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-rw-r--r--unix/tkUnixSend.c80
1 files changed, 50 insertions, 30 deletions
diff --git a/unix/tkUnixSend.c b/unix/tkUnixSend.c
index 1c8c67c..711315a 100644
--- a/unix/tkUnixSend.c
+++ b/unix/tkUnixSend.c
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@
* See the file "license.terms" for information on usage and redistribution of
* this file, and for a DISCLAIMER OF ALL WARRANTIES.
*
- * RCS: @(#) $Id: tkUnixSend.c,v 1.20.2.1 2009/08/25 08:48:16 dkf Exp $
+ * RCS: @(#) $Id: tkUnixSend.c,v 1.20.2.2 2009/12/20 23:16:30 dkf Exp $
*/
#include "tkUnixInt.h"
@@ -679,54 +679,74 @@ ServerSecure(
int numHosts, secure;
Bool enabled;
- secure = 0;
addrPtr = XListHosts(dispPtr->display, &numHosts, &enabled);
- if (enabled) {
- if (numHosts == 0) {
- secure = 1;
- }
-
+ if (!enabled) {
+ insecure:
+ secure = 0;
+ } else if (numHosts == 0) {
+ secure = 1;
+ } else {
/*
* Recent versions of X11 have the extra feature of allowing more
* sophisticated authorization checks to be performed than the dozy
* old ones that used to plague xhost usage. However, not all deployed
* versions of Xlib know how to deal with this feature, so this code
* is conditional on having the right #def in place. [Bug 1909931]
+ *
+ * Note that at this point we know that there's at least one entry in
+ * the list returned by XListHosts. However there may be multiple
+ * entries; as long as each is one of either 'SI:localhost:*' or
+ * 'SI:localgroup:*' then we will claim to be secure enough.
*/
#ifdef FamilyServerInterpreted
- if (numHosts == 1 && addrPtr[0].family == FamilyServerInterpreted) {
- XServerInterpretedAddress *siPtr =
- (XServerInterpretedAddress *) addrPtr[0].address;
-
- if (siPtr->typelength==9 && !memcmp(siPtr->type,"localuser",9)) {
- /*
- * We don't check the username here. This is because it's
- * officially non-portable and we are just making sure there
- * aren't silly misconfigurations. (Apparently 'root' is not a
- * very good choice, but we still don't put any effort in to
- * spot that.)
- */
+ XServerInterpretedAddress *siPtr;
+ int i;
- secure = 1;
- } else if (siPtr->typelength == 10
- && !memcmp(siPtr->type, "localgroup", 10)) {
+ for (i=0 ; i<numHosts ; i++) {
+ if (addrPtr[i].family != FamilyServerInterpreted) {
/*
- * Similarly to above, we don't attempt to peek inside server
- * interpreted group names. If someone set it, it's what they
- * want and we assume it's OK.
+ * We don't understand what the X server is letting in, so we
+ * err on the side of safety.
*/
- secure = 1;
+ goto insecure;
}
+ siPtr = (XServerInterpretedAddress *) addrPtr[0].address;
/*
- * The other defined types of server-interpreted controls involve
- * particular hosts; these are still insecure for the same reasons
- * that classic xhost access is insecure.
+ * We don't check the username or group here. This is because it's
+ * officially non-portable and we are just making sure there
+ * aren't silly misconfigurations. (Apparently 'root' is not a
+ * very good choice, but we still don't put any effort in to spot
+ * that.) However we do check to see that the constraints are
+ * imposed against the connecting user and/or group.
*/
+
+ if ( !(siPtr->typelength == 9 /* ==strlen("localuser") */
+ && !memcmp(siPtr->type, "localuser", 9))
+ && !(siPtr->typelength == 10 /* ==strlen("localgroup") */
+ && !memcmp(siPtr->type, "localgroup", 10))) {
+ /*
+ * The other defined types of server-interpreted controls
+ * involve particular hosts. These are still insecure for the
+ * same reasons that classic xhost access is insecure; there's
+ * just no way to be sure that the users on those systems are
+ * the ones who should be allowed to connect to this display.
+ */
+
+ goto insecure;
+ }
}
-#endif
+ secure = 1;
+#else
+ /*
+ * We don't understand what the X server is letting in, so we err on
+ * the side of safety.
+ */
+
+ goto insecure;
+#endif /* FamilyServerInterpreted */
}
if (addrPtr != NULL) {
XFree((char *) addrPtr);