diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'openssl/engines/e_sureware.c')
-rw-r--r-- | openssl/engines/e_sureware.c | 1101 |
1 files changed, 1101 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/openssl/engines/e_sureware.c b/openssl/engines/e_sureware.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..8a23763 --- /dev/null +++ b/openssl/engines/e_sureware.c @@ -0,0 +1,1101 @@ +/*- +* Written by Corinne Dive-Reclus(cdive@baltimore.com) +* +* +* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without +* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions +* are met: +* +* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright +* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. +* +* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright +* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in +* the documentation and/or other materials provided with the +* distribution. +* +* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this +* software must display the following acknowledgment: +* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project +* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" +* +* 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to +* endorse or promote products derived from this software without +* prior written permission. For written permission, please contact +* licensing@OpenSSL.org. +* +* 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" +* nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written +* permission of the OpenSSL Project. +* +* 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following +* acknowledgment: +* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project +* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" +* +* Written by Corinne Dive-Reclus(cdive@baltimore.com) +* +* Copyright@2001 Baltimore Technologies Ltd. +* All right Reserved. +* * +* THIS FILE IS PROVIDED BY BALTIMORE TECHNOLOGIES ``AS IS'' AND * +* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * +* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * +* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL BALTIMORE TECHNOLOGIES BE LIABLE * +* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL * +* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS * +* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * +* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT * +* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * +* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * +* SUCH DAMAGE. * +====================================================================*/ + +#include <stdio.h> +#include <string.h> +#include <openssl/crypto.h> +#include <openssl/pem.h> +#include <openssl/dso.h> +#include <openssl/engine.h> +#include <openssl/rand.h> +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA +# include <openssl/rsa.h> +#endif +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA +# include <openssl/dsa.h> +#endif +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH +# include <openssl/dh.h> +#endif +#include <openssl/bn.h> + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW +# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_SUREWARE + +# ifdef FLAT_INC +# include "sureware.h" +# else +# include "vendor_defns/sureware.h" +# endif + +# define SUREWARE_LIB_NAME "sureware engine" +# include "e_sureware_err.c" + +static int surewarehk_ctrl(ENGINE *e, int cmd, long i, void *p, + void (*f) (void)); +static int surewarehk_destroy(ENGINE *e); +static int surewarehk_init(ENGINE *e); +static int surewarehk_finish(ENGINE *e); +static int surewarehk_modexp(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, + const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx); + +/* RSA stuff */ +# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA +static int surewarehk_rsa_priv_dec(int flen, const unsigned char *from, + unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding); +static int surewarehk_rsa_sign(int flen, const unsigned char *from, + unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding); +# endif + +/* RAND stuff */ +static int surewarehk_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num); +static void surewarehk_rand_seed(const void *buf, int num); +static void surewarehk_rand_add(const void *buf, int num, double entropy); + +/* KM stuff */ +static EVP_PKEY *surewarehk_load_privkey(ENGINE *e, const char *key_id, + UI_METHOD *ui_method, + void *callback_data); +static EVP_PKEY *surewarehk_load_pubkey(ENGINE *e, const char *key_id, + UI_METHOD *ui_method, + void *callback_data); +static void surewarehk_ex_free(void *obj, void *item, CRYPTO_EX_DATA *ad, + int idx, long argl, void *argp); +# if 0 +static void surewarehk_dh_ex_free(void *obj, void *item, CRYPTO_EX_DATA *ad, + int idx, long argl, void *argp); +# endif + +# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA +/* This function is aliased to mod_exp (with the mont stuff dropped). */ +static int surewarehk_mod_exp_mont(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, + const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *m, + BN_CTX *ctx, BN_MONT_CTX *m_ctx) +{ + return surewarehk_modexp(r, a, p, m, ctx); +} + +/* Our internal RSA_METHOD that we provide pointers to */ +static RSA_METHOD surewarehk_rsa = { + "SureWare RSA method", + NULL, /* pub_enc */ + NULL, /* pub_dec */ + surewarehk_rsa_sign, /* our rsa_sign is OpenSSL priv_enc */ + surewarehk_rsa_priv_dec, /* priv_dec */ + NULL, /* mod_exp */ + surewarehk_mod_exp_mont, /* mod_exp_mongomery */ + NULL, /* init */ + NULL, /* finish */ + 0, /* RSA flag */ + NULL, + NULL, /* OpenSSL sign */ + NULL, /* OpenSSL verify */ + NULL /* keygen */ +}; +# endif + +# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH +/* Our internal DH_METHOD that we provide pointers to */ +/* This function is aliased to mod_exp (with the dh and mont dropped). */ +static int surewarehk_modexp_dh(const DH *dh, BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, + const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx, + BN_MONT_CTX *m_ctx) +{ + return surewarehk_modexp(r, a, p, m, ctx); +} + +static DH_METHOD surewarehk_dh = { + "SureWare DH method", + NULL, /* gen_key */ + NULL, /* agree, */ + surewarehk_modexp_dh, /* dh mod exp */ + NULL, /* init */ + NULL, /* finish */ + 0, /* flags */ + NULL, + NULL +}; +# endif + +static RAND_METHOD surewarehk_rand = { + /* "SureWare RAND method", */ + surewarehk_rand_seed, + surewarehk_rand_bytes, + NULL, /* cleanup */ + surewarehk_rand_add, + surewarehk_rand_bytes, + NULL, /* rand_status */ +}; + +# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA +/* DSA stuff */ +static DSA_SIG *surewarehk_dsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen, + DSA *dsa); +static int surewarehk_dsa_mod_exp(DSA *dsa, BIGNUM *rr, BIGNUM *a1, + BIGNUM *p1, BIGNUM *a2, BIGNUM *p2, + BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx, + BN_MONT_CTX *in_mont) +{ + BIGNUM t; + int to_return = 0; + BN_init(&t); + /* let rr = a1 ^ p1 mod m */ + if (!surewarehk_modexp(rr, a1, p1, m, ctx)) + goto end; + /* let t = a2 ^ p2 mod m */ + if (!surewarehk_modexp(&t, a2, p2, m, ctx)) + goto end; + /* let rr = rr * t mod m */ + if (!BN_mod_mul(rr, rr, &t, m, ctx)) + goto end; + to_return = 1; + end: + BN_free(&t); + return to_return; +} + +static DSA_METHOD surewarehk_dsa = { + "SureWare DSA method", + surewarehk_dsa_do_sign, + NULL, /* sign setup */ + NULL, /* verify, */ + surewarehk_dsa_mod_exp, /* mod exp */ + NULL, /* bn mod exp */ + NULL, /* init */ + NULL, /* finish */ + 0, + NULL, + NULL, + NULL +}; +# endif + +static const char *engine_sureware_id = "sureware"; +static const char *engine_sureware_name = "SureWare hardware engine support"; + +/* Now, to our own code */ + +/* + * As this is only ever called once, there's no need for locking (indeed - + * the lock will already be held by our caller!!!) + */ +static int bind_sureware(ENGINE *e) +{ +# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA + const RSA_METHOD *meth1; +# endif +# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA + const DSA_METHOD *meth2; +# endif +# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH + const DH_METHOD *meth3; +# endif + + if (!ENGINE_set_id(e, engine_sureware_id) || + !ENGINE_set_name(e, engine_sureware_name) || +# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA + !ENGINE_set_RSA(e, &surewarehk_rsa) || +# endif +# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA + !ENGINE_set_DSA(e, &surewarehk_dsa) || +# endif +# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH + !ENGINE_set_DH(e, &surewarehk_dh) || +# endif + !ENGINE_set_RAND(e, &surewarehk_rand) || + !ENGINE_set_destroy_function(e, surewarehk_destroy) || + !ENGINE_set_init_function(e, surewarehk_init) || + !ENGINE_set_finish_function(e, surewarehk_finish) || + !ENGINE_set_ctrl_function(e, surewarehk_ctrl) || + !ENGINE_set_load_privkey_function(e, surewarehk_load_privkey) || + !ENGINE_set_load_pubkey_function(e, surewarehk_load_pubkey)) + return 0; + +# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA + /* + * We know that the "PKCS1_SSLeay()" functions hook properly to the + * cswift-specific mod_exp and mod_exp_crt so we use those functions. NB: + * We don't use ENGINE_openssl() or anything "more generic" because + * something like the RSAref code may not hook properly, and if you own + * one of these cards then you have the right to do RSA operations on it + * anyway! + */ + meth1 = RSA_PKCS1_SSLeay(); + if (meth1) { + surewarehk_rsa.rsa_pub_enc = meth1->rsa_pub_enc; + surewarehk_rsa.rsa_pub_dec = meth1->rsa_pub_dec; + } +# endif + +# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA + /* + * Use the DSA_OpenSSL() method and just hook the mod_exp-ish bits. + */ + meth2 = DSA_OpenSSL(); + if (meth2) { + surewarehk_dsa.dsa_do_verify = meth2->dsa_do_verify; + } +# endif + +# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH + /* Much the same for Diffie-Hellman */ + meth3 = DH_OpenSSL(); + if (meth3) { + surewarehk_dh.generate_key = meth3->generate_key; + surewarehk_dh.compute_key = meth3->compute_key; + } +# endif + + /* Ensure the sureware error handling is set up */ + ERR_load_SUREWARE_strings(); + return 1; +} + +# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DYNAMIC_ENGINE +static int bind_helper(ENGINE *e, const char *id) +{ + if (id && (strcmp(id, engine_sureware_id) != 0)) + return 0; + if (!bind_sureware(e)) + return 0; + return 1; +} + +IMPLEMENT_DYNAMIC_CHECK_FN() + IMPLEMENT_DYNAMIC_BIND_FN(bind_helper) +# else +static ENGINE *engine_sureware(void) +{ + ENGINE *ret = ENGINE_new(); + if (!ret) + return NULL; + if (!bind_sureware(ret)) { + ENGINE_free(ret); + return NULL; + } + return ret; +} + +void ENGINE_load_sureware(void) +{ + /* Copied from eng_[openssl|dyn].c */ + ENGINE *toadd = engine_sureware(); + if (!toadd) + return; + ENGINE_add(toadd); + ENGINE_free(toadd); + ERR_clear_error(); +} +# endif + +/* + * This is a process-global DSO handle used for loading and unloading the + * SureWareHook library. NB: This is only set (or unset) during an init() or + * finish() call (reference counts permitting) and they're operating with + * global locks, so this should be thread-safe implicitly. + */ +static DSO *surewarehk_dso = NULL; +# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA +/* Index for KM handle. Not really used yet. */ +static int rsaHndidx = -1; +# endif +# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA +/* Index for KM handle. Not really used yet. */ +static int dsaHndidx = -1; +# endif + +/* + * These are the function pointers that are (un)set when the library has + * successfully (un)loaded. + */ +static SureWareHook_Init_t *p_surewarehk_Init = NULL; +static SureWareHook_Finish_t *p_surewarehk_Finish = NULL; +static SureWareHook_Rand_Bytes_t *p_surewarehk_Rand_Bytes = NULL; +static SureWareHook_Rand_Seed_t *p_surewarehk_Rand_Seed = NULL; +static SureWareHook_Load_Privkey_t *p_surewarehk_Load_Privkey = NULL; +static SureWareHook_Info_Pubkey_t *p_surewarehk_Info_Pubkey = NULL; +static SureWareHook_Load_Rsa_Pubkey_t *p_surewarehk_Load_Rsa_Pubkey = NULL; +static SureWareHook_Load_Dsa_Pubkey_t *p_surewarehk_Load_Dsa_Pubkey = NULL; +static SureWareHook_Free_t *p_surewarehk_Free = NULL; +static SureWareHook_Rsa_Priv_Dec_t *p_surewarehk_Rsa_Priv_Dec = NULL; +static SureWareHook_Rsa_Sign_t *p_surewarehk_Rsa_Sign = NULL; +static SureWareHook_Dsa_Sign_t *p_surewarehk_Dsa_Sign = NULL; +static SureWareHook_Mod_Exp_t *p_surewarehk_Mod_Exp = NULL; + +/* Used in the DSO operations. */ +static const char *surewarehk_LIBNAME = "SureWareHook"; +static const char *n_surewarehk_Init = "SureWareHook_Init"; +static const char *n_surewarehk_Finish = "SureWareHook_Finish"; +static const char *n_surewarehk_Rand_Bytes = "SureWareHook_Rand_Bytes"; +static const char *n_surewarehk_Rand_Seed = "SureWareHook_Rand_Seed"; +static const char *n_surewarehk_Load_Privkey = "SureWareHook_Load_Privkey"; +static const char *n_surewarehk_Info_Pubkey = "SureWareHook_Info_Pubkey"; +static const char *n_surewarehk_Load_Rsa_Pubkey = + "SureWareHook_Load_Rsa_Pubkey"; +static const char *n_surewarehk_Load_Dsa_Pubkey = + "SureWareHook_Load_Dsa_Pubkey"; +static const char *n_surewarehk_Free = "SureWareHook_Free"; +static const char *n_surewarehk_Rsa_Priv_Dec = "SureWareHook_Rsa_Priv_Dec"; +static const char *n_surewarehk_Rsa_Sign = "SureWareHook_Rsa_Sign"; +static const char *n_surewarehk_Dsa_Sign = "SureWareHook_Dsa_Sign"; +static const char *n_surewarehk_Mod_Exp = "SureWareHook_Mod_Exp"; +static BIO *logstream = NULL; + +/* + * SureWareHook library functions and mechanics - these are used by the + * higher-level functions further down. NB: As and where there's no error + * checking, take a look lower down where these functions are called, the + * checking and error handling is probably down there. + */ +static int threadsafe = 1; +static int surewarehk_ctrl(ENGINE *e, int cmd, long i, void *p, + void (*f) (void)) +{ + int to_return = 1; + + switch (cmd) { + case ENGINE_CTRL_SET_LOGSTREAM: + { + BIO *bio = (BIO *)p; + CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_ENGINE); + if (logstream) { + BIO_free(logstream); + logstream = NULL; + } + if (CRYPTO_add(&bio->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_BIO) > 1) + logstream = bio; + else + SUREWAREerr(SUREWARE_F_SUREWAREHK_CTRL, + SUREWARE_R_BIO_WAS_FREED); + } + CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_ENGINE); + break; + /* + * This will prevent the initialisation function from "installing" + * the mutex-handling callbacks, even if they are available from + * within the library (or were provided to the library from the + * calling application). This is to remove any baggage for + * applications not using multithreading. + */ + case ENGINE_CTRL_CHIL_NO_LOCKING: + CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_ENGINE); + threadsafe = 0; + CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_ENGINE); + break; + + /* The command isn't understood by this engine */ + default: + SUREWAREerr(SUREWARE_F_SUREWAREHK_CTRL, + ENGINE_R_CTRL_COMMAND_NOT_IMPLEMENTED); + to_return = 0; + break; + } + + return to_return; +} + +/* Destructor (complements the "ENGINE_surewarehk()" constructor) */ +static int surewarehk_destroy(ENGINE *e) +{ + ERR_unload_SUREWARE_strings(); + return 1; +} + +/* (de)initialisation functions. */ +static int surewarehk_init(ENGINE *e) +{ + char msg[64] = "ENGINE_init"; + SureWareHook_Init_t *p1 = NULL; + SureWareHook_Finish_t *p2 = NULL; + SureWareHook_Rand_Bytes_t *p3 = NULL; + SureWareHook_Rand_Seed_t *p4 = NULL; + SureWareHook_Load_Privkey_t *p5 = NULL; + SureWareHook_Load_Rsa_Pubkey_t *p6 = NULL; + SureWareHook_Free_t *p7 = NULL; + SureWareHook_Rsa_Priv_Dec_t *p8 = NULL; + SureWareHook_Rsa_Sign_t *p9 = NULL; + SureWareHook_Dsa_Sign_t *p12 = NULL; + SureWareHook_Info_Pubkey_t *p13 = NULL; + SureWareHook_Load_Dsa_Pubkey_t *p14 = NULL; + SureWareHook_Mod_Exp_t *p15 = NULL; + + if (surewarehk_dso != NULL) { + SUREWAREerr(SUREWARE_F_SUREWAREHK_INIT, ENGINE_R_ALREADY_LOADED); + goto err; + } + /* Attempt to load libsurewarehk.so/surewarehk.dll/whatever. */ + surewarehk_dso = DSO_load(NULL, surewarehk_LIBNAME, NULL, 0); + if (surewarehk_dso == NULL) { + SUREWAREerr(SUREWARE_F_SUREWAREHK_INIT, ENGINE_R_DSO_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + if (! + (p1 = + (SureWareHook_Init_t *) DSO_bind_func(surewarehk_dso, + n_surewarehk_Init)) +|| !(p2 = + (SureWareHook_Finish_t *) DSO_bind_func(surewarehk_dso, + n_surewarehk_Finish)) +|| !(p3 = + (SureWareHook_Rand_Bytes_t *) DSO_bind_func(surewarehk_dso, + n_surewarehk_Rand_Bytes)) +|| !(p4 = + (SureWareHook_Rand_Seed_t *) DSO_bind_func(surewarehk_dso, + n_surewarehk_Rand_Seed)) +|| !(p5 = + (SureWareHook_Load_Privkey_t *) DSO_bind_func(surewarehk_dso, + n_surewarehk_Load_Privkey)) +|| !(p6 = + (SureWareHook_Load_Rsa_Pubkey_t *) DSO_bind_func(surewarehk_dso, + n_surewarehk_Load_Rsa_Pubkey)) +|| !(p7 = + (SureWareHook_Free_t *) DSO_bind_func(surewarehk_dso, n_surewarehk_Free)) +|| !(p8 = + (SureWareHook_Rsa_Priv_Dec_t *) DSO_bind_func(surewarehk_dso, + n_surewarehk_Rsa_Priv_Dec)) +|| !(p9 = + (SureWareHook_Rsa_Sign_t *) DSO_bind_func(surewarehk_dso, + n_surewarehk_Rsa_Sign)) +|| !(p12 = + (SureWareHook_Dsa_Sign_t *) DSO_bind_func(surewarehk_dso, + n_surewarehk_Dsa_Sign)) +|| !(p13 = + (SureWareHook_Info_Pubkey_t *) DSO_bind_func(surewarehk_dso, + n_surewarehk_Info_Pubkey)) +|| !(p14 = + (SureWareHook_Load_Dsa_Pubkey_t *) DSO_bind_func(surewarehk_dso, + n_surewarehk_Load_Dsa_Pubkey)) +|| !(p15 = + (SureWareHook_Mod_Exp_t *) DSO_bind_func(surewarehk_dso, + n_surewarehk_Mod_Exp))) { + SUREWAREerr(SUREWARE_F_SUREWAREHK_INIT, ENGINE_R_DSO_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + /* Copy the pointers */ + p_surewarehk_Init = p1; + p_surewarehk_Finish = p2; + p_surewarehk_Rand_Bytes = p3; + p_surewarehk_Rand_Seed = p4; + p_surewarehk_Load_Privkey = p5; + p_surewarehk_Load_Rsa_Pubkey = p6; + p_surewarehk_Free = p7; + p_surewarehk_Rsa_Priv_Dec = p8; + p_surewarehk_Rsa_Sign = p9; + p_surewarehk_Dsa_Sign = p12; + p_surewarehk_Info_Pubkey = p13; + p_surewarehk_Load_Dsa_Pubkey = p14; + p_surewarehk_Mod_Exp = p15; + /* Contact the hardware and initialises it. */ + if (p_surewarehk_Init(msg, threadsafe) == SUREWAREHOOK_ERROR_UNIT_FAILURE) { + SUREWAREerr(SUREWARE_F_SUREWAREHK_INIT, SUREWARE_R_UNIT_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + if (p_surewarehk_Init(msg, threadsafe) == SUREWAREHOOK_ERROR_UNIT_FAILURE) { + SUREWAREerr(SUREWARE_F_SUREWAREHK_INIT, SUREWARE_R_UNIT_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + /* + * try to load the default private key, if failed does not return a + * failure but wait for an explicit ENGINE_load_privakey + */ + surewarehk_load_privkey(e, NULL, NULL, NULL); + + /* Everything's fine. */ +# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA + if (rsaHndidx == -1) + rsaHndidx = RSA_get_ex_new_index(0, + "SureWareHook RSA key handle", + NULL, NULL, surewarehk_ex_free); +# endif +# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA + if (dsaHndidx == -1) + dsaHndidx = DSA_get_ex_new_index(0, + "SureWareHook DSA key handle", + NULL, NULL, surewarehk_ex_free); +# endif + + return 1; + err: + if (surewarehk_dso) + DSO_free(surewarehk_dso); + surewarehk_dso = NULL; + p_surewarehk_Init = NULL; + p_surewarehk_Finish = NULL; + p_surewarehk_Rand_Bytes = NULL; + p_surewarehk_Rand_Seed = NULL; + p_surewarehk_Load_Privkey = NULL; + p_surewarehk_Load_Rsa_Pubkey = NULL; + p_surewarehk_Free = NULL; + p_surewarehk_Rsa_Priv_Dec = NULL; + p_surewarehk_Rsa_Sign = NULL; + p_surewarehk_Dsa_Sign = NULL; + p_surewarehk_Info_Pubkey = NULL; + p_surewarehk_Load_Dsa_Pubkey = NULL; + p_surewarehk_Mod_Exp = NULL; + return 0; +} + +static int surewarehk_finish(ENGINE *e) +{ + int to_return = 1; + if (surewarehk_dso == NULL) { + SUREWAREerr(SUREWARE_F_SUREWAREHK_FINISH, ENGINE_R_NOT_LOADED); + to_return = 0; + goto err; + } + p_surewarehk_Finish(); + if (!DSO_free(surewarehk_dso)) { + SUREWAREerr(SUREWARE_F_SUREWAREHK_FINISH, ENGINE_R_DSO_FAILURE); + to_return = 0; + goto err; + } + err: + if (logstream) + BIO_free(logstream); + surewarehk_dso = NULL; + p_surewarehk_Init = NULL; + p_surewarehk_Finish = NULL; + p_surewarehk_Rand_Bytes = NULL; + p_surewarehk_Rand_Seed = NULL; + p_surewarehk_Load_Privkey = NULL; + p_surewarehk_Load_Rsa_Pubkey = NULL; + p_surewarehk_Free = NULL; + p_surewarehk_Rsa_Priv_Dec = NULL; + p_surewarehk_Rsa_Sign = NULL; + p_surewarehk_Dsa_Sign = NULL; + p_surewarehk_Info_Pubkey = NULL; + p_surewarehk_Load_Dsa_Pubkey = NULL; + p_surewarehk_Mod_Exp = NULL; + return to_return; +} + +static void surewarehk_error_handling(char *const msg, int func, int ret) +{ + switch (ret) { + case SUREWAREHOOK_ERROR_UNIT_FAILURE: + ENGINEerr(func, SUREWARE_R_UNIT_FAILURE); + break; + case SUREWAREHOOK_ERROR_FALLBACK: + ENGINEerr(func, SUREWARE_R_REQUEST_FALLBACK); + break; + case SUREWAREHOOK_ERROR_DATA_SIZE: + ENGINEerr(func, SUREWARE_R_SIZE_TOO_LARGE_OR_TOO_SMALL); + break; + case SUREWAREHOOK_ERROR_INVALID_PAD: + ENGINEerr(func, SUREWARE_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED); + break; + default: + ENGINEerr(func, SUREWARE_R_REQUEST_FAILED); + break; + case 1: /* nothing */ + msg[0] = '\0'; + } + if (*msg) { + ERR_add_error_data(1, msg); + if (logstream) { + CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_BIO); + BIO_write(logstream, msg, strlen(msg)); + CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_BIO); + } + } +} + +static int surewarehk_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num) +{ + int ret = 0; + char msg[64] = "ENGINE_rand_bytes"; + if (!p_surewarehk_Rand_Bytes) { + SUREWAREerr(SUREWARE_F_SUREWAREHK_RAND_BYTES, + ENGINE_R_NOT_INITIALISED); + } else { + ret = p_surewarehk_Rand_Bytes(msg, buf, num); + surewarehk_error_handling(msg, SUREWARE_F_SUREWAREHK_RAND_BYTES, ret); + } + return ret == 1 ? 1 : 0; +} + +static void surewarehk_rand_seed(const void *buf, int num) +{ + int ret = 0; + char msg[64] = "ENGINE_rand_seed"; + if (!p_surewarehk_Rand_Seed) { + SUREWAREerr(SUREWARE_F_SUREWAREHK_RAND_SEED, + ENGINE_R_NOT_INITIALISED); + } else { + ret = p_surewarehk_Rand_Seed(msg, buf, num); + surewarehk_error_handling(msg, SUREWARE_F_SUREWAREHK_RAND_SEED, ret); + } +} + +static void surewarehk_rand_add(const void *buf, int num, double entropy) +{ + surewarehk_rand_seed(buf, num); +} + +static EVP_PKEY *sureware_load_public(ENGINE *e, const char *key_id, + char *hptr, unsigned long el, + char keytype) +{ + EVP_PKEY *res = NULL; +# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA + RSA *rsatmp = NULL; +# endif +# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA + DSA *dsatmp = NULL; +# endif + char msg[64] = "sureware_load_public"; + int ret = 0; + if (!p_surewarehk_Load_Rsa_Pubkey || !p_surewarehk_Load_Dsa_Pubkey) { + SUREWAREerr(SUREWARE_F_SUREWARE_LOAD_PUBLIC, + ENGINE_R_NOT_INITIALISED); + goto err; + } + switch (keytype) { +# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA + case 1: + /*RSA*/ + /* set private external reference */ + rsatmp = RSA_new_method(e); + RSA_set_ex_data(rsatmp, rsaHndidx, hptr); + rsatmp->flags |= RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY; + + /* set public big nums */ + rsatmp->e = BN_new(); + rsatmp->n = BN_new(); + if(!rsatmp->e || !rsatmp->n) + goto err; + bn_expand2(rsatmp->e, el / sizeof(BN_ULONG)); + bn_expand2(rsatmp->n, el / sizeof(BN_ULONG)); + if (rsatmp->e->dmax != (int)(el / sizeof(BN_ULONG)) || + rsatmp->n->dmax != (int)(el / sizeof(BN_ULONG))) + goto err; + ret = p_surewarehk_Load_Rsa_Pubkey(msg, key_id, el, + (unsigned long *)rsatmp->n->d, + (unsigned long *)rsatmp->e->d); + surewarehk_error_handling(msg, SUREWARE_F_SUREWARE_LOAD_PUBLIC, ret); + if (ret != 1) { + SUREWAREerr(SUREWARE_F_SUREWARE_LOAD_PUBLIC, + ENGINE_R_FAILED_LOADING_PUBLIC_KEY); + goto err; + } + /* normalise pub e and pub n */ + rsatmp->e->top = el / sizeof(BN_ULONG); + bn_fix_top(rsatmp->e); + rsatmp->n->top = el / sizeof(BN_ULONG); + bn_fix_top(rsatmp->n); + /* create an EVP object: engine + rsa key */ + res = EVP_PKEY_new(); + EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA(res, rsatmp); + break; +# endif + +# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA + case 2: + /*DSA*/ + /* set private/public external reference */ + dsatmp = DSA_new_method(e); + DSA_set_ex_data(dsatmp, dsaHndidx, hptr); + /* + * dsatmp->flags |= DSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY; + */ + + /* set public key */ + dsatmp->pub_key = BN_new(); + dsatmp->p = BN_new(); + dsatmp->q = BN_new(); + dsatmp->g = BN_new(); + if(!dsatmp->pub_key || !dsatmp->p || !dsatmp->q || !dsatmp->g) + goto err; + bn_expand2(dsatmp->pub_key, el / sizeof(BN_ULONG)); + bn_expand2(dsatmp->p, el / sizeof(BN_ULONG)); + bn_expand2(dsatmp->q, 20 / sizeof(BN_ULONG)); + bn_expand2(dsatmp->g, el / sizeof(BN_ULONG)); + if (dsatmp->pub_key->dmax != (int)(el / sizeof(BN_ULONG)) + || dsatmp->p->dmax != (int)(el / sizeof(BN_ULONG)) + || dsatmp->q->dmax != 20 / sizeof(BN_ULONG) + || dsatmp->g->dmax != (int)(el / sizeof(BN_ULONG))) + goto err; + + ret = p_surewarehk_Load_Dsa_Pubkey(msg, key_id, el, + (unsigned long *)dsatmp-> + pub_key->d, + (unsigned long *)dsatmp->p->d, + (unsigned long *)dsatmp->q->d, + (unsigned long *)dsatmp->g->d); + surewarehk_error_handling(msg, SUREWARE_F_SUREWARE_LOAD_PUBLIC, ret); + if (ret != 1) { + SUREWAREerr(SUREWARE_F_SUREWARE_LOAD_PUBLIC, + ENGINE_R_FAILED_LOADING_PUBLIC_KEY); + goto err; + } + /* set parameters */ + /* normalise pubkey and parameters in case of */ + dsatmp->pub_key->top = el / sizeof(BN_ULONG); + bn_fix_top(dsatmp->pub_key); + dsatmp->p->top = el / sizeof(BN_ULONG); + bn_fix_top(dsatmp->p); + dsatmp->q->top = 20 / sizeof(BN_ULONG); + bn_fix_top(dsatmp->q); + dsatmp->g->top = el / sizeof(BN_ULONG); + bn_fix_top(dsatmp->g); + + /* create an EVP object: engine + rsa key */ + res = EVP_PKEY_new(); + EVP_PKEY_assign_DSA(res, dsatmp); + break; +# endif + + default: + SUREWAREerr(SUREWARE_F_SUREWARE_LOAD_PUBLIC, + ENGINE_R_FAILED_LOADING_PRIVATE_KEY); + goto err; + } + return res; + err: +# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA + if (rsatmp) + RSA_free(rsatmp); +# endif +# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA + if (dsatmp) + DSA_free(dsatmp); +# endif + return NULL; +} + +static EVP_PKEY *surewarehk_load_privkey(ENGINE *e, const char *key_id, + UI_METHOD *ui_method, + void *callback_data) +{ + EVP_PKEY *res = NULL; + int ret = 0; + unsigned long el = 0; + char *hptr = NULL; + char keytype = 0; + char msg[64] = "ENGINE_load_privkey"; + + if (!p_surewarehk_Load_Privkey) { + SUREWAREerr(SUREWARE_F_SUREWAREHK_LOAD_PRIVKEY, + ENGINE_R_NOT_INITIALISED); + } else { + ret = p_surewarehk_Load_Privkey(msg, key_id, &hptr, &el, &keytype); + if (ret != 1) { + SUREWAREerr(SUREWARE_F_SUREWAREHK_LOAD_PRIVKEY, + ENGINE_R_FAILED_LOADING_PRIVATE_KEY); + ERR_add_error_data(1, msg); + } else + res = sureware_load_public(e, key_id, hptr, el, keytype); + } + return res; +} + +static EVP_PKEY *surewarehk_load_pubkey(ENGINE *e, const char *key_id, + UI_METHOD *ui_method, + void *callback_data) +{ + EVP_PKEY *res = NULL; + int ret = 0; + unsigned long el = 0; + char *hptr = NULL; + char keytype = 0; + char msg[64] = "ENGINE_load_pubkey"; + + if (!p_surewarehk_Info_Pubkey) { + SUREWAREerr(SUREWARE_F_SUREWAREHK_LOAD_PUBKEY, + ENGINE_R_NOT_INITIALISED); + } else { + /* call once to identify if DSA or RSA */ + ret = p_surewarehk_Info_Pubkey(msg, key_id, &el, &keytype); + if (ret != 1) { + SUREWAREerr(SUREWARE_F_SUREWAREHK_LOAD_PUBKEY, + ENGINE_R_FAILED_LOADING_PUBLIC_KEY); + ERR_add_error_data(1, msg); + } else + res = sureware_load_public(e, key_id, hptr, el, keytype); + } + return res; +} + +/* + * This cleans up an RSA/DSA KM key(do not destroy the key into the hardware) + * , called when ex_data is freed + */ +static void surewarehk_ex_free(void *obj, void *item, CRYPTO_EX_DATA *ad, + int idx, long argl, void *argp) +{ + if (!p_surewarehk_Free) { + SUREWAREerr(SUREWARE_F_SUREWAREHK_EX_FREE, ENGINE_R_NOT_INITIALISED); + } else + p_surewarehk_Free((char *)item, 0); +} + +# if 0 +/* not currently used (bug?) */ +/* + * This cleans up an DH KM key (destroys the key into hardware), called when + * ex_data is freed + */ +static void surewarehk_dh_ex_free(void *obj, void *item, CRYPTO_EX_DATA *ad, + int idx, long argl, void *argp) +{ + if (!p_surewarehk_Free) { + SUREWAREerr(SUREWARE_F_SUREWAREHK_DH_EX_FREE, + ENGINE_R_NOT_INITIALISED); + } else + p_surewarehk_Free((char *)item, 1); +} +# endif + +/* + * return number of decrypted bytes + */ +# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA +static int surewarehk_rsa_priv_dec(int flen, const unsigned char *from, + unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding) +{ + int ret = 0, tlen; + char *buf = NULL, *hptr = NULL; + char msg[64] = "ENGINE_rsa_priv_dec"; + if (!p_surewarehk_Rsa_Priv_Dec) { + SUREWAREerr(SUREWARE_F_SUREWAREHK_RSA_PRIV_DEC, + ENGINE_R_NOT_INITIALISED); + } + /* extract ref to private key */ + else if (!(hptr = RSA_get_ex_data(rsa, rsaHndidx))) { + SUREWAREerr(SUREWARE_F_SUREWAREHK_RSA_PRIV_DEC, + SUREWARE_R_MISSING_KEY_COMPONENTS); + goto err; + } + /* analyse what padding we can do into the hardware */ + if (padding == RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) { + /* do it one shot */ + ret = + p_surewarehk_Rsa_Priv_Dec(msg, flen, (unsigned char *)from, &tlen, + to, hptr, SUREWARE_PKCS1_PAD); + surewarehk_error_handling(msg, SUREWARE_F_SUREWAREHK_RSA_PRIV_DEC, + ret); + if (ret != 1) + goto err; + ret = tlen; + } else { /* do with no padding into hardware */ + + ret = + p_surewarehk_Rsa_Priv_Dec(msg, flen, (unsigned char *)from, &tlen, + to, hptr, SUREWARE_NO_PAD); + surewarehk_error_handling(msg, SUREWARE_F_SUREWAREHK_RSA_PRIV_DEC, + ret); + if (ret != 1) + goto err; + /* intermediate buffer for padding */ + if ((buf = OPENSSL_malloc(tlen)) == NULL) { + SUREWAREerr(SUREWARE_F_SUREWAREHK_RSA_PRIV_DEC, + ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + memcpy(buf, to, tlen); /* transfert to into buf */ + switch (padding) { /* check padding in software */ +# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA + case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING: + ret = + RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP(to, tlen, (unsigned char *)buf, + tlen, tlen, NULL, 0); + break; +# endif + case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING: + ret = + RSA_padding_check_SSLv23(to, tlen, (unsigned char *)buf, flen, + tlen); + break; + case RSA_NO_PADDING: + ret = + RSA_padding_check_none(to, tlen, (unsigned char *)buf, flen, + tlen); + break; + default: + SUREWAREerr(SUREWARE_F_SUREWAREHK_RSA_PRIV_DEC, + SUREWARE_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE); + goto err; + } + if (ret < 0) + SUREWAREerr(SUREWARE_F_SUREWAREHK_RSA_PRIV_DEC, + SUREWARE_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED); + } + err: + if (buf) { + OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, tlen); + OPENSSL_free(buf); + } + return ret; +} + +/* + * Does what OpenSSL rsa_priv_enc does. + */ +static int surewarehk_rsa_sign(int flen, const unsigned char *from, + unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding) +{ + int ret = 0, tlen; + char *hptr = NULL; + char msg[64] = "ENGINE_rsa_sign"; + if (!p_surewarehk_Rsa_Sign) { + SUREWAREerr(SUREWARE_F_SUREWAREHK_RSA_SIGN, ENGINE_R_NOT_INITIALISED); + } + /* extract ref to private key */ + else if (!(hptr = RSA_get_ex_data(rsa, rsaHndidx))) { + SUREWAREerr(SUREWARE_F_SUREWAREHK_RSA_SIGN, + SUREWARE_R_MISSING_KEY_COMPONENTS); + } else { + switch (padding) { + case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING: /* do it in one shot */ + ret = + p_surewarehk_Rsa_Sign(msg, flen, (unsigned char *)from, &tlen, + to, hptr, SUREWARE_PKCS1_PAD); + surewarehk_error_handling(msg, SUREWARE_F_SUREWAREHK_RSA_SIGN, + ret); + break; + case RSA_NO_PADDING: + default: + SUREWAREerr(SUREWARE_F_SUREWAREHK_RSA_SIGN, + SUREWARE_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE); + } + } + return ret == 1 ? tlen : ret; +} + +# endif + +# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA +/* DSA sign and verify */ +static DSA_SIG *surewarehk_dsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *from, int flen, + DSA *dsa) +{ + int ret = 0; + char *hptr = NULL; + DSA_SIG *psign = NULL; + char msg[64] = "ENGINE_dsa_do_sign"; + if (!p_surewarehk_Dsa_Sign) { + SUREWAREerr(SUREWARE_F_SUREWAREHK_DSA_DO_SIGN, + ENGINE_R_NOT_INITIALISED); + goto err; + } + /* extract ref to private key */ + else if (!(hptr = DSA_get_ex_data(dsa, dsaHndidx))) { + SUREWAREerr(SUREWARE_F_SUREWAREHK_DSA_DO_SIGN, + SUREWARE_R_MISSING_KEY_COMPONENTS); + goto err; + } else { + if ((psign = DSA_SIG_new()) == NULL) { + SUREWAREerr(SUREWARE_F_SUREWAREHK_DSA_DO_SIGN, + ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + psign->r = BN_new(); + psign->s = BN_new(); + if(!psign->r || !psign->s) + goto err; + bn_expand2(psign->r, 20 / sizeof(BN_ULONG)); + bn_expand2(psign->s, 20 / sizeof(BN_ULONG)); + if (psign->r->dmax != 20 / sizeof(BN_ULONG) || + psign->s->dmax != 20 / sizeof(BN_ULONG)) + goto err; + ret = p_surewarehk_Dsa_Sign(msg, flen, from, + (unsigned long *)psign->r->d, + (unsigned long *)psign->s->d, hptr); + surewarehk_error_handling(msg, SUREWARE_F_SUREWAREHK_DSA_DO_SIGN, + ret); + } + psign->r->top = 20 / sizeof(BN_ULONG); + bn_fix_top(psign->r); + psign->s->top = 20 / sizeof(BN_ULONG); + bn_fix_top(psign->s); + + err: + if (psign) { + DSA_SIG_free(psign); + psign = NULL; + } + return psign; +} +# endif + +static int surewarehk_modexp(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, + const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx) +{ + int ret = 0; + char msg[64] = "ENGINE_modexp"; + if (!p_surewarehk_Mod_Exp) { + SUREWAREerr(SUREWARE_F_SUREWAREHK_MODEXP, ENGINE_R_NOT_INITIALISED); + } else if (r) { + bn_expand2(r, m->top); + if (r->dmax == m->top) { + /* do it */ + ret = p_surewarehk_Mod_Exp(msg, + m->top * sizeof(BN_ULONG), + (unsigned long *)m->d, + p->top * sizeof(BN_ULONG), + (unsigned long *)p->d, + a->top * sizeof(BN_ULONG), + (unsigned long *)a->d, + (unsigned long *)r->d); + surewarehk_error_handling(msg, SUREWARE_F_SUREWAREHK_MODEXP, ret); + if (ret == 1) { + /* normalise result */ + r->top = m->top; + bn_fix_top(r); + } + } + } + return ret; +} +# endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_HW_SureWare */ +#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_HW */ |