initial commit

1 files changed, 3569 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/openssl/ssl/ssl_lib.c b/openssl/ssl/ssl_lib.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f8054da
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl/ssl/ssl_lib.c
@@ -0,0 +1,3569 @@
+/*
+ * ! \file ssl/ssl_lib.c \brief Version independent SSL functions.
+ */
+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This package is an SSL implementation written
+ * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
+ * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
+ *
+ * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
+ * the following conditions are aheared to.  The following conditions
+ * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
+ * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code.  The SSL documentation
+ * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
+ * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
+ * the code are not to be removed.
+ * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
+ * as the author of the parts of the library used.
+ * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
+ * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ *    must display the following acknowledgement:
+ *    "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ *     Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
+ *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ *    being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ *    distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ *    openssl-core@openssl.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ *    acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
+ * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by
+ * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project.
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
+ * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
+ * license.
+ *
+ * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
+ * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
+ * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
+ *
+ * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
+ * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
+ * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
+ *
+ * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
+ * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
+ * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
+ * to make use of the Contribution.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
+ * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
+ * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
+ * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
+ * OTHERWISE.
+ */
+
+#ifdef REF_CHECK
+# include <assert.h>
+#endif
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "ssl_locl.h"
+#include "kssl_lcl.h"
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/lhash.h>
+#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include <openssl/ocsp.h>
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+# include <openssl/dh.h>
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+# include <openssl/engine.h>
+#endif
+
+const char *SSL_version_str = OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT;
+
+SSL3_ENC_METHOD ssl3_undef_enc_method = {
+    /*
+     * evil casts, but these functions are only called if there's a library
+     * bug
+     */
+    (int (*)(SSL *, int))ssl_undefined_function,
+    (int (*)(SSL *, unsigned char *, int))ssl_undefined_function,
+    ssl_undefined_function,
+    (int (*)(SSL *, unsigned char *, unsigned char *, int))
+        ssl_undefined_function,
+    (int (*)(SSL *, int))ssl_undefined_function,
+    (int (*)(SSL *, const char *, int, unsigned char *))
+        ssl_undefined_function,
+    0,                          /* finish_mac_length */
+    (int (*)(SSL *, int, unsigned char *))ssl_undefined_function,
+    NULL,                       /* client_finished_label */
+    0,                          /* client_finished_label_len */
+    NULL,                       /* server_finished_label */
+    0,                          /* server_finished_label_len */
+    (int (*)(int))ssl_undefined_function,
+    (int (*)(SSL *, unsigned char *, size_t, const char *,
+             size_t, const unsigned char *, size_t,
+             int use_context))ssl_undefined_function,
+};
+
+int SSL_clear(SSL *s)
+{
+
+    if (s->method == NULL) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CLEAR, SSL_R_NO_METHOD_SPECIFIED);
+        return (0);
+    }
+
+    if (ssl_clear_bad_session(s)) {
+        SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
+        s->session = NULL;
+    }
+
+    s->error = 0;
+    s->hit = 0;
+    s->shutdown = 0;
+
+#if 0
+    /*
+     * Disabled since version 1.10 of this file (early return not
+     * needed because SSL_clear is not called when doing renegotiation)
+     */
+    /*
+     * This is set if we are doing dynamic renegotiation so keep
+     * the old cipher.  It is sort of a SSL_clear_lite :-)
+     */
+    if (s->renegotiate)
+        return (1);
+#else
+    if (s->renegotiate) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CLEAR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+        return 0;
+    }
+#endif
+
+    s->type = 0;
+
+    s->state = SSL_ST_BEFORE | ((s->server) ? SSL_ST_ACCEPT : SSL_ST_CONNECT);
+
+    s->version = s->method->version;
+    s->client_version = s->version;
+    s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
+    s->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
+#if 0
+    s->read_ahead = s->ctx->read_ahead;
+#endif
+
+    if (s->init_buf != NULL) {
+        BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
+        s->init_buf = NULL;
+    }
+
+    ssl_clear_cipher_ctx(s);
+    ssl_clear_hash_ctx(&s->read_hash);
+    ssl_clear_hash_ctx(&s->write_hash);
+
+    s->first_packet = 0;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+    if (s->cert != NULL) {
+        if (s->cert->alpn_proposed) {
+            OPENSSL_free(s->cert->alpn_proposed);
+            s->cert->alpn_proposed = NULL;
+        }
+        s->cert->alpn_proposed_len = 0;
+        s->cert->alpn_sent = 0;
+    }
+#endif
+#if 1
+    /*
+     * Check to see if we were changed into a different method, if so, revert
+     * back if we are not doing session-id reuse.
+     */
+    if (!s->in_handshake && (s->session == NULL)
+        && (s->method != s->ctx->method)) {
+        s->method->ssl_free(s);
+        s->method = s->ctx->method;
+        if (!s->method->ssl_new(s))
+            return (0);
+    } else
+#endif
+        s->method->ssl_clear(s);
+    return (1);
+}
+
+/** Used to change an SSL_CTXs default SSL method type */
+int SSL_CTX_set_ssl_version(SSL_CTX *ctx, const SSL_METHOD *meth)
+{
+    STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
+
+    ctx->method = meth;
+
+    sk = ssl_create_cipher_list(ctx->method, &(ctx->cipher_list),
+                                &(ctx->cipher_list_by_id),
+                                meth->version ==
+                                SSL2_VERSION ? "SSLv2" :
+                                SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST, ctx->cert);
+    if ((sk == NULL) || (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) <= 0)) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_SSL_VERSION,
+               SSL_R_SSL_LIBRARY_HAS_NO_CIPHERS);
+        return (0);
+    }
+    return (1);
+}
+
+SSL *SSL_new(SSL_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    SSL *s;
+
+    if (ctx == NULL) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_NEW, SSL_R_NULL_SSL_CTX);
+        return (NULL);
+    }
+    if (ctx->method == NULL) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_NEW, SSL_R_SSL_CTX_HAS_NO_DEFAULT_SSL_VERSION);
+        return (NULL);
+    }
+
+    s = (SSL *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(SSL));
+    if (s == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    memset(s, 0, sizeof(SSL));
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
+    s->kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new();
+#endif                          /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
+
+    s->options = ctx->options;
+    s->mode = ctx->mode;
+    s->max_cert_list = ctx->max_cert_list;
+    s->references = 1;
+
+    if (ctx->cert != NULL) {
+        /*
+         * Earlier library versions used to copy the pointer to the CERT, not
+         * its contents; only when setting new parameters for the per-SSL
+         * copy, ssl_cert_new would be called (and the direct reference to
+         * the per-SSL_CTX settings would be lost, but those still were
+         * indirectly accessed for various purposes, and for that reason they
+         * used to be known as s->ctx->default_cert). Now we don't look at the
+         * SSL_CTX's CERT after having duplicated it once.
+         */
+
+        s->cert = ssl_cert_dup(ctx->cert);
+        if (s->cert == NULL)
+            goto err;
+    } else
+        s->cert = NULL;         /* Cannot really happen (see SSL_CTX_new) */
+
+    s->read_ahead = ctx->read_ahead;
+    s->msg_callback = ctx->msg_callback;
+    s->msg_callback_arg = ctx->msg_callback_arg;
+    s->verify_mode = ctx->verify_mode;
+#if 0
+    s->verify_depth = ctx->verify_depth;
+#endif
+    s->sid_ctx_length = ctx->sid_ctx_length;
+    OPENSSL_assert(s->sid_ctx_length <= sizeof s->sid_ctx);
+    memcpy(&s->sid_ctx, &ctx->sid_ctx, sizeof(s->sid_ctx));
+    s->verify_callback = ctx->default_verify_callback;
+    s->generate_session_id = ctx->generate_session_id;
+
+    s->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new();
+    if (!s->param)
+        goto err;
+    X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(s->param, ctx->param);
+#if 0
+    s->purpose = ctx->purpose;
+    s->trust = ctx->trust;
+#endif
+    s->quiet_shutdown = ctx->quiet_shutdown;
+    s->max_send_fragment = ctx->max_send_fragment;
+
+    CRYPTO_add(&ctx->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
+    s->ctx = ctx;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+    s->tlsext_debug_cb = 0;
+    s->tlsext_debug_arg = NULL;
+    s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
+    s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
+    s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
+    s->tlsext_ocsp_ids = NULL;
+    s->tlsext_ocsp_exts = NULL;
+    s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
+    s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
+    CRYPTO_add(&ctx->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
+    s->initial_ctx = ctx;
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+    if (ctx->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
+        s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist =
+            BUF_memdup(ctx->tlsext_ecpointformatlist,
+                       ctx->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
+        if (!s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
+            goto err;
+        s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length =
+            ctx->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
+    }
+    if (ctx->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist) {
+        s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist =
+            BUF_memdup(ctx->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist,
+                       ctx->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length);
+        if (!s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist)
+            goto err;
+        s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length =
+            ctx->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
+    }
+# endif
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
+    s->next_proto_negotiated = NULL;
+# endif
+
+    if (s->ctx->alpn_client_proto_list) {
+        s->alpn_client_proto_list =
+            OPENSSL_malloc(s->ctx->alpn_client_proto_list_len);
+        if (s->alpn_client_proto_list == NULL)
+            goto err;
+        memcpy(s->alpn_client_proto_list, s->ctx->alpn_client_proto_list,
+               s->ctx->alpn_client_proto_list_len);
+        s->alpn_client_proto_list_len = s->ctx->alpn_client_proto_list_len;
+    }
+#endif
+
+    s->verify_result = X509_V_OK;
+
+    s->method = ctx->method;
+
+    if (!s->method->ssl_new(s))
+        goto err;
+
+    s->server = (ctx->method->ssl_accept == ssl_undefined_function) ? 0 : 1;
+
+    SSL_clear(s);
+
+    CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL, s, &s->ex_data);
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+    s->psk_client_callback = ctx->psk_client_callback;
+    s->psk_server_callback = ctx->psk_server_callback;
+#endif
+
+    return (s);
+ err:
+    if (s != NULL)
+        SSL_free(s);
+    SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+    return (NULL);
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_set_session_id_context(SSL_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *sid_ctx,
+                                   unsigned int sid_ctx_len)
+{
+    if (sid_ctx_len > sizeof ctx->sid_ctx) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT,
+               SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT_TOO_LONG);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    ctx->sid_ctx_length = sid_ctx_len;
+    memcpy(ctx->sid_ctx, sid_ctx, sid_ctx_len);
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int SSL_set_session_id_context(SSL *ssl, const unsigned char *sid_ctx,
+                               unsigned int sid_ctx_len)
+{
+    if (sid_ctx_len > SSL_MAX_SID_CTX_LENGTH) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT,
+               SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT_TOO_LONG);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    ssl->sid_ctx_length = sid_ctx_len;
+    memcpy(ssl->sid_ctx, sid_ctx, sid_ctx_len);
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_set_generate_session_id(SSL_CTX *ctx, GEN_SESSION_CB cb)
+{
+    CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
+    ctx->generate_session_id = cb;
+    CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int SSL_set_generate_session_id(SSL *ssl, GEN_SESSION_CB cb)
+{
+    CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL);
+    ssl->generate_session_id = cb;
+    CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL);
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int SSL_has_matching_session_id(const SSL *ssl, const unsigned char *id,
+                                unsigned int id_len)
+{
+    /*
+     * A quick examination of SSL_SESSION_hash and SSL_SESSION_cmp shows how
+     * we can "construct" a session to give us the desired check - ie. to
+     * find if there's a session in the hash table that would conflict with
+     * any new session built out of this id/id_len and the ssl_version in use
+     * by this SSL.
+     */
+    SSL_SESSION r, *p;
+
+    if (id_len > sizeof r.session_id)
+        return 0;
+
+    r.ssl_version = ssl->version;
+    r.session_id_length = id_len;
+    memcpy(r.session_id, id, id_len);
+    /*
+     * NB: SSLv2 always uses a fixed 16-byte session ID, so even if a
+     * callback is calling us to check the uniqueness of a shorter ID, it
+     * must be compared as a padded-out ID because that is what it will be
+     * converted to when the callback has finished choosing it.
+     */
+    if ((r.ssl_version == SSL2_VERSION) &&
+        (id_len < SSL2_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH)) {
+        memset(r.session_id + id_len, 0, SSL2_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH - id_len);
+        r.session_id_length = SSL2_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH;
+    }
+
+    CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
+    p = lh_SSL_SESSION_retrieve(ssl->ctx->sessions, &r);
+    CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
+    return (p != NULL);
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_set_purpose(SSL_CTX *s, int purpose)
+{
+    return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_purpose(s->param, purpose);
+}
+
+int SSL_set_purpose(SSL *s, int purpose)
+{
+    return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_purpose(s->param, purpose);
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_set_trust(SSL_CTX *s, int trust)
+{
+    return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_trust(s->param, trust);
+}
+
+int SSL_set_trust(SSL *s, int trust)
+{
+    return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_trust(s->param, trust);
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_set1_param(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm)
+{
+    return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1(ctx->param, vpm);
+}
+
+int SSL_set1_param(SSL *ssl, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm)
+{
+    return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1(ssl->param, vpm);
+}
+
+X509_VERIFY_PARAM *SSL_CTX_get0_param(SSL_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    return ctx->param;
+}
+
+X509_VERIFY_PARAM *SSL_get0_param(SSL *ssl)
+{
+    return ssl->param;
+}
+
+void SSL_certs_clear(SSL *s)
+{
+    ssl_cert_clear_certs(s->cert);
+}
+
+void SSL_free(SSL *s)
+{
+    int i;
+
+    if (s == NULL)
+        return;
+
+    i = CRYPTO_add(&s->references, -1, CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL);
+#ifdef REF_PRINT
+    REF_PRINT("SSL", s);
+#endif
+    if (i > 0)
+        return;
+#ifdef REF_CHECK
+    if (i < 0) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "SSL_free, bad reference count\n");
+        abort();                /* ok */
+    }
+#endif
+
+    if (s->param)
+        X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(s->param);
+
+    CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL, s, &s->ex_data);
+
+    if (s->bbio != NULL) {
+        /* If the buffering BIO is in place, pop it off */
+        if (s->bbio == s->wbio) {
+            s->wbio = BIO_pop(s->wbio);
+        }
+        BIO_free(s->bbio);
+        s->bbio = NULL;
+    }
+    if (s->rbio != NULL)
+        BIO_free_all(s->rbio);
+    if ((s->wbio != NULL) && (s->wbio != s->rbio))
+        BIO_free_all(s->wbio);
+
+    if (s->init_buf != NULL)
+        BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
+
+    /* add extra stuff */
+    if (s->cipher_list != NULL)
+        sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
+    if (s->cipher_list_by_id != NULL)
+        sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
+
+    /* Make the next call work :-) */
+    if (s->session != NULL) {
+        ssl_clear_bad_session(s);
+        SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
+    }
+
+    ssl_clear_cipher_ctx(s);
+    ssl_clear_hash_ctx(&s->read_hash);
+    ssl_clear_hash_ctx(&s->write_hash);
+
+    if (s->cert != NULL)
+        ssl_cert_free(s->cert);
+    /* Free up if allocated */
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+    if (s->tlsext_hostname)
+        OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_hostname);
+    if (s->initial_ctx)
+        SSL_CTX_free(s->initial_ctx);
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+    if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
+        OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
+    if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist)
+        OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist);
+# endif                         /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
+    if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input)
+        OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input);
+    if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
+        sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, X509_EXTENSION_free);
+    if (s->tlsext_ocsp_ids)
+        sk_OCSP_RESPID_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, OCSP_RESPID_free);
+    if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
+        OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
+    if (s->alpn_client_proto_list)
+        OPENSSL_free(s->alpn_client_proto_list);
+#endif
+
+    if (s->client_CA != NULL)
+        sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s->client_CA, X509_NAME_free);
+
+    if (s->method != NULL)
+        s->method->ssl_free(s);
+
+    if (s->ctx)
+        SSL_CTX_free(s->ctx);
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
+    if (s->kssl_ctx != NULL)
+        kssl_ctx_free(s->kssl_ctx);
+#endif                          /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
+
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
+    if (s->next_proto_negotiated)
+        OPENSSL_free(s->next_proto_negotiated);
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
+    if (s->srtp_profiles)
+        sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_free(s->srtp_profiles);
+#endif
+
+    OPENSSL_free(s);
+}
+
+void SSL_set_bio(SSL *s, BIO *rbio, BIO *wbio)
+{
+    /*
+     * If the output buffering BIO is still in place, remove it
+     */
+    if (s->bbio != NULL) {
+        if (s->wbio == s->bbio) {
+            s->wbio = s->wbio->next_bio;
+            s->bbio->next_bio = NULL;
+        }
+    }
+    if ((s->rbio != NULL) && (s->rbio != rbio))
+        BIO_free_all(s->rbio);
+    if ((s->wbio != NULL) && (s->wbio != wbio) && (s->rbio != s->wbio))
+        BIO_free_all(s->wbio);
+    s->rbio = rbio;
+    s->wbio = wbio;
+}
+
+BIO *SSL_get_rbio(const SSL *s)
+{
+    return (s->rbio);
+}
+
+BIO *SSL_get_wbio(const SSL *s)
+{
+    return (s->wbio);
+}
+
+int SSL_get_fd(const SSL *s)
+{
+    return (SSL_get_rfd(s));
+}
+
+int SSL_get_rfd(const SSL *s)
+{
+    int ret = -1;
+    BIO *b, *r;
+
+    b = SSL_get_rbio(s);
+    r = BIO_find_type(b, BIO_TYPE_DESCRIPTOR);
+    if (r != NULL)
+        BIO_get_fd(r, &ret);
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+int SSL_get_wfd(const SSL *s)
+{
+    int ret = -1;
+    BIO *b, *r;
+
+    b = SSL_get_wbio(s);
+    r = BIO_find_type(b, BIO_TYPE_DESCRIPTOR);
+    if (r != NULL)
+        BIO_get_fd(r, &ret);
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SOCK
+int SSL_set_fd(SSL *s, int fd)
+{
+    int ret = 0;
+    BIO *bio = NULL;
+
+    bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_socket());
+
+    if (bio == NULL) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_FD, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    BIO_set_fd(bio, fd, BIO_NOCLOSE);
+    SSL_set_bio(s, bio, bio);
+    ret = 1;
+ err:
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+int SSL_set_wfd(SSL *s, int fd)
+{
+    int ret = 0;
+    BIO *bio = NULL;
+
+    if ((s->rbio == NULL) || (BIO_method_type(s->rbio) != BIO_TYPE_SOCKET)
+        || ((int)BIO_get_fd(s->rbio, NULL) != fd)) {
+        bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_socket());
+
+        if (bio == NULL) {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_WFD, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        BIO_set_fd(bio, fd, BIO_NOCLOSE);
+        SSL_set_bio(s, SSL_get_rbio(s), bio);
+    } else
+        SSL_set_bio(s, SSL_get_rbio(s), SSL_get_rbio(s));
+    ret = 1;
+ err:
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+int SSL_set_rfd(SSL *s, int fd)
+{
+    int ret = 0;
+    BIO *bio = NULL;
+
+    if ((s->wbio == NULL) || (BIO_method_type(s->wbio) != BIO_TYPE_SOCKET)
+        || ((int)BIO_get_fd(s->wbio, NULL) != fd)) {
+        bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_socket());
+
+        if (bio == NULL) {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_RFD, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        BIO_set_fd(bio, fd, BIO_NOCLOSE);
+        SSL_set_bio(s, bio, SSL_get_wbio(s));
+    } else
+        SSL_set_bio(s, SSL_get_wbio(s), SSL_get_wbio(s));
+    ret = 1;
+ err:
+    return (ret);
+}
+#endif
+
+/* return length of latest Finished message we sent, copy to 'buf' */
+size_t SSL_get_finished(const SSL *s, void *buf, size_t count)
+{
+    size_t ret = 0;
+
+    if (s->s3 != NULL) {
+        ret = s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len;
+        if (count > ret)
+            count = ret;
+        memcpy(buf, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, count);
+    }
+    return ret;
+}
+
+/* return length of latest Finished message we expected, copy to 'buf' */
+size_t SSL_get_peer_finished(const SSL *s, void *buf, size_t count)
+{
+    size_t ret = 0;
+
+    if (s->s3 != NULL) {
+        ret = s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len;
+        if (count > ret)
+            count = ret;
+        memcpy(buf, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, count);
+    }
+    return ret;
+}
+
+int SSL_get_verify_mode(const SSL *s)
+{
+    return (s->verify_mode);
+}
+
+int SSL_get_verify_depth(const SSL *s)
+{
+    return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_depth(s->param);
+}
+
+int (*SSL_get_verify_callback(const SSL *s)) (int, X509_STORE_CTX *) {
+    return (s->verify_callback);
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_get_verify_mode(const SSL_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    return (ctx->verify_mode);
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_get_verify_depth(const SSL_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_depth(ctx->param);
+}
+
+int (*SSL_CTX_get_verify_callback(const SSL_CTX *ctx)) (int, X509_STORE_CTX *) {
+    return (ctx->default_verify_callback);
+}
+
+void SSL_set_verify(SSL *s, int mode,
+                    int (*callback) (int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx))
+{
+    s->verify_mode = mode;
+    if (callback != NULL)
+        s->verify_callback = callback;
+}
+
+void SSL_set_verify_depth(SSL *s, int depth)
+{
+    X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(s->param, depth);
+}
+
+void SSL_set_read_ahead(SSL *s, int yes)
+{
+    s->read_ahead = yes;
+}
+
+int SSL_get_read_ahead(const SSL *s)
+{
+    return (s->read_ahead);
+}
+
+int SSL_pending(const SSL *s)
+{
+    /*
+     * SSL_pending cannot work properly if read-ahead is enabled
+     * (SSL_[CTX_]ctrl(..., SSL_CTRL_SET_READ_AHEAD, 1, NULL)), and it is
+     * impossible to fix since SSL_pending cannot report errors that may be
+     * observed while scanning the new data. (Note that SSL_pending() is
+     * often used as a boolean value, so we'd better not return -1.)
+     */
+    return (s->method->ssl_pending(s));
+}
+
+X509 *SSL_get_peer_certificate(const SSL *s)
+{
+    X509 *r;
+
+    if ((s == NULL) || (s->session == NULL))
+        r = NULL;
+    else
+        r = s->session->peer;
+
+    if (r == NULL)
+        return (r);
+
+    CRYPTO_add(&r->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
+
+    return (r);
+}
+
+STACK_OF(X509) *SSL_get_peer_cert_chain(const SSL *s)
+{
+    STACK_OF(X509) *r;
+
+    if ((s == NULL) || (s->session == NULL)
+        || (s->session->sess_cert == NULL))
+        r = NULL;
+    else
+        r = s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain;
+
+    /*
+     * If we are a client, cert_chain includes the peer's own certificate; if
+     * we are a server, it does not.
+     */
+
+    return (r);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Now in theory, since the calling process own 't' it should be safe to
+ * modify.  We need to be able to read f without being hassled
+ */
+void SSL_copy_session_id(SSL *t, const SSL *f)
+{
+    CERT *tmp;
+
+    /* Do we need to to SSL locking? */
+    SSL_set_session(t, SSL_get_session(f));
+
+    /*
+     * what if we are setup as SSLv2 but want to talk SSLv3 or vice-versa
+     */
+    if (t->method != f->method) {
+        t->method->ssl_free(t); /* cleanup current */
+        t->method = f->method;  /* change method */
+        t->method->ssl_new(t);  /* setup new */
+    }
+
+    tmp = t->cert;
+    if (f->cert != NULL) {
+        CRYPTO_add(&f->cert->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CERT);
+        t->cert = f->cert;
+    } else
+        t->cert = NULL;
+    if (tmp != NULL)
+        ssl_cert_free(tmp);
+    SSL_set_session_id_context(t, f->sid_ctx, f->sid_ctx_length);
+}
+
+/* Fix this so it checks all the valid key/cert options */
+int SSL_CTX_check_private_key(const SSL_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    if ((ctx == NULL) ||
+        (ctx->cert == NULL) || (ctx->cert->key->x509 == NULL)) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY,
+               SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_ASSIGNED);
+        return (0);
+    }
+    if (ctx->cert->key->privatekey == NULL) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY,
+               SSL_R_NO_PRIVATE_KEY_ASSIGNED);
+        return (0);
+    }
+    return (X509_check_private_key
+            (ctx->cert->key->x509, ctx->cert->key->privatekey));
+}
+
+/* Fix this function so that it takes an optional type parameter */
+int SSL_check_private_key(const SSL *ssl)
+{
+    if (ssl == NULL) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+        return (0);
+    }
+    if (ssl->cert == NULL) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_ASSIGNED);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    if (ssl->cert->key->x509 == NULL) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_ASSIGNED);
+        return (0);
+    }
+    if (ssl->cert->key->privatekey == NULL) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, SSL_R_NO_PRIVATE_KEY_ASSIGNED);
+        return (0);
+    }
+    return (X509_check_private_key(ssl->cert->key->x509,
+                                   ssl->cert->key->privatekey));
+}
+
+int SSL_accept(SSL *s)
+{
+    if (s->handshake_func == 0)
+        /* Not properly initialized yet */
+        SSL_set_accept_state(s);
+
+    return (s->method->ssl_accept(s));
+}
+
+int SSL_connect(SSL *s)
+{
+    if (s->handshake_func == 0)
+        /* Not properly initialized yet */
+        SSL_set_connect_state(s);
+
+    return (s->method->ssl_connect(s));
+}
+
+long SSL_get_default_timeout(const SSL *s)
+{
+    return (s->method->get_timeout());
+}
+
+int SSL_read(SSL *s, void *buf, int num)
+{
+    if (s->handshake_func == 0) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_READ, SSL_R_UNINITIALIZED);
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) {
+        s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
+        return (0);
+    }
+    return (s->method->ssl_read(s, buf, num));
+}
+
+int SSL_peek(SSL *s, void *buf, int num)
+{
+    if (s->handshake_func == 0) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PEEK, SSL_R_UNINITIALIZED);
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) {
+        return (0);
+    }
+    return (s->method->ssl_peek(s, buf, num));
+}
+
+int SSL_write(SSL *s, const void *buf, int num)
+{
+    if (s->handshake_func == 0) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_WRITE, SSL_R_UNINITIALIZED);
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    if (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) {
+        s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_WRITE, SSL_R_PROTOCOL_IS_SHUTDOWN);
+        return (-1);
+    }
+    return (s->method->ssl_write(s, buf, num));
+}
+
+int SSL_shutdown(SSL *s)
+{
+    /*
+     * Note that this function behaves differently from what one might
+     * expect.  Return values are 0 for no success (yet), 1 for success; but
+     * calling it once is usually not enough, even if blocking I/O is used
+     * (see ssl3_shutdown).
+     */
+
+    if (s->handshake_func == 0) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SHUTDOWN, SSL_R_UNINITIALIZED);
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    if (!SSL_in_init(s)) {
+        return s->method->ssl_shutdown(s);
+    } else {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SHUTDOWN, SSL_R_SHUTDOWN_WHILE_IN_INIT);
+        return -1;
+    }
+}
+
+int SSL_renegotiate(SSL *s)
+{
+    if (s->renegotiate == 0)
+        s->renegotiate = 1;
+
+    s->new_session = 1;
+
+    return (s->method->ssl_renegotiate(s));
+}
+
+int SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated(SSL *s)
+{
+    if (s->renegotiate == 0)
+        s->renegotiate = 1;
+
+    s->new_session = 0;
+
+    return (s->method->ssl_renegotiate(s));
+}
+
+int SSL_renegotiate_pending(SSL *s)
+{
+    /*
+     * becomes true when negotiation is requested; false again once a
+     * handshake has finished
+     */
+    return (s->renegotiate != 0);
+}
+
+long SSL_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, long larg, void *parg)
+{
+    long l;
+
+    switch (cmd) {
+    case SSL_CTRL_GET_READ_AHEAD:
+        return (s->read_ahead);
+    case SSL_CTRL_SET_READ_AHEAD:
+        l = s->read_ahead;
+        s->read_ahead = larg;
+        return (l);
+
+    case SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK_ARG:
+        s->msg_callback_arg = parg;
+        return 1;
+
+    case SSL_CTRL_OPTIONS:
+        return (s->options |= larg);
+    case SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_OPTIONS:
+        return (s->options &= ~larg);
+    case SSL_CTRL_MODE:
+        return (s->mode |= larg);
+    case SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_MODE:
+        return (s->mode &= ~larg);
+    case SSL_CTRL_GET_MAX_CERT_LIST:
+        return (s->max_cert_list);
+    case SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_CERT_LIST:
+        l = s->max_cert_list;
+        s->max_cert_list = larg;
+        return (l);
+    case SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_SEND_FRAGMENT:
+        if (larg < 512 || larg > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)
+            return 0;
+        s->max_send_fragment = larg;
+        return 1;
+    case SSL_CTRL_GET_RI_SUPPORT:
+        if (s->s3)
+            return s->s3->send_connection_binding;
+        else
+            return 0;
+    case SSL_CTRL_CERT_FLAGS:
+        return (s->cert->cert_flags |= larg);
+    case SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_CERT_FLAGS:
+        return (s->cert->cert_flags &= ~larg);
+
+    case SSL_CTRL_GET_RAW_CIPHERLIST:
+        if (parg) {
+            if (s->cert->ciphers_raw == NULL)
+                return 0;
+            *(unsigned char **)parg = s->cert->ciphers_raw;
+            return (int)s->cert->ciphers_rawlen;
+        } else
+            return ssl_put_cipher_by_char(s, NULL, NULL);
+    default:
+        return (s->method->ssl_ctrl(s, cmd, larg, parg));
+    }
+}
+
+long SSL_callback_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, void (*fp) (void))
+{
+    switch (cmd) {
+    case SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK:
+        s->msg_callback = (void (*)
+                           (int write_p, int version, int content_type,
+                            const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl,
+                            void *arg))(fp);
+        return 1;
+
+    default:
+        return (s->method->ssl_callback_ctrl(s, cmd, fp));
+    }
+}
+
+LHASH_OF(SSL_SESSION) *SSL_CTX_sessions(SSL_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    return ctx->sessions;
+}
+
+long SSL_CTX_ctrl(SSL_CTX *ctx, int cmd, long larg, void *parg)
+{
+    long l;
+    /* For some cases with ctx == NULL perform syntax checks */
+    if (ctx == NULL) {
+        switch (cmd) {
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+        case SSL_CTRL_SET_CURVES_LIST:
+            return tls1_set_curves_list(NULL, NULL, parg);
+#endif
+        case SSL_CTRL_SET_SIGALGS_LIST:
+        case SSL_CTRL_SET_CLIENT_SIGALGS_LIST:
+            return tls1_set_sigalgs_list(NULL, parg, 0);
+        default:
+            return 0;
+        }
+    }
+
+    switch (cmd) {
+    case SSL_CTRL_GET_READ_AHEAD:
+        return (ctx->read_ahead);
+    case SSL_CTRL_SET_READ_AHEAD:
+        l = ctx->read_ahead;
+        ctx->read_ahead = larg;
+        return (l);
+
+    case SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK_ARG:
+        ctx->msg_callback_arg = parg;
+        return 1;
+
+    case SSL_CTRL_GET_MAX_CERT_LIST:
+        return (ctx->max_cert_list);
+    case SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_CERT_LIST:
+        l = ctx->max_cert_list;
+        ctx->max_cert_list = larg;
+        return (l);
+
+    case SSL_CTRL_SET_SESS_CACHE_SIZE:
+        l = ctx->session_cache_size;
+        ctx->session_cache_size = larg;
+        return (l);
+    case SSL_CTRL_GET_SESS_CACHE_SIZE:
+        return (ctx->session_cache_size);
+    case SSL_CTRL_SET_SESS_CACHE_MODE:
+        l = ctx->session_cache_mode;
+        ctx->session_cache_mode = larg;
+        return (l);
+    case SSL_CTRL_GET_SESS_CACHE_MODE:
+        return (ctx->session_cache_mode);
+
+    case SSL_CTRL_SESS_NUMBER:
+        return (lh_SSL_SESSION_num_items(ctx->sessions));
+    case SSL_CTRL_SESS_CONNECT:
+        return (ctx->stats.sess_connect);
+    case SSL_CTRL_SESS_CONNECT_GOOD:
+        return (ctx->stats.sess_connect_good);
+    case SSL_CTRL_SESS_CONNECT_RENEGOTIATE:
+        return (ctx->stats.sess_connect_renegotiate);
+    case SSL_CTRL_SESS_ACCEPT:
+        return (ctx->stats.sess_accept);
+    case SSL_CTRL_SESS_ACCEPT_GOOD:
+        return (ctx->stats.sess_accept_good);
+    case SSL_CTRL_SESS_ACCEPT_RENEGOTIATE:
+        return (ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate);
+    case SSL_CTRL_SESS_HIT:
+        return (ctx->stats.sess_hit);
+    case SSL_CTRL_SESS_CB_HIT:
+        return (ctx->stats.sess_cb_hit);
+    case SSL_CTRL_SESS_MISSES:
+        return (ctx->stats.sess_miss);
+    case SSL_CTRL_SESS_TIMEOUTS:
+        return (ctx->stats.sess_timeout);
+    case SSL_CTRL_SESS_CACHE_FULL:
+        return (ctx->stats.sess_cache_full);
+    case SSL_CTRL_OPTIONS:
+        return (ctx->options |= larg);
+    case SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_OPTIONS:
+        return (ctx->options &= ~larg);
+    case SSL_CTRL_MODE:
+        return (ctx->mode |= larg);
+    case SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_MODE:
+        return (ctx->mode &= ~larg);
+    case SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_SEND_FRAGMENT:
+        if (larg < 512 || larg > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)
+            return 0;
+        ctx->max_send_fragment = larg;
+        return 1;
+    case SSL_CTRL_CERT_FLAGS:
+        return (ctx->cert->cert_flags |= larg);
+    case SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_CERT_FLAGS:
+        return (ctx->cert->cert_flags &= ~larg);
+    default:
+        return (ctx->method->ssl_ctx_ctrl(ctx, cmd, larg, parg));
+    }
+}
+
+long SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(SSL_CTX *ctx, int cmd, void (*fp) (void))
+{
+    switch (cmd) {
+    case SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK:
+        ctx->msg_callback = (void (*)
+                             (int write_p, int version, int content_type,
+                              const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl,
+                              void *arg))(fp);
+        return 1;
+
+    default:
+        return (ctx->method->ssl_ctx_callback_ctrl(ctx, cmd, fp));
+    }
+}
+
+int ssl_cipher_id_cmp(const SSL_CIPHER *a, const SSL_CIPHER *b)
+{
+    long l;
+
+    l = a->id - b->id;
+    if (l == 0L)
+        return (0);
+    else
+        return ((l > 0) ? 1 : -1);
+}
+
+int ssl_cipher_ptr_id_cmp(const SSL_CIPHER *const *ap,
+                          const SSL_CIPHER *const *bp)
+{
+    long l;
+
+    l = (*ap)->id - (*bp)->id;
+    if (l == 0L)
+        return (0);
+    else
+        return ((l > 0) ? 1 : -1);
+}
+
+/** return a STACK of the ciphers available for the SSL and in order of
+ * preference */
+STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *SSL_get_ciphers(const SSL *s)
+{
+    if (s != NULL) {
+        if (s->cipher_list != NULL) {
+            return (s->cipher_list);
+        } else if ((s->ctx != NULL) && (s->ctx->cipher_list != NULL)) {
+            return (s->ctx->cipher_list);
+        }
+    }
+    return (NULL);
+}
+
+/** return a STACK of the ciphers available for the SSL and in order of
+ * algorithm id */
+STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(SSL *s)
+{
+    if (s != NULL) {
+        if (s->cipher_list_by_id != NULL) {
+            return (s->cipher_list_by_id);
+        } else if ((s->ctx != NULL) && (s->ctx->cipher_list_by_id != NULL)) {
+            return (s->ctx->cipher_list_by_id);
+        }
+    }
+    return (NULL);
+}
+
+/** The old interface to get the same thing as SSL_get_ciphers() */
+const char *SSL_get_cipher_list(const SSL *s, int n)
+{
+    SSL_CIPHER *c;
+    STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
+
+    if (s == NULL)
+        return (NULL);
+    sk = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
+    if ((sk == NULL) || (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) <= n))
+        return (NULL);
+    c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, n);
+    if (c == NULL)
+        return (NULL);
+    return (c->name);
+}
+
+/** specify the ciphers to be used by default by the SSL_CTX */
+int SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *str)
+{
+    STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
+
+    sk = ssl_create_cipher_list(ctx->method, &ctx->cipher_list,
+                                &ctx->cipher_list_by_id, str, ctx->cert);
+    /*
+     * ssl_create_cipher_list may return an empty stack if it was unable to
+     * find a cipher matching the given rule string (for example if the rule
+     * string specifies a cipher which has been disabled). This is not an
+     * error as far as ssl_create_cipher_list is concerned, and hence
+     * ctx->cipher_list and ctx->cipher_list_by_id has been updated.
+     */
+    if (sk == NULL)
+        return 0;
+    else if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) == 0) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_CIPHER_LIST, SSL_R_NO_CIPHER_MATCH);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/** specify the ciphers to be used by the SSL */
+int SSL_set_cipher_list(SSL *s, const char *str)
+{
+    STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
+
+    sk = ssl_create_cipher_list(s->ctx->method, &s->cipher_list,
+                                &s->cipher_list_by_id, str, s->cert);
+    /* see comment in SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list */
+    if (sk == NULL)
+        return 0;
+    else if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) == 0) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_CIPHER_LIST, SSL_R_NO_CIPHER_MATCH);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/* works well for SSLv2, not so good for SSLv3 */
+char *SSL_get_shared_ciphers(const SSL *s, char *buf, int len)
+{
+    char *p;
+    STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
+    SSL_CIPHER *c;
+    int i;
+
+    if ((s->session == NULL) || (s->session->ciphers == NULL) || (len < 2))
+        return (NULL);
+
+    p = buf;
+    sk = s->session->ciphers;
+
+    if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) == 0)
+        return NULL;
+
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++) {
+        int n;
+
+        c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i);
+        n = strlen(c->name);
+        if (n + 1 > len) {
+            if (p != buf)
+                --p;
+            *p = '\0';
+            return buf;
+        }
+        strcpy(p, c->name);
+        p += n;
+        *(p++) = ':';
+        len -= n + 1;
+    }
+    p[-1] = '\0';
+    return (buf);
+}
+
+int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk,
+                             unsigned char *p,
+                             int (*put_cb) (const SSL_CIPHER *,
+                                            unsigned char *))
+{
+    int i, j = 0;
+    SSL_CIPHER *c;
+    CERT *ct = s->cert;
+    unsigned char *q;
+    int empty_reneg_info_scsv = !s->renegotiate;
+    /* Set disabled masks for this session */
+    ssl_set_client_disabled(s);
+
+    if (sk == NULL)
+        return (0);
+    q = p;
+    if (put_cb == NULL)
+        put_cb = s->method->put_cipher_by_char;
+
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++) {
+        c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i);
+        /* Skip disabled ciphers */
+        if (c->algorithm_ssl & ct->mask_ssl ||
+            c->algorithm_mkey & ct->mask_k || c->algorithm_auth & ct->mask_a)
+            continue;
+#ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
+        if (c->id == SSL3_CK_SCSV) {
+            if (!empty_reneg_info_scsv)
+                continue;
+            else
+                empty_reneg_info_scsv = 0;
+        }
+#endif
+        j = put_cb(c, p);
+        p += j;
+    }
+    /*
+     * If p == q, no ciphers; caller indicates an error. Otherwise, add
+     * applicable SCSVs.
+     */
+    if (p != q) {
+        if (empty_reneg_info_scsv) {
+            static SSL_CIPHER scsv = {
+                0, NULL, SSL3_CK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
+            };
+            j = put_cb(&scsv, p);
+            p += j;
+#ifdef OPENSSL_RI_DEBUG
+            fprintf(stderr,
+                    "TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV sent by client\n");
+#endif
+        }
+        if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV) {
+            static SSL_CIPHER scsv = {
+                0, NULL, SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
+            };
+            j = put_cb(&scsv, p);
+            p += j;
+        }
+    }
+
+    return (p - q);
+}
+
+STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(SSL *s, unsigned char *p,
+                                               int num,
+                                               STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) **skp)
+{
+    const SSL_CIPHER *c;
+    STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
+    int i, n;
+
+    if (s->s3)
+        s->s3->send_connection_binding = 0;
+
+    n = ssl_put_cipher_by_char(s, NULL, NULL);
+    if (n == 0 || (num % n) != 0) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST,
+               SSL_R_ERROR_IN_RECEIVED_CIPHER_LIST);
+        return (NULL);
+    }
+    if ((skp == NULL) || (*skp == NULL)) {
+        sk = sk_SSL_CIPHER_new_null(); /* change perhaps later */
+        if(sk == NULL) {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            return NULL;
+        }
+    } else {
+        sk = *skp;
+        sk_SSL_CIPHER_zero(sk);
+    }
+
+    if (s->cert->ciphers_raw)
+        OPENSSL_free(s->cert->ciphers_raw);
+    s->cert->ciphers_raw = BUF_memdup(p, num);
+    if (s->cert->ciphers_raw == NULL) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    s->cert->ciphers_rawlen = (size_t)num;
+
+    for (i = 0; i < num; i += n) {
+        /* Check for TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV */
+        if (s->s3 && (n != 3 || !p[0]) &&
+            (p[n - 2] == ((SSL3_CK_SCSV >> 8) & 0xff)) &&
+            (p[n - 1] == (SSL3_CK_SCSV & 0xff))) {
+            /* SCSV fatal if renegotiating */
+            if (s->renegotiate) {
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST,
+                       SSL_R_SCSV_RECEIVED_WHEN_RENEGOTIATING);
+                ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+                goto err;
+            }
+            s->s3->send_connection_binding = 1;
+            p += n;
+#ifdef OPENSSL_RI_DEBUG
+            fprintf(stderr, "SCSV received by server\n");
+#endif
+            continue;
+        }
+
+        /* Check for TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV */
+        if ((n != 3 || !p[0]) &&
+            (p[n - 2] == ((SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV >> 8) & 0xff)) &&
+            (p[n - 1] == (SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV & 0xff))) {
+            /*
+             * The SCSV indicates that the client previously tried a higher
+             * version. Fail if the current version is an unexpected
+             * downgrade.
+             */
+            if (!SSL_ctrl(s, SSL_CTRL_CHECK_PROTO_VERSION, 0, NULL)) {
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST,
+                       SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
+                if (s->s3)
+                    ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL,
+                                    SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
+                goto err;
+            }
+            p += n;
+            continue;
+        }
+
+        c = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, p);
+        p += n;
+        if (c != NULL) {
+            if (!sk_SSL_CIPHER_push(sk, c)) {
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+                goto err;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (skp != NULL)
+        *skp = sk;
+    return (sk);
+ err:
+    if ((skp == NULL) || (*skp == NULL))
+        sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(sk);
+    return (NULL);
+}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+/** return a servername extension value if provided in Client Hello, or NULL.
+ * So far, only host_name types are defined (RFC 3546).
+ */
+
+const char *SSL_get_servername(const SSL *s, const int type)
+{
+    if (type != TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name)
+        return NULL;
+
+    return s->session && !s->tlsext_hostname ?
+        s->session->tlsext_hostname : s->tlsext_hostname;
+}
+
+int SSL_get_servername_type(const SSL *s)
+{
+    if (s->session
+        && (!s->tlsext_hostname ? s->session->
+            tlsext_hostname : s->tlsext_hostname))
+        return TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
+    return -1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * SSL_select_next_proto implements the standard protocol selection. It is
+ * expected that this function is called from the callback set by
+ * SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb. The protocol data is assumed to be a
+ * vector of 8-bit, length prefixed byte strings. The length byte itself is
+ * not included in the length. A byte string of length 0 is invalid. No byte
+ * string may be truncated. The current, but experimental algorithm for
+ * selecting the protocol is: 1) If the server doesn't support NPN then this
+ * is indicated to the callback. In this case, the client application has to
+ * abort the connection or have a default application level protocol. 2) If
+ * the server supports NPN, but advertises an empty list then the client
+ * selects the first protcol in its list, but indicates via the API that this
+ * fallback case was enacted. 3) Otherwise, the client finds the first
+ * protocol in the server's list that it supports and selects this protocol.
+ * This is because it's assumed that the server has better information about
+ * which protocol a client should use. 4) If the client doesn't support any
+ * of the server's advertised protocols, then this is treated the same as
+ * case 2. It returns either OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED if a common protocol was
+ * found, or OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP if the fallback case was reached.
+ */
+int SSL_select_next_proto(unsigned char **out, unsigned char *outlen,
+                          const unsigned char *server,
+                          unsigned int server_len,
+                          const unsigned char *client,
+                          unsigned int client_len)
+{
+    unsigned int i, j;
+    const unsigned char *result;
+    int status = OPENSSL_NPN_UNSUPPORTED;
+
+    /*
+     * For each protocol in server preference order, see if we support it.
+     */
+    for (i = 0; i < server_len;) {
+        for (j = 0; j < client_len;) {
+            if (server[i] == client[j] &&
+                memcmp(&server[i + 1], &client[j + 1], server[i]) == 0) {
+                /* We found a match */
+                result = &server[i];
+                status = OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED;
+                goto found;
+            }
+            j += client[j];
+            j++;
+        }
+        i += server[i];
+        i++;
+    }
+
+    /* There's no overlap between our protocols and the server's list. */
+    result = client;
+    status = OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP;
+
+ found:
+    *out = (unsigned char *)result + 1;
+    *outlen = result[0];
+    return status;
+}
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
+/*
+ * SSL_get0_next_proto_negotiated sets *data and *len to point to the
+ * client's requested protocol for this connection and returns 0. If the
+ * client didn't request any protocol, then *data is set to NULL. Note that
+ * the client can request any protocol it chooses. The value returned from
+ * this function need not be a member of the list of supported protocols
+ * provided by the callback.
+ */
+void SSL_get0_next_proto_negotiated(const SSL *s, const unsigned char **data,
+                                    unsigned *len)
+{
+    *data = s->next_proto_negotiated;
+    if (!*data) {
+        *len = 0;
+    } else {
+        *len = s->next_proto_negotiated_len;
+    }
+}
+
+/*
+ * SSL_CTX_set_next_protos_advertised_cb sets a callback that is called when
+ * a TLS server needs a list of supported protocols for Next Protocol
+ * Negotiation. The returned list must be in wire format.  The list is
+ * returned by setting |out| to point to it and |outlen| to its length. This
+ * memory will not be modified, but one should assume that the SSL* keeps a
+ * reference to it. The callback should return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK if it
+ * wishes to advertise. Otherwise, no such extension will be included in the
+ * ServerHello.
+ */
+void SSL_CTX_set_next_protos_advertised_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx,
+                                           int (*cb) (SSL *ssl,
+                                                      const unsigned char
+                                                      **out,
+                                                      unsigned int *outlen,
+                                                      void *arg), void *arg)
+{
+    ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb = cb;
+    ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg = arg;
+}
+
+/*
+ * SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb sets a callback that is called when a
+ * client needs to select a protocol from the server's provided list. |out|
+ * must be set to point to the selected protocol (which may be within |in|).
+ * The length of the protocol name must be written into |outlen|. The
+ * server's advertised protocols are provided in |in| and |inlen|. The
+ * callback can assume that |in| is syntactically valid. The client must
+ * select a protocol. It is fatal to the connection if this callback returns
+ * a value other than SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK.
+ */
+void SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx,
+                                      int (*cb) (SSL *s, unsigned char **out,
+                                                 unsigned char *outlen,
+                                                 const unsigned char *in,
+                                                 unsigned int inlen,
+                                                 void *arg), void *arg)
+{
+    ctx->next_proto_select_cb = cb;
+    ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg = arg;
+}
+# endif
+
+/*
+ * SSL_CTX_set_alpn_protos sets the ALPN protocol list on |ctx| to |protos|.
+ * |protos| must be in wire-format (i.e. a series of non-empty, 8-bit
+ * length-prefixed strings). Returns 0 on success.
+ */
+int SSL_CTX_set_alpn_protos(SSL_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *protos,
+                            unsigned protos_len)
+{
+    if (ctx->alpn_client_proto_list)
+        OPENSSL_free(ctx->alpn_client_proto_list);
+
+    ctx->alpn_client_proto_list = OPENSSL_malloc(protos_len);
+    if (!ctx->alpn_client_proto_list)
+        return 1;
+    memcpy(ctx->alpn_client_proto_list, protos, protos_len);
+    ctx->alpn_client_proto_list_len = protos_len;
+
+    return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * SSL_set_alpn_protos sets the ALPN protocol list on |ssl| to |protos|.
+ * |protos| must be in wire-format (i.e. a series of non-empty, 8-bit
+ * length-prefixed strings). Returns 0 on success.
+ */
+int SSL_set_alpn_protos(SSL *ssl, const unsigned char *protos,
+                        unsigned protos_len)
+{
+    if (ssl->alpn_client_proto_list)
+        OPENSSL_free(ssl->alpn_client_proto_list);
+
+    ssl->alpn_client_proto_list = OPENSSL_malloc(protos_len);
+    if (!ssl->alpn_client_proto_list)
+        return 1;
+    memcpy(ssl->alpn_client_proto_list, protos, protos_len);
+    ssl->alpn_client_proto_list_len = protos_len;
+
+    return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * SSL_CTX_set_alpn_select_cb sets a callback function on |ctx| that is
+ * called during ClientHello processing in order to select an ALPN protocol
+ * from the client's list of offered protocols.
+ */
+void SSL_CTX_set_alpn_select_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx,
+                                int (*cb) (SSL *ssl,
+                                           const unsigned char **out,
+                                           unsigned char *outlen,
+                                           const unsigned char *in,
+                                           unsigned int inlen,
+                                           void *arg), void *arg)
+{
+    ctx->alpn_select_cb = cb;
+    ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg = arg;
+}
+
+/*
+ * SSL_get0_alpn_selected gets the selected ALPN protocol (if any) from
+ * |ssl|. On return it sets |*data| to point to |*len| bytes of protocol name
+ * (not including the leading length-prefix byte). If the server didn't
+ * respond with a negotiated protocol then |*len| will be zero.
+ */
+void SSL_get0_alpn_selected(const SSL *ssl, const unsigned char **data,
+                            unsigned *len)
+{
+    *data = NULL;
+    if (ssl->s3)
+        *data = ssl->s3->alpn_selected;
+    if (*data == NULL)
+        *len = 0;
+    else
+        *len = ssl->s3->alpn_selected_len;
+}
+
+#endif                          /* !OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
+
+int SSL_export_keying_material(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, size_t olen,
+                               const char *label, size_t llen,
+                               const unsigned char *p, size_t plen,
+                               int use_context)
+{
+    if (s->version < TLS1_VERSION && s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
+        return -1;
+
+    return s->method->ssl3_enc->export_keying_material(s, out, olen, label,
+                                                       llen, p, plen,
+                                                       use_context);
+}
+
+static unsigned long ssl_session_hash(const SSL_SESSION *a)
+{
+    unsigned long l;
+
+    l = (unsigned long)
+        ((unsigned int)a->session_id[0]) |
+        ((unsigned int)a->session_id[1] << 8L) |
+        ((unsigned long)a->session_id[2] << 16L) |
+        ((unsigned long)a->session_id[3] << 24L);
+    return (l);
+}
+
+/*
+ * NB: If this function (or indeed the hash function which uses a sort of
+ * coarser function than this one) is changed, ensure
+ * SSL_CTX_has_matching_session_id() is checked accordingly. It relies on
+ * being able to construct an SSL_SESSION that will collide with any existing
+ * session with a matching session ID.
+ */
+static int ssl_session_cmp(const SSL_SESSION *a, const SSL_SESSION *b)
+{
+    if (a->ssl_version != b->ssl_version)
+        return (1);
+    if (a->session_id_length != b->session_id_length)
+        return (1);
+    return (memcmp(a->session_id, b->session_id, a->session_id_length));
+}
+
+/*
+ * These wrapper functions should remain rather than redeclaring
+ * SSL_SESSION_hash and SSL_SESSION_cmp for void* types and casting each
+ * variable. The reason is that the functions aren't static, they're exposed
+ * via ssl.h.
+ */
+static IMPLEMENT_LHASH_HASH_FN(ssl_session, SSL_SESSION)
+static IMPLEMENT_LHASH_COMP_FN(ssl_session, SSL_SESSION)
+
+SSL_CTX *SSL_CTX_new(const SSL_METHOD *meth)
+{
+    SSL_CTX *ret = NULL;
+
+    if (meth == NULL) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW, SSL_R_NULL_SSL_METHOD_PASSED);
+        return (NULL);
+    }
+#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
+    if (FIPS_mode() && (meth->version < TLS1_VERSION)) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW, SSL_R_ONLY_TLS_ALLOWED_IN_FIPS_MODE);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+#endif
+
+    if (SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx() < 0) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW, SSL_R_X509_VERIFICATION_SETUP_PROBLEMS);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    ret = (SSL_CTX *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(SSL_CTX));
+    if (ret == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    memset(ret, 0, sizeof(SSL_CTX));
+
+    ret->method = meth;
+
+    ret->cert_store = NULL;
+    ret->session_cache_mode = SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER;
+    ret->session_cache_size = SSL_SESSION_CACHE_MAX_SIZE_DEFAULT;
+    ret->session_cache_head = NULL;
+    ret->session_cache_tail = NULL;
+
+    /* We take the system default */
+    ret->session_timeout = meth->get_timeout();
+
+    ret->new_session_cb = 0;
+    ret->remove_session_cb = 0;
+    ret->get_session_cb = 0;
+    ret->generate_session_id = 0;
+
+    memset((char *)&ret->stats, 0, sizeof(ret->stats));
+
+    ret->references = 1;
+    ret->quiet_shutdown = 0;
+
+/*  ret->cipher=NULL;*/
+/*-
+    ret->s2->challenge=NULL;
+    ret->master_key=NULL;
+    ret->key_arg=NULL;
+    ret->s2->conn_id=NULL; */
+
+    ret->info_callback = NULL;
+
+    ret->app_verify_callback = 0;
+    ret->app_verify_arg = NULL;
+
+    ret->max_cert_list = SSL_MAX_CERT_LIST_DEFAULT;
+    ret->read_ahead = 0;
+    ret->msg_callback = 0;
+    ret->msg_callback_arg = NULL;
+    ret->verify_mode = SSL_VERIFY_NONE;
+#if 0
+    ret->verify_depth = -1;     /* Don't impose a limit (but x509_lu.c does) */
+#endif
+    ret->sid_ctx_length = 0;
+    ret->default_verify_callback = NULL;
+    if ((ret->cert = ssl_cert_new()) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    ret->default_passwd_callback = 0;
+    ret->default_passwd_callback_userdata = NULL;
+    ret->client_cert_cb = 0;
+    ret->app_gen_cookie_cb = 0;
+    ret->app_verify_cookie_cb = 0;
+
+    ret->sessions = lh_SSL_SESSION_new();
+    if (ret->sessions == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    ret->cert_store = X509_STORE_new();
+    if (ret->cert_store == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    ssl_create_cipher_list(ret->method,
+                           &ret->cipher_list, &ret->cipher_list_by_id,
+                           meth->version ==
+                           SSL2_VERSION ? "SSLv2" : SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST,
+                           ret->cert);
+    if (ret->cipher_list == NULL || sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ret->cipher_list) <= 0) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW, SSL_R_LIBRARY_HAS_NO_CIPHERS);
+        goto err2;
+    }
+
+    ret->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new();
+    if (!ret->param)
+        goto err;
+
+    if ((ret->rsa_md5 = EVP_get_digestbyname("ssl2-md5")) == NULL) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW, SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_LOAD_SSL2_MD5_ROUTINES);
+        goto err2;
+    }
+    if ((ret->md5 = EVP_get_digestbyname("ssl3-md5")) == NULL) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW, SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_LOAD_SSL3_MD5_ROUTINES);
+        goto err2;
+    }
+    if ((ret->sha1 = EVP_get_digestbyname("ssl3-sha1")) == NULL) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW, SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_LOAD_SSL3_SHA1_ROUTINES);
+        goto err2;
+    }
+
+    if ((ret->client_CA = sk_X509_NAME_new_null()) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_CTX, ret, &ret->ex_data);
+
+    ret->extra_certs = NULL;
+    /* No compression for DTLS */
+    if (!(meth->ssl3_enc->enc_flags & SSL_ENC_FLAG_DTLS))
+        ret->comp_methods = SSL_COMP_get_compression_methods();
+
+    ret->max_send_fragment = SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+    ret->tlsext_servername_callback = 0;
+    ret->tlsext_servername_arg = NULL;
+    /* Setup RFC4507 ticket keys */
+    if ((RAND_bytes(ret->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16) <= 0)
+        || (RAND_bytes(ret->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16) <= 0)
+        || (RAND_bytes(ret->tlsext_tick_aes_key, 16) <= 0))
+        ret->options |= SSL_OP_NO_TICKET;
+
+    ret->tlsext_status_cb = 0;
+    ret->tlsext_status_arg = NULL;
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
+    ret->next_protos_advertised_cb = 0;
+    ret->next_proto_select_cb = 0;
+# endif
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+    ret->psk_identity_hint = NULL;
+    ret->psk_client_callback = NULL;
+    ret->psk_server_callback = NULL;
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+    SSL_CTX_SRP_CTX_init(ret);
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_BUF_FREELISTS
+    ret->freelist_max_len = SSL_MAX_BUF_FREELIST_LEN_DEFAULT;
+    ret->rbuf_freelist = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(SSL3_BUF_FREELIST));
+    if (!ret->rbuf_freelist)
+        goto err;
+    ret->rbuf_freelist->chunklen = 0;
+    ret->rbuf_freelist->len = 0;
+    ret->rbuf_freelist->head = NULL;
+    ret->wbuf_freelist = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(SSL3_BUF_FREELIST));
+    if (!ret->wbuf_freelist)
+        goto err;
+    ret->wbuf_freelist->chunklen = 0;
+    ret->wbuf_freelist->len = 0;
+    ret->wbuf_freelist->head = NULL;
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+    ret->client_cert_engine = NULL;
+# ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_CLIENT_ENGINE_AUTO
+#  define eng_strx(x)     #x
+#  define eng_str(x)      eng_strx(x)
+    /* Use specific client engine automatically... ignore errors */
+    {
+        ENGINE *eng;
+        eng = ENGINE_by_id(eng_str(OPENSSL_SSL_CLIENT_ENGINE_AUTO));
+        if (!eng) {
+            ERR_clear_error();
+            ENGINE_load_builtin_engines();
+            eng = ENGINE_by_id(eng_str(OPENSSL_SSL_CLIENT_ENGINE_AUTO));
+        }
+        if (!eng || !SSL_CTX_set_client_cert_engine(ret, eng))
+            ERR_clear_error();
+    }
+# endif
+#endif
+    /*
+     * Default is to connect to non-RI servers. When RI is more widely
+     * deployed might change this.
+     */
+    ret->options |= SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT;
+
+    /*
+     * Disable SSLv2 by default, callers that want to enable SSLv2 will have to
+     * explicitly clear this option via either of SSL_CTX_clear_options() or
+     * SSL_clear_options().
+     */
+    ret->options |= SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2;
+
+    return (ret);
+ err:
+    SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ err2:
+    if (ret != NULL)
+        SSL_CTX_free(ret);
+    return (NULL);
+}
+
+#if 0
+static void SSL_COMP_free(SSL_COMP *comp)
+{
+    OPENSSL_free(comp);
+}
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_BUF_FREELISTS
+static void ssl_buf_freelist_free(SSL3_BUF_FREELIST *list)
+{
+    SSL3_BUF_FREELIST_ENTRY *ent, *next;
+    for (ent = list->head; ent; ent = next) {
+        next = ent->next;
+        OPENSSL_free(ent);
+    }
+    OPENSSL_free(list);
+}
+#endif
+
+void SSL_CTX_free(SSL_CTX *a)
+{
+    int i;
+
+    if (a == NULL)
+        return;
+
+    i = CRYPTO_add(&a->references, -1, CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
+#ifdef REF_PRINT
+    REF_PRINT("SSL_CTX", a);
+#endif
+    if (i > 0)
+        return;
+#ifdef REF_CHECK
+    if (i < 0) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "SSL_CTX_free, bad reference count\n");
+        abort();                /* ok */
+    }
+#endif
+
+    if (a->param)
+        X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(a->param);
+
+    /*
+     * Free internal session cache. However: the remove_cb() may reference
+     * the ex_data of SSL_CTX, thus the ex_data store can only be removed
+     * after the sessions were flushed.
+     * As the ex_data handling routines might also touch the session cache,
+     * the most secure solution seems to be: empty (flush) the cache, then
+     * free ex_data, then finally free the cache.
+     * (See ticket [openssl.org #212].)
+     */
+    if (a->sessions != NULL)
+        SSL_CTX_flush_sessions(a, 0);
+
+    CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_CTX, a, &a->ex_data);
+
+    if (a->sessions != NULL)
+        lh_SSL_SESSION_free(a->sessions);
+
+    if (a->cert_store != NULL)
+        X509_STORE_free(a->cert_store);
+    if (a->cipher_list != NULL)
+        sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(a->cipher_list);
+    if (a->cipher_list_by_id != NULL)
+        sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(a->cipher_list_by_id);
+    if (a->cert != NULL)
+        ssl_cert_free(a->cert);
+    if (a->client_CA != NULL)
+        sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(a->client_CA, X509_NAME_free);
+    if (a->extra_certs != NULL)
+        sk_X509_pop_free(a->extra_certs, X509_free);
+#if 0                           /* This should never be done, since it
+                                 * removes a global database */
+    if (a->comp_methods != NULL)
+        sk_SSL_COMP_pop_free(a->comp_methods, SSL_COMP_free);
+#else
+    a->comp_methods = NULL;
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
+    if (a->srtp_profiles)
+        sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_free(a->srtp_profiles);
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+    if (a->psk_identity_hint)
+        OPENSSL_free(a->psk_identity_hint);
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+    SSL_CTX_SRP_CTX_free(a);
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+    if (a->client_cert_engine)
+        ENGINE_finish(a->client_cert_engine);
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_BUF_FREELISTS
+    if (a->wbuf_freelist)
+        ssl_buf_freelist_free(a->wbuf_freelist);
+    if (a->rbuf_freelist)
+        ssl_buf_freelist_free(a->rbuf_freelist);
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+    if (a->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
+        OPENSSL_free(a->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
+    if (a->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist)
+        OPENSSL_free(a->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist);
+# endif                         /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
+    if (a->alpn_client_proto_list != NULL)
+        OPENSSL_free(a->alpn_client_proto_list);
+#endif
+
+    OPENSSL_free(a);
+}
+
+void SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, pem_password_cb *cb)
+{
+    ctx->default_passwd_callback = cb;
+}
+
+void SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb_userdata(SSL_CTX *ctx, void *u)
+{
+    ctx->default_passwd_callback_userdata = u;
+}
+
+void SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,
+                                      int (*cb) (X509_STORE_CTX *, void *),
+                                      void *arg)
+{
+    ctx->app_verify_callback = cb;
+    ctx->app_verify_arg = arg;
+}
+
+void SSL_CTX_set_verify(SSL_CTX *ctx, int mode,
+                        int (*cb) (int, X509_STORE_CTX *))
+{
+    ctx->verify_mode = mode;
+    ctx->default_verify_callback = cb;
+}
+
+void SSL_CTX_set_verify_depth(SSL_CTX *ctx, int depth)
+{
+    X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(ctx->param, depth);
+}
+
+void SSL_CTX_set_cert_cb(SSL_CTX *c, int (*cb) (SSL *ssl, void *arg),
+                         void *arg)
+{
+    ssl_cert_set_cert_cb(c->cert, cb, arg);
+}
+
+void SSL_set_cert_cb(SSL *s, int (*cb) (SSL *ssl, void *arg), void *arg)
+{
+    ssl_cert_set_cert_cb(s->cert, cb, arg);
+}
+
+void ssl_set_cert_masks(CERT *c, const SSL_CIPHER *cipher)
+{
+    CERT_PKEY *cpk;
+    int rsa_enc, rsa_tmp, rsa_sign, dh_tmp, dh_rsa, dh_dsa, dsa_sign;
+    int rsa_enc_export, dh_rsa_export, dh_dsa_export;
+    int rsa_tmp_export, dh_tmp_export, kl;
+    unsigned long mask_k, mask_a, emask_k, emask_a;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
+    int have_ecc_cert, ecdsa_ok, ecc_pkey_size;
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+    int have_ecdh_tmp, ecdh_ok;
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+    X509 *x = NULL;
+    EVP_PKEY *ecc_pkey = NULL;
+    int signature_nid = 0, pk_nid = 0, md_nid = 0;
+#endif
+    if (c == NULL)
+        return;
+
+    kl = SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(cipher);
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+    rsa_tmp = (c->rsa_tmp != NULL || c->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL);
+    rsa_tmp_export = (c->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL ||
+                      (rsa_tmp && RSA_size(c->rsa_tmp) * 8 <= kl));
+#else
+    rsa_tmp = rsa_tmp_export = 0;
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+    dh_tmp = (c->dh_tmp != NULL || c->dh_tmp_cb != NULL);
+    dh_tmp_export = (c->dh_tmp_cb != NULL ||
+                     (dh_tmp && DH_size(c->dh_tmp) * 8 <= kl));
+#else
+    dh_tmp = dh_tmp_export = 0;
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+    have_ecdh_tmp = (c->ecdh_tmp || c->ecdh_tmp_cb || c->ecdh_tmp_auto);
+#endif
+    cpk = &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC]);
+    rsa_enc = cpk->valid_flags & CERT_PKEY_VALID;
+    rsa_enc_export = (rsa_enc && EVP_PKEY_size(cpk->privatekey) * 8 <= kl);
+    cpk = &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN]);
+    rsa_sign = cpk->valid_flags & CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
+    cpk = &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN]);
+    dsa_sign = cpk->valid_flags & CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
+    cpk = &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA]);
+    dh_rsa = cpk->valid_flags & CERT_PKEY_VALID;
+    dh_rsa_export = (dh_rsa && EVP_PKEY_size(cpk->privatekey) * 8 <= kl);
+    cpk = &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA]);
+/* FIX THIS EAY EAY EAY */
+    dh_dsa = cpk->valid_flags & CERT_PKEY_VALID;
+    dh_dsa_export = (dh_dsa && EVP_PKEY_size(cpk->privatekey) * 8 <= kl);
+    cpk = &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC]);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+    have_ecc_cert = cpk->valid_flags & CERT_PKEY_VALID;
+#endif
+    mask_k = 0;
+    mask_a = 0;
+    emask_k = 0;
+    emask_a = 0;
+
+#ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
+    fprintf(stderr,
+            "rt=%d rte=%d dht=%d ecdht=%d re=%d ree=%d rs=%d ds=%d dhr=%d dhd=%d\n",
+            rsa_tmp, rsa_tmp_export, dh_tmp, have_ecdh_tmp, rsa_enc,
+            rsa_enc_export, rsa_sign, dsa_sign, dh_rsa, dh_dsa);
+#endif
+
+    cpk = &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01]);
+    if (cpk->x509 != NULL && cpk->privatekey != NULL) {
+        mask_k |= SSL_kGOST;
+        mask_a |= SSL_aGOST01;
+    }
+    cpk = &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST94]);
+    if (cpk->x509 != NULL && cpk->privatekey != NULL) {
+        mask_k |= SSL_kGOST;
+        mask_a |= SSL_aGOST94;
+    }
+
+    if (rsa_enc || (rsa_tmp && rsa_sign))
+        mask_k |= SSL_kRSA;
+    if (rsa_enc_export || (rsa_tmp_export && (rsa_sign || rsa_enc)))
+        emask_k |= SSL_kRSA;
+
+#if 0
+    /* The match needs to be both kEDH and aRSA or aDSA, so don't worry */
+    if ((dh_tmp || dh_rsa || dh_dsa) && (rsa_enc || rsa_sign || dsa_sign))
+        mask_k |= SSL_kEDH;
+    if ((dh_tmp_export || dh_rsa_export || dh_dsa_export) &&
+        (rsa_enc || rsa_sign || dsa_sign))
+        emask_k |= SSL_kEDH;
+#endif
+
+    if (dh_tmp_export)
+        emask_k |= SSL_kEDH;
+
+    if (dh_tmp)
+        mask_k |= SSL_kEDH;
+
+    if (dh_rsa)
+        mask_k |= SSL_kDHr;
+    if (dh_rsa_export)
+        emask_k |= SSL_kDHr;
+
+    if (dh_dsa)
+        mask_k |= SSL_kDHd;
+    if (dh_dsa_export)
+        emask_k |= SSL_kDHd;
+
+    if (mask_k & (SSL_kDHr | SSL_kDHd))
+        mask_a |= SSL_aDH;
+
+    if (rsa_enc || rsa_sign) {
+        mask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
+        emask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
+    }
+
+    if (dsa_sign) {
+        mask_a |= SSL_aDSS;
+        emask_a |= SSL_aDSS;
+    }
+
+    mask_a |= SSL_aNULL;
+    emask_a |= SSL_aNULL;
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
+    mask_k |= SSL_kKRB5;
+    mask_a |= SSL_aKRB5;
+    emask_k |= SSL_kKRB5;
+    emask_a |= SSL_aKRB5;
+#endif
+
+    /*
+     * An ECC certificate may be usable for ECDH and/or ECDSA cipher suites
+     * depending on the key usage extension.
+     */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+    if (have_ecc_cert) {
+        cpk = &c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC];
+        x = cpk->x509;
+        /* This call populates extension flags (ex_flags) */
+        X509_check_purpose(x, -1, 0);
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+        ecdh_ok = (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) ?
+            (x->ex_kusage & X509v3_KU_KEY_AGREEMENT) : 1;
+# endif
+        ecdsa_ok = (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) ?
+            (x->ex_kusage & X509v3_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE) : 1;
+        if (!(cpk->valid_flags & CERT_PKEY_SIGN))
+            ecdsa_ok = 0;
+        ecc_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
+        ecc_pkey_size = (ecc_pkey != NULL) ? EVP_PKEY_bits(ecc_pkey) : 0;
+        EVP_PKEY_free(ecc_pkey);
+        if ((x->sig_alg) && (x->sig_alg->algorithm)) {
+            signature_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(x->sig_alg->algorithm);
+            OBJ_find_sigid_algs(signature_nid, &md_nid, &pk_nid);
+        }
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+        if (ecdh_ok) {
+
+            if (pk_nid == NID_rsaEncryption || pk_nid == NID_rsa) {
+                mask_k |= SSL_kECDHr;
+                mask_a |= SSL_aECDH;
+                if (ecc_pkey_size <= 163) {
+                    emask_k |= SSL_kECDHr;
+                    emask_a |= SSL_aECDH;
+                }
+            }
+
+            if (pk_nid == NID_X9_62_id_ecPublicKey) {
+                mask_k |= SSL_kECDHe;
+                mask_a |= SSL_aECDH;
+                if (ecc_pkey_size <= 163) {
+                    emask_k |= SSL_kECDHe;
+                    emask_a |= SSL_aECDH;
+                }
+            }
+        }
+# endif
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
+        if (ecdsa_ok) {
+            mask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
+            emask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
+        }
+# endif
+    }
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+    if (have_ecdh_tmp) {
+        mask_k |= SSL_kEECDH;
+        emask_k |= SSL_kEECDH;
+    }
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+    mask_k |= SSL_kPSK;
+    mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
+    emask_k |= SSL_kPSK;
+    emask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
+#endif
+
+    c->mask_k = mask_k;
+    c->mask_a = mask_a;
+    c->export_mask_k = emask_k;
+    c->export_mask_a = emask_a;
+    c->valid = 1;
+}
+
+/* This handy macro borrowed from crypto/x509v3/v3_purp.c */
+#define ku_reject(x, usage) \
+        (((x)->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) && !((x)->ex_kusage & (usage)))
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+
+int ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(X509 *x, SSL *s)
+{
+    unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
+    EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
+    int keysize = 0;
+    int signature_nid = 0, md_nid = 0, pk_nid = 0;
+    const SSL_CIPHER *cs = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
+
+    alg_k = cs->algorithm_mkey;
+    alg_a = cs->algorithm_auth;
+
+    if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(cs)) {
+        /* ECDH key length in export ciphers must be <= 163 bits */
+        pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
+        if (pkey == NULL)
+            return 0;
+        keysize = EVP_PKEY_bits(pkey);
+        EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+        if (keysize > 163)
+            return 0;
+    }
+
+    /* This call populates the ex_flags field correctly */
+    X509_check_purpose(x, -1, 0);
+    if ((x->sig_alg) && (x->sig_alg->algorithm)) {
+        signature_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(x->sig_alg->algorithm);
+        OBJ_find_sigid_algs(signature_nid, &md_nid, &pk_nid);
+    }
+    if (alg_k & SSL_kECDHe || alg_k & SSL_kECDHr) {
+        /* key usage, if present, must allow key agreement */
+        if (ku_reject(x, X509v3_KU_KEY_AGREEMENT)) {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SRVR_ECC_CERT_AND_ALG,
+                   SSL_R_ECC_CERT_NOT_FOR_KEY_AGREEMENT);
+            return 0;
+        }
+        if ((alg_k & SSL_kECDHe) && TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION) {
+            /* signature alg must be ECDSA */
+            if (pk_nid != NID_X9_62_id_ecPublicKey) {
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SRVR_ECC_CERT_AND_ALG,
+                       SSL_R_ECC_CERT_SHOULD_HAVE_SHA1_SIGNATURE);
+                return 0;
+            }
+        }
+        if ((alg_k & SSL_kECDHr) && TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION) {
+            /* signature alg must be RSA */
+
+            if (pk_nid != NID_rsaEncryption && pk_nid != NID_rsa) {
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SRVR_ECC_CERT_AND_ALG,
+                       SSL_R_ECC_CERT_SHOULD_HAVE_RSA_SIGNATURE);
+                return 0;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    if (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA) {
+        /* key usage, if present, must allow signing */
+        if (ku_reject(x, X509v3_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE)) {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SRVR_ECC_CERT_AND_ALG,
+                   SSL_R_ECC_CERT_NOT_FOR_SIGNING);
+            return 0;
+        }
+    }
+
+    return 1;                   /* all checks are ok */
+}
+
+#endif
+
+static int ssl_get_server_cert_index(const SSL *s)
+{
+    int idx;
+    idx = ssl_cipher_get_cert_index(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher);
+    if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC && !s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509)
+        idx = SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
+    if (idx == -1)
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_SERVER_CERT_INDEX, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+    return idx;
+}
+
+CERT_PKEY *ssl_get_server_send_pkey(const SSL *s)
+{
+    CERT *c;
+    int i;
+
+    c = s->cert;
+    if (!s->s3 || !s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
+        return NULL;
+    ssl_set_cert_masks(c, s->s3->tmp.new_cipher);
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
+    /*
+     * Broken protocol test: return last used certificate: which may mismatch
+     * the one expected.
+     */
+    if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
+        return c->key;
+#endif
+
+    i = ssl_get_server_cert_index(s);
+
+    /* This may or may not be an error. */
+    if (i < 0)
+        return NULL;
+
+    /* May be NULL. */
+    return &c->pkeys[i];
+}
+
+EVP_PKEY *ssl_get_sign_pkey(SSL *s, const SSL_CIPHER *cipher,
+                            const EVP_MD **pmd)
+{
+    unsigned long alg_a;
+    CERT *c;
+    int idx = -1;
+
+    alg_a = cipher->algorithm_auth;
+    c = s->cert;
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
+    /*
+     * Broken protocol test: use last key: which may mismatch the one
+     * expected.
+     */
+    if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
+        idx = c->key - c->pkeys;
+    else
+#endif
+
+    if ((alg_a & SSL_aDSS) &&
+            (c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].privatekey != NULL))
+        idx = SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
+    else if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA) {
+        if (c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].privatekey != NULL)
+            idx = SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
+        else if (c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey != NULL)
+            idx = SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC;
+    } else if ((alg_a & SSL_aECDSA) &&
+               (c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey != NULL))
+        idx = SSL_PKEY_ECC;
+    if (idx == -1) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_SIGN_PKEY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+        return (NULL);
+    }
+    if (pmd)
+        *pmd = c->pkeys[idx].digest;
+    return c->pkeys[idx].privatekey;
+}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+int ssl_get_server_cert_serverinfo(SSL *s, const unsigned char **serverinfo,
+                                   size_t *serverinfo_length)
+{
+    CERT *c = NULL;
+    int i = 0;
+    *serverinfo_length = 0;
+
+    c = s->cert;
+    i = ssl_get_server_cert_index(s);
+
+    if (i == -1)
+        return 0;
+    if (c->pkeys[i].serverinfo == NULL)
+        return 0;
+
+    *serverinfo = c->pkeys[i].serverinfo;
+    *serverinfo_length = c->pkeys[i].serverinfo_length;
+    return 1;
+}
+#endif
+
+void ssl_update_cache(SSL *s, int mode)
+{
+    int i;
+
+    /*
+     * If the session_id_length is 0, we are not supposed to cache it, and it
+     * would be rather hard to do anyway :-)
+     */
+    if (s->session->session_id_length == 0)
+        return;
+
+    i = s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode;
+    if ((i & mode) && (!s->hit)
+        && ((i & SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_STORE)
+            || SSL_CTX_add_session(s->session_ctx, s->session))
+        && (s->session_ctx->new_session_cb != NULL)) {
+        CRYPTO_add(&s->session->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION);
+        if (!s->session_ctx->new_session_cb(s, s->session))
+            SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
+    }
+
+    /* auto flush every 255 connections */
+    if ((!(i & SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_AUTO_CLEAR)) && ((i & mode) == mode)) {
+        if ((((mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT)
+              ? s->session_ctx->stats.sess_connect_good
+              : s->session_ctx->stats.sess_accept_good) & 0xff) == 0xff) {
+            SSL_CTX_flush_sessions(s->session_ctx, (unsigned long)time(NULL));
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+const SSL_METHOD *SSL_CTX_get_ssl_method(SSL_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    return ctx->method;
+}
+
+const SSL_METHOD *SSL_get_ssl_method(SSL *s)
+{
+    return (s->method);
+}
+
+int SSL_set_ssl_method(SSL *s, const SSL_METHOD *meth)
+{
+    int conn = -1;
+    int ret = 1;
+
+    if (s->method != meth) {
+        if (s->handshake_func != NULL)
+            conn = (s->handshake_func == s->method->ssl_connect);
+
+        if (s->method->version == meth->version)
+            s->method = meth;
+        else {
+            s->method->ssl_free(s);
+            s->method = meth;
+            ret = s->method->ssl_new(s);
+        }
+
+        if (conn == 1)
+            s->handshake_func = meth->ssl_connect;
+        else if (conn == 0)
+            s->handshake_func = meth->ssl_accept;
+    }
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+int SSL_get_error(const SSL *s, int i)
+{
+    int reason;
+    unsigned long l;
+    BIO *bio;
+
+    if (i > 0)
+        return (SSL_ERROR_NONE);
+
+    /*
+     * Make things return SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL when doing SSL_do_handshake etc,
+     * where we do encode the error
+     */
+    if ((l = ERR_peek_error()) != 0) {
+        if (ERR_GET_LIB(l) == ERR_LIB_SYS)
+            return (SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL);
+        else
+            return (SSL_ERROR_SSL);
+    }
+
+    if ((i < 0) && SSL_want_read(s)) {
+        bio = SSL_get_rbio(s);
+        if (BIO_should_read(bio))
+            return (SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ);
+        else if (BIO_should_write(bio))
+            /*
+             * This one doesn't make too much sense ... We never try to write
+             * to the rbio, and an application program where rbio and wbio
+             * are separate couldn't even know what it should wait for.
+             * However if we ever set s->rwstate incorrectly (so that we have
+             * SSL_want_read(s) instead of SSL_want_write(s)) and rbio and
+             * wbio *are* the same, this test works around that bug; so it
+             * might be safer to keep it.
+             */
+            return (SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE);
+        else if (BIO_should_io_special(bio)) {
+            reason = BIO_get_retry_reason(bio);
+            if (reason == BIO_RR_CONNECT)
+                return (SSL_ERROR_WANT_CONNECT);
+            else if (reason == BIO_RR_ACCEPT)
+                return (SSL_ERROR_WANT_ACCEPT);
+            else
+                return (SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL); /* unknown */
+        }
+    }
+
+    if ((i < 0) && SSL_want_write(s)) {
+        bio = SSL_get_wbio(s);
+        if (BIO_should_write(bio))
+            return (SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE);
+        else if (BIO_should_read(bio))
+            /*
+             * See above (SSL_want_read(s) with BIO_should_write(bio))
+             */
+            return (SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ);
+        else if (BIO_should_io_special(bio)) {
+            reason = BIO_get_retry_reason(bio);
+            if (reason == BIO_RR_CONNECT)
+                return (SSL_ERROR_WANT_CONNECT);
+            else if (reason == BIO_RR_ACCEPT)
+                return (SSL_ERROR_WANT_ACCEPT);
+            else
+                return (SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL);
+        }
+    }
+    if ((i < 0) && SSL_want_x509_lookup(s)) {
+        return (SSL_ERROR_WANT_X509_LOOKUP);
+    }
+
+    if (i == 0) {
+        if (s->version == SSL2_VERSION) {
+            /* assume it is the socket being closed */
+            return (SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN);
+        } else {
+            if ((s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) &&
+                (s->s3->warn_alert == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY))
+                return (SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN);
+        }
+    }
+    return (SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL);
+}
+
+int SSL_do_handshake(SSL *s)
+{
+    int ret = 1;
+
+    if (s->handshake_func == NULL) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_DO_HANDSHAKE, SSL_R_CONNECTION_TYPE_NOT_SET);
+        return (-1);
+    }
+
+    s->method->ssl_renegotiate_check(s);
+
+    if (SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) {
+        ret = s->handshake_func(s);
+    }
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+/*
+ * For the next 2 functions, SSL_clear() sets shutdown and so one of these
+ * calls will reset it
+ */
+void SSL_set_accept_state(SSL *s)
+{
+    s->server = 1;
+    s->shutdown = 0;
+    s->state = SSL_ST_ACCEPT | SSL_ST_BEFORE;
+    s->handshake_func = s->method->ssl_accept;
+    /* clear the current cipher */
+    ssl_clear_cipher_ctx(s);
+    ssl_clear_hash_ctx(&s->read_hash);
+    ssl_clear_hash_ctx(&s->write_hash);
+}
+
+void SSL_set_connect_state(SSL *s)
+{
+    s->server = 0;
+    s->shutdown = 0;
+    s->state = SSL_ST_CONNECT | SSL_ST_BEFORE;
+    s->handshake_func = s->method->ssl_connect;
+    /* clear the current cipher */
+    ssl_clear_cipher_ctx(s);
+    ssl_clear_hash_ctx(&s->read_hash);
+    ssl_clear_hash_ctx(&s->write_hash);
+}
+
+int ssl_undefined_function(SSL *s)
+{
+    SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_UNDEFINED_FUNCTION, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
+    return (0);
+}
+
+int ssl_undefined_void_function(void)
+{
+    SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_UNDEFINED_VOID_FUNCTION,
+           ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
+    return (0);
+}
+
+int ssl_undefined_const_function(const SSL *s)
+{
+    SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_UNDEFINED_CONST_FUNCTION,
+           ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
+    return (0);
+}
+
+SSL_METHOD *ssl_bad_method(int ver)
+{
+    SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BAD_METHOD, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
+    return (NULL);
+}
+
+const char *SSL_get_version(const SSL *s)
+{
+    if (s->version == TLS1_2_VERSION)
+        return ("TLSv1.2");
+    else if (s->version == TLS1_1_VERSION)
+        return ("TLSv1.1");
+    else if (s->version == TLS1_VERSION)
+        return ("TLSv1");
+    else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
+        return ("SSLv3");
+    else if (s->version == SSL2_VERSION)
+        return ("SSLv2");
+    else if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
+        return ("DTLSv0.9");
+    else if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION)
+        return ("DTLSv1");
+    else if (s->version == DTLS1_2_VERSION)
+        return ("DTLSv1.2");
+    else
+        return ("unknown");
+}
+
+SSL *SSL_dup(SSL *s)
+{
+    STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk;
+    X509_NAME *xn;
+    SSL *ret;
+    int i;
+
+    if ((ret = SSL_new(SSL_get_SSL_CTX(s))) == NULL)
+        return (NULL);
+
+    ret->version = s->version;
+    ret->type = s->type;
+    ret->method = s->method;
+
+    if (s->session != NULL) {
+        /* This copies session-id, SSL_METHOD, sid_ctx, and 'cert' */
+        SSL_copy_session_id(ret, s);
+    } else {
+        /*
+         * No session has been established yet, so we have to expect that
+         * s->cert or ret->cert will be changed later -- they should not both
+         * point to the same object, and thus we can't use
+         * SSL_copy_session_id.
+         */
+
+        ret->method->ssl_free(ret);
+        ret->method = s->method;
+        ret->method->ssl_new(ret);
+
+        if (s->cert != NULL) {
+            if (ret->cert != NULL) {
+                ssl_cert_free(ret->cert);
+            }
+            ret->cert = ssl_cert_dup(s->cert);
+            if (ret->cert == NULL)
+                goto err;
+        }
+
+        SSL_set_session_id_context(ret, s->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx_length);
+    }
+
+    ret->options = s->options;
+    ret->mode = s->mode;
+    SSL_set_max_cert_list(ret, SSL_get_max_cert_list(s));
+    SSL_set_read_ahead(ret, SSL_get_read_ahead(s));
+    ret->msg_callback = s->msg_callback;
+    ret->msg_callback_arg = s->msg_callback_arg;
+    SSL_set_verify(ret, SSL_get_verify_mode(s), SSL_get_verify_callback(s));
+    SSL_set_verify_depth(ret, SSL_get_verify_depth(s));
+    ret->generate_session_id = s->generate_session_id;
+
+    SSL_set_info_callback(ret, SSL_get_info_callback(s));
+
+    ret->debug = s->debug;
+
+    /* copy app data, a little dangerous perhaps */
+    if (!CRYPTO_dup_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL, &ret->ex_data, &s->ex_data))
+        goto err;
+
+    /* setup rbio, and wbio */
+    if (s->rbio != NULL) {
+        if (!BIO_dup_state(s->rbio, (char *)&ret->rbio))
+            goto err;
+    }
+    if (s->wbio != NULL) {
+        if (s->wbio != s->rbio) {
+            if (!BIO_dup_state(s->wbio, (char *)&ret->wbio))
+                goto err;
+        } else
+            ret->wbio = ret->rbio;
+    }
+    ret->rwstate = s->rwstate;
+    ret->in_handshake = s->in_handshake;
+    ret->handshake_func = s->handshake_func;
+    ret->server = s->server;
+    ret->renegotiate = s->renegotiate;
+    ret->new_session = s->new_session;
+    ret->quiet_shutdown = s->quiet_shutdown;
+    ret->shutdown = s->shutdown;
+    ret->state = s->state;      /* SSL_dup does not really work at any state,
+                                 * though */
+    ret->rstate = s->rstate;
+    ret->init_num = 0;          /* would have to copy ret->init_buf,
+                                 * ret->init_msg, ret->init_num,
+                                 * ret->init_off */
+    ret->hit = s->hit;
+
+    X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ret->param, s->param);
+
+    /* dup the cipher_list and cipher_list_by_id stacks */
+    if (s->cipher_list != NULL) {
+        if ((ret->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->cipher_list)) == NULL)
+            goto err;
+    }
+    if (s->cipher_list_by_id != NULL)
+        if ((ret->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->cipher_list_by_id))
+            == NULL)
+            goto err;
+
+    /* Dup the client_CA list */
+    if (s->client_CA != NULL) {
+        if ((sk = sk_X509_NAME_dup(s->client_CA)) == NULL)
+            goto err;
+        ret->client_CA = sk;
+        for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++) {
+            xn = sk_X509_NAME_value(sk, i);
+            if (sk_X509_NAME_set(sk, i, X509_NAME_dup(xn)) == NULL) {
+                X509_NAME_free(xn);
+                goto err;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (0) {
+ err:
+        if (ret != NULL)
+            SSL_free(ret);
+        ret = NULL;
+    }
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+void ssl_clear_cipher_ctx(SSL *s)
+{
+    if (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL) {
+        EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(s->enc_read_ctx);
+        OPENSSL_free(s->enc_read_ctx);
+        s->enc_read_ctx = NULL;
+    }
+    if (s->enc_write_ctx != NULL) {
+        EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(s->enc_write_ctx);
+        OPENSSL_free(s->enc_write_ctx);
+        s->enc_write_ctx = NULL;
+    }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+    if (s->expand != NULL) {
+        COMP_CTX_free(s->expand);
+        s->expand = NULL;
+    }
+    if (s->compress != NULL) {
+        COMP_CTX_free(s->compress);
+        s->compress = NULL;
+    }
+#endif
+}
+
+X509 *SSL_get_certificate(const SSL *s)
+{
+    if (s->cert != NULL)
+        return (s->cert->key->x509);
+    else
+        return (NULL);
+}
+
+EVP_PKEY *SSL_get_privatekey(const SSL *s)
+{
+    if (s->cert != NULL)
+        return (s->cert->key->privatekey);
+    else
+        return (NULL);
+}
+
+X509 *SSL_CTX_get0_certificate(const SSL_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    if (ctx->cert != NULL)
+        return ctx->cert->key->x509;
+    else
+        return NULL;
+}
+
+EVP_PKEY *SSL_CTX_get0_privatekey(const SSL_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    if (ctx->cert != NULL)
+        return ctx->cert->key->privatekey;
+    else
+        return NULL;
+}
+
+const SSL_CIPHER *SSL_get_current_cipher(const SSL *s)
+{
+    if ((s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL))
+        return (s->session->cipher);
+    return (NULL);
+}
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+const COMP_METHOD *SSL_get_current_compression(SSL *s)
+{
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+const COMP_METHOD *SSL_get_current_expansion(SSL *s)
+{
+    return NULL;
+}
+#else
+
+const COMP_METHOD *SSL_get_current_compression(SSL *s)
+{
+    if (s->compress != NULL)
+        return (s->compress->meth);
+    return (NULL);
+}
+
+const COMP_METHOD *SSL_get_current_expansion(SSL *s)
+{
+    if (s->expand != NULL)
+        return (s->expand->meth);
+    return (NULL);
+}
+#endif
+
+int ssl_init_wbio_buffer(SSL *s, int push)
+{
+    BIO *bbio;
+
+    if (s->bbio == NULL) {
+        bbio = BIO_new(BIO_f_buffer());
+        if (bbio == NULL)
+            return (0);
+        s->bbio = bbio;
+    } else {
+        bbio = s->bbio;
+        if (s->bbio == s->wbio)
+            s->wbio = BIO_pop(s->wbio);
+    }
+    (void)BIO_reset(bbio);
+/*      if (!BIO_set_write_buffer_size(bbio,16*1024)) */
+    if (!BIO_set_read_buffer_size(bbio, 1)) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_INIT_WBIO_BUFFER, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
+        return (0);
+    }
+    if (push) {
+        if (s->wbio != bbio)
+            s->wbio = BIO_push(bbio, s->wbio);
+    } else {
+        if (s->wbio == bbio)
+            s->wbio = BIO_pop(bbio);
+    }
+    return (1);
+}
+
+void ssl_free_wbio_buffer(SSL *s)
+{
+    if (s->bbio == NULL)
+        return;
+
+    if (s->bbio == s->wbio) {
+        /* remove buffering */
+        s->wbio = BIO_pop(s->wbio);
+#ifdef REF_CHECK                /* not the usual REF_CHECK, but this avoids
+                                 * adding one more preprocessor symbol */
+        assert(s->wbio != NULL);
+#endif
+    }
+    BIO_free(s->bbio);
+    s->bbio = NULL;
+}
+
+void SSL_CTX_set_quiet_shutdown(SSL_CTX *ctx, int mode)
+{
+    ctx->quiet_shutdown = mode;
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_get_quiet_shutdown(const SSL_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    return (ctx->quiet_shutdown);
+}
+
+void SSL_set_quiet_shutdown(SSL *s, int mode)
+{
+    s->quiet_shutdown = mode;
+}
+
+int SSL_get_quiet_shutdown(const SSL *s)
+{
+    return (s->quiet_shutdown);
+}
+
+void SSL_set_shutdown(SSL *s, int mode)
+{
+    s->shutdown = mode;
+}
+
+int SSL_get_shutdown(const SSL *s)
+{
+    return (s->shutdown);
+}
+
+int SSL_version(const SSL *s)
+{
+    return (s->version);
+}
+
+SSL_CTX *SSL_get_SSL_CTX(const SSL *ssl)
+{
+    return (ssl->ctx);
+}
+
+SSL_CTX *SSL_set_SSL_CTX(SSL *ssl, SSL_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    CERT *ocert = ssl->cert;
+    if (ssl->ctx == ctx)
+        return ssl->ctx;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+    if (ctx == NULL)
+        ctx = ssl->initial_ctx;
+#endif
+    ssl->cert = ssl_cert_dup(ctx->cert);
+    if (ocert) {
+        /* Preserve any already negotiated parameters */
+        if (ssl->server) {
+            ssl->cert->peer_sigalgs = ocert->peer_sigalgs;
+            ssl->cert->peer_sigalgslen = ocert->peer_sigalgslen;
+            ocert->peer_sigalgs = NULL;
+            ssl->cert->ciphers_raw = ocert->ciphers_raw;
+            ssl->cert->ciphers_rawlen = ocert->ciphers_rawlen;
+            ocert->ciphers_raw = NULL;
+        }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+        ssl->cert->alpn_proposed = ocert->alpn_proposed;
+        ssl->cert->alpn_proposed_len = ocert->alpn_proposed_len;
+        ocert->alpn_proposed = NULL;
+        ssl->cert->alpn_sent = ocert->alpn_sent;
+#endif
+        ssl_cert_free(ocert);
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * Program invariant: |sid_ctx| has fixed size (SSL_MAX_SID_CTX_LENGTH),
+     * so setter APIs must prevent invalid lengths from entering the system.
+     */
+    OPENSSL_assert(ssl->sid_ctx_length <= sizeof(ssl->sid_ctx));
+
+    /*
+     * If the session ID context matches that of the parent SSL_CTX,
+     * inherit it from the new SSL_CTX as well. If however the context does
+     * not match (i.e., it was set per-ssl with SSL_set_session_id_context),
+     * leave it unchanged.
+     */
+    if ((ssl->ctx != NULL) &&
+        (ssl->sid_ctx_length == ssl->ctx->sid_ctx_length) &&
+        (memcmp(ssl->sid_ctx, ssl->ctx->sid_ctx, ssl->sid_ctx_length) == 0)) {
+        ssl->sid_ctx_length = ctx->sid_ctx_length;
+        memcpy(&ssl->sid_ctx, &ctx->sid_ctx, sizeof(ssl->sid_ctx));
+    }
+
+    CRYPTO_add(&ctx->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
+    if (ssl->ctx != NULL)
+        SSL_CTX_free(ssl->ctx); /* decrement reference count */
+    ssl->ctx = ctx;
+
+    return (ssl->ctx);
+}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO
+int SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_paths(SSL_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    return (X509_STORE_set_default_paths(ctx->cert_store));
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *CAfile,
+                                  const char *CApath)
+{
+    return (X509_STORE_load_locations(ctx->cert_store, CAfile, CApath));
+}
+#endif
+
+void SSL_set_info_callback(SSL *ssl,
+                           void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val))
+{
+    ssl->info_callback = cb;
+}
+
+/*
+ * One compiler (Diab DCC) doesn't like argument names in returned function
+ * pointer.
+ */
+void (*SSL_get_info_callback(const SSL *ssl)) (const SSL * /* ssl */ ,
+                                               int /* type */ ,
+                                               int /* val */ ) {
+    return ssl->info_callback;
+}
+
+int SSL_state(const SSL *ssl)
+{
+    return (ssl->state);
+}
+
+void SSL_set_state(SSL *ssl, int state)
+{
+    ssl->state = state;
+}
+
+void SSL_set_verify_result(SSL *ssl, long arg)
+{
+    ssl->verify_result = arg;
+}
+
+long SSL_get_verify_result(const SSL *ssl)
+{
+    return (ssl->verify_result);
+}
+
+int SSL_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func,
+                         CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func, CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func)
+{
+    return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL, argl, argp,
+                                   new_func, dup_func, free_func);
+}
+
+int SSL_set_ex_data(SSL *s, int idx, void *arg)
+{
+    return (CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&s->ex_data, idx, arg));
+}
+
+void *SSL_get_ex_data(const SSL *s, int idx)
+{
+    return (CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&s->ex_data, idx));
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func,
+                             CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func,
+                             CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func)
+{
+    return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_CTX, argl, argp,
+                                   new_func, dup_func, free_func);
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_set_ex_data(SSL_CTX *s, int idx, void *arg)
+{
+    return (CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&s->ex_data, idx, arg));
+}
+
+void *SSL_CTX_get_ex_data(const SSL_CTX *s, int idx)
+{
+    return (CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&s->ex_data, idx));
+}
+
+int ssl_ok(SSL *s)
+{
+    return (1);
+}
+
+X509_STORE *SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(const SSL_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    return (ctx->cert_store);
+}
+
+void SSL_CTX_set_cert_store(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store)
+{
+    if (ctx->cert_store != NULL)
+        X509_STORE_free(ctx->cert_store);
+    ctx->cert_store = store;
+}
+
+int SSL_want(const SSL *s)
+{
+    return (s->rwstate);
+}
+
+/**
+ * \brief Set the callback for generating temporary RSA keys.
+ * \param ctx the SSL context.
+ * \param cb the callback
+ */
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+void SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, RSA *(*cb) (SSL *ssl,
+                                                            int is_export,
+                                                            int keylength))
+{
+    SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(ctx, SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_RSA_CB, (void (*)(void))cb);
+}
+
+void SSL_set_tmp_rsa_callback(SSL *ssl, RSA *(*cb) (SSL *ssl,
+                                                    int is_export,
+                                                    int keylength))
+{
+    SSL_callback_ctrl(ssl, SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_RSA_CB, (void (*)(void))cb);
+}
+#endif
+
+#ifdef DOXYGEN
+/**
+ * \brief The RSA temporary key callback function.
+ * \param ssl the SSL session.
+ * \param is_export \c TRUE if the temp RSA key is for an export ciphersuite.
+ * \param keylength if \c is_export is \c TRUE, then \c keylength is the size
+ * of the required key in bits.
+ * \return the temporary RSA key.
+ * \sa SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa_callback, SSL_set_tmp_rsa_callback
+ */
+
+RSA *cb(SSL *ssl, int is_export, int keylength)
+{
+}
+#endif
+
+/**
+ * \brief Set the callback for generating temporary DH keys.
+ * \param ctx the SSL context.
+ * \param dh the callback
+ */
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+void SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,
+                                 DH *(*dh) (SSL *ssl, int is_export,
+                                            int keylength))
+{
+    SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(ctx, SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_DH_CB, (void (*)(void))dh);
+}
+
+void SSL_set_tmp_dh_callback(SSL *ssl, DH *(*dh) (SSL *ssl, int is_export,
+                                                  int keylength))
+{
+    SSL_callback_ctrl(ssl, SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_DH_CB, (void (*)(void))dh);
+}
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+void SSL_CTX_set_tmp_ecdh_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,
+                                   EC_KEY *(*ecdh) (SSL *ssl, int is_export,
+                                                    int keylength))
+{
+    SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(ctx, SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_ECDH_CB,
+                          (void (*)(void))ecdh);
+}
+
+void SSL_set_tmp_ecdh_callback(SSL *ssl,
+                               EC_KEY *(*ecdh) (SSL *ssl, int is_export,
+                                                int keylength))
+{
+    SSL_callback_ctrl(ssl, SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_ECDH_CB, (void (*)(void))ecdh);
+}
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+int SSL_CTX_use_psk_identity_hint(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *identity_hint)
+{
+    if (identity_hint != NULL && strlen(identity_hint) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_PSK_IDENTITY_HINT,
+               SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    if (ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL)
+        OPENSSL_free(ctx->psk_identity_hint);
+    if (identity_hint != NULL) {
+        ctx->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(identity_hint);
+        if (ctx->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
+            return 0;
+    } else
+        ctx->psk_identity_hint = NULL;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int SSL_use_psk_identity_hint(SSL *s, const char *identity_hint)
+{
+    if (s == NULL)
+        return 0;
+
+    if (s->session == NULL)
+        return 1;               /* session not created yet, ignored */
+
+    if (identity_hint != NULL && strlen(identity_hint) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_USE_PSK_IDENTITY_HINT, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    if (s->session->psk_identity_hint != NULL)
+        OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
+    if (identity_hint != NULL) {
+        s->session->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(identity_hint);
+        if (s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
+            return 0;
+    } else
+        s->session->psk_identity_hint = NULL;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+const char *SSL_get_psk_identity_hint(const SSL *s)
+{
+    if (s == NULL || s->session == NULL)
+        return NULL;
+    return (s->session->psk_identity_hint);
+}
+
+const char *SSL_get_psk_identity(const SSL *s)
+{
+    if (s == NULL || s->session == NULL)
+        return NULL;
+    return (s->session->psk_identity);
+}
+
+void SSL_set_psk_client_callback(SSL *s,
+                                 unsigned int (*cb) (SSL *ssl,
+                                                     const char *hint,
+                                                     char *identity,
+                                                     unsigned int
+                                                     max_identity_len,
+                                                     unsigned char *psk,
+                                                     unsigned int
+                                                     max_psk_len))
+{
+    s->psk_client_callback = cb;
+}
+
+void SSL_CTX_set_psk_client_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,
+                                     unsigned int (*cb) (SSL *ssl,
+                                                         const char *hint,
+                                                         char *identity,
+                                                         unsigned int
+                                                         max_identity_len,
+                                                         unsigned char *psk,
+                                                         unsigned int
+                                                         max_psk_len))
+{
+    ctx->psk_client_callback = cb;
+}
+
+void SSL_set_psk_server_callback(SSL *s,
+                                 unsigned int (*cb) (SSL *ssl,
+                                                     const char *identity,
+                                                     unsigned char *psk,
+                                                     unsigned int
+                                                     max_psk_len))
+{
+    s->psk_server_callback = cb;
+}
+
+void SSL_CTX_set_psk_server_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,
+                                     unsigned int (*cb) (SSL *ssl,
+                                                         const char *identity,
+                                                         unsigned char *psk,
+                                                         unsigned int
+                                                         max_psk_len))
+{
+    ctx->psk_server_callback = cb;
+}
+#endif
+
+void SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,
+                              void (*cb) (int write_p, int version,
+                                          int content_type, const void *buf,
+                                          size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg))
+{
+    SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(ctx, SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK, (void (*)(void))cb);
+}
+
+void SSL_set_msg_callback(SSL *ssl,
+                          void (*cb) (int write_p, int version,
+                                      int content_type, const void *buf,
+                                      size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg))
+{
+    SSL_callback_ctrl(ssl, SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK, (void (*)(void))cb);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Allocates new EVP_MD_CTX and sets pointer to it into given pointer
+ * vairable, freeing EVP_MD_CTX previously stored in that variable, if any.
+ * If EVP_MD pointer is passed, initializes ctx with this md Returns newly
+ * allocated ctx;
+ */
+
+EVP_MD_CTX *ssl_replace_hash(EVP_MD_CTX **hash, const EVP_MD *md)
+{
+    ssl_clear_hash_ctx(hash);
+    *hash = EVP_MD_CTX_create();
+    if (*hash == NULL || (md && EVP_DigestInit_ex(*hash, md, NULL) <= 0)) {
+        EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(*hash);
+        *hash = NULL;
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    return *hash;
+}
+
+void ssl_clear_hash_ctx(EVP_MD_CTX **hash)
+{
+
+    if (*hash)
+        EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(*hash);
+    *hash = NULL;
+}
+
+void SSL_set_debug(SSL *s, int debug)
+{
+    s->debug = debug;
+}
+
+int SSL_cache_hit(SSL *s)
+{
+    return s->hit;
+}
+
+int SSL_is_server(SSL *s)
+{
+    return s->server;
+}
+
+#if defined(_WINDLL) && defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN16)
+# include "../crypto/bio/bss_file.c"
+#endif
+
+IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER)
+IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(SSL_COMP)
+IMPLEMENT_OBJ_BSEARCH_GLOBAL_CMP_FN(SSL_CIPHER, SSL_CIPHER, ssl_cipher_id);