_ST_OK;
+ if (s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_DELAY_CLIENT_FINISHED) {
+ s->state = SSL_ST_OK;
+ s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER;
+ s->s3->delay_buf_pop_ret = 0;
+ }
+ } else {
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ /*
+ * Allow NewSessionTicket if ticket expected
+ */
+ if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
+ s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A;
+ else
+#endif
+
+ s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A;
+ }
+ s->init_num = 0;
+ break;
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ case SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_B:
+ ret = ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(s);
+ if (ret <= 0)
+ goto end;
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A;
+ s->init_num = 0;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_B:
+ ret = ssl3_get_cert_status(s);
+ if (ret <= 0)
+ goto end;
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A;
+ s->init_num = 0;
+ break;
+#endif
+
+ case SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_B:
+ if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
+ s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
+ ret = ssl3_get_finished(s, SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A,
+ SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_B);
+ if (ret <= 0)
+ goto end;
+
+ if (s->hit)
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A;
+ else
+ s->state = SSL_ST_OK;
+ s->init_num = 0;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_CW_FLUSH:
+ s->rwstate = SSL_WRITING;
+ if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0) {
+ ret = -1;
+ goto end;
+ }
+ s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
+ s->state = s->s3->tmp.next_state;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL_ST_OK:
+ /* clean a few things up */
+ ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
+
+ if (s->init_buf != NULL) {
+ BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
+ s->init_buf = NULL;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If we are not 'joining' the last two packets, remove the
+ * buffering now
+ */
+ if (!(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER))
+ ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
+ /* else do it later in ssl3_write */
+
+ s->init_num = 0;
+ s->renegotiate = 0;
+ s->new_session = 0;
+
+ ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT);
+ if (s->hit)
+ s->ctx->stats.sess_hit++;
+
+ ret = 1;
+ /* s->server=0; */
+ s->handshake_func = ssl3_connect;
+ s->ctx->stats.sess_connect_good++;
+
+ if (cb != NULL)
+ cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1);
+
+ goto end;
+ /* break; */
+
+ case SSL_ST_ERR:
+ default:
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CONNECT, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
+ ret = -1;
+ goto end;
+ /* break; */
+ }
+
+ /* did we do anything */
+ if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip) {
+ if (s->debug) {
+ if ((ret = BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0)
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state)) {
+ new_state = s->state;
+ s->state = state;
+ cb(s, SSL_CB_CONNECT_LOOP, 1);
+ s->state = new_state;
+ }
+ }
+ skip = 0;
+ }
+ end:
+ s->in_handshake--;
+ if (buf != NULL)
+ BUF_MEM_free(buf);
+ if (cb != NULL)
+ cb(s, SSL_CB_CONNECT_EXIT, ret);
+ return (ret);
+}
+
+int ssl3_client_hello(SSL *s)
+{
+ unsigned char *buf;
+ unsigned char *p, *d;
+ int i;
+ unsigned long l;
+ int al = 0;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+ int j;
+ SSL_COMP *comp;
+#endif
+
+ buf = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
+ if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) {
+ SSL_SESSION *sess = s->session;
+ if ((sess == NULL) || (sess->ssl_version != s->version) ||
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ !sess->session_id_length ||
+#else
+ /*
+ * In the case of EAP-FAST, we can have a pre-shared
+ * "ticket" without a session ID.
+ */
+ (!sess->session_id_length && !sess->tlsext_tick) ||
+#endif
+ (sess->not_resumable)) {
+ if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0))
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) {
+ /* Determine which DTLS version to use */
+ int options = s->options;
+ /* If DTLS 1.2 disabled correct the version number */
+ if (options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1_2) {
+ if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO,
+ SSL_R_ONLY_DTLS_1_2_ALLOWED_IN_SUITEB_MODE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ /*
+ * Disabling all versions is silly: return an error.
+ */
+ if (options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ /*
+ * Update method so we don't use any DTLS 1.2 features.
+ */
+ s->method = DTLSv1_client_method();
+ s->version = DTLS1_VERSION;
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * We only support one version: update method
+ */
+ if (options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1)
+ s->method = DTLSv1_2_client_method();
+ s->version = DTLS1_2_VERSION;
+ }
+ s->client_version = s->version;
+ }
+ /* else use the pre-loaded session */
+
+ p = s->s3->client_random;
+
+ /*
+ * for DTLS if client_random is initialized, reuse it, we are
+ * required to use same upon reply to HelloVerify
+ */
+ if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
+ size_t idx;
+ i = 1;
+ for (idx = 0; idx < sizeof(s->s3->client_random); idx++) {
+ if (p[idx]) {
+ i = 0;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ } else
+ i = 1;
+
+ if (i && ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 0, p,
+ sizeof(s->s3->client_random)) <= 0)
+ goto err;
+
+ /* Do the message type and length last */
+ d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
+
+ /*-
+ * version indicates the negotiated version: for example from
+ * an SSLv2/v3 compatible client hello). The client_version
+ * field is the maximum version we permit and it is also
+ * used in RSA encrypted premaster secrets. Some servers can
+ * choke if we initially report a higher version then
+ * renegotiate to a lower one in the premaster secret. This
+ * didn't happen with TLS 1.0 as most servers supported it
+ * but it can with TLS 1.1 or later if the server only supports
+ * 1.0.
+ *
+ * Possible scenario with previous logic:
+ * 1. Client hello indicates TLS 1.2
+ * 2. Server hello says TLS 1.0
+ * 3. RSA encrypted premaster secret uses 1.2.
+ * 4. Handhaked proceeds using TLS 1.0.
+ * 5. Server sends hello request to renegotiate.
+ * 6. Client hello indicates TLS v1.0 as we now
+ * know that is maximum server supports.
+ * 7. Server chokes on RSA encrypted premaster secret
+ * containing version 1.0.
+ *
+ * For interoperability it should be OK to always use the
+ * maximum version we support in client hello and then rely
+ * on the checking of version to ensure the servers isn't
+ * being inconsistent: for example initially negotiating with
+ * TLS 1.0 and renegotiating with TLS 1.2. We do this by using
+ * client_version in client hello and not resetting it to
+ * the negotiated version.
+ */
+#if 0
+ *(p++) = s->version >> 8;
+ *(p++) = s->version & 0xff;
+ s->client_version = s->version;
+#else
+ *(p++) = s->client_version >> 8;
+ *(p++) = s->client_version & 0xff;
+#endif
+
+ /* Random stuff */
+ memcpy(p, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+ p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
+
+ /* Session ID */
+ if (s->new_session)
+ i = 0;
+ else
+ i = s->session->session_id_length;
+ *(p++) = i;
+ if (i != 0) {
+ if (i > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ memcpy(p, s->session->session_id, i);
+ p += i;
+ }
+
+ /* cookie stuff for DTLS */
+ if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
+ if (s->d1->cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ *(p++) = s->d1->cookie_len;
+ memcpy(p, s->d1->cookie, s->d1->cookie_len);
+ p += s->d1->cookie_len;
+ }
+
+ /* Ciphers supported */
+ i = ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s, SSL_get_ciphers(s), &(p[2]), 0);
+ if (i == 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+#ifdef OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH
+ /*
+ * Some servers hang if client hello > 256 bytes as hack workaround
+ * chop number of supported ciphers to keep it well below this if we
+ * use TLS v1.2
+ */
+ if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION
+ && i > OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH)
+ i = OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH & ~1;
+#endif
+ s2n(i, p);
+ p += i;
+
+ /* COMPRESSION */
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+ *(p++) = 1;
+#else
+
+ if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION)
+ || !s->ctx->comp_methods)
+ j = 0;
+ else
+ j = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
+ *(p++) = 1 + j;
+ for (i = 0; i < j; i++) {
+ comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, i);
+ *(p++) = comp->id;
+ }
+#endif
+ *(p++) = 0; /* Add the NULL method */
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ /* TLS extensions */
+ if (ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if ((p =
+ ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(s, p, buf + SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,
+ &al)) == NULL) {
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+#endif
+
+ l = p - d;
+ ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO, l);
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B;
+ }
+
+ /* SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B */
+ return ssl_do_write(s);
+ err:
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
+ return (-1);
+}
+
+int ssl3_get_server_hello(SSL *s)
+{
+ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
+ const SSL_CIPHER *c;
+ CERT *ct = s->cert;
+ unsigned char *p, *d;
+ int i, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ok;
+ unsigned int j;
+ long n;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+ SSL_COMP *comp;
+#endif
+ /*
+ * Hello verify request and/or server hello version may not match so set
+ * first packet if we're negotiating version.
+ */
+ if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
+ s->first_packet = 1;
+
+ n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
+ SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A,
+ SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_B, -1, 20000, &ok);
+
+ if (!ok)
+ return ((int)n);
+
+ if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
+ s->first_packet = 0;
+ if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) {
+ if (s->d1->send_cookie == 0) {
+ s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
+ return 1;
+ } else { /* already sent a cookie */
+
+ al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_BAD_MESSAGE_TYPE);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
+ al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_BAD_MESSAGE_TYPE);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ d = p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
+ if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) {
+ /* Work out correct protocol version to use */
+ int hversion = (p[0] << 8) | p[1];
+ int options = s->options;
+ if (hversion == DTLS1_2_VERSION && !(options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1_2))
+ s->method = DTLSv1_2_client_method();
+ else if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,
+ SSL_R_ONLY_DTLS_1_2_ALLOWED_IN_SUITEB_MODE);
+ s->version = hversion;
+ al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
+ goto f_err;
+ } else if (hversion == DTLS1_VERSION && !(options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1))
+ s->method = DTLSv1_client_method();
+ else {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION);
+ s->version = hversion;
+ al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ s->session->ssl_version = s->version = s->method->version;
+ }
+
+ if ((p[0] != (s->version >> 8)) || (p[1] != (s->version & 0xff))) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION);
+ s->version = (s->version & 0xff00) | p[1];
+ al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ p += 2;
+
+ /* load the server hello data */
+ /* load the server random */
+ memcpy(s->s3->server_random, p, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+ p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
+
+ s->hit = 0;
+
+ /* get the session-id */
+ j = *(p++);
+
+ if ((j > sizeof s->session->session_id) || (j > SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE)) {
+ al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ /*
+ * Check if we can resume the session based on external pre-shared secret.
+ * EAP-FAST (RFC 4851) supports two types of session resumption.
+ * Resumption based on server-side state works with session IDs.
+ * Resumption based on pre-shared Protected Access Credentials (PACs)
+ * works by overriding the SessionTicket extension at the application
+ * layer, and does not send a session ID. (We do not know whether EAP-FAST
+ * servers would honour the session ID.) Therefore, the session ID alone
+ * is not a reliable indicator of session resumption, so we first check if
+ * we can resume, and later peek at the next handshake message to see if the
+ * server wants to resume.
+ */
+ if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb &&
+ s->session->tlsext_tick) {
+ SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
+ s->session->master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
+ if (s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
+ &s->session->master_key_length,
+ NULL, &pref_cipher,
+ s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg)) {
+ s->session->cipher = pref_cipher ?
+ pref_cipher : ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, p + j);
+ } else {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ }
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
+
+ if (j != 0 && j == s->session->session_id_length
+ && memcmp(p, s->session->session_id, j) == 0) {
+ if (s->sid_ctx_length != s->session->sid_ctx_length
+ || memcmp(s->session->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx_length)) {
+ /* actually a client application bug */
+ al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,
+ SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ s->hit = 1;
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * If we were trying for session-id reuse but the server
+ * didn't echo the ID, make a new SSL_SESSION.
+ * In the case of EAP-FAST and PAC, we do not send a session ID,
+ * so the PAC-based session secret is always preserved. It'll be
+ * overwritten if the server refuses resumption.
+ */
+ if (s->session->session_id_length > 0) {
+ if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0)) {
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ }
+ s->session->session_id_length = j;
+ memcpy(s->session->session_id, p, j); /* j could be 0 */
+ }
+ p += j;
+ c = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, p);
+ if (c == NULL) {
+ /* unknown cipher */
+ al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ /* Set version disabled mask now we know version */
+ if (!SSL_USE_TLS1_2_CIPHERS(s))
+ ct->mask_ssl = SSL_TLSV1_2;
+ else
+ ct->mask_ssl = 0;
+ /*
+ * If it is a disabled cipher we didn't send it in client hello, so
+ * return an error.
+ */
+ if (c->algorithm_ssl & ct->mask_ssl ||
+ c->algorithm_mkey & ct->mask_k || c->algorithm_auth & ct->mask_a) {
+ al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ p += ssl_put_cipher_by_char(s, NULL, NULL);
+
+ sk = ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(s);
+ i = sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(sk, c);
+ if (i < 0) {
+ /* we did not say we would use this cipher */
+ al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Depending on the session caching (internal/external), the cipher
+ * and/or cipher_id values may not be set. Make sure that cipher_id is
+ * set and use it for comparison.
+ */
+ if (s->session->cipher)
+ s->session->cipher_id = s->session->cipher->id;
+ if (s->hit && (s->session->cipher_id != c->id)) {
+/* Workaround is now obsolete */
+#if 0
+ if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG))
+#endif
+ {
+ al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,
+ SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ }
+ s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = c;
+ /*
+ * Don't digest cached records if no sigalgs: we may need them for client
+ * authentication.
+ */
+ if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
+ goto f_err;
+ /* lets get the compression algorithm */
+ /* COMPRESSION */
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+ if (*(p++) != 0) {
+ al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,
+ SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ /*
+ * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
+ * using compression.
+ */
+ if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+#else
+ j = *(p++);
+ if (s->hit && j != s->session->compress_meth) {
+ al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,
+ SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_NOT_RETURNED);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ if (j == 0)
+ comp = NULL;
+ else if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) {
+ al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_DISABLED);
+ goto f_err;
+ } else
+ comp = ssl3_comp_find(s->ctx->comp_methods, j);
+
+ if ((j != 0) && (comp == NULL)) {
+ al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,
+ SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
+ goto f_err;
+ } else {
+ s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
+ }
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ /* TLS extensions */
+ if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(s, &p, d, n)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
+ goto err;
+ }
+#endif
+
+ if (p != (d + n)) {
+ /* wrong packet length */
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ return (1);
+ f_err:
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
+ err:
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
+ return (-1);
+}
+
+int ssl3_get_server_certificate(SSL *s)
+{
+ int al, i, ok, ret = -1;
+ unsigned long n, nc, llen, l;
+ X509 *x = NULL;
+ const unsigned char *q, *p;
+ unsigned char *d;
+ STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
+ SESS_CERT *sc;
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
+ int need_cert = 1; /* VRS: 0=> will allow null cert if auth ==
+ * KRB5 */
+
+ n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
+ SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A,
+ SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_B,
+ -1, s->max_cert_list, &ok);
+
+ if (!ok)
+ return ((int)n);
+
+ if ((s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) ||
+ ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5) &&
+ (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE))) {
+ s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
+ return (1);
+ }
+
+ if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
+ al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_BAD_MESSAGE_TYPE);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ p = d = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
+
+ if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ n2l3(p, llen);
+ if (llen + 3 != n) {
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ for (nc = 0; nc < llen;) {
+ if (nc + 3 > llen) {
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
+ SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ n2l3(p, l);
+ if ((l + nc + 3) > llen) {
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
+ SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ q = p;
+ x = d2i_X509(NULL, &q, l);
+ if (x == NULL) {
+ al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ if (q != (p + l)) {
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
+ SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ x = NULL;
+ nc += l + 3;
+ p = q;
+ }
+
+ i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
+ if ((s->verify_mode != SSL_VERIFY_NONE) && (i <= 0)
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
+ && !((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5) &&
+ (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5))
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
+ ) {
+ al = ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
+ SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ ERR_clear_error(); /* but we keep s->verify_result */
+
+ sc = ssl_sess_cert_new();
+ if (sc == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ if (s->session->sess_cert)
+ ssl_sess_cert_free(s->session->sess_cert);
+ s->session->sess_cert = sc;
+
+ sc->cert_chain = sk;
+ /*
+ * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does include the peer's certificate,
+ * which we don't include in s3_srvr.c
+ */
+ x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
+ sk = NULL;
+ /*
+ * VRS 19990621: possible memory leak; sk=null ==> !sk_pop_free() @end
+ */
+
+ pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
+
+ /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
+ need_cert = ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5) &&
+ (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5))
+ ? 0 : 1;
+
+#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
+ fprintf(stderr, "pkey,x = %p, %p\n", pkey, x);
+ fprintf(stderr, "ssl_cert_type(x,pkey) = %d\n", ssl_cert_type(x, pkey));
+ fprintf(stderr, "cipher, alg, nc = %s, %lx, %lx, %d\n",
+ s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->name,
+ s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey,
+ s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth, need_cert);
+#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
+
+ if (need_cert && ((pkey == NULL) || EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey))) {
+ x = NULL;
+ al = SSL3_AL_FATAL;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
+ SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PUBLIC_KEY_PARAMETERS);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ i = ssl_cert_type(x, pkey);
+ if (need_cert && i < 0) {
+ x = NULL;
+ al = SSL3_AL_FATAL;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
+ SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ if (need_cert) {
+ int exp_idx = ssl_cipher_get_cert_index(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher);
+ if (exp_idx >= 0 && i != exp_idx) {
+ x = NULL;
+ al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
+ SSL_R_WRONG_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ sc->peer_cert_type = i;
+ CRYPTO_add(&x->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
+ /*
+ * Why would the following ever happen? We just created sc a couple
+ * of lines ago.
+ */
+ if (sc->peer_pkeys[i].x509 != NULL)
+ X509_free(sc->peer_pkeys[i].x509);
+ sc->peer_pkeys[i].x509 = x;
+ sc->peer_key = &(sc->peer_pkeys[i]);
+
+ if (s->session->peer != NULL)
+ X509_free(s->session->peer);
+ CRYPTO_add(&x->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
+ s->session->peer = x;
+ } else {
+ sc->peer_cert_type = i;
+ sc->peer_key = NULL;
+
+ if (s->session->peer != NULL)
+ X509_free(s->session->peer);
+ s->session->peer = NULL;
+ }
+ s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
+
+ x = NULL;
+ ret = 1;
+ if (0) {
+ f_err:
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
+ err:
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
+ }
+
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+ X509_free(x);
+ sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
+ return (ret);
+}
+
+int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s)
+{
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+ unsigned char *q, md_buf[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE * 2];
+#endif
+ EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
+ unsigned char *param, *p;
+ int al, j, ok;
+ long i, param_len, n, alg_k, alg_a;
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
+ const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+ RSA *rsa = NULL;
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+ DH *dh = NULL;
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+ EC_KEY *ecdh = NULL;
+ BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
+ EC_POINT *srvr_ecpoint = NULL;
+ int curve_nid = 0;
+ int encoded_pt_len = 0;
+#endif
+
+ EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
+
+ /*
+ * use same message size as in ssl3_get_certificate_request() as
+ * ServerKeyExchange message may be skipped
+ */
+ n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
+ SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A,
+ SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_B,
+ -1, s->max_cert_list, &ok);
+ if (!ok)
+ return ((int)n);
+
+ alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
+
+ if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
+ /*
+ * Can't skip server key exchange if this is an ephemeral
+ * ciphersuite.
+ */
+ if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+ al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+ /*
+ * In plain PSK ciphersuite, ServerKeyExchange can be omitted if no
+ * identity hint is sent. Set session->sess_cert anyway to avoid
+ * problems later.
+ */
+ if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
+ s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new();
+ if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint)
+ OPENSSL_free(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
+ s->ctx->psk_identity_hint = NULL;
+ }
+#endif
+ s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
+ return (1);
+ }
+
+ param = p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
+ if (s->session->sess_cert != NULL) {
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+ if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp != NULL) {
+ RSA_free(s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp);
+ s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp = NULL;
+ }
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+ if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp) {
+ DH_free(s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp);
+ s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp = NULL;
+ }
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+ if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp) {
+ EC_KEY_free(s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp);
+ s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp = NULL;
+ }
+#endif
+ } else {
+ s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new();
+ }
+
+ /* Total length of the parameters including the length prefix */
+ param_len = 0;
+
+ alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
+
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+ if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
+ param_len = 2;
+ if (param_len > n) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ n2s(p, i);
+
+ /*
+ * Store PSK identity hint for later use, hint is used in
+ * ssl3_send_client_key_exchange. Assume that the maximum length of
+ * a PSK identity hint can be as long as the maximum length of a PSK
+ * identity.
+ */
+ if (i > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
+ al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ if (i > n - param_len) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_BAD_PSK_IDENTITY_HINT_LENGTH);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ param_len += i;
+
+ s->session->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strndup((char *)p, i);
+ if (s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL) {
+ al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ p += i;
+ n -= param_len;
+ } else
+#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+ if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
+ param_len = 2;
+ if (param_len > n) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ n2s(p, i);
+
+ if (i > n - param_len) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_N_LENGTH);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ param_len += i;
+
+ if (!(s->srp_ctx.N = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL))) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ p += i;
+
+ if (2 > n - param_len) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ param_len += 2;
+
+ n2s(p, i);
+
+ if (i > n - param_len) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_G_LENGTH);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ param_len += i;
+
+ if (!(s->srp_ctx.g = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL))) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ p += i;
+
+ if (1 > n - param_len) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ param_len += 1;
+
+ i = (unsigned int)(p[0]);
+ p++;
+
+ if (i > n - param_len) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_S_LENGTH);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ param_len += i;
+
+ if (!(s->srp_ctx.s = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL))) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ p += i;
+
+ if (2 > n - param_len) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ param_len += 2;
+
+ n2s(p, i);
+
+ if (i > n - param_len) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_B_LENGTH);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ param_len += i;
+
+ if (!(s->srp_ctx.B = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL))) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ p += i;
+ n -= param_len;
+
+ if (!srp_verify_server_param(s, &al)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+/* We must check if there is a certificate */
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+ if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA)
+ pkey =
+ X509_get_pubkey(s->session->
+ sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509);
+# else
+ if (0) ;
+# endif
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+ else if (alg_a & SSL_aDSS)
+ pkey =
+ X509_get_pubkey(s->session->
+ sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].
+ x509);
+# endif
+ } else
+#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+ if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) {
+ /* Temporary RSA keys only allowed in export ciphersuites */
+ if (!SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) {
+ al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ if ((rsa = RSA_new()) == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ param_len = 2;
+ if (param_len > n) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ n2s(p, i);
+
+ if (i > n - param_len) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_MODULUS_LENGTH);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ param_len += i;
+
+ if (!(rsa->n = BN_bin2bn(p, i, rsa->n))) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ p += i;
+
+ if (2 > n - param_len) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ param_len += 2;
+
+ n2s(p, i);
+
+ if (i > n - param_len) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_E_LENGTH);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ param_len += i;
+
+ if (!(rsa->e = BN_bin2bn(p, i, rsa->e))) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ p += i;
+ n -= param_len;
+
+ /* this should be because we are using an export cipher */
+ if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA)
+ pkey =
+ X509_get_pubkey(s->session->
+ sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509);
+ else {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (EVP_PKEY_bits(pkey) <= SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) {
+ al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp = rsa;
+ rsa = NULL;
+ }
+#else /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
+ if (0) ;
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+ else if (alg_k & SSL_kEDH) {
+ if ((dh = DH_new()) == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ param_len = 2;
+ if (param_len > n) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ n2s(p, i);
+
+ if (i > n - param_len) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_DH_P_LENGTH);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ param_len += i;
+
+ if (!(dh->p = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL))) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ p += i;
+
+ if (2 > n - param_len) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ param_len += 2;
+
+ n2s(p, i);
+
+ if (i > n - param_len) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_DH_G_LENGTH);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ param_len += i;
+
+ if (!(dh->g = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL))) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ p += i;
+
+ if (2 > n - param_len) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ param_len += 2;
+
+ n2s(p, i);
+
+ if (i > n - param_len) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_DH_PUB_KEY_LENGTH);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ param_len += i;
+
+ if (!(dh->pub_key = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL))) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ p += i;
+ n -= param_len;
+
+ if (BN_is_zero(dh->pub_key)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_DH_PUB_KEY_VALUE);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ /*-
+ * Check that p and g are suitable enough
+ *
+ * p is odd
+ * 1 < g < p - 1
+ */
+ {
+ BIGNUM *tmp = NULL;
+
+ if (!BN_is_odd(dh->p)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_DH_P_VALUE);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ if (BN_is_negative(dh->g) || BN_is_zero(dh->g)
+ || BN_is_one(dh->g)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_DH_G_VALUE);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ if ((tmp = BN_new()) == NULL
+ || BN_copy(tmp, dh->p) == NULL
+ || !BN_sub_word(tmp, 1)) {
+ BN_free(tmp);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (BN_cmp(dh->g, tmp) >= 0) {
+ BN_free(tmp);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_DH_G_VALUE);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ BN_free(tmp);
+ }
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+ if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA)
+ pkey =
+ X509_get_pubkey(s->session->
+ sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509);
+# else
+ if (0) ;
+# endif
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+ else if (alg_a & SSL_aDSS)
+ pkey =
+ X509_get_pubkey(s->session->
+ sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].
+ x509);
+# endif
+ /* else anonymous DH, so no certificate or pkey. */
+
+ s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp = dh;
+ dh = NULL;
+ } else if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHr) || (alg_k & SSL_kDHd)) {
+ al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_TRIED_TO_USE_UNSUPPORTED_CIPHER);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_DH */
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+ else if (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH) {
+ EC_GROUP *ngroup;
+ const EC_GROUP *group;
+
+ if ((ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Extract elliptic curve parameters and the server's ephemeral ECDH
+ * public key. Keep accumulating lengths of various components in
+ * param_len and make sure it never exceeds n.
+ */
+
+ /*
+ * XXX: For now we only support named (not generic) curves and the
+ * ECParameters in this case is just three bytes. We also need one
+ * byte for the length of the encoded point
+ */
+ param_len = 4;
+ if (param_len > n) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ /*
+ * Check curve is one of our preferences, if not server has sent an
+ * invalid curve. ECParameters is 3 bytes.
+ */
+ if (!tls1_check_curve(s, p, 3)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ if ((curve_nid = tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(*(p + 2))) == 0) {
+ al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ ngroup = EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(curve_nid);
+ if (ngroup == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (EC_KEY_set_group(ecdh, ngroup) == 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ EC_GROUP_free(ngroup);
+
+ group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh);
+
+ if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
+ (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163)) {
+ al = SSL_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ p += 3;
+
+ /* Next, get the encoded ECPoint */
+ if (((srvr_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) ||
+ ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ encoded_pt_len = *p; /* length of encoded point */
+ p += 1;
+
+ if ((encoded_pt_len > n - param_len) ||
+ (EC_POINT_oct2point(group, srvr_ecpoint,
+ p, encoded_pt_len, bn_ctx) == 0)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ param_len += encoded_pt_len;
+
+ n -= param_len;
+ p += encoded_pt_len;
+
+ /*
+ * The ECC/TLS specification does not mention the use of DSA to sign
+ * ECParameters in the server key exchange message. We do support RSA
+ * and ECDSA.
+ */
+ if (0) ;
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+ else if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA)
+ pkey =
+ X509_get_pubkey(s->session->
+ sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509);
+# endif
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
+ else if (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)
+ pkey =
+ X509_get_pubkey(s->session->
+ sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].x509);
+# endif
+ /* else anonymous ECDH, so no certificate or pkey. */
+ EC_KEY_set_public_key(ecdh, srvr_ecpoint);
+ s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp = ecdh;
+ ecdh = NULL;
+ BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
+ bn_ctx = NULL;
+ EC_POINT_free(srvr_ecpoint);
+ srvr_ecpoint = NULL;
+ } else if (alg_k) {
+ al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
+
+ /* p points to the next byte, there are 'n' bytes left */
+
+ /* if it was signed, check the signature */
+ if (pkey != NULL) {
+ if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
+ int rv;
+ if (2 > n) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ rv = tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md, s, p, pkey);
+ if (rv == -1)
+ goto err;
+ else if (rv == 0) {
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
+ fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
+#endif
+ p += 2;
+ n -= 2;
+ } else
+ md = EVP_sha1();
+
+ if (2 > n) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ n2s(p, i);
+ n -= 2;
+ j = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
+
+ /*
+ * Check signature length. If n is 0 then signature is empty
+ */
+ if ((i != n) || (n > j) || (n <= 0)) {
+ /* wrong packet length */
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+ if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA && !SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
+ int num;
+ unsigned int size;
+
+ j = 0;
+ q = md_buf;
+ for (num = 2; num > 0; num--) {
+ EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
+ if (EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx,
+ (num == 2) ? s->ctx->md5 : s->ctx->sha1,
+ NULL) <= 0
+ || EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
+ SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
+ || EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
+ SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
+ || EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, param, param_len) <= 0
+ || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx, q, &size) <= 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ q += size;
+ j += size;
+ }
+ i = RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j, p, n, pkey->pkey.rsa);
+ if (i < 0) {
+ al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ if (i == 0) {
+ /* bad signature */
+ al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ } else
+#endif
+ {
+ if (EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL) <= 0
+ || EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
+ SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
+ || EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
+ SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
+ || EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx, param, param_len) <= 0) {
+ al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&md_ctx, p, (int)n, pkey) <= 0) {
+ /* bad signature */
+ al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ }
+ } else {
+ /* aNULL, aSRP or kPSK do not need public keys */
+ if (!(alg_a & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP)) && !(alg_k & SSL_kPSK)) {
+ /* Might be wrong key type, check it */
+ if (ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s))
+ /* Otherwise this shouldn't happen */
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ /* still data left over */
+ if (n != 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ }
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+ EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
+ return (1);
+ f_err:
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
+ err:
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+ if (rsa != NULL)
+ RSA_free(rsa);
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+ if (dh != NULL)
+ DH_free(dh);
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+ BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
+ EC_POINT_free(srvr_ecpoint);
+ if (ecdh != NULL)
+ EC_KEY_free(ecdh);
+#endif
+ EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
+ return (-1);
+}
+
+int ssl3_get_certificate_request(SSL *s)
+{
+ int ok, ret = 0;
+ unsigned long n, nc, l;
+ unsigned int llen, ctype_num, i;
+ X509_NAME *xn = NULL;
+ const unsigned char *p, *q;
+ unsigned char *d;
+ STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk = NULL;
+
+ n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
+ SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A,
+ SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_B,
+ -1, s->max_cert_list, &ok);
+
+ if (!ok)
+ return ((int)n);
+
+ s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 0;
+
+ if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) {
+ s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
+ /*
+ * If we get here we don't need any cached handshake records as we
+ * wont be doing client auth.
+ */
+ if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
+ if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
+ goto err;
+ }
+ return (1);
+ }
+
+ if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* TLS does not like anon-DH with client cert */
+ if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION) {
+ if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) {
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
+ SSL_R_TLS_CLIENT_CERT_REQ_WITH_ANON_CIPHER);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ p = d = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
+
+ if ((ca_sk = sk_X509_NAME_new(ca_dn_cmp)) == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* get the certificate types */
+ ctype_num = *(p++);
+ if (s->cert->ctypes) {
+ OPENSSL_free(s->cert->ctypes);
+ s->cert->ctypes = NULL;
+ }
+ if (ctype_num > SSL3_CT_NUMBER) {
+ /* If we exceed static buffer copy all to cert structure */
+ s->cert->ctypes = OPENSSL_malloc(ctype_num);
+ if (s->cert->ctypes == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ memcpy(s->cert->ctypes, p, ctype_num);
+ s->cert->ctype_num = (size_t)ctype_num;
+ ctype_num = SSL3_CT_NUMBER;
+ }
+ for (i = 0; i < ctype_num; i++)
+ s->s3->tmp.ctype[i] = p[i];
+ p += p[-1];
+ if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
+ n2s(p, llen);
+ /*
+ * Check we have enough room for signature algorithms and following
+ * length value.
+ */
+ if ((unsigned long)(p - d + llen + 2) > n) {
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
+ SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
+ for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
+ s->cert->pkeys[i].digest = NULL;
+ s->cert->pkeys[i].valid_flags = 0;
+ }
+ if ((llen & 1) || !tls1_save_sigalgs(s, p, llen)) {
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
+ SSL_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ p += llen;
+ }
+
+ /* get the CA RDNs */
+ n2s(p, llen);
+#if 0
+ {
+ FILE *out;
+ out = fopen("/tmp/vsign.der", "w");
+ fwrite(p, 1, llen, out);
+ fclose(out);
+ }
+#endif
+
+ if ((unsigned long)(p - d + llen) != n) {
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ for (nc = 0; nc < llen;) {
+ if (nc + 2 > llen) {
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, SSL_R_CA_DN_TOO_LONG);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ n2s(p, l);
+ if ((l + nc + 2) > llen) {
+ if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG))
+ goto cont; /* netscape bugs */
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, SSL_R_CA_DN_TOO_LONG);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ q = p;
+
+ if ((xn = d2i_X509_NAME(NULL, &q, l)) == NULL) {
+ /* If netscape tolerance is on, ignore errors */
+ if (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG)
+ goto cont;
+ else {
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (q != (p + l)) {
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
+ SSL_R_CA_DN_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(ca_sk, xn)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ xn = NULL;
+
+ p += l;
+ nc += l + 2;
+ }
+
+ if (0) {
+ cont:
+ ERR_clear_error();
+ }
+
+ /* we should setup a certificate to return.... */
+ s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 1;
+ s->s3->tmp.ctype_num = ctype_num;
+ if (s->s3->tmp.ca_names != NULL)
+ sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s->s3->tmp.ca_names, X509_NAME_free);
+ s->s3->tmp.ca_names = ca_sk;
+ ca_sk = NULL;
+
+ ret = 1;
+ goto done;
+ err:
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
+ done:
+ X509_NAME_free(xn);
+ if (ca_sk != NULL)
+ sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ca_sk, X509_NAME_free);
+ return (ret);
+}
+
+static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b)
+{
+ return (X509_NAME_cmp(*a, *b));
+}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+int ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(SSL *s)
+{
+ int ok, al, ret = 0, ticklen;
+ long n;
+ const unsigned char *p;
+ unsigned char *d;
+ unsigned long ticket_lifetime_hint;
+
+ n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
+ SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A,
+ SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_B,
+ SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET, 16384, &ok);
+
+ if (!ok)
+ return ((int)n);
+
+ if (n < 6) {
+ /* need at least ticket_lifetime_hint + ticket length */
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ p = d = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
+
+ n2l(p, ticket_lifetime_hint);
+ n2s(p, ticklen);
+ /* ticket_lifetime_hint + ticket_length + ticket */
+ if (ticklen + 6 != n) {
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ /* Server is allowed to change its mind and send an empty ticket. */
+ if (ticklen == 0)
+ return 1;
+
+ if (s->session->session_id_length > 0) {
+ int i = s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode;
+ SSL_SESSION *new_sess;
+ /*
+ * We reused an existing session, so we need to replace it with a new
+ * one
+ */
+ if (i & SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT) {
+ /*
+ * Remove the old session from the cache
+ */
+ if (i & SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_STORE) {
+ if (s->session_ctx->remove_session_cb != NULL)
+ s->session_ctx->remove_session_cb(s->session_ctx,
+ s->session);
+ } else {
+ /* We carry on if this fails */
+ SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session);
+ }
+ }
+
+ if ((new_sess = ssl_session_dup(s->session, 0)) == 0) {
+ al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
+ s->session = new_sess;
+ }
+
+ if (s->session->tlsext_tick) {
+ OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_tick);
+ s->session->tlsext_ticklen = 0;
+ }
+ s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
+ if (!s->session->tlsext_tick) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick, p, ticklen);
+ s->session->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint = ticket_lifetime_hint;
+ s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
+ /*
+ * There are two ways to detect a resumed ticket session. One is to set
+ * an appropriate session ID and then the server must return a match in
+ * ServerHello. This allows the normal client session ID matching to work
+ * and we know much earlier that the ticket has been accepted. The
+ * other way is to set zero length session ID when the ticket is
+ * presented and rely on the handshake to determine session resumption.
+ * We choose the former approach because this fits in with assumptions
+ * elsewhere in OpenSSL. The session ID is set to the SHA256 (or SHA1 is
+ * SHA256 is disabled) hash of the ticket.
+ */
+ EVP_Digest(p, ticklen,
+ s->session->session_id, &s->session->session_id_length,
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
+ EVP_sha256(), NULL);
+# else
+ EVP_sha1(), NULL);
+# endif
+ ret = 1;
+ return (ret);
+ f_err:
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
+ err:
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
+ return (-1);
+}
+
+int ssl3_get_cert_status(SSL *s)
+{
+ int ok, al;
+ unsigned long resplen, n;
+ const unsigned char *p;
+
+ n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
+ SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A,
+ SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_B,
+ -1, 16384, &ok);
+
+ if (!ok)
+ return ((int)n);
+
+ if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS) {
+ /*
+ * The CertificateStatus message is optional even if
+ * tlsext_status_expected is set
+ */
+ s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
+ } else {
+ if (n < 4) {
+ /* need at least status type + length */
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
+ if (*p++ != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_STATUS_TYPE);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ n2l3(p, resplen);
+ if (resplen + 4 != n) {
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = BUF_memdup(p, resplen);
+ if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp == NULL) {
+ al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = resplen;
+ }
+ if (s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) {
+ int ret;
+ ret = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
+ if (ret == 0) {
+ al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS, SSL_R_INVALID_STATUS_RESPONSE);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ }
+ return 1;
+ f_err:
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
+ return (-1);
+}
+#endif
+
+int ssl3_get_server_done(SSL *s)
+{
+ int ok, ret = 0;
+ long n;
+
+ /* Second to last param should be very small, like 0 :-) */
+ n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
+ SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A,
+ SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_B,
+ SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE, 30, &ok);
+
+ if (!ok)
+ return ((int)n);
+ if (n > 0) {
+ /* should contain no data */
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_DONE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
+ return -1;
+ }
+ ret = 1;
+ return (ret);
+}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+static DH *get_server_static_dh_key(SESS_CERT *scert)
+{
+ DH *dh_srvr = NULL;
+ EVP_PKEY *spkey = NULL;
+ int idx = scert->peer_cert_type;
+
+ if (idx >= 0)
+ spkey = X509_get_pubkey(scert->peer_pkeys[idx].x509);
+ if (spkey) {
+ dh_srvr = EVP_PKEY_get1_DH(spkey);
+ EVP_PKEY_free(spkey);
+ }
+ if (dh_srvr == NULL)
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_SERVER_STATIC_DH_KEY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return dh_srvr;
+}
+#endif
+
+int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
+{
+ unsigned char *p;
+ int n;
+ unsigned long alg_k;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+ unsigned char *q;
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
+ KSSL_ERR kssl_err;
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+ EC_KEY *clnt_ecdh = NULL;
+ const EC_POINT *srvr_ecpoint = NULL;
+ EVP_PKEY *srvr_pub_pkey = NULL;
+ unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
+ int encoded_pt_len = 0;
+ BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
+#endif
+
+ if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A) {
+ p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
+
+ alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
+
+ /* Fool emacs indentation */
+ if (0) {
+ }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+ else if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) {
+ RSA *rsa;
+ unsigned char tmp_buf[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
+
+ if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) {
+ /*
+ * We should always have a server certificate with SSL_kRSA.
+ */
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp != NULL)
+ rsa = s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp;
+ else {
+ pkey =
+ X509_get_pubkey(s->session->
+ sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].
+ x509);
+ if ((pkey == NULL) || (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA)
+ || (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ rsa = pkey->pkey.rsa;
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+ }
+
+ tmp_buf[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
+ tmp_buf[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
+ if (RAND_bytes(&(tmp_buf[2]), sizeof tmp_buf - 2) <= 0)
+ goto err;
+
+ s->session->master_key_length = sizeof tmp_buf;
+
+ q = p;
+ /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
+ if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION)
+ p += 2;
+ n = RSA_public_encrypt(sizeof tmp_buf,
+ tmp_buf, p, rsa, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
+# ifdef PKCS1_CHECK
+ if (s->options & SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_1)
+ p[1]++;
+ if (s->options & SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_2)
+ tmp_buf[0] = 0x70;
+# endif
+ if (n <= 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
+ if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION) {
+ s2n(n, q);
+ n += 2;
+ }
+
+ s->session->master_key_length =
+ s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
+ s->
+ session->master_key,
+ tmp_buf,
+ sizeof tmp_buf);
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_buf, sizeof tmp_buf);
+ }
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
+ else if (alg_k & SSL_kKRB5) {
+ krb5_error_code krb5rc;
+ KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx;
+ /* krb5_data krb5_ap_req; */
+ krb5_data *enc_ticket;
+ krb5_data authenticator, *authp = NULL;
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx;
+ const EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL;
+ unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
+ unsigned char tmp_buf[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
+ unsigned char epms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
+ int padl, outl = sizeof(epms);
+
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx);
+
+# ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
+ fprintf(stderr, "ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(%lx & %lx)\n",
+ alg_k, SSL_kKRB5);
+# endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
+
+ authp = NULL;
+# ifdef KRB5SENDAUTH
+ if (KRB5SENDAUTH)
+ authp = &authenticator;
+# endif /* KRB5SENDAUTH */
+
+ krb5rc = kssl_cget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, authp, &kssl_err);
+ enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype);
+ if (enc == NULL)
+ goto err;
+# ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
+ {
+ fprintf(stderr, "kssl_cget_tkt rtn %d\n", krb5rc);
+ if (krb5rc && kssl_err.text)
+ fprintf(stderr, "kssl_cget_tkt kssl_err=%s\n",
+ kssl_err.text);
+ }
+# endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
+
+ if (krb5rc) {
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, kssl_err.reason);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /*-
+ * 20010406 VRS - Earlier versions used KRB5 AP_REQ
+ * in place of RFC 2712 KerberosWrapper, as in:
+ *
+ * Send ticket (copy to *p, set n = length)
+ * n = krb5_ap_req.length;
+ * memcpy(p, krb5_ap_req.data, krb5_ap_req.length);
+ * if (krb5_ap_req.data)
+ * kssl_krb5_free_data_contents(NULL,&krb5_ap_req);
+ *
+ * Now using real RFC 2712 KerberosWrapper
+ * (Thanks to Simon Wilkinson <sxw@sxw.org.uk>)
+ * Note: 2712 "opaque" types are here replaced
+ * with a 2-byte length followed by the value.
+ * Example:
+ * KerberosWrapper= xx xx asn1ticket 0 0 xx xx encpms
+ * Where "xx xx" = length bytes. Shown here with
+ * optional authenticator omitted.
+ */
+
+ /* KerberosWrapper.Ticket */
+ s2n(enc_ticket->length, p);
+ memcpy(p, enc_ticket->data, enc_ticket->length);
+ p += enc_ticket->length;
+ n = enc_ticket->length + 2;
+
+ /* KerberosWrapper.Authenticator */
+ if (authp && authp->length) {
+ s2n(authp->length, p);
+ memcpy(p, authp->data, authp->length);
+ p += authp->length;
+ n += authp->length + 2;
+
+ free(authp->data);
+ authp->data = NULL;
+ authp->length = 0;
+ } else {
+ s2n(0, p); /* null authenticator length */
+ n += 2;
+ }
+
+ tmp_buf[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
+ tmp_buf[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
+ if (RAND_bytes(&(tmp_buf[2]), sizeof tmp_buf - 2) <= 0)
+ goto err;
+
+ /*-
+ * 20010420 VRS. Tried it this way; failed.
+ * EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc, NULL,NULL);
+ * EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length(&ciph_ctx,
+ * kssl_ctx->length);
+ * EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,NULL, key,iv);
+ */
+
+ memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */
+ EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx, enc, NULL, kssl_ctx->key, iv);
+ EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx, epms, &outl, tmp_buf,
+ sizeof tmp_buf);
+ EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx, &(epms[outl]), &padl);
+ outl += padl;
+ if (outl > (int)sizeof epms) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx);
+
+ /* KerberosWrapper.EncryptedPreMasterSecret */
+ s2n(outl, p);
+ memcpy(p, epms, outl);
+ p += outl;
+ n += outl + 2;
+
+ s->session->master_key_length =
+ s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
+ s->
+ session->master_key,
+ tmp_buf,
+ sizeof tmp_buf);
+
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_buf, sizeof tmp_buf);
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(epms, outl);
+ }
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+ else if (alg_k & (SSL_kEDH | SSL_kDHr | SSL_kDHd)) {
+ DH *dh_srvr, *dh_clnt;
+ SESS_CERT *scert = s->session->sess_cert;
+
+ if (scert == NULL) {
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (scert->peer_dh_tmp != NULL) {
+ dh_srvr = scert->peer_dh_tmp;
+ } else {
+ dh_srvr = get_server_static_dh_key(scert);
+ if (dh_srvr == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY) {
+ /* Use client certificate key */
+ EVP_PKEY *clkey = s->cert->key->privatekey;
+ dh_clnt = NULL;
+ if (clkey)
+ dh_clnt = EVP_PKEY_get1_DH(clkey);
+ if (dh_clnt == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ } else {
+ /* generate a new random key */
+ if ((dh_clnt = DHparams_dup(dh_srvr)) == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (!DH_generate_key(dh_clnt)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
+ DH_free(dh_clnt);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * use the 'p' output buffer for the DH key, but make sure to
+ * clear it out afterwards
+ */
+
+ n = DH_compute_key(p, dh_srvr->pub_key, dh_clnt);
+ if (scert->peer_dh_tmp == NULL)
+ DH_free(dh_srvr);
+
+ if (n <= 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
+ DH_free(dh_clnt);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* generate master key from the result */
+ s->session->master_key_length =
+ s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
+ s->
+ session->master_key,
+ p, n);
+ /* clean up */
+ memset(p, 0, n);
+
+ if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY)
+ n = 0;
+ else {
+ /* send off the data */
+ n = BN_num_bytes(dh_clnt->pub_key);
+ s2n(n, p);
+ BN_bn2bin(dh_clnt->pub_key, p);
+ n += 2;
+ }
+
+ DH_free(dh_clnt);
+ }
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+ else if (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) {
+ const EC_GROUP *srvr_group = NULL;
+ EC_KEY *tkey;
+ int ecdh_clnt_cert = 0;
+ int field_size = 0;
+
+ if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) {
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Did we send out the client's ECDH share for use in premaster
+ * computation as part of client certificate? If so, set
+ * ecdh_clnt_cert to 1.
+ */
+ if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) && (s->cert != NULL)) {
+ /*-
+ * XXX: For now, we do not support client
+ * authentication using ECDH certificates.
+ * To add such support, one needs to add
+ * code that checks for appropriate
+ * conditions and sets ecdh_clnt_cert to 1.
+ * For example, the cert have an ECC
+ * key on the same curve as the server's
+ * and the key should be authorized for
+ * key agreement.
+ *
+ * One also needs to add code in ssl3_connect
+ * to skip sending the certificate verify
+ * message.
+ *
+ * if ((s->cert->key->privatekey != NULL) &&
+ * (s->cert->key->privatekey->type ==
+ * EVP_PKEY_EC) && ...)
+ * ecdh_clnt_cert = 1;
+ */
+ }
+
+ if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp != NULL) {
+ tkey = s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp;
+ } else {
+ /* Get the Server Public Key from Cert */
+ srvr_pub_pkey =
+ X509_get_pubkey(s->session->
+ sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].x509);
+ if ((srvr_pub_pkey == NULL)
+ || (srvr_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC)
+ || (srvr_pub_pkey->pkey.ec == NULL)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ tkey = srvr_pub_pkey->pkey.ec;
+ }
+
+ srvr_group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey);
+ srvr_ecpoint = EC_KEY_get0_public_key(tkey);
+
+ if ((srvr_group == NULL) || (srvr_ecpoint == NULL)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if ((clnt_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (!EC_KEY_set_group(clnt_ecdh, srvr_group)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (ecdh_clnt_cert) {
+ /*
+ * Reuse key info from our certificate We only need our
+ * private key to perform the ECDH computation.
+ */
+ const BIGNUM *priv_key;
+ tkey = s->cert->key->privatekey->pkey.ec;
+ priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey);
+ if (priv_key == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (!EC_KEY_set_private_key(clnt_ecdh, priv_key)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ } else {
+ /* Generate a new ECDH key pair */
+ if (!(EC_KEY_generate_key(clnt_ecdh))) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * use the 'p' output buffer for the ECDH key, but make sure to
+ * clear it out afterwards
+ */
+
+ field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(srvr_group);
+ if (field_size <= 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ n = ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size + 7) / 8, srvr_ecpoint,
+ clnt_ecdh, NULL);
+ if (n <= 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* generate master key from the result */
+ s->session->master_key_length =
+ s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
+ s->
+ session->master_key,
+ p, n);
+
+ memset(p, 0, n); /* clean up */
+
+ if (ecdh_clnt_cert) {
+ /* Send empty client key exch message */
+ n = 0;
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * First check the size of encoding and allocate memory
+ * accordingly.
+ */
+ encoded_pt_len =
+ EC_POINT_point2oct(srvr_group,
+ EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_ecdh),
+ POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
+ NULL, 0, NULL);
+
+ encodedPoint = (unsigned char *)
+ OPENSSL_malloc(encoded_pt_len * sizeof(unsigned char));
+ bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
+ if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Encode the public key */
+ n = EC_POINT_point2oct(srvr_group,
+ EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_ecdh),
+ POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
+ encodedPoint, encoded_pt_len, bn_ctx);
+
+ *p = n; /* length of encoded point */
+ /* Encoded point will be copied here */
+ p += 1;
+ /* copy the point */
+ memcpy((unsigned char *)p, encodedPoint, n);
+ /* increment n to account for length field */
+ n += 1;
+ }
+
+ /* Free allocated memory */
+ BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
+ if (encodedPoint != NULL)
+ OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
+ if (clnt_ecdh != NULL)
+ EC_KEY_free(clnt_ecdh);
+ EVP_PKEY_free(srvr_pub_pkey);
+ }
+#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
+ else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
+ /* GOST key exchange message creation */
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
+ X509 *peer_cert;
+ size_t msglen;
+ unsigned int md_len;
+ int keytype;
+ unsigned char premaster_secret[32], shared_ukm[32], tmp[256];
+ EVP_MD_CTX *ukm_hash;
+ EVP_PKEY *pub_key;
+
+ /*
+ * Get server sertificate PKEY and create ctx from it
+ */
+ peer_cert =
+ s->session->
+ sess_cert->peer_pkeys[(keytype = SSL_PKEY_GOST01)].x509;
+ if (!peer_cert)
+ peer_cert =
+ s->session->
+ sess_cert->peer_pkeys[(keytype = SSL_PKEY_GOST94)].x509;
+ if (!peer_cert) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pub_key =
+ X509_get_pubkey(peer_cert), NULL);
+ if (pkey_ctx == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ /*
+ * If we have send a certificate, and certificate key
+ *
+ * * parameters match those of server certificate, use
+ * certificate key for key exchange
+ */
+
+ /* Otherwise, generate ephemeral key pair */
+
+ if (pkey_ctx == NULL
+ || EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0
+ /* Generate session key */
+ || RAND_bytes(premaster_secret, 32) <= 0) {
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ /*
+ * Compute shared IV and store it in algorithm-specific context
+ * data
+ */
+ ukm_hash = EVP_MD_CTX_create();
+ if (EVP_DigestInit(ukm_hash,
+ EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_94)) <= 0
+ || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->client_random,
+ SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
+ || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->server_random,
+ SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
+ || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ukm_hash, shared_ukm, &md_len) <= 0) {
+ EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(ukm_hash);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(ukm_hash);
+ if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl
+ (pkey_ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV, 8,
+ shared_ukm) < 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ /* Make GOST keytransport blob message */
+ /*
+ * Encapsulate it into sequence
+ */
+ *(p++) = V_ASN1_SEQUENCE | V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED;
+ msglen = 255;
+ if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx, tmp, &msglen, premaster_secret, 32)
+ <= 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (msglen >= 0x80) {
+ *(p++) = 0x81;
+ *(p++) = msglen & 0xff;
+ n = msglen + 3;
+ } else {
+ *(p++) = msglen & 0xff;
+ n = msglen + 2;
+ }
+ memcpy(p, tmp, msglen);
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
+ s->session->master_key_length =
+ s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
+ s->
+ session->master_key,
+ premaster_secret,
+ 32);
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pub_key);
+
+ }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+ else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
+ if (s->srp_ctx.A != NULL) {
+ /* send off the data */
+ n = BN_num_bytes(s->srp_ctx.A);
+ s2n(n, p);
+ BN_bn2bin(s->srp_ctx.A, p);
+ n += 2;
+ } else {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (s->session->srp_username != NULL)
+ OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
+ s->session->srp_username = BUF_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
+ if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if ((s->session->master_key_length =
+ SRP_generate_client_master_secret(s,
+ s->session->master_key)) <
+ 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+ else if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
+ /*
+ * The callback needs PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 bytes to return a
+ * \0-terminated identity. The last byte is for us for simulating
+ * strnlen.
+ */
+ char identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 2];
+ size_t identity_len;
+ unsigned char *t = NULL;
+ unsigned char psk_or_pre_ms[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN * 2 + 4];
+ unsigned int pre_ms_len = 0, psk_len = 0;
+ int psk_err = 1;
+
+ n = 0;
+ if (s->psk_client_callback == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_PSK_NO_CLIENT_CB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ memset(identity, 0, sizeof(identity));
+ psk_len = s->psk_client_callback(s, s->session->psk_identity_hint,
+ identity, sizeof(identity) - 1,
+ psk_or_pre_ms,
+ sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
+ if (psk_len > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto psk_err;
+ } else if (psk_len == 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
+ goto psk_err;
+ }
+ identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1] = '\0';
+ identity_len = strlen(identity);
+ if (identity_len > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto psk_err;
+ }
+ /* create PSK pre_master_secret */
+ pre_ms_len = 2 + psk_len + 2 + psk_len;
+ t = psk_or_pre_ms;
+ memmove(psk_or_pre_ms + psk_len + 4, psk_or_pre_ms, psk_len);
+ s2n(psk_len, t);
+ memset(t, 0, psk_len);
+ t += psk_len;
+ s2n(psk_len, t);
+
+ if (s->session->psk_identity_hint != NULL)
+ OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
+ s->session->psk_identity_hint =
+ BUF_strdup(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
+ if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL
+ && s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto psk_err;
+ }
+
+ if (s->session->psk_identity != NULL)
+ OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
+ s->session->psk_identity = BUF_strdup(identity);
+ if (s->session->psk_identity == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto psk_err;
+ }
+
+ s->session->master_key_length =
+ s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
+ s->
+ session->master_key,
+ psk_or_pre_ms,
+ pre_ms_len);
+ s2n(identity_len, p);
+ memcpy(p, identity, identity_len);
+ n = 2 + identity_len;
+ psk_err = 0;
+ psk_err:
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(identity, sizeof(identity));
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
+ if (psk_err != 0) {
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+ else {
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, n);
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B;
+ }
+
+ /* SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B */
+ return ssl_do_write(s);
+ err:
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+ BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
+ if (encodedPoint != NULL)
+ OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
+ if (clnt_ecdh != NULL)
+ EC_KEY_free(clnt_ecdh);
+ EVP_PKEY_free(srvr_pub_pkey);
+#endif
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
+ return (-1);
+}
+
+int ssl3_send_client_verify(SSL *s)
+{
+ unsigned char *p;
+ unsigned char data[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey;
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
+ EVP_MD_CTX mctx;
+ unsigned u = 0;
+ unsigned long n;
+ int j;
+
+ EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx);
+
+ if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A) {
+ p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
+ pkey = s->cert->key->privatekey;
+/* Create context from key and test if sha1 is allowed as digest */
+ pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL);
+ if (pctx == NULL || EVP_PKEY_sign_init(pctx) <= 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_signature_md(pctx, EVP_sha1()) > 0) {
+ if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
+ s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
+ NID_sha1,
+ &(data
+ [MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]));
+ } else {
+ ERR_clear_error();
+ }
+ /*
+ * For TLS v1.2 send signature algorithm and signature using agreed
+ * digest and cached handshake records.
+ */
+ if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
+ long hdatalen = 0;
+ void *hdata;
+ const EVP_MD *md = s->cert->key->digest;
+ hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata);
+ if (hdatalen <= 0 || !tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ p += 2;
+#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
+ fprintf(stderr, "Using TLS 1.2 with client alg %s\n",
+ EVP_MD_name(md));
+#endif
+ if (!EVP_SignInit_ex(&mctx, md, NULL)
+ || !EVP_SignUpdate(&mctx, hdata, hdatalen)
+ || !EVP_SignFinal(&mctx, p + 2, &u, pkey)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ s2n(u, p);
+ n = u + 4;
+ if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
+ goto err;
+ } else
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+ if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA) {
+ s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s, NID_md5, &(data[0]));
+ if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, data,
+ MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,
+ &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_RSA_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ s2n(u, p);
+ n = u + 2;
+ } else
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+ if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA) {
+ if (!DSA_sign(pkey->save_type,
+ &(data[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
+ SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, &(p[2]),
+ (unsigned int *)&j, pkey->pkey.dsa)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_DSA_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ s2n(j, p);
+ n = j + 2;
+ } else
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
+ if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
+ if (!ECDSA_sign(pkey->save_type,
+ &(data[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
+ SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, &(p[2]),
+ (unsigned int *)&j, pkey->pkey.ec)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_ECDSA_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ s2n(j, p);
+ n = j + 2;
+ } else
+#endif
+ if (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94
+ || pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) {
+ unsigned char signbuf[64];
+ int i;
+ size_t sigsize = 64;
+ s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
+ NID_id_GostR3411_94, data);
+ if (EVP_PKEY_sign(pctx, signbuf, &sigsize, data, 32) <= 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ for (i = 63, j = 0; i >= 0; j++, i--) {
+ p[2 + j] = signbuf[i];
+ }
+ s2n(j, p);
+ n = j + 2;
+ } else {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY, n);
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_B;
+ }
+ EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx);
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
+ return ssl_do_write(s);
+ err:
+ EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx);
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
+ return (-1);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check a certificate can be used for client authentication. Currently check
+ * cert exists, if we have a suitable digest for TLS 1.2 if static DH client
+ * certificates can be used and optionally checks suitability for Suite B.
+ */
+static int ssl3_check_client_certificate(SSL *s)
+{
+ unsigned long alg_k;
+ if (!s->cert || !s->cert->key->x509 || !s->cert->key->privatekey)
+ return 0;
+ /* If no suitable signature algorithm can't use certificate */
+ if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) && !s->cert->key->digest)
+ return 0;
+ /*
+ * If strict mode check suitability of chain before using it. This also
+ * adjusts suite B digest if necessary.
+ */
+ if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT &&
+ !tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, -2))
+ return 0;
+ alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
+ /* See if we can use client certificate for fixed DH */
+ if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHr | SSL_kDHd)) {
+ SESS_CERT *scert = s->session->sess_cert;
+ int i = scert->peer_cert_type;
+ EVP_PKEY *clkey = NULL, *spkey = NULL;
+ clkey = s->cert->key->privatekey;
+ /* If client key not DH assume it can be used */
+ if (EVP_PKEY_id(clkey) != EVP_PKEY_DH)
+ return 1;
+ if (i >= 0)
+ spkey = X509_get_pubkey(scert->peer_pkeys[i].x509);
+ if (spkey) {
+ /* Compare server and client parameters */
+ i = EVP_PKEY_cmp_parameters(clkey, spkey);
+ EVP_PKEY_free(spkey);
+ if (i != 1)
+ return 0;
+ }
+ s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY;
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int ssl3_send_client_certificate(SSL *s)
+{
+ X509 *x509 = NULL;
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
+ int i;
+
+ if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A) {
+ /* Let cert callback update client certificates if required */
+ if (s->cert->cert_cb) {
+ i = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
+ if (i < 0) {
+ s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if (i == 0) {
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
+ }
+ if (ssl3_check_client_certificate(s))
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C;
+ else
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B;
+ }
+
+ /* We need to get a client cert */
+ if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B) {
+ /*
+ * If we get an error, we need to ssl->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
+ * return(-1); We then get retied later
+ */
+ i = ssl_do_client_cert_cb(s, &x509, &pkey);
+ if (i < 0) {
+ s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
+ return (-1);
+ }
+ s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
+ if ((i == 1) && (pkey != NULL) && (x509 != NULL)) {
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B;
+ if (!SSL_use_certificate(s, x509) || !SSL_use_PrivateKey(s, pkey))
+ i = 0;
+ } else if (i == 1) {
+ i = 0;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
+ SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK);
+ }
+
+ if (x509 != NULL)
+ X509_free(x509);
+ if (pkey != NULL)
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+ if (i && !ssl3_check_client_certificate(s))
+ i = 0;
+ if (i == 0) {
+ if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
+ s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 0;
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE);
+ return (1);
+ } else {
+ s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 2;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Ok, we have a cert */
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C;
+ }
+
+ if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C) {
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D;
+ if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s,
+ (s->s3->tmp.cert_req ==
+ 2) ? NULL : s->cert->key)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+ /* SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D */
+ return ssl_do_write(s);
+}
+
+#define has_bits(i,m) (((i)&(m)) == (m))
+
+int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s)
+{
+ int i, idx;
+ long alg_k, alg_a;
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
+ int pkey_bits;
+ SESS_CERT *sc;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+ RSA *rsa;
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+ DH *dh;
+#endif
+ int al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+
+ alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
+ alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
+
+ /* we don't have a certificate */
+ if ((alg_a & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aKRB5)) || (alg_k & SSL_kPSK))
+ return (1);
+
+ sc = s->session->sess_cert;
+ if (sc == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+ rsa = s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp;
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+ dh = s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp;
+#endif
+
+ /* This is the passed certificate */
+
+ idx = sc->peer_cert_type;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+ if (idx == SSL_PKEY_ECC) {
+ if (ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(sc->peer_pkeys[idx].x509, s) == 0) {
+ /* check failed */
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT);
+ goto f_err;
+ } else {
+ return 1;
+ }
+ } else if (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
+ SSL_R_MISSING_ECDSA_SIGNING_CERT);
+ goto f_err;
+ } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, SSL_R_MISSING_ECDH_CERT);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+#endif
+ pkey = X509_get_pubkey(sc->peer_pkeys[idx].x509);
+ pkey_bits = EVP_PKEY_bits(pkey);
+ i = X509_certificate_type(sc->peer_pkeys[idx].x509, pkey);
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+
+ /* Check that we have a certificate if we require one */
+ if ((alg_a & SSL_aRSA) && !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_RSA | EVP_PKT_SIGN)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
+ SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_SIGNING_CERT);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+ else if ((alg_a & SSL_aDSS) && !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_DSA | EVP_PKT_SIGN)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
+ SSL_R_MISSING_DSA_SIGNING_CERT);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+ if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) {
+ if (!SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
+ !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_RSA | EVP_PKT_ENC)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
+ SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT);
+ goto f_err;
+ } else if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) {
+ if (pkey_bits <= SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) {
+ if (!has_bits(i, EVP_PK_RSA | EVP_PKT_ENC)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
+ SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ if (rsa != NULL) {
+ /* server key exchange is not allowed. */
+ al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+ if ((alg_k & SSL_kEDH) && dh == NULL) {
+ al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHr) && !SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) &&
+ !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_DH | EVP_PKS_RSA)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
+ SSL_R_MISSING_DH_RSA_CERT);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+ if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHd) && !SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) &&
+ !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_DH | EVP_PKS_DSA)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
+ SSL_R_MISSING_DH_DSA_CERT);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+# endif
+
+ if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHr | SSL_kDHd)) {
+ int dh_size;
+ if (alg_k & SSL_kDHE) {
+ dh_size = BN_num_bits(dh->p);
+ } else {
+ DH *dh_srvr = get_server_static_dh_key(sc);
+ if (dh_srvr == NULL)
+ goto f_err;
+ dh_size = BN_num_bits(dh_srvr->p);
+ DH_free(dh_srvr);
+ }
+
+ if ((!SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) && dh_size < 1024)
+ || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) && dh_size < 512)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ }
+#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_DH */
+
+ if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
+ pkey_bits > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) {
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+ if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) {
+ if (rsa == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
+ SSL_R_MISSING_EXPORT_TMP_RSA_KEY);
+ goto f_err;
+ } else if (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) >
+ SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) {
+ /* We have a temporary RSA key but it's too large. */
+ al = SSL_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
+ SSL_R_MISSING_EXPORT_TMP_RSA_KEY);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ } else
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+ if (alg_k & SSL_kDHE) {
+ if (BN_num_bits(dh->p) >
+ SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) {
+ /* We have a temporary DH key but it's too large. */
+ al = SSL_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
+ SSL_R_MISSING_EXPORT_TMP_DH_KEY);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHr | SSL_kDHd)) {
+ /* The cert should have had an export DH key. */
+ al = SSL_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
+ SSL_R_MISSING_EXPORT_TMP_DH_KEY);
+ goto f_err;
+ } else
+#endif
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
+ SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ }
+ return (1);
+ f_err:
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
+ err:
+ return (0);
+}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+/*
+ * Normally, we can tell if the server is resuming the session from
+ * the session ID. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851), however, relies on the next server
+ * message after the ServerHello to determine if the server is resuming.
+ * Therefore, we allow EAP-FAST to peek ahead.
+ * ssl3_check_finished returns 1 if we are resuming from an external
+ * pre-shared secret, we have a "ticket" and the next server handshake message
+ * is Finished; and 0 otherwise. It returns -1 upon an error.
+ */
+static int ssl3_check_finished(SSL *s)
+{
+ int ok = 0;
+
+ if (s->version < TLS1_VERSION || !s->tls_session_secret_cb ||
+ !s->session->tlsext_tick)
+ return 0;
+
+ /* Need to permit this temporarily, in case the next message is Finished. */
+ s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
+ /*
+ * This function is called when we might get a Certificate message instead,
+ * so permit appropriate message length.
+ * We ignore the return value as we're only interested in the message type
+ * and not its length.
+ */
+ s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
+ SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A,
+ SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_B,
+ -1, s->max_cert_list, &ok);
+ s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
+
+ if (!ok)
+ return -1;
+
+ s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
+
+ if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_FINISHED)
+ return 1;
+
+ /* If we're not done, then the CCS arrived early and we should bail. */
+ if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_FINISHED, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
+int ssl3_send_next_proto(SSL *s)
+{
+ unsigned int len, padding_len;
+ unsigned char *d;
+
+ if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_A) {
+ len = s->next_proto_negotiated_len;
+ padding_len = 32 - ((len + 2) % 32);
+ d = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
+ d[4] = len;
+ memcpy(d + 5, s->next_proto_negotiated, len);
+ d[5 + len] = padding_len;
+ memset(d + 6 + len, 0, padding_len);
+ *(d++) = SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO;
+ l2n3(2 + len + padding_len, d);
+ s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_B;
+ s->init_num = 4 + 2 + len + padding_len;
+ s->init_off = 0;
+ }
+
+ return ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE);
+}
+#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG */
+#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
+
+int ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL *s, X509 **px509, EVP_PKEY **ppkey)
+{
+ int i = 0;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+ if (s->ctx->client_cert_engine) {
+ i = ENGINE_load_ssl_client_cert(s->ctx->client_cert_engine, s,
+ SSL_get_client_CA_list(s),
+ px509, ppkey, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+ if (i != 0)
+ return i;
+ }
+#endif
+ if (s->ctx->client_cert_cb)
+ i = s->ctx->client_cert_cb(s, px509, ppkey);
+ return i;
+}
generated by cgit v0.12 at 2024-09-03 07:13:44 (GMT)